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Preface
We are undoubtedly witnessing a continuously changing interpolar setting, which 
makes us to be even more cautious with what we know about the international sys-
tem, its actors, their relations, future positions and possible roles. We certainly face 
abundant challenges, – and surely – opportunities, together with a growing number 
of insecurities, to which proper answers are to be articulated. In a number of cases 
individual responses are not plausible (basically impossible), yet, in almost all cases 
– in addition to joint/common positions – single national or sub-national (e.g. on the 
level of a city/county) reactions are expected. The European Union cannot escape 
from becoming a ‘real’ global actor so that it can safeguard the community of values 
that are dear to hundreds of millions (and even more) people in Europe and beyond. 
In particular, when ongoing crises – such as the one in Ukraine – challenge the many 
plans and policies the members of the Union have constructed since the foundation 
stones were laid down in 1957. In a time of rising Euroscepticism, it is even more 
adequate to ask: which direction(s) to take for a more coherent community and a 
firmer global actorness on the world stage, while coping with and accommodating 
diverging national views and interests?
The present volume addresses many challenges the European Union faces as we 
soon enter the second half of the second decade of the twenty-first century. These 
historic times have been attributed many names and characteristics such as the 
“post-American world” (Zakaria), an “interpolar world” (Grevi), a “uni-mutipolar 
world” (Huntington), or the rise and fall of “Chimerica” (Ferguson), but more and 
more markedly, the “The Next Big Thing: Africa” (Moyo). It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the EU – having been struggling with its own internal challenges (and 
reforms) for a long time – needs to tackle a large pool of heated questions on identity, 
citizenship, democratic deficit, territorial cohesion, regional policy, gender issues, 
foreign policies and partnerships, or multi-level governance, as a matter of fact. 
All these are discussed in this book with the intention to present fresh arguments, 
contribute to sophisticated new debates and help the efforts of predominantly terti-
ary education by offering the volume as an educational tool for all those teaching 
EU-, EU integration-related courses, and naturally, also those taking such modules as 
students majoring in EU Studies, International Relations, Political Science, History, 
and many more social science domains.
With the grant support of the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme (Project reference 
number: 529548-LLP-1-2012-1-HU-AJM-PO), we are glad to present this new e-book, 
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which hopefully will serve the good purpose of teaching and fostering further 
research on EU- and European integration-related topics. Our Jean Monnet Centre 
of Excellence is grateful that experts from Romania, Poland, Italy and Hungary re-
sponded to our open call and have contributed to high-quality research papers. The 
selected and peer-reviewed 18 papers are edited in three sections in the first part of 
the book devoted to ‘Studies’. Section I. contains five studies about mainly territorial 
problems analysed from different economic, political and international perspectives. 
Section II. with its five papers tackle questions connected with civil society, demo-
cratic transition and economic transformation via the case of Hungary. Section III. 
finally collects eight papers about foreign policy, agricultural policy, global roles, 
Eastern Partnership, EU–Latin-America relations, as well as governance questions. 
The peculiarity of this section is that it intentionally multi-lingual and hosts scholarly 
contributions in Spanish and French, too. The second part of the e-book (‘Documents’) 
lists several useful basic texts about the past, the present and the (possible) future of 
Europe and the European Union. This collection is based upon open-access sources 
on the Internet carefully selected for the sake of supplementing teaching activities at 
institutions of higher education. Four sections contain over sixty pieces about major 
“Ideas of Europe”, the “Council of Europe”, “The European Community”, and “The 
European Union”.
The volume’s title “European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges. How 
‘Borderless’ Is Europe?” also wishes to resemble the many disciplines, views and ar-
guments our authors represent. With such a multi-coloured approach we also intend 
to address the many aspects, unique territorial features, common struggles, as well 
as institutional and geographical ‘openness’ of our ‘Borderless Europe’.
We wish all our readers that they find the volume a useful compilation and an 
enjoyable reading.
Pécs, June 2014    
       The Editors
I. Studies

Section I. 
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Territory Matters – 
Re-Territorialized Identities in the Common Europe1 
Boglárka Koller2
Abstract
The last decade of the European integration can be labelled as the decade of iden-
tity crisis of the European Union itself. It seems that the vision of a common Europe 
created by the founding fathers is fading away, as new fragmentation lines are ap-
pearing in the integration process. A growing number of European citizens feel that 
the European Union is only providing answers to the not-so-relevant issues of their 
lives and fails to deal with the salient ones; those that mostly affect the every-days of 
individuals. Europe is not close enough to its citizens. Although the European Union 
has been making great efforts since the 1970s to establish a strong link between the 
supranational political community and its citizens, i.e. establish a European identity, 
approximately 40 per cent of the overall EU population does not identify with the 
common Europe at any level and has solely national identities.3 Moreover, as the 
Eurobarometer survey results suggest, the overall support for European integration 
has been continuously falling since the new millennium.4 Thus, it seems that the mes-
sages of the common Europe have not reached many of the EU citizens. 
Parallel to this, there has been another major development. The local and regional 
communities are gaining more importance in the EU. As a result of this, the EU citi-
zens’ attachment to the cities and regions have been continuously strengthened. An 
intensified focus on territoriality can be also detected in the EU documents. The Lis-
bon Treaty codified territorial cohesion as the third cohesion objective of the Union 
along the already existing economic and social ones. Why is territorial cohesion so 
crucial for forming collective identities in the European Union? What could be the 
consequences of re-territorialisation on the identities of European citizens? Would 
these new tendencies lead to more unity or further fragmentation at the EU level?
1 This paper is a synthesis and summary of the previously published book chapters and 
research papers on identity issues of the author. See Koller, 2006, 2010a, 2011b,c,d, 2012, 
2013.
2 PhD, Associate Professor, King Sigismund Business School. koller.boglarka@zskf.hu
3 See Eurobarometer 17-77
4 Eurobarometer 79
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To answer these questions, the first section of the paper provides a brief overview 
of the evolution of the territorial approach in the EU documents. Then in the second 
part, the multiple models of identities are introduced for describing the diverse and 
plural nature of collective attachments in contemporary Europe. The underlying 
theoretical assumption of the paper is that identity formation is both a construction 
and an “ongoing socialization process” by which actors continuously internalize the 
values and norms of the community and acquire new loyalties (Risse, 2004: 3). Further, 
the paper expands upon the novel developments of territorialisation of identities. It 
is argued that sub-national territorialisation can provide the required closeness to 
the individuals in identity-building and therefore can foster bottom-up processes. 
Finally, the boundary issues of the re-territorialisation processes are examined, with 
special respect to the newly emerged functional macro-regions in Europe. 
Territorial dimension in the EU documents
While the objective of establishing a greater level of cohesion and a more harmoni-
ous development in Europe is far from being new – it was already declared in the 
Rome Treaty in 1957 – the meaning of cohesion underwent a considerable evolution 
in the Union. While for a long time, the economic and social aspects were emphasized, 
currently, a third dimension has been added to the original “twins”: the territorial 
cohesion. In fact territorial cohesion became the new magic word in European inte-
gration. Nevertheless, the definitions provided for territorial cohesion remain rather 
vague and uncertain. According to the European Commission’s Green Paper, “territo-
rial cohesion highlights the need for an integrated approach to addressing problems 
on an appropriate geographical scale which may require local, regional, and even 
national authorities to cooperate”. The Green Paper, however, left open the question 
on the role of the EU in promoting territorial cohesion (Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion, 2008: 12). A widened concept of cohesion appears in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Article 174 of the Treaty named territorial cohesion as the third cohesion objective of 
the Union and codified the triple goals of cohesion (economic, social, and territorial) 
in the Treaty, declaring that “the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading 
to the strengthening of its economic, social, and territorial cohesion. In particular, 
the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of 
the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions. Among the 
regions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected by 
industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural 
or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low popula-
tion densities, and island, cross-border, and mountain regions.” Fabricio Barca in his 
independent report, instead of using the term “territorial” uses another word, i.e. 
“place-based” to highlight the new overarching approach of his suggested strategy. 
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that he is using it interchangeably with the term “ter-
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ritorial”. Barca lays emphasis on providing a clear definition of his term. First, he 
defines place not only as a geographical entity but “as a social concept, a contiguous/
continuous area within whose boundaries a set of conditions conducive to develop-
ment apply more than they do across boundaries (i.e. relative to other places): natural 
and cultural circumstances and the preferences of people are more homogeneous or 
complementary, the knowledge of people is more synergetic, and positive externali-
ties and formal and informal institutions are more likely to arise. The boundaries of 
places are thus independent of administrative boundaries, endogenous to the policy 
process and can change over time” (Barca Report, 2009: 5). The continuity to define 
place-based development as a strategy that simultaneously creates economic and 
social cohesion should be interpreted as a catalyst for achieving the other two objec-
tives: “A place-based development policy can be defined as: a long-term development 
strategy whose objective is to reduce persistent inefficiency (under-utilisation of the 
full potential) and inequality (share of people below a given standard of well-being 
and/or extent of interpersonal disparities) in specific places, through the produc-
tion of bundles of integrated, place-tailored public goods and services, designed and 
implemented by eliciting and aggregating local preferences and knowledge through 
participatory political institutions, and by establishing linkages with other places; 
and promoted from outside the place by a system of multilevel governance where 
grants subject to conditionalities on both objectives and institutions are transferred 
from higher to lower levels of government.” (Ibid) The 5th Cohesion Report provided 
a much narrower definition of territorial cohesion than the Barca Report. Neverthe-
less, later it is also highlighted in the text that the territorial approach indicates a 
more integrated way of policy making that “implies a need for the different levels of 
government, local and regional as well as national and EU level, to work together to 
ensure consistency between policies” (5th Cohesion Report, 2010: 201)
While the definitions provided above are far from being consistent, it seems that 
the newly declared treaty goal, i.e. territorial cohesion is both a catalyst for increas-
ing economic and social cohesion and a standalone objective of the Union. This was 
confirmed by the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Territorial Cohesion in 2011, where 
the member states’ ministers agreed that the territorial approach can ensure that 
the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Cohesion Policy, and other sectoral policies mutually 
contribute to each other’s aims.5 
5 At the same venue, the ministers agreed on the Territorial Agenda of the European Union 
2020 (TA2020) and declared the six territorial priorities for the European Union as “pro-
moting polycentric and balanced territorial development (1), encouraging integrated devel-
opment in cities, rural and specific regions (2),  territorial integration in cross-border and 
transnational functional regions (3), ensuring the global competitiveness of regions based 
on strong local economies (4),  improving territorial connectivity for individuals, communi-
ties and enterprises (5), managing and connecting the ecological, landscape and cultural 
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But how would the new territorial agenda affect the collective identities of the 
European citizens? How can the new territorial approach be interpreted from the 
identity point of view?
Territorial identities – theoretical considerations
By definition, identity means the self-understanding of the individual, encompassing 
both self and collective elements. Identity is not a static category; it is a dynamically 
changing element of our existence, which continuously gains new interpretations in 
our lifetime. Another important feature of collective identities is its distinguishing 
character in relation to other individuals and groups. In order to define who we are we 
have to define who we are not. While we are forming our identities we continuously 
differentiate the category of “us” from “them” (Koller, 2006; Pataki, 1986; Moore and 
Kimmerling, 1995). 
Theorists dealing with collective identities all agree that territory is an important 
component among the identity elements of the individuals, however, what territory 
means is understood differently by the various authors (See Kaiser, 2009). For a long 
time, territory in collective identification referred to the territory of the nation. One 
of the most often referred to definition for national identity also highlights the role of 
“a historic territory or homeland” and continues to include “the common myths and 
historical memories; a common mass public culture; common legal rights and duties 
for all members; a common economy with territorial mobility for members” (Smith, 
1991: 14). In Smith’s definition, apart from the existence of the geographical entity, the 
legal and economic systems as well as the common culture and individual mobility 
are included.
While there is a strong linkage of the collective identity and territory in Europe, 
the nature and intensity of this linkage varies in case of the different communities 
and in various periods of history. As one author points out, “human societies neces-
sarily occupy space and almost always use their territorial location as a foundation 
for their social identity. But this relationship between space and identity, which is at 
the heart of the “national question”, varies from group to group and over historical 
time” (Voutat, 2000: 293). For example, national homeland is an essential component 
of national identity, a well-defined territory, however, was not an option for many 
European nations for a long a time in their history. These nations had to find other 
ways of forming their identities, and defining their communities along ethnic and 
cultural traits.  In fact, there were two different nation-building models in Europe: 
the territorial and the ethnic/cultural. In the territorial model, the membership in 
the community is linked to a certain territory; the rights and duties are determined 
values of regions (6)”. See Summary of the work of the Hungarian Presidency. Cohesion 
Policy. 2011. http://www.eu2011.hu/files/bveu/documents/Summary_HU_PRES_160603_
full_FINAL.pdf
Territory – Identity – Integration | 21 
St
u
d
ie
s
by the legal and institutional system. France between 1789 and 1794 can be named 
as an example for this model. However, as Napoleon’s conquests began, the French 
nation-state started to redefine itself. The territorial state’s identity formation meth-
ods were extended by cultural and linguistic tools (Brubaker, 1992).6 In Central and 
Eastern Europe, however, the birth of a universal citizenship concept was preceded 
by the birth of a national identity which was defined by ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
boundaries of the community and due the lack of unequivocally defined territorial 
boundaries was not tied to a certain territory. The territorial concept of the nation 
was born at a later stage in these nations. (Meinecke, 1969; Kohn, 1955; Smith, 1986) 
Apart from national identity, what kind of other geographical attachments could 
individuals have? There is an agreement among theorists, that collective identities 
of individuals today can only be imagined as a multi-level structure. For individuals, 
the immediate vicinity, the city, the town or the village where they live, the region, 
the county, the nation, the European Union, and even the global sphere all signify 
one of their territorial attachments. Although the majority of theorists accept the 
concept of multiple identities, they differ in understanding its content. As Salazar 
claims, for example, aside from the most important national identity there are other 
“nation-related identities” such as “regionalism”, “stateless nationalism” and “supra-
nationalism”, which constitute concentric circles of identities or, as he calls it after 
the Russian wooden doll, the “matryoshka of identities” (Salazar, 1998). For him, 
there is a hierarchy between allegiances, and the national identity is at the top of 
other identifications. Smith, talking about collective identities, emphasises that these 
are “pervasive and persistent” and can be “situational”, but not completely “optional”. 
Therefore, “national identification possesses distinct advantages over the idea of 
a unified European identity” (Smith, 1997: 322-325). The Hungarian writer, Konrád 
argues that currently individuals can freely choose among their attachments. He 
sees an analogy between the multi-layers of identities and a “many-storey house” 
and argues that the individual’s mind can as easily shift from one identity to another 
as we can visit different floors in a building (Konrád, 1997). The self-understanding 
of Europeans can be also described by the so-called identity-net model (Koller, 2006) 
which not only indicates the dynamic co-existence of individuals’ various geographic 
attachments, but also includes the time dimension. It can be imagined as a net made 
from Christmas tree lights. Applying the functionalist approach, individuals regu-
larly decide which aspect or junction of their identity-net they activate in their eve-
ryday lives. The lights at the junction points of the net light up alternatively. It may 
be that they shed more or less intense light in different time periods. It may also be 
6 Eugen Weber emphasized this change in his “Peasants into Frenchman” (Weber, 1979) book 
and pointed out that France started to apply a wide range of cultural tools in order to form 
good French citizens from peasants.
22 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
that either many of them or only a few are sparkling. Individuals are also capable of 
changing their collective attachments regularly as well as their respective ranking 
and intensity. 
Finally, it should be asked how collective identities are formed. Here, the much-
quoted ethno-symbolist and constructivist debate of nations and nationalism dis-
course, as well as the theories on the social identity formation should be referred to. 
Ethno-symbolists argue that a common ethnic past, myths, and symbols rooted in a 
shared history are necessary for successful nation-building, and through the popu-
lar memory these elements form the identities of individuals. Therefore, without a 
common ethnic past, identity formation cannot be successful (Smith, 1986 and Arm-
strong, 1982). For constructivists, as opposed to ethno-symbolists, national identity 
is “an intellectual artefact”. Symbols and traditions are young creations. In the 19th 
century, due to the pursuits of the nation-building elites “entirely new symbols and 
devices came into existence: national anthem, national flag, personification of the 
nation”, etc. (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). There are many structures in politics and 
society that were first constructed by the leading elites and later became accepted 
and admired by the majority of the population.7 Moreover, with the tools of mass 
media and communication, construction of identities has become easier and faster. 
It is enough to think about the diversity of communities in which we can obtain “im-
agined” memberships (Anderson, 1991: 6). As Anderson rightly argues, the national 
intelligentsia had a key role in this process. In the 19th century, the producers of the 
print market, “the lexicographers, philologists, grammarians, folklorists, publicists, 
and composers” glittered ancient histories and depicted “golden ages” of history 
which became available for “the consuming public” and thus the nation became an 
imagined community (Ibid, 71-75). Today, reporters, editors and Internet bloggers are 
in a similar role. To sum up, both the ethno-symbolist and the constructivist theories 
could be relevant in explaining the processes of identity formation, but they approach 
it from two opposing angles. Smith rightly claims that construction could be effective 
in some cases and not in others, and Hobsbawm and Ranger also rightly argue that 
national elites had a key role in constructing our identities. Thus, the establishment 
of collective identities in contemporary Europe should be looked at as not only a 
construct, but also as an outcome of a socialisation process. On the one hand, it is 
a top-down process. Local, regional, national, and European elites, for the sake of 
establishing a legitimised community (national or European), try to construct the 
symbolic and structural elements of common identification. On the other hand, it is 
not a mere construction, new identities are continuously formed as individuals adapt 
7 For example, the existence of the greatest French national holiday is due to the choice of the 
elite of the time too. The republican delegates selected 14 July in 1880 to be the national 
holiday of France. Revolutionary days of 1830, 1848, 1870 were also options, but finally the 
delegates choose the day of demolishing the Bastille (See Nora, 1996:119)
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the values and norms of the communities in which they live and in this way acquire 
new attachments.
Re-birth of sub-national identities in Europe
For a long time the prevalent opinion was held that due to the effects of economic glo-
balisation and the transferred sovereignties in the European Union the boundaries 
of the nation-states are fading away, and their role is going to be taken over by the 
boundaries of a supranational community, i.e. the European Union. Today it seems 
that apart from the still distinguished role of the national homeland (Dombrowski 
and Rice, 2000), local and regional communities are gaining more importance in the 
integration process. Signs of “re-territorialisation” of collective identities within 
Europe can be detected. Nonetheless, this re-territorialisation of collective identi-
ties happens not at the member-state’s level, but at the sub-national levels, e.g. at the 
cities’ and regions’ levels. Moreno also gets to this conclusion: there is “a growing 
attachment of citizens to communities at local and meso-level [...], particularly in 
Europe” (Moreno, 1999: 61).
Due to the fulfilment of the Regional Policy, the cities and the regions have gained 
a greater role in the common Europe and have been recognised as key players in the 
European governance structure since the 1980s. While the EC was seeking to estab-
lish a direct link between the regions and the supranational community in order to 
counterbalance the member-states’ interests and to strengthen the local involvement 
in the project of the common Europe, the urban and regional elites viewed Euro-
peanization as an opportunity to mobilize their regional agendas and strengthen 
themselves as a community in a bigger political space as opposed to only be identified 
within the nation-states’ boundaries.8 Due to this, there has been an emergence of 
sub-state nationalism Europe-wide. The example of Basque nationalism can be men-
tioned here that has been always defined on the basis of a strong territorial claim for 
the historical homeland (Zabalo, 2008; Bollens, 2008: 189). In the Basque cities, urban 
leaders recognised the opportunity of linking their nationalism to a wider European 
space, and managed to produce an urbanised, economically more developed, and 
to other European regions more connected kind of nationalism. This also resulted 
in “an alternative path to the rural-based ideology of militant Basque nationalism.” 
(Bollens, 2008: 215). Or the example of the emergence of the regional identities in 
Northern Italy can be mentioned which has been continuously supported by the 
Leagues. (Levy, 1996, Voutat 2000) From Central and Eastern Europe, the example of 
Upper Silesia in Poland can be mentioned where regional identity was reborn after 
8 A counter argument can also be formulated that this happens only on the surface, and 
European integration is becoming an increasingly member state governed enterprise – as 
the intergovernmentalists would like to interpret the major steps in European integration 
– and the cities and towns are just at the sidelines of the European governance structures.
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the fall of the communism (Bialasiewicz, 2002) and became an even stronger territo-
rial attachment after the EU accession. 
The list can be continued with other examples; nevertheless the aim of this paper 
is not to provide a full picture of these developments, but only to demonstrate that 
there is a recent revival of local and regional identities in contemporary Europe. For 
individuals, the towns, the cities or the regions in which they live constitute their 
geographic communities that are close enough to them in order to become strong 
reference points in their collective identification. There are, of course, significant 
variations in this respect among the member states. As the overall results of a 2002 
Eurobarometer survey indicate, 90% of EU citizens feel attached to their country, 
86% to their region, 87% to their village/town and 45% to Europe.9 While for the ma-
jority of EU citizens the attachment to their country still ranks as the most important 
among other identities, regional and local attachments are of nearly equal impor-
tance for many. In Germany, however, for example, 89% of the citizens feel attached 
to their village or town and also 89% to the country, in Greece 94% of the citizens feel 
attached to the regions and the same ratio to the country, while in Belgium 86% of 
the citizens indicated their attachments to their region which was exactly the same 
percentage as in the case of their attachment to the country. 
Beyond that, the contemporary identity-formation pursuits in towns, cities, and 
metropolises deserve a special attention. Historically, developing and maintaining 
distinguished local identities in cities and towns was always the interest of local 
leaders, however, there are new developments in this respect. Due to the effects of 
European integration and the increasingly curtailed national sovereignty there is a 
greater room for strengthening these attachments. Cities can be viewed as “significant 
fulcrums through which new relations between historic sub-state nationalism and 
contemporary European governance are being forged.” (Bollens, 2008: 189) Walking 
around in big European cities, we witness a large amount of new public buildings that 
are also imprints of identity construction too. As McNeil and Tewdwr-Jones rightly 
argues “the process of negotiation and debate over the form and function of major 
new architectural projects reveals an attempt by territorial elites to “re-narrate 
their nations” at a time when sovereignty in Europe is being re-bundled.” (McNeil and 
Tewdwr-Jones, 2003: 238) This narrative of sub-state nationalism is often strongly 
territorialised. 
Why would the European citizens be open to the messages of the local elites? 
Because their strengthened and intensified territorialized identities can optimally 
counterbalance the de-territorialisation processes of globalisation and the processes 
of the redefinition of the nation. Moreover, local and regional identities could be built 
on rich cultural elements and myths, historic roots and linguistic ties that bound the 
9 Eurobarometer 57
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individuals of the same vicinity or neighbourhood together that are largely missing 
in case of bigger, “distant” communities, for example in case of the European Union.
Until this point the identity formation was interpreted as a construction of elites. 
However, as it was emphasized in the theoretical part of the paper, collective identity 
is also an “ongoing socialization process”, in which individuals internalize the norms 
and the values of the community and formulate their own mix of attachments. Why 
are European citizens so receptive to the trends of territorialisation? Answers could 
be found in the writings of identity theorists. In order to be able to affect the process 
of collective identity formation, the targeted individuals should be included in the 
process. Thus, a certain level of intimacy or closeness to the individuals is needed. 
Authors of identity theories all agree that the too big, too distant, and too over-
regulated communities and organisations are not able to affect identity formation 
because these are only able view their members in their “partial functionality”, which 
is often not enough for forming real, deep emotional attachments. (Young, 1972: 37-38, 
Pataki, 1982: 312, Koller, 2006: 51) Conversely, sub-national territorialisation can pro-
vide the required closeness to the individuals. Namely, carrying out the place-based 
strategy and increasing a higher level of territorial cohesion at local and regional 
levels can contribute to enhance the involvement of the European citizens in their 
local and regional endeavours and projects, and “activate” them in their sub-national 
communities. Activating European citizens in their communities can have numerous 
positive outcomes10, among which from collective identities’ point of view the most 
notable is that it is expected to strengthen the civic nature of their attachments. 
Further, the re-territorialisation of Europe can also lead to a better “imagining” of 
the common Europe too, since the positive examples of the EU supported projects can 
be perceived not only from distance but in their physical reality. 
The boundary issues of re-territorialisation
As territorial cohesion was codified in the Lisbon Treaty, and the objective to achieve 
territorial cohesion gains widespread support both among the elites and the general 
public, it should be asked how this process could affect European identity? Does re-
territorialisation lead to unity or more fragmentation in the common Europe? Above 
the prospects of the enhanced territorial cohesion were mentioned, but here some of 
the threats of the re-territorialisation tendencies should be revealed. 
By defining our collective identities we continuously draw imaginative bounda-
ries that delineate our communities from the “others”, thus identity formation 
is also about inclusion and exclusion at the same time. If the role of sub-national 
governance structures is strengthened and the sub-national territorialisation of col-
10 See Study on Active Citizenship Education. DG Education and Culture, http://ec.europa.eu/
education/pdf/doc248_en.pdf
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lective attachments continues, it can be easily imagined that this process will lead 
to fragmentation of the “imagined community” of the common Europe. This could 
happen because individuals would see competing identities in the other emerging 
territorial units. Increased competition among the sub-national communities is also 
an outcome of a higher level of territorialistation. The economic rationality and the 
market exposure also support this trend, while it is the cities’ and region’s interest 
to be best positioned for getting development funds and using the opportunities pro-
vided in the national arena as well as in a wider Europe. (Keating, 1998, Bollens 2008) 
Nevertheless, the competition of sub-national units can be favourable for the com-
mon Europe too, because as cities and sub-state territories become more embedded 
in European networks, and as more often interact and communicate with each other, 
the exclusionary nature of their collective identity becomes moderated. Nonetheless, 
a lot is dependent upon the sub-national leaders’ intentions. It makes a clear differ-
ence if they are “packaging” sub-state nationalism in ethnic-based, inward looking, 
separatist wrapping or defining their identity as a mutually open, civic-based, but 
culturally and historically peculiar category. We can find examples for both kinds in 
contemporary Europe.
Apart from the sub-state territorialisation, another major development in 
European integration should be mentioned, namely the spread of differentiated 
integration in various forms (multi-speed Europe, variable geometry, a la Carte Europe 
etc.11) in the European Union. (See Stubb 1996; Kölliker 2001; De Neve; Philippart & 
Edwards 1999; Tekin & Wessels 2008; Andersen and Sitter 2006, Koller 2012) The 
evolution of differentiated integration in the European Union and also in relation to 
non-members is expected to results in significant changes in how we imagine the 
Union in the future. Differentiated integration can be interpreted as a boundary is-
sue and a continuous formation of new “clubs of membership” in connection with 
the European integration. Forming a new club and delineating its boundaries also 
means including the joining members and excluding those who do not participate 
in the cooperation, therefore differentiated integration is also about defining ‘ins’ 
11 One of the most comprehensive typologies of differentiated integration comes from Stubb 
who defined three major forms of differentiated integration: “Multi-speed EU can be defined 
as the mode of differentiated integration according to which the pursuits of common objec-
tives is driven by a core group of member states which are both able and willing to pursue 
some policy areas further, the underlying assumption being that others will follow later” (1); 
“Variable geometry can be defined as the mode of differentiated integration which admits 
to unattainable differences within the main integrative structure by allowing permanent 
and irreversible separation between the core of countries and lesser developed integrative 
units.” (2); “A la Carte Europe, based on the culinary metaphor ‘allows each member state to 
pick and choose as from a menu, in which policy area it would like to participate, whilst at 
the same time maintaining a minimum number of common objectives.’”(3) (See Stubb, 1996: 
287-288)
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and ‘outs’ in relation to the club (Koller 2010a). In line with the spread of differenti-
ated integration, the mirror of self-understanding of the Union becomes vague and 
uncertain. It is not so obvious to define who belongs to “us” and “them” any more. 
Being a member of the EU 28, the Euro-zone, Schengen Zone or part of the European 
Economic Area or cooperating with the EU in the framework of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement all represent a different type of “club membership” and all 
in an exclusionary way. Apparently, the value of these club memberships differs to a 
large extent. Thus, differentiated integration can also be interpreted as forming new 
fragmentation lines in the Union, thereby establishing new boundaries inside and 
outside the EU as well. The establishment of the so-called functional macro-regions 
could be also be interpreted as outcomes of differentiated integration. Due to the 
launch of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the Danube Region Strategy, or the 
“just to be born” EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region, other “in between” 
territorial categories, the so-called functional macro-regions appeared on the scene 
that aim to foster territorial cohesion, but geographically in a different “size” than 
cities or sub-national regions.
We can further speculate on the future paths of re-territorialisation tendencies 
within the Union, nevertheless it can be projected that the various communities’ 
(sub-national or macro regions) interconnectedness is going be the crucial indica-
tor whether they are going to become building blocks of a wider European space 
or undermining forces in the project of common Europe. As the dynamic models of 
multiple identities suggest, it is not at all necessary for identity elements to be in a 
hierarchical structure, individuals are capable of having many different attachments 
that are not exclusionary in nature. Finally, it should not be forgotten that in the era of 
information technology, there are numerous “de-territorialized” methods of identity 
formation and community building that can counteract the re-territorialisation proc-
esses. 
Conclusions
The concept of territorial cohesion is far from being fully elaborated in the Union’s 
documents, but as a concept through which the European Union aims to find the lost 
consent of people to the common European project. From an identity point of view, the 
place-based strategy can be the tool to effectively target the people by their immedi-
ate vicinity, the cities and regions. As it was demonstrated by bringing up examples 
of re-territorialisation in Europe, this identity building strategy could be efficient 
because of the geographical closeness to individuals and the wide range of tangible 
elements of cultural heritage available. An enhanced territorial cohesion can have an 
overall positive effect on activating European citizens, and by this can contribute to 
the strengthening of the civic component of their European identity. Finally, however 
the possible threats of re-territorialistation tendencies to common Europe were also 
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gathered by bringing up the examples of not only the emerging sub-national but the 
macro-regional units as well. 
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Instruments for the Achievement 
of Territorial Cohesion within the European Union 
in the Financial Framework 2014–2020 
Małgorzata Michalewska-Pawlak1
Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the instruments for achievement of ter-
ritorial cohesion within the European Union from 2014-2020. This issue seems to be 
important because disparities in socio-economic development within the European 
Union are still growing, and this has a direct impact on the increasing disproportion 
in the living standard of EU citizens. In the first part of the article the concepts and 
definitions of territorial cohesion are defined. Then the author describes the begin-
ning of the territorial cohesion issue within the European Union. The key documents, 
strategies and agendas are distinguished. The last but the most important part cen-
tres upon the European Territorial Cooperation and rural-urban partnerships as the 
tools of cooperation and creation of connections between different types of regions, 
regardless of their administrative borders.
Introduction
The existence of developmental disparities between states and regions within the 
European Union (EU) is not only an indisputable fact, but also a consequence of eco-
nomic integration that Europe has been undergoing over the last decades. On the one 
hand, the internal market based on unrestricted movement of goods, people, services 
and capital is beneficial for those countries and regions, which possess sufficient 
economic potential. On the other hand, it is detrimental to those entities that are not 
able to meet the requirements of a competitive environment. Research on economic, 
social and territorial cohesion confirms that disparities in socio-economic develop-
ment are growing, and this has a direct impact on the increasing disproportion in the 
living standard of EU citizens. The disparities stem not only from differing potentials 
of particular territories, but also their localisation.
1 PhD, Chair of European Studies, University of Wrocław. malgorzata.michalewska@uni.wroc.pl
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The issue of cohesion – also in its territorial dimension – should be considered as 
a vital political problem that fits into the discussion on the model of socio-economic 
development for the EU. This is why in this paper I set out to analyse chosen instru-
ments aimed at achieving territorial cohesion that are to be implemented under the 
Financial Framework 2014–2020. I have intentionally omitted certain details related 
to the structural funds and the Cohesion Fund, as I consider them to be only one 
(albeit important) of many possible sources of funding for the solutions envisioned 
in the Framework. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the issue of how the new 
multiannual EU budget distributes funding between regions is of secondary impor-
tance. A key question to be answered here is whether proposed instruments can 
prove equally feasible and useful for different types of regions, and to what extent 
they are coherent with EU territorial development priorities.
In the first part of the paper, I focus on the concept of territorial cohesion and its 
definitions. So far, it has not been given a single, universally accepted definition – a 
fact that has certain practical benefits for the EU Member States (MS) and regions. I 
begin the second section by describing the origins of the problem of territorial cohe-
sion within the EU. This is also where I elaborate on what goals the EU currently 
pursues in this regard – these were agreed on and included in the new developmental 
strategy adopted by the EU in 2010 and presented in the Europe 2020 and Territorial 
Agenda of the European Union 2020 documents. Third, key part of the paper is devoted 
to analysing specific instruments, aimed at achieving territorial cohesion within the 
EU, that are to be implemented from 2014 onwards. I present the new shape of the 
European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) and its facilitating tools, including the Euro-
pean Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) as well as rural-urban partnerships 
(RUPs). I have chosen the above-mentioned instruments because of their focus on 
developing cooperation and connections between regions considered as functional 
units, regardless of their administrative borders. The fact that neighbouring regions 
face common challenges constitutes a sound justification for developing new forms of 
cooperation, including those of international character.
Some scholars express the opinion that territorial cooperation, when conducted 
without regard to state borders, shifts the locus of certain functions from states 
to other units of territorial organisation and, hence, contributes to the erosion of 
nation-state (Hirst & Thompson, 1995; Magone, 2006). The purpose of this article is to 
consider the development of various forms of territorial cooperation as an answer to 
diverse social, economic and demographic challenges that neighbouring regions have 
in common. I claim that as tools for achieving territorial cohesion and managing spa-
tial development, the ‘place-based’ development approach and territorially-tailored 
interventions are complements to, rather than substitutes for the traditional, state-
centred model. At the same time, they fit well into the modern concept of territorial 
governance defined as follows:
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Territorial governance is the formulation and implementation of public policies, 
programmes and projects for the development of a place/territory by: a. integrating 
relevant policy sectors, b. co-ordinating the actions of relevant actors and institutions, 
particularly considering multilevel interplay, c. mobilising stakeholder participation, d. 
being adaptive to changing contexts, e. addressing the place-based/territorial specifici-
ties and characteristics (ESPON, 2012: 11).
The concept of territorial cohesion
One of the scholars interested in the issue of cohesion within the EU, Willem Molle, 
rightly points out that this concept has a specific, political character. It refers to the 
acceptable level of disparities in social, economic and territorial development among 
EU MS and regions (Molle, 2007: 5). Having this in mind, it has to be said that cohesion 
is not about making all regions equally developed – this, in practice, would require 
supporting underdeveloped regions at the expense of those more prosperous, growth 
of which would have to be slowed down. In fact, bringing all regions to the same level 
of development would not only be infeasible due to substantial disparities between 
them, but also irrational. Initiatives aimed at building cohesion, including the EU 
regional policy, are most of all directed at supporting and improving the situation in 
underdeveloped areas. The extent to which the MS and institutions are truly oriented 
toward limiting developmental disproportions is revealed whenever they sit down 
to negotiate the amount and directions of spending in subsequent EU budgets. The 
more developed countries opt for improving the economic competitiveness of their 
regions, while the less developed ones prefer to reduce disparities through active, 
and frequently rather costly, regional policy.
Cohesion is a dynamic factor – it fluctuates over time, just like the differences 
in the level of development between particular regions. In turn, instruments for 
increasing cohesion within the EU have the political character and depend on the 
MS’ willingness to fund relevant initiatives and activities. Hence, cohesion should 
be treated as a process, not as an equilibrium that can be achieved within a speci-
fied time. In the European reality, cohesion is defined in three different dimensions: 
economic, social and territorial. Economic cohesion is measured by Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) index. The smaller the differences in GDPs of particular regions, the 
higher the economic cohesion. Social cohesion is determined using such indicators 
as unemployment or employment rate among people of working age. The purpose of 
intervention in this area is to decrease disparities that occur among various regions 
with regard to the utilization of their human capital (Pastuszka, 2012: 101).
As for the territorial cohesion, neither the academic literature of the subject 
nor official EU- and MS-produced documents provide us with a single, unambigu-
ous definition of this term. According to Andreas Faludi, such state of affairs may 
serve a certain purpose, as it allows both the MS and EU institutions some leeway in 
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interpreting it, depending on their interests, preferences and developmental chal-
lenges (Faludi, 2007). The system of indicators for measuring its level also remains 
imprecise.
For instance, the definition of territorial cohesion proposed by the European 
Economic and Social Committee is as follows: “task entrusted to the European Union 
of promoting throughout its territory a harmonious, balanced and sustainable develop-
ment of economic activities” (European Economic and Social Committee, 2009: 6). It is 
worth noting that while this statement treats the EU territory as a whole, its subject 
matter is limited solely to economy.
Multidimensional approach to the concept of territorial cohesion may be found in 
documents and reports published by ESPON2, which uses it in the following contexts:
• smart growth in a competitive and polycentric Europe,
• inclusive, balanced development and fair access to services,
• local development conditions and geographical specificities,
• environmental dimension and sustainable development,
• governance and coordination of policies and territorial impacts (Van Well, 2012: 
1555).
The analysis of 246 Operational Programmes (OPs) financed by structural funds 
and implemented in Member States in the period from 2007 to 2013 seems to confirm 
Faludi’s hypothesis on the contextual understanding of the term. In 2009, fourteen 
experts conducted research to examine how OPs are relevant to territorial cohesion. 
As they found out, MS tend to emphasise different issues related to this problem. 23 
per cent of Programmes associated territorial cohesion with the reduction of rural-
urban disparities. The same number associated it with territorial accessibility. In 19 
per cent, it was akin to exploiting regional potential, while 14 per cent considered it 
as a horizontal principle of the EU. 7 per cent of the OPs included support for physical 
regeneration of deprived areas, and 6 per cent were aimed at developing territorial 
cooperation. Only 4 per cent associated territorial cohesion with the development of 
city networks or growth poles (Ibid: 1559).
Likewise, the results of the above-mentioned research reveal that the MS do not 
share a single, common way of defining territorial cohesion. Rather, its understand-
ing depends on the needs, interests and developmental challenges of a given coun-
try. One might notice that none of the above interpretations is substantially more 
widespread than the others, while some (like the development of growth poles) refer 
predominantly to strengthening competitiveness.
The body of scholarly writing on the subject offers numerous definitions of ter-
ritorial cohesion. Willem Molle associates it with a situation whereby citizens’ and 
2 European Spatial Planning Observation Network.
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enterprises’ access to basic services, infrastructure and knowledge is not hindered 
by existing spatial differences (Molle, 2007: 5). Andreas Faludi points to economic and 
political domination of centrally-located, urbanised areas, and perceives the increase 
in territorial cohesion as a reduction of that domination (Faludi, 2004).
Eduardo Medeiros offers a useful summary of the discussion on various defini-
tions of the term. Stating its character as an ongoing process, he stresses that it signi-
fies the shaping of a more coherent, balanced territory through the following types 
of activities:
• supporting the reduction of socioeconomic disparities between various areas,
• promoting environmentally sustainable development,
• reshaping and improving territorial cooperation and management,
• reshaping and establishing a more polycentric urban system (Medeiros, 2011: 4).
In a sense, the lack of a commonly accepted definition reflects the spatial diversity 
within Europe and varying developmental potential of its many regions. It also cre-
ates the possibility of implementing a more flexible and territory-based development 
policy.
Territorial cohesion in EU policy
Faced with deepening disproportions in development of numerous European re-
gions, the MS first started debating the issue of territorial cohesion in the 1990s. The 
discussion was spurred by growing awareness that Europe was becoming more and 
more divided between a geographical and developmental core on the one hand, and 
the peripheries on the other hand (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2013: 3).
Although the most recent report on social, economic and territorial cohesion pre-
pared by the European Commission states that differences in GDP between regions all 
across the EU decreased over the period from 1996 to 2007, it also indicates that they 
increased within several MS (Medeiros, 2011: 4). This results from the fact that growth 
is mostly concentrated in and around agglomerations. At the same time, it confirms 
that disparities in development between various regions remain substantial.
The first intergovernmental initiative related to territorial issues was under-
taken in 1999, during the meeting of ministers responsible for spatial planning in 
their respective MS. As an outcome of the meeting, they adopted a document entitled 
European Spatial Development Perspective, in which they defined three major goals 
with regard to territorial cohesion: access to resources and know-how, polycentrism 
(by which they meant maintaining a balanced urban system for the EU as a whole and 
for its constituent parts), and trusteeship (that signified achieving prudent manage-
ment of the cultural and natural heritage) (Molle, 2007: 85).
The year 2007 saw the adoption of the Territorial Agenda for the European Union 
and the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities. Although neither of these 
38 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
documents was legally binding, both outlined desirable directions of further actions 
with regard to territorial development. Their authors pointed to the need of ensuring 
good living standard and conditions for all EU citizens, regardless of their place of 
residence. They also identified six territorial development priorities for the Union:
• strengthening polycentric development and innovation through networking of 
city regions and cities,
• new forms of partnership and territorial governance between rural and urban 
areas,
• promoting regional clusters of competition and innovation in Europe,
• supporting the strengthening and extension of trans-European networks,
• promoting trans-European risk management including the impacts of climate 
change,
• strengthening of ecological structures and cultural resources as the added value 
for development (European Union, 2007: 3-5).
Another step toward the inclusion of territorial cohesion among EU goals came in 
the shape of the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion published by the European Com-
mission in 2008. This document contained significant statements referring to territo-
rial cohesion and challenges related to pursuing it. The first one is concentration – it 
applies to spatial distribution of not just population, but also economic activity. As 
stated in the Paper, agglomeration has both positive and negative consequences, with 
the latter taking the form of pollution, social exclusion, crime and social unrest. The 
document also lists a number of advantages held by rural areas: clean air, natural 
resources, pockets of unspoiled nature, as well as security. In order to increase 
territorial cohesion, the EU should make an effort to develop connections between 
various areas so as to overcome difficulties posed by physical distance between them 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008: 6).
The above-mentioned connections were to encompass transport, communication 
and energy networks. The purpose expressed by the authors was to improve citizens’ 
access to basic services, spur cooperation between business and research centres, as 
well as to improve the situation of disadvantaged social groups such as the disabled 
or the elderly (Ibid: 7).
The authors of the Green Paper stress the importance of multi-level cooperation 
for solving problems common to all regions in the EU. They rightly point to the fact 
that administrative borders do not prevent the emergence of problems such as pol-
lution, floods, the loss of biodiversity or issues related to commuting. Therefore, 
solving such problems requires cooperation of various entities (Ibid: 7).
Territorial cohesion was officially sanctioned as one of the EU goals in the Lisbon 
Treaty, which not only introduced this new aim to the Union’s primary law, but also 
expressed (in Article 174) the need for “reducing disparities between the levels of devel-
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opment of the various regions and backwardness of the least favoured regions. Among 
the regions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected 
by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural 
or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low population 
density and island, cross-border and mountain regions” (European Union, 2007a).
In 2009, the European Commission organised a conference that took place in 
Kiruna (Sweden). The purpose of the meeting was to summarize the public debate 
over territorial cohesion in the EU that began with the publishing of the Green Paper 
the year before. 400 stakeholders who participated in the conference identified four 
different areas for the achievement of territorial cohesion. These were:
• cooperation between territories for bolstering European integration,
• fostering liveable urban and rural communities and strengthening ‘territorial 
programming’ in cohesion policy,
• coordination of policies to achieve greater policy coherence,
• analysis and data collection for evidence-based policy making (European Com-
mission, 2009: 3).
The concept of territorial cohesion was strengthened thanks to the current 
strategy for development adopted by the EU – Europe 2020. Implemented in times of 
economic crisis, this strategy emphasizes smart and inclusive growth that embraces 
territorial diversity and geographical specificities of a given area. At the same time, it 
aims at providing all EU citizens with equal access to basic services. The new strategy 
restores the concept of solidarity, since it envisions economic centres of Europe as 
growth poles around which their surrounding regions might develop. The new ap-
proach envisages a place-based policy that focuses on a given territory’s comparative 
advantages, often based on tacit knowledge, cultural or natural resources (Dabinett, 
2013: 183).
The above interpretation of territorial cohesion bears very little relation to the re-
distribution model implemented in welfare states, although it, too, refers to the idea 
of fair redistribution. Still, in this context, territorial cohesion is not about bringing 
everyone to the same level – it focuses on supporting regions in such a way so as to al-
low them to make the best possible use of their diverse potential, as well as on ensur-
ing access to basic services for citizens. The new Territorial Agenda for the European 
Union 2020, adopted on 19 May 2012 at an informal meeting of ministers responsible 
for regional development and spatial planning in Gödöllő (Hungary), confirms the 
understanding of territorial cohesion as tailoring development opportunities to the 
specificities of a given area. The document also stresses the importance of building 
networks for cooperation between various regions (European Union, 2011: 4).
The newly defined priorities require changes in the implementation of policies 
that are supposed to contribute to their achievement. The following part of the article 
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is focused on the analysis of how goals and priorities articulated with regard to ter-
ritorial cohesion will translate into instruments and actions to be undertaken by the 
Union from 2014 onwards.
The importance of European Territorial Cooperation in the process of pursu-
ing territorial cohesion among European regions
Territorial cooperation between European regions, supported within the framework 
of EU policies, has been developing since the 1990s. Still, it was adopted as one of the 
key goals of the regional policy in as late as 2007. Initially, the Union’s support for 
territorial cooperation took the form of INTERREG – an initiative managed by the Eu-
ropean Commission. 182 programmes of territorial cooperation were implemented 
under INTERREG (Ferry & Gross, 2005: 11).
Since 2007, the European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) has been the third objective 
of the regional policy, encompassing three components: cross-border, interregional 
and transnational. It should be noted that 3 per cent of the regional policy budget 
were allocated to territorial cooperation programmes. However, the importance of 
the ETC has been slowly, yet systematically growing (ESPON, 2013: 1). It is planned 
that after 2013 its budget allocation will further increase up to 3.5 per cent, of which 
over 73 per cent will be directed to the cross-border, 21 per cent to the transnational 
and 6 per cent to the interregional cooperation (European Commission, 2011: 6-7). 
It might be added that a separate regulation has been proposed for the purpose of 
regulating legal aspects of the ETC.
The strengthening of the ETC as a goal of regional policy is justified in the light of 
provisions included in the Territorial Agenda for the European Union 2020. The authors 
of the Agenda explain that divergences in legal, social and political systems cause 
continuing problems for borderlands, particularly with respect to trade and migra-
tions (European Union, 2011: 5-6). To remedy these difficulties, the Union intends to 
develop cross-border cooperation that is to be based not only on projects, but, most 
of all, on long-term development strategies.
The research conducted by ESPON indicates that regions vary in their preferences 
as to the subjects of cooperation. Those located in the countries of the “old EU” tend 
to focus on common initiatives related to environmental or economic issues. In turn, 
regions of states that acceded to the Union in and after 2004 are oriented toward 
developing social and technical infrastructure, spatial planning as well as tourism. 
This shows that the scope of problems faced by regions is broad and depends on their 
location. Another interesting conclusion drawn from the research is that territorial 
cooperation has been developed most dynamically in peripheral and specific types 
of European regions, such as sparsely populated areas and islands: in north-western 
Europe, southern France, Italy, Greece and the coastal areas of the Iberian Peninsula; 
particularly regions in Scandinavia, the Baltic States and Scotland (ESPON, 2013: 2-3).
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Consultations on the new solutions proposed under ETC revealed that focusing 
the effort on four thematic priorities may limit flexibility, as well as regions’ ability 
to pursue important territorial priorities that are not included in the programmes, 
yet constitute important prerequisites of cohesion (European Commission, 2011: 20). 
Among such vital priorities, the Commission listed: demographic changes, tourism, 
managing natural and cultural heritage, as well as transport accessibility, all of which 
have up to now been areas of cross-border cooperation, but will be scrapped with the 
end of the current Financial Framework (Mendez, Bachtler, Wishlade, 2012: 81).
An instrument that will be maintained after 2013 is the European Grouping of 
Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), created in 2006 for the purpose of implementing 
programmes and projects of territorial cooperation. EGTC is essentially a legal in-
strument that allows partners undertaking territorial cooperation to become legal 
entities, and so overcome difficulties caused by differences between legal systems of 
different MS. EGTCs may encompass states, regional and local authorities, and bodies 
governed by public law, created for the purpose of meeting needs of general interests 
(Zapletal, 2010: 17).
A draft directive that is to regulate the functioning of EGTCs after 2013 provides 
for solutions designed to simplify the use of this instrument. With regard to member-
ship, the draft introduces a legal basis that allows regions and authorities in third 
countries to participate in a Grouping regardless of whether its other members come 
from one or more EU Member States. Previously, the regulations called for participa-
tion of at least two bodies from MS (European Commission, 2011a: 3). The proposed 
change seems beneficial from the perspective of regions located along the external 
borders of the Union (in, for instance, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Bulgaria or Romania), 
that will now have a chance to develop cooperation within the framework of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.
It is worth noting that the EGTC is not a form of cooperation separated from oth-
ers currently in existence – rather, it is a potentially useful solution for facilitating 
cooperation. The Grouping may be established for the purpose of implementing any 
aspect of territorial cooperation, without favouring programmes and projects co-
funded by the European Regional Development Fund (Ibid: 2).
The Rural-Urban Partnerships as an instrument 
for raising territorial cohesion in the EU after 2013
The development of Rural-Urban Partnerships is reflected in neo-endogenous theo-
ries, which claim the potential of each region is different and the key to its develop-
ment is its utilization. The establishment of territorial partnerships can contribute 
to the development of cooperation on different levels and sustainable development 
of regions through the exchange of resources. It is worth noting that the sustainable 
character of this cooperation is determined by benefits, which should be reaped not 
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only by rural areas, but also cities. The added value has to be present for both sides, 
otherwise this concept has no chance of a long-term success.
The Territorial Agenda for the European Union 2020 underlines the importance of 
establishing various connections between cities and rural areas of various types, 
including the outermost ones. The document indicates the need to raise the aware-
ness of the authorities of agglomerations in regard to their responsibility for the 
development of not only the urban centres, but also of the more remote areas tied to 
them directly or indirectly (European Union, 2011: 8).
Practice shows that many factors affect the readiness to establish, and most im-
portantly, maintain such partnerships. Of crucial importance are the public authorities 
and their strategic capacity for initiating processes, and, subsequently, mobilisation 
and participation of stakeholders who possess the necessary knowledge and resources 
(Atkinson 2013: 303). Cooperation should be founded upon specific, joint projects and 
include various actors. Previous positive experiences are also important.
Furthermore, one should assume various types of regions may have different 
expectations regarding the priorities of potential cooperation. Peripheral areas are 
usually more focused on improving access to urban infrastructure and making bet-
ter use of their landscapes and cultural assets for recreation and tourism. Cities, in 
turn, prefer to create the economic clusters and networks (Kawka, 2011: 3). It can 
therefore be expected that the establishment of common objectives for units with 
similar functions is easier than for separate regions, because their developmental 
problems are of the same character.
Another important element is motivation, that is, partners’ will and readiness to 
cooperate. The stereotypical and negative image of rural areas presented in the Eu-
ropean public debate can be a barrier limiting trust, and therefore the development 
of such cooperation. Andrew Copus lists some of the negative stereotypes of rural 
areas in Europe, such as low levels of human capital, hidden unemployment, aging 
society and rural “dependency culture”, which means dependency on social transfers 
as the main source of income in rural communities. According to the researcher, the 
above-mentioned problems appear in rural areas, but not in full, and the vast majority 
of such regions, “even remote ones, show evidence of dynamism, innovation and growth, 
even without policy support” (Copus, 2010: 39).
Rupert Kawka explains the mutual prejudice existing in relations between rural 
and urban areas. Urban areas are accused of taking away the resources of rural areas 
for their own development, while rural areas, of living at the expense of urban areas 
(Kawka, 2011: 1).
In the years 2007–2013, the Rural–Urban Partnerships as a systemic solution have 
not been included in OPs. However, some regions in Spain, France, Italy and Ireland 
used the structural funds and the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development 
to finance such partnerships (Ibid: 9).
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The reform of the EU regional policy, starting from 2014, envisions the introduc-
tion of new solutions that should, in the institutional and financial dimensions, facili-
tate the development of such partnerships. One of them is the possibility to establish 
Community-led Local Development (CLLD), which is based on integrated, multi-
sectoral, area-based, local development strategies led by Local Action Groups and 
supported by coordinated assistance of several funds. CLLD concentrates on specific 
sub-regional territories (European Commission, 2012: 3). Judging by the size of the 
population that can be encompassed by the CLLD, this tool can be used to establish 
partnerships between smaller cities and rural areas in their immediate vicinity.
The other solution are the Integrated Territorial Investments (ITIs) which are 
defined as urban development strategies or other territorial strategies or pacts in-
volving integrated investments under more than one priority axis of one or more OPs. 
The ITIs focus on particular regions, therefore their scopes are not constrained by 
administrative borders. The condition to use this instrument is the preparation of an 
integrated development strategy for the given region (European Commission, 2012a: 
2-3). Therefore, the implementation of this tool to establish a Rural–Urban Partner-
ship has to be preceded by the creation of a common, detailed vision in the form of a 
future development strategy.
The proposed solutions are, however, not without weaknesses. Experts point out 
that e.g. the requirement to select 20 cities that will use the ITIs shortens the list of 
potential beneficiaries of this instrument, while some MS demand more clarity in 
defining the relationships between ITIs and CLLD in regard to their functions and 
practical uses (Mendez, Bachtler, Wishlade, 2012: 78). Certainly, their implementation 
will depend, in part, on the bottom-up initiatives of regional stakeholders.
Conclusion
Territorial cohesion is a process through which European regions, despite their 
differing potentials and functions, should have the possibility and equal chances for 
development. The European Commission proposed certain changes in the cohesion 
policy for the Financial Framework 2014–2020 so as to strengthen its territorial 
dimension. Nonetheless, the thematic approach, oriented toward priorities set forth 
in the Europe 2020 strategy, remains dominant. Drafts of regulations that are to regu-
late the cohesion policy briefly mention specific territorial features and challenges 
– cities, rural areas, fisheries and coastal areas, areas facing specific geographical 
or demographic problems, the outermost regions, the northernmost regions with a 
very low population density, as well as island, cross-border or mountain regions and 
urban-rural linkages. Still, they lack specific proposals for actions that could increase 
cohesion between these territories and more developed agglomerations. Although 
the importance of the two instruments described in this article (ETC and RUPs) 
should not be underestimated, their efficiency will depend largely on legal, adminis-
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trative or even cultural factors that shape the framework for the implementation of 
the cohesion policy.
Currently, the paradigm of competitiveness seems to trump cohesion in the dis-
course both at the European level and within particular policies (particularly, the 
regional policy). Following the priorities of Europe 2020 (that is, smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth), regions that wish to use funds from the European Regional 
Development Fund are obliged to prepare “smart specialisation strategies for re-
gional innovation”. However, research indicates that some European regions do not 
possess basic capacity necessary to establish such strategies for innovation. They 
may be able to prepare the documents that would set forth such strategy, but have 
no realistic chances of implementing it (Charles, Gross, Bachtler, 2012: 8). Therefore, 
smart specialisation only theoretically offers a solution for every region. In practice, 
having in mind disparities in development level and potential, regions should be al-
lowed to prepare their individual development strategies, adapted to their needs and 
abilities.
The hypothesis that the nation-state is eroded as regions become subjects and 
actors of territorial governance finds no confirmation in reality. Countries remain 
important actors in the process of increasing territorial cohesion between various 
regions, both within their borders and in cross-border cooperation. State interven-
tion should be of subsidiary, supporting or even initiating character, particularly with 
regard to regions underdeveloped in terms of human, social or cultural capital. In 
many cases, the state’s involvement cannot be limited to creating legal norms or pro-
viding funding for bottom-up initiatives. Instead, it should also encompass creating 
solutions that will be beneficial not only for growth poles (that is, agglomerations), 
but also for other types of territories.
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Dynamics of the Specialisation Patterns 
in the Old and the New Member States
of the European Union
Gabriela Carmen Pascariu1 – Ramona Ţigănaşu2
Abstract
The present paper has as starting point the need to pay additional attention on the 
influence of a country export sector in determining its output growth, a key issue being 
the cumulative causation mechanism, which underlines the interaction between the 
trade costs and the concentration of industries. Moreover, the new approaches in the 
trade theory reveals that the comparative advantage pattern fails to explain the inter-
regional trade. Therefore, based on these assumptions, in this paper we intend to test if 
the hypothesis according to which the integration process tends to produce a short and 
medium term intense specialisation followed by a long term despecialisation, result-
ing from the need to ensure a wide range of comparative advantages and products in 
all fields, is confirmed or not. For this purpose, will be calculated the Krugman and 
Grubel-Lloyd specialisation indices for some old and new EU member states, for differ-
ent types of products (manufactures, agricultural products, commercial services, fuels 
and mining products). Then, will be computed the specialisation potential of the EU 
countries, approach that will enable us to realize a hierarchy in terms of specialization, 
both of the European Economic Community founders and of the countries which were 
integrated into this structure much later, namely in 2004 and 2007. Essentially, the 
research results will allow us to notice if there is a strong correlation between how 
closely integrated economies are and the degree of intra-industry trade (horizontal 
versus vertical), and to conclude if the countries should increase the specialization or 
the diversification of export production to support an intra-EU convergence process. 
Contextualizing EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 
The expansion of the European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe had pri-
marily a huge political issue at stake in the context of the reconsideration of global 
and regional power relationships in the last decade of the 20th century. Enlargement 
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ramona.frunza@uaic.ro.
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was seen as an opportunity for the European Union to strengthen its role of interna-
tional player in the new global order, mainly in relation to the USA, but also to the new 
entrants at the top of the ladder in the post-bipolar world, Russia and China. In the 
meantime, the integration of Central and Eastern European countries offered a per-
spective on a true unity of the European continent, on the reinforcement of political 
stability across Europe and on the creation of a shared regional identity (Więcławski, 
2010) as prerequisites for a future European political union, ‘a destiny fulfilment’, to 
put it in another way. For Central and Eastern European countries, joining the Eu-
ropean Union guaranteed success, the sustainability of democratic reforms and the 
avoidance, once for all, of the risk to reinstate authoritarian systems (in the context 
of the political instability arising in the transition process) and, implicitly, a recession 
from the potential expansion of Russian influence in the area and a sidestep from a 
new ‘Finlandization’ process3). Obviously, we cannot ignore the anticipated positive 
economic impact, mostly for Central and Eastern European countries, in terms of 
boosting economic growth, of creating scale economies, of generating trade or ag-
glomeration economies, which was later confirmed by further studies (Ilzkovitz et 
al., 2007); however, the EU15 economic interests were considered to be insignificant 
and shadowed by the political interests at stake for EU10 (Baldwin, 1995).
Passing therefore for a political priority to both West and East right after the 
shift in political regimes in the Central and Eastern part of the continent in the early 
1990s, enlargement was envisaged as a ‘fast global process’ likely to end by the dawn 
of the new millennium (Foucher, 1996, p. 217). The optimism of Europeans was then 
rooted in the experience accrued during the southward enlargement and the proven 
success of the Community integration process associating market integration (nega-
tive integration) with complementary support policies, mainly the agricultural and 
cohesion policies (negative integration). Furthermore, a set of adhesion criteria was 
established in 1993 for future member states by the Copenhagen European Council, 
institutional reform measures were adopted across the EU with the Treaty of Am-
sterdam and the Treaty of Nice and the reform of ‘major’ European policies (under the 
2000 Agenda) and new association agreements were concluded (in view of securing 
favourable conditions for political cooperation and commercial integration), to men-
tion just the main support actions implemented by the EU towards such an ambitious 
goal.
Nevertheless, EU enlargement turned out to be much more difficult to achieve, 
while the absorption of new member states into the EU system proved much more 
complex than was initially thought and at much higher political as well as economic 
3 Term used to illustrate the case when a leading country avails of its dominance and influence 
over a neighbouring ‘small’ country with reference to the type of relationships established 
between Finland and Russia during the Cold War.
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risks. Roughly speaking: Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) were 
beyond schedule in adopting the reforms required to achieve market economy; 
economies faced a major and difficult to manage restructuring in production and 
trade and proved to have a relatively low capacity to cope with free competition on 
the internal market; the Community acquis was generally transposed in due time, yet 
the technical and human resources needed to enforce European laws and to assist in 
European policies were developed rather late by the public administrative bodies, 
some disparities/limitations not being overcome so far (see the use of structural 
funds in regional development policies). As a matter of fact, the annual progress re-
ports drafted by the European Commission for every state in the negotiation process 
showed that none of the countries fully met the Copenhagen Criteria at the time of 
adhesion, the most sensitive issues being related to the capacity of economies to get 
through with competition on the local market and of their public administration bod-
ies to apply the European laws.4 
Furthermore, the EU’s enlargement was also obstructed by the delays in adopt-
ing the necessary local reforms. In a study published in 1997 in Quo vadis Europe, R. 
Baldwin drew attention to the EU’s lack of consistent strategy on the integration of 
new states and on the need to take more clear-cut and effective actions towards a 
more powerful economic and political incorporation of future member states. Dur-
ing enlargement preparations, most community members, political leaders and even 
specialists in the concerned field rather concentrated on the acceding countries than 
on the EU; for quite a long period, they gave less attention to the need of reflect-
ing upon EU’s ability to integrate new entrants and mainly to handle the extreme 
diversity of economies and interest and to ensure a balance between such diversity 
urging flexible integration and extension methods, on one side, and the high level 
of integration already achieved (an economic and monetary union) which required 
higher convergence and coordination of national economic policies, on the other side 
(Wohlgemuth and Brandi, 2006: 26-31). The EU opted for a block expansion with a 
short intermediate phase for Bulgaria and Romania over a differentiated and multi-
tier integration matching up the progress achieved by associate states in fulfilling 
the convergence criteria and the enhancement of the EU’s capacity of integration, 
stability and achievement of a large political unity (Baldwin, 1997; Martens, 2011). 
This option was actually a denial of ‘multi-speed Europe’ (although it was a fact in the 
integration process and was later on materialized in the monetary union) because, 
4 In a Deutsche Bank study released in 2000, only the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia would have succeeded in joining the EU in 2004 (under the 
best “small convoy” scenario); Bulgaria and Romania would have done it after 2008 and all 
the other countries in 2006) (Eastward enlargement of the EU – accession scenarios, Deutsche 
Bank Research, EU Enlargement Monitor September 2000, http://www.dbresearch.com/
PROD/ DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000030536.pdf).  
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even though it brought flexibility, it was carrying a major risk that the basic rules of 
the ‘Community game’ and the geostrategic outlook change and consequently deter-
mine new cleavages in Europe. As already stated above, the Union focused internally 
on institutional, agricultural policy and structural policy reform and externally on 
the support of associate countries in achieving the required political and economic 
reforms in addition to the integrating role of markets, specific to the Community 
system. 
The enlargement took place shortly after the adoption of the Euro. In a speech in 
1992, Wilfried Martens5 expressed his hope that the European consolidation would 
avoid the risk of an ‘impetuous enlargement’ that would threaten the thoroughness 
of integration and the future of the European project (Martens, 2011: 134-139). How-
ever, the European Union abode to the political schedule of the monetary union even 
though the involved economies did not meet the actual convergence criteria specific 
to an optimal monetary zone (Mundell), and not even all nominal convergence cri-
teria defined in the Treaty of Maastricht, and furthered its eastward enlargement 
under the principle of ‘variable geometry’ with temporary derogations and transi-
tion periods although new member states failed to fully meet the accession criteria. 
Thus, the Union related thoroughness to enlargement against the major structural 
deficits and the gap between the economic power and the political one, the lack of 
an efficient economic governance and the low coordination between national and 
Community policies, the democracy and image deficit, the European citizens’ little 
trust and interest in the European project, the lack of a true European identity and, 
consequently, of a feeling of solidarity and belonging to common values. Last, but 
not least, the European Union faced the economic crisis only 4 years after the first 
enlargement phase and one year upon the accession of the last two countries of this 
wave, Romania and Bulgaria. According to Eurostat, the EU27’s growth rate of 3.2% 
in 2007 lowered to 0.4% in 2008, -4.5% in 2009 and 0.0% in 2013. The crisis not only 
impaired the absorption of new entrants into the internal market and the monetary 
union (reduction of trade flows, cash flows, macroeconomic instability), but also 
highlighted the above-mentioned systemic flaws/limitations of the integration proc-
ess thus generating a high risk of Europe’s lack of functionality and disintegration.
It may be therefore inferred that the EU’s enlargement towards Central and 
Eastern Europe was not achieved under the best possible conditions (at least not 
similar to those of the southward expansion) to support the rapid integration and 
convergence of new entrants.  
5 Belgian Prime Minister until 1992; President of the European People’s Party between 1990 
and 2013; member of the European Council for 12 years. 
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Integration, disparities and convergence. 
Theoretical approaches and empirical evidences
Essentially, an integration process focused on economic unity in the form of a mon-
etary union and on the achievement of a political union as the final process stage 
(Balassa, 1961) cannot be carried out in the absence of a high level of economic, politi-
cal and institutional convergence. With the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU specifically 
sought to obtain minimum convergence before the accession of CEECs so that the 
actual enlargement would neither generate risks and failures nor would it delay the 
attainment of political unity goals. From an institutional point of view, the Copen-
hagen cooperation framework succeeded in ensuring a minimum convergence level 
for the political, legislative and administrative systems and the economic integration 
backed up by the liberalization of trade under the association agreements entailed 
a genuine structural convergence process between EU15 and EU10 (as we shall see 
hereinafter). 
However, a short glance at the Central and Eastern European economies reveals 
that the latest enlargement wave deepened economic, social and territorial dis-
parities within the Community, rendering more difficult not only the integration of 
new entrants into the system, but also generating new limitations and risks for the 
economic and political consolidation of the European Union. For instance, if the less 
developed EU15 countries recorded in 2005 a GDP /capita close to the European aver-
age of EU27 (EU15 plus the 2004 accessions plus Romania and Bulgaria), i.e. of 102% in 
Spain, 90% in Greece and 79% in Portugal, the poorest countries in the latest group, 
Romania and Bulgaria, recorded a GDP/capita of only 35% and 37% respectively (see 
table 1 in attachments) which broadened the extreme disparity from 1:5 within EU15 
to 1:7 within EU27. The eastward enlargement translated in a GDP rise by 5% within 
the EU15 (11% in PPS) over a 20% increase in the population compared to the south-
ward enlargement which entailed a 10% rise in the GDP (14% in PPS) and only a 22% 
rise within EU-9 (as in 1980) (EC, 2004). Productivity gaps doubled as well. Compared 
to a minimum 72.8% within EU15 for Portugal (based on PPS per employed person for 
2005), the European minimum productivity lowered to 35.8% for Bulgaria (Eurostat, 
2013).
At the regional level (NUTS II), disparities increased even more upon EU’s en-
largement from 15 to 27 member states; the poorest EU27 region registered a GDP per 
capita at the level of 2005, of only 24% of the European average (North East, Roma-
nia), compared to a GDP per capita of 303% in the richest region (Inner London, UK), 
name an extreme disparity of 1:12.6. The population doubled in regions with a GDP 
per capita below 75% of the Community average (approx. 25% of the EU27 popula-
tion) while 12.6% of the population registered a GDP per capita below 505 of the EU27 
average, most of it living in regions from Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. None of the 
EU12 regions registered a productivity rate above the European average, the average 
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industrial productivity rate within the EU12 being three times less than within EU15 
(the least productive regions being in Bulgaria and Romania)6 (EC, 2008).
In addition, CEECs were and are characterized by significant gaps between them. 
Among CEECs, the best in economic terms are central countries, namely Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland and the least developed are Eastern 
countries like Romania and Bulgaria (see Table 1 in Annexes).. 
With a relatively higher GDP per capita and productivity rate and better 
geographical positioning (near the economic centre of the EU defined by the London-
Hamburg-Munich-Milan-Paris area), Central European countries seemed to have 
better chances of catching-up than the Eastern countries, thus emphasizing the core-
periphery dynamics for development specific to the European economic geography 
(Pascariu and Frunză, 2011). 
In such a context, the key issue is to determine, on the one hand, whether the 
internal market system entails fewer disparities or, on the contrary, deepens the 
existing ones, and, on the other, the manner in which the existing gaps affect the inte-
gration process. In the absence of a wide multi-disciplinary literature agreeing on the 
impact of disparities on the European integration and on the integration-disparity 
ratio, we may still identify a number of explanations in the international trade and 
growth theories and, obviously, draw conclusions from the analysis of the integration 
process dynamics in almost 60 years of evolution.   
First of all, it is worth mentioning that the economic openness in the process of 
the movement of goods and factors liberalization, just like the liberalization process 
specific to the European internal market, brings about a restructuring in production 
and trade through competitive exposure. Thus, the essence of the European economic 
integration is the enhancement of the effects specific to free market mechanisms at 
the European scale in the context of extensive competition on a large market (larger 
than the one enabled by national economies), namely: generating trade and wealth, 
specializing production and ensuring more effective distribution of resources (Viner, 
1950); scale economies and learning processes (lower costs, higher demand and high-
er margins), that help increase productivity and improve competitiveness through 
investments in research/development, innovation and diversification of production 
and trade (Frankel and Rose,1998; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001); inter-industries 
technological transfer and spillover (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007; Romer, 1990), 
mainly as a result of the foreign direct investment flows; economic growth (Solow 
and Swan, 1956; Myrdal, 1956; Henrekson et al., 1997, Pelkmans, 2001). However, the 
main question is whether such effects relate to the internal market or may be ob-
6 It is worth mentioning, however, that the CEECs joining the EU did not increase the disper-
sion of regional GDP per capita or of productivity rates; national gaps were lower within 
EU12 than within some of the EU-5 countries (Germany, France, UK).
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tained beyond it in the trade liberalization and globalization process; in other words, 
in order to understand the impact of European integration, one needs to determine 
whether economic integration through the internal market actually generates extra 
growth incentives and, if so, how are the integration beneficial effects distributed 
among participants, in terms of income and economic growth. Empirical evidence 
is contradictory in relation to the first aspect. In this respect, Crespo-Cuaresma et 
al. (2005) refer to three studies: De Mello in 1999 and Landau in 1995 which found no 
proof of European integration impact on growth, on the one hand, and Henrekson 
et al. (1997) who show a growth allowance of 0.6-0.8% per annum arising from the 
effects of economic integration within the EC and EFTA, on the other hand. In the 
meanwhile, the European Commission studies on the impact of internal market point 
to an economic growth of 2.13% of the European GDP only for the 1992–2008 period, 
thus confirming the direct link between integration processes determined by the 
economic liberalization on the internal market and economic growth (EC, Single 
Market Act II, 2012).7  
Next, concerning the distribution of the integration effects between member 
states, we are interested in determining whether economic integration generates 
more economic growth in less developed countries over developed ones thus driving 
a convergence of development levels in the long run or if, on the contrary, market 
liberalization triggers a gap widening process as more developed countries benefit 
more from the economic dynamics effects generated by the internal market. 
The starting point in understanding the integration – economic growth – conver-
gence relation is the analysis of economic growth models. The neoclassical theories of 
growth predict that less developed countries will register a more rapid growth under 
market liberalization than the developed ones, which, in time, results in a complete 
convergence of incomes and development levels; in other words, we have a negative 
relation between growth and regional inequalities (convergence perspective). On 
the contrary, more recent theories (post-Keynesian and those based on endogenous 
growth) establish a positive relation between growth and regional inequality, the 
economic integration rather leading to an increase in initial disparities (divergence 
theories). This is a short presentation of the main approaches: 
1. In the neo-classical theory based on exogenous growth (Solow, 1956; Mankiw et al., 
1992; Armstrong and Taylor, 2000) which dominated the literature by the mid-
1980s, countries are similar in terms of preferences, demographic growth and 
technology; there is no technological breakthrough (this is an exogenous variable 
seen as a public good evenly accessible to all countries); returns on capital are 
diminishing and the mobility of factors is perfect (Button and Pentecost, 1999). If 
returns are diminishing and economies are open (upon removal of fee and non-fee 
7 Using the macroeconomic model QUEST II.
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barriers in the trading of goods and factors), the capital will move from developed 
economies (capital-abundant/capital-intensive economies in which the return on 
capital and the remuneration are low) towards emerging economies where the 
capital is a relatively scarce production factor and it therefore provides higher 
return and remuneration rates. The capital moves until the return rate matches 
the interest rate (see MacDougall diagram, 1958). At the same time, the labour fac-
tor moves backward, i.e. from developing countries towards the developed ones. 
Since capital is more mobile than labour force, developing economies will grow 
more and at a faster pace. Consequently, developed economies/regions will regis-
ter growth rates below the developing countries, the result being a convergence 
of the endowment and production factors, return rates, income and, implicitly, 
development levels (beta convergence). Production and consumption patterns 
become similar, with an increase in industrial trade arising from the diversifica-
tion of production and trade that supports a long-term economic convergence as 
the integration process enhances (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Hausman and Klinger, 
2007). Thus, convergence appears to be the consequence of market liberalization 
in the context of economic integration, further enhanced by the adoption of a sin-
gle currency (within the EU), which stimulates factor mobility through increased 
market transparency and lower transaction costs. The neo-classical model was 
rejected by Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1970) through the cumulative causation 
theory and, later on, through the endogenous growth (Romer, 1990) and New 
Economic Geography (Krugman, 1991) theories. 
2. Under the cumulative causation model (Myrdal, 1957; Kaldor, 1970; Dixon and 
Thirlwall, 1975), highly-productive countries/regions will be more competitive 
on an extended free market and more capable to benefit from scale economies and 
to generate agglomeration processes, all these resulting in deepening the gaps 
(asymmetric development). The economic integration will increase competition 
and the specialisation degree of economies and capitals will be pooled in the 
most competitive, highest-demand regions in order to benefit from the positive 
externalities associated with industrial agglomeration processes which entail 
increasing returns (the theory of increasing returns is otherwise the main ele-
ment differentiating the cumulative causation theory from neo-classical models). 
More developed economies will undergo intra-industry specialisation in highly-
productive and capital-intensive activities and will expand their export sector. 
The increase in demand shall induce higher accumulation rates in economy, which 
will, on their turn, boost economic growth. The successive agglomeration and 
growth processes will thus deepen the disparities, especially in the case of large 
economic areas, which increase the cost of transportation (Krugman, 1991). Such 
a perspective on the effects of integration is also a theoretical support of a pos-
sible gap widening across the EU and a projection of a new type of core-periphery 
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relationships determined by the eastward enlargement. The peripheral character 
of the new member states’ economies relates to their spatial periphery (large 
distances from the competitive core of the European economy and from its main 
outlets, with reduced accessibility) (Pascariu and Frunză, 2011). The acknowledg-
ment of a cumulative causation model means that economic integration may lead 
through internal market mechanisms to the concentration of capital intensive 
activities, with high productivity in the Central-European countries, based on 
two-way trade in vertically differentiated products specialization, whilst East-
ern-European countries will concentrate natural resources and labour-intensive 
industries, based on low skilled, low and medium technologies, with an one-way 
trade specialization according to traditional comparative advantages (Dupuch at 
al., 2004). Consequently, Central European countries may register a catching-up 
process (the Spanish model) while Eastern countries may emphasize the periph-
eral nature (the Mediterranean model) through an increase in initial disparities 
as experienced by Greece (until 1995) and Portugal (after 2000). Moreover, the 
core-periphery development specific to the European economy will deepen if the 
current crisis is not solved more rapidly and the economic growth is not rein-
stated to its level before the crisis, the negative relationship between economic 
growth and disparities being confirmed.  
3. More recent approaches relying on endogenous growth and The New Economic 
Geography (NEG) support this idea. In the endogenous growth models (Romer, 
1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988), the return on capital is increasing and the techno-
logical spillover is an endogenous variable which, along with the human capital, 
innovation and knowledge determines growth. After the innovative economies 
come the developed ones which have the possibility to invest in research and 
development or to buy new technology, place more money in the human capital 
and, since technology and human capital are positive externalities generating 
technological agglomeration and technology spillover processes, one may assume 
that developed economies will consequently concentrate high-technologies and 
capital intensive and creative activities. Here shall emerge the new ideas that will 
back up the diversification of production and increase in productivity and com-
petitive advantages. Economies/regions with relatively low technical and human 
capacity, low income and little investment in research/development will depend 
on the transfer of technology and knowledge between developed regions and 
will specialize in industries based on low skilled and low and medium technolo-
gies (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). Furthermore, since generating progress and 
even the capacity to absorb new technologies is conditional upon the degree of 
development, of education and training of the human capital, as well as upon the 
institutional environment, developed economies will be more capable to produce 
and use the technological breakthrough than the developing regions, even when 
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technology is similar to a capital good and moves freely, with a widening of gaps 
over time (Fagerberg, 1996). 
4. Friedman (1966) suggests an extended version of the cumulative causation theory 
by the so-called core-periphery model which is the essence and the starting point 
of the New Economic Geography subsequently developed by Krugman (1991). 
Beyond the various theories relying on a core-periphery development, the main 
idea is that reducing transaction costs in the context of market liberalization 
will enhance the mobility of production factors and firms will establish in more 
accessible regions characterized by developed infrastructure, high potential for 
research, innovation and transfer of technology, extended market, well-trained 
workforce, diversified business services and a ‘friendly’ business environment 
(with no unclear administrative and/or cultural limitations). This entails an ag-
glomeration/concentration of economic activities which represent the source of 
scale economies (both internal and external) and of localization economies which 
may lead to the formation of clusters with a major impact on economic growth. 
Agglomeration economies may generate both convergence effects and divergence 
effects according to the origin and intended use of capital flows. Since the main 
capital flow across the EU, after a long period of internal market integration 
and functioning in absolute freedom in the movement of factors, is North–North 
(between developed economies with similar structures of demand and supply), 
integration appears to generate divergence rather than convergence processes. 
Competitive industries (which may obtain scale economies and increasing returns 
and for which transaction costs are relevant) tend to concentrate in developed and 
central regions with high connectivity and accessibility while the periphery ones 
(underdeveloped economies/regions and/or with low accessibility and connec-
tivity rates) attract activities for which regional costs are relatively higher than 
the transaction costs and scale economies are relatively small (Martin, 2003). 
We must mention however that many of the NEG models attest the occurrence of 
economic dispersion factors as economic integration intensifies and this leads to 
a polycentric structure and even to a disparity reduction in time. 
Considering the above, it appears that there is no consent in literature on the 
integration-growth-convergence relationship. Empirical studies reflect the same 
diversity in results and conclusions, even though most of them see a positive link 
between integration, growth and convergence. For instance, one of the most frequent 
quotations is that of Sala-i-Martin (1996), that obtained a convergence rate of 2% per 
year generated by the economic integration. Ben-David and Kimhi (2000) get for the 
1960–1985 period an overall divergence process and a convergence by country clusters 
if they liberalize trade. In the European economy, the national convergence processes 
related to the regional divergence processes. For instance, in the 1980–1988 period, 
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the EU registered an annual national convergence rate of 0.5%, of 0.7% in 1988–1994 
and of 0.9% in 1994–2001. Greece, Spain and Portugal moved from a 68% GDP per 
capita in 1988 to a 79% GDP per capita in 1999, with an average growth rate of 1% 
above the Community average in 1994–2001, while the poorest 10 regions registered 
a 50% GDP per capita in 1986–1996 instead of 41%, although interregional disparities 
(standard gap) went up from 26.7% to 28.3% within approximately the same period 
(Drăgan et al., 2013: 48). 
In the case of EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, Crespo and Fon-
toura (2001) find that for the period 1995–2001 (following the start of association 
agreements), all CEECs registered a convergence of trade specialisation patterns 
through the increase in product and trade specialisation, in technology and skilled 
labour-intensive products, although a major part of exports, especially in relation to 
Romania and Bulgaria, remained specialized in labour-intensive factors and concen-
trated in low and medium technology sectors. 
Accordingly, based on a study of the economic dynamics within EU25 (CEECs and 
the old member states) throughout the period 1996–2007, Rapacki and Próchniak 
(2009) find that EU enlargement significantly contributed to the economic growth of 
the CEECs -10 countries and their catching up with the EU15. Average growth rates by 
both country and the two regions and their initial GDP per capita value are in reverse 
relationship as new member states registered a faster EU15 catching-up in the second 
part of the subject period (the beta convergence coefficient increased from 0.78% 
within 1996-2001 to 4.15); such increase was supposedly determined by the imminent 
accession and the more accelerated post-accession integration processes (Rapacki 
and Próchniak, 2009: 4-17).8 For the same period approximately (1995–2005), the 
reverse relationship between the low GDP per capita and the economic growth rate 
(beta convergence) is also confirmed by Melchior (2009), yet in association with the 
widening of regional disparities). The prospect of convergence and the subsequent 
confirmation of the reverse relationship between the GDP per capita and the economic 
dynamics in the integration process were also anticipated by Baldwin, Francois and 
Poters (1997). They estimated an annual growth of 0.2% of GDP for EU15 and of 1.5% 
for accession countries (in the static scenario) in the aftermath of enlargement. 
The conclusion that may be inferred from the analysis of growth and convergence 
models as well as of the related empirical studies on the European economy is that 
convergence is possible as the effect of economic integration, but it depends on the 
8 However, the authors say that, on the average, the two regions would reduce gaps by half 
in 25 years, with a variation of 8 to 33 years for CEECs considered individually. What is 
important is that no projection of a new core- periphery model in CEECs was found, consid-
ering the convergence rates. For instance, if authors estimate a halving of disparities at 30 
years for Bulgaria and 20 years for Romania, Hungary would need 28 years, Poland 25 and 
Slovakia 20 to do the same.
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pattern of industrial and trade specialisation, public policy, public investments, qual-
ity of institutions, the accumulation of knowledge, the quality of the intermediate in-
puts, innovation, technological transfer. Consequently, regional development policies 
relating to the internal market should focus on developing those factors, which may 
contribute to bridging economic, social and territorial disparities in the long run. 
Disparities. Nominal convergence versus actual convergence
The significance of the issue of regional disparities within the European integration 
process derives from the economic and political risks it carries. Basically, the pres-
ence of disparities has a destabilizing impact on integration because: it delays or even 
slows down growth; may represent an inflation factor; generates high costs in sup-
porting development across underdeveloped regions (Buzelay, 1996). Initial dispari-
ties may deepen or narrow down depending on the impact of market liberalization on 
growth and growth distribution among member states. The long-term maintenance 
of major economic, social and territorial disparities may trigger unbalances, instabil-
ity, dysfunctions and risks for the monetary union and may also affect the political 
consensus in favor of European integration. 
As the integration process deepens (evolution towards the internal market, the 
European Monetary Union) and upon successive enlargements, the European econo-
my has been faced with a complementarity in convergence (disparity reduction) and 
divergence processes (disparity increase) against a long-term tendency to bridging 
gaps, especially at the national level. The evolution of the European economy has con-
firmed that the convergence processes are fuelled by the periods of economic growth 
(while divergence processes by periods of recession and crisis), that such processes 
take place essentially by clusters of countries/regions and that they depend on the 
pattern of specialisation, public policy, public investments, quality of institutions, 
technological transfer, etc. Hence, the switch in the EU cohesion policy intervention 
system dynamics, from a liberal concept to an interventionist one, from the focus 
on the solidarity principles and redistributive function to the one on sustainable 
growth and development, from the concrete/sectoral approach to an integrated one, 
by constant adaptation to the evolution of the integration process and to redefining 
strategic objectives. Under these circumstances, the evolution of the cohesion policy 
from its beginning to the present day may be divided into two main phases: 
• 1957–1987: a period when, despite the disparities and problems caused by the 
internal market functioning in Central and Eastern Europe, it was considered that 
convergence could be obtained as a result of the internal market (the European 
concept applied was specific to the convergence theories and to the functional 
integration system); 
• 1989–2013: a period when it was accepted that, due to the specificity of the Euro-
pean integration process (dynamics, development level and structure of member 
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country economies, the integration mechanisms adopted – internal market, mon-
etary union), the internal market and the integration process as a whole do not 
generate a convergence process, at least not to the extent required by the internal 
market to operate effectively and by the EU to meet its strategic objectives. As a 
result, the convergence needed to ensure the EU’s functioning and the attainment 
of strategic objectives may only arise from the complementarity between the in-
ternal market and European policies; regional convergence turned into a special 
objective and even into an integration principle under the Treaty of Maastricht 
(the European concept applied was specific to the convergence theories and to 
the neo-functional integration method); it is actually the time for the outline and 
development of a true European regional policy put into motion by the first set of 
measures adopted in 1988 and called the ‘Delors I Package’. Two approaches are 
distinguished in this period. Although the redistributive role and the structural 
funds allocation solidarity dominated the first two planning periods (1989–1992 
and 1993–1999) (with a focus on patterns of nominal convergence), in the next 
two periods (2000–2006 and 2007–2013), the cohesion policy was aligned to the 
strategic objectives of the Union and was called to play its part in the sustainable 
growth of regions through the convergence of economic performance and the 
improvement of endogenous development factors (actual convergence). 
This dynamics of approaches made it possible for the cohesion policy to convert from 
an essentially redistributive policy into a structural one focused on supporting innova-
tion and technological development, on the development of human capital and on the 
improvement of endogenous growth factors, founded on the reality of a core-periphery 
pattern. The deep insight into the way in which economic growth is achieved and into 
the effects of the economic integration process specific to European integration on 
growth and convergence is crucial in directing public interventions (at the European, 
national and regional level). The current period of vast reforms in the Union’s economic 
governance against the effects of the economic crisis compels European and national 
political decision-makers to pay greater attention to both redistributive and growth 
and cohesion policy development factors. Under an effective regional/Community 
cohesion policy associated with shared strategic objectives, member states and the EU 
may join their actions in a coordinated and coherent way to enable a better spreading of 
both economic activities and resources across national territories and implicitly across 
the Community and to support sustainable development within the EU.
However, notwithstanding any diverging opinions in the literature on the integra-
tion – growth – convergence relationship and the part that public interventions may 
play in this relationship, it is obvious that the long-term evolution of the integration 
process and the achievement of the political union objective across a continental EU 
depends first of all on the actual convergence, namely on the convergence of pro-
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ductivities, on the timing of business cycles (reduction of asymmetric shocks), on 
the convergence of productive structures, of the formal and informal institutional 
system and on others. An essential part is played by the production and trade pat-
terns convergence that we plan to analyze in the next pages. 
Convergence vs. divergence in the production and trade patterns
In terms of the integration – specialisation relationship, we have two main classical 
perspectives:
• The intra-industry trade occurs from the diversification of production and trade 
and supports a long-term economic convergence process on the long term, simul-
taneously with the acceleration of integration (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Hausman 
and Klinger, 2007); 
• The acceleration of integration triggers the increase in the degree of specialisation 
based on the comparative advantage and an increase in core/periphery dispari-
ties (Balassa, 1965; Grubel and Loyd, 1975; Dupuch et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, some of the latest studies highlight the presence of a “U” curve in 
the growth-specialisation export relationship according to this design: First Stage: 
specialisation based on the comparative advantage in a reduced number of industries 
(inter-industry specialisation predominantly); Second Stage: diversification with IIT 
horizontal and IIT vertical (learning and information externalities, scale economies, 
diversification of domestic demand, inter-industries technological transfer and 
spillover, the financial industry diversification; Third Stage: specialization with IIT 
horizontal (scale economies; searching for comparative advantages in technology, 
human capital, innovation). Therefore, the more the economies develop and get ab-
sorbed into the global economy, the more they tend to get less specialized (reverse 
relationship between growth/integration – specialization) (Ben-David and Kimhi, 
2001; Agosin, 2007; Hoekman et al., 2007). 
From the historical evolution point of view, the development process underwent 
several changes due to the progress of national economies and the variation of their 
structure and, based on the former two, due to the specialisation in trade. If we refer 
to the EU states, one may distinguish the group of states relying on modern technol-
ogy and high-grade international specialisation that enables them to get a consistent 
weight in the total of global exports, at one end. At the other end, we find the underde-
veloped countries with one-way international specialisation and a minor share in the 
world exports GNP. In seeking competitiveness, a country should focus on supporting 
the industry (Cartas, 2008: 3). The European experience shows that the industry is 
a strategic branch of the national economy in all developed economies. The most 
important is the processing industry because maintaining a strong and effective in-
dustry of the kind is essential for the full exploitation of a nation’s potential to grow. 
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The key factor for the EU to keep its competitive edge is the specialisation in average 
or high tech capital-intensive industries. The economic growth and the prosperity of 
a society depend to a great extent on the productivity dynamics in various industrial 
sectors and on its capacity to ensure a constant reorientation of its labour and capital 
resources towards industries with a dynamics open to technological breakthrough 
and to changes in consumption demand planning. A supporting factor for the indus-
trial sector is the encouragement of subcontracting-based production methods which 
helped attach more importance to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) whose 
competitiveness influences the performance of large suppliers (Stegăroiu, 2004: 480). 
Figure 1. Macroeconomic indicators in the EU states
Source: own representation after Eurostat data, 2013
We believe that an overview of the general macroeconomic context within the 
EU is required in order to get a more specific idea on the specialisation situation in 
some EU countries. In this context, the exports and imports from the EU performed 
by member states, the foreign direct investment flows and labour productivity, all 
these with a direct impact on the GDP/capita value, are very important (Figure 1). 
This is precisely why Luxembourg, the country with the highest productivity (176.3 
over the EU27 average=100) and FDI rate (31.02% of GDP), is not by accident reaching 
the highest rates of GDP per capita in PPS (272 over the EU27 average=100). Close to 
France, Belgium and Germany, this little state turned out to register solid growth and 
low inflation and unemployment rates throughout history. Moreover, the industrial 
sector dominated by steel became more and more diversified and included chemi-
cal products, rubber, etc. Its economy depends on approximately 40% foreign and 
cross-border workforce. In crisis, Luxembourg adopted governmental measures 
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to stimulate and support the banking system. Despite these measures, the budget 
deficit reached 5% in 2009, but fell to 1.1% in 2011 and 0.9 % in 2012. Thus, Luxem-
bourg registered the largest current account surplus as rate per cent of GDP in the 
Eurozone, mainly due to its financial services industry. It is worth reminding that it 
focused on strengthening the supervision of local banks to the detriment of foreign 
banks’ activities (Index Mundi, 2013). 
Besides Luxembourg, Ireland (GDP=130; FDI=15.66%; LP=129.7) and France (GDP=108; 
FDI=2.50%; LP=127.8%) also occupy top positions and among Central and Eastern Europe 
states, we may mention: the Slovak Republic (EXP=83.9%), Czech Republic (EXP=80.9%), 
Estonia (FDI=7.40%), Hungary (FDI=6.77%), Slovenia (LP=84.2), Czech Republic (65.9%). 
Also, as seen in table 1, there is a strong correlation between a state’s development level, 
ISD and labour productivity (LP). By calculating the Pearson correlation indices, we find, 
in table 1, that there is over 50% inter-conditionality between EXP and LP (93.3%), GDP 
and LP (89.7%), GDP and FDI (62.7%), GDP and EXP (54.9%).
Table 1. Pearson correlation indices
GDP per 
capita 
in PPS 
(EU27=100)
Share of 
exports 
from EU 
in total 
exports (%)
Share of 
imports 
from EU 
in total 
imports (%)
FDI, net 
inflows 
(% of 
GDP)
Labour 
productiv-
ity per hour 
worked 
(EU27=100)
GDP per 
capita in PPS 
(EU27=100)
Pearson 
Correlation
1,000 ,118 ,053 ,627** ,897**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,549 ,790 ,000 ,000
N 28 28 28 28 28
Share of 
exports from 
EU in total 
exports (%)
Pearson 
Correlation
,118 1,000 ,383* ,250 ,017
Sig. (2-tailed) ,549 ,044 ,200 ,933
N 28 28 28 28 28
Share of 
imports from 
EU in total 
imports (%)
Pearson 
Correlation
,053 ,383* 1,000 ,360 -,138
Sig. (2-tailed) ,790 ,044 ,060 ,484
N 28 28 28 28 28
FDI, net inflows 
(% of GDP)
Pearson 
Correlation
,627** ,250 ,360 1,000 ,334
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,200 ,060 ,083
N 28 28 28 28 28
Labour pro-
ductivity per 
hour worked 
(EU27=100)
Pearson 
Correlation
,897** ,017 -,138 ,334 1,000
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,933 ,484 ,083
N 28 28 28 28 28
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data, 2013
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Actually, in Figure 2, the member states’ position compared to the EU27 average 
can be observed. Luxembourg’s positioning above the average is obvious, being the 
leader at the level of all the analyzed indices. Also, Ireland, Belgium and France hold 
a high labour productivity and export rate, as well as favourable conditions for FDI. 
Figure 2. The relation FDI-LP-EXP
Source: own representation based on Eurostat data, 2013
All these elements, defined as independent variables (EXP, LP, FDI), enable all the 
above-mentioned countries to be the most developed in the EU and therefore, there 
is an R=0.962, an R2=0.926, Sig.=0.000 between the GDP/capita dependent variable 
and the independent variables, which means we may be over 99% certain when we 
state that there are very strong connections among the variables taken into account 
(Table 2).
Table 2. Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Durbin-Watson
1 ,962a ,926 ,914 12,519 1,596
a. Predictors: (Constant), Labour productivity per hour worked (EU27=100), 
Share of exports from EU in total exports (%), Share of imports from EU in total imports (%), 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
b. Dependent Variable: GDP per capita in PPS (EU27=100)
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Table 3. Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) -13,099 22,630 -,579 ,568
Share of exports from EU 
in total exports (%)
,020 ,243 ,005 ,083 ,935
Share of imports from EU 
in total imports (%)
,134 ,289 ,031 ,466 ,646
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 2,398 ,455 ,354 5,274 ,000
Labour productivity per 
hour worked (EU27=100)
1,000 ,080 ,783 12,463 ,000
a. Dependent Variable: GDP per capita in PPS (EU27=100)
Thus, the obtained regression model is as follows: GDP/capita= (0.020 * EXP + 
0.123 * IMP + 2.398 * FDI +1.000 * LP) – 13.099 (table 3). If there is a 0.02% increase 
in export, a 0.12% increase in import, a 2.39% one in FDI, with one LP unit, the GDP 
per capita will increase by one unit. It is not by chance that Luxembourg, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, which hold the top positions in terms of FDI, EXP, LP, also have the 
highest GDP per capita (Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Source: own representation based on Eurostat data, 2013
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Starting from the same indicators, we can calculate the so-called ”specialisation 
potential” (SP): 
where SP
ij
 represents the specialisation potential of a country; X
ij
 is the i variable 
value in the j country and maxX
i
 and minX
i
 are the maximum and minimum values of 
the variables taken into account. SP will ultimately be the weighted average of EXP, 
IMP, FDI, LP. 
The results of our analysis are presented in the Table 4. 
Table 4. Specialisation potential in the EU countries
 EXP IMP FDI LP SP
EU27 0,528 0,441 0,096 0,425 0,372
Belgium 0,690 0,648 -0,049 0,672 0,490
Bulgaria 0,432 0,383 0,098 0,005 0,229
Czech Republic 0,933 0,859 0,145 0,168 0,526
Denmark 0,541 0,732 -0,023 0,636 0,472
Germany 0,403 0,525 -0,009 0,614 0,383
Estonia 0,601 1,000 0,211 0,121 0,483
Ireland 0,448 0,628 0,487 0,649 0,553
Greece 0,114 0,012 0,002 0,229 0,089
Spain 0,546 0,268 0,054 0,479 0,336
France 0,443 0,631 0,047 0,635 0,439
Italy 0,327 0,219 -0,023 0,427 0,238
Cyprus 0,477 0,683 0,108 0,290 0,389
Latvia 0,546 0,948 0,072 0,081 0,412
Lithuania 0,479 0,331 0,017 0,152 0,245
Luxembourg 0,904 0,919 1,000 1,000 0,956
Hungary 0,820 0,718 0,190 0,129 0,464
Malta 0,000 0,905 0,122 0,176 0,301
Netherlands 0,824 0,000 -0,072 0,645 0,349
Austria 0,673 0,882 -0,018 0,540 0,519
Poland 0,817 0,631 -0,016 0,109 0,385
Portugal 0,713 0,764 0,181 0,158 0,454
Romania 0,695 0,813 0,009 0,000 0,379
Slovenia 0,664 0,631 -0,037 0,306 0,391
Slovakia 1,000 0,827 0,091 0,229 0,537
Finland 0,325 0,504 -0,011 0,464 0,321
Sweden 0,399 0,628 -0,011 0,557 0,393
United Kingdom 0,249 0,075 0,040 0,457 0,205
Source: own calculations based on WTO data, 2013
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As expected, by analyzing Table 4, one may notice that the first positions, with the 
highest specialisation coefficient, are held by old EU member states:  Luxembourg 
(0.956), followed by Ireland (0.552), the Slovak Republic (0.537), Czech Republic (0.526). 
If we refer to each component of the specialisation coefficient, with the exception of 
Luxembourg, in terms of export coefficient, the top position is held by Slovak Republic 
(1.000) followed by Czech Republic (0.933), the Netherlands (0.824), Hungary (0.820), 
and Poland (0.817). As for imports, the top positions are held by Estonia (1.000), Latvia 
(0.948), Malta (0.905), Austria (0.882), and the Czech Republic (0.859). Foreign direct 
investments are closely related to labour productivity, which enables Ireland to have 
a 0.487:0.649 ratio. We note the negative example of Romania where labour produc-
tivity is the lowest in the EU. We present the EU27 states’ hierarchy according to the 
specialisation potential in the Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Specialisation potential at EU27 level 
Source: own representation based on own calculations
The EU expansion experience shows that integration stimulates a catching-up 
process, the states being more and more diverse, with an increase in inter-industry 
specialisations, in a manner similar to central economies (the European trade is 
predominantly of the inter-industry type). Eastern economies are mostly special-
ized in low-tech industries which incorporate intense work, the perspective gener-
ated by the integration process being different. Central European economies tend to 
overcome disparities with an accent on industrial diversity and inter-industry trade 
while Eastern countries tend to maintain their inter-industry specialisations with a 
low diversification level. As shown in figure 4, Romania’s specialisation potential is 
above the EU’s average, an aspect which demonstrates the existence of some domains 
in which it holds a clear competitive advantage (agriculture, services etc.) as well as 
of international demand for exports in these fields.  
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Methodology and data
Given the fact that a nation’s specialisation sets the growth acceleration process into 
motion, we consider appropriate an analysis of the fields in which there are compara-
tive advantages based on which states chose to specialize in the 2000–2012 period. 
On the one hand, we will analyze 5 Central and Eastern European states (Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania) – the so-called “supporters of cohesion” – 
which are less developed and have shown a particular interest in the growth and 
retrieval of the already existing disparities processes; on the other hand, we will 
analyze 4 states in the opposed group – “supporters of wiser public spending”: Italy, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, all of these known as developed countries which 
put a stress on competitiveness. Our choice of these groups of states was based on the 
fact that we wish to find whether the hypothesis according to which the integration 
process tends to produce a short and medium term intense specialisation followed by 
a long term despecialisation, resulting from the need to ensure a wide range of com-
parative advantages and products in all fields, is confirmed or not.  Such an attempt 
will enable us to identify, after carrying out the analysis, the European Economic 
Community founding states’ position, as well as that of the countries which joined 
this structure later, in 2004 and 2007, in terms of specialisation. For this purpose, 
we will calculate the Krugman and Grubel-Lloyd specialisation indices of every state, 
for different types of products (manufactures, agricultural products, commercial 
services, fuels and mining products). The Krugman index for export compared to 
EU27 has been calculated in the following manner:
The Grubel-Lloyd index has been determined by the following calculation:
We mention that the data necessary for the analysis has been gathered from of-
ficial statistics (WTO, Amecodatabase, Eurostat). Starting from the analysis results, 
we are going to draw some adjustment measures in crisis within the conclusions 
section, though without claiming that our approach is exhaustive.  
Main results of the analysis
In the 1980s, Central Eastern Europe (CEE) knew comparative advantages in intense 
labour force or traditional products (textiles, clothing, shoes, paper trade), natural 
sectors (basic metals, oil products, fuels) as well as in other groups of products in 
which the labour force cost is more important than technology (Traistaru, Nijkamp 
and Longhi, 2002). In the big resource consuming sectors, the CEE specialisation sud-
denly increased in the early 1980s, when the countries exporting oil products from 
the Western markets benefited from the low price of the oil imported from the former 
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Soviet Union. If we refer to another field, i.e. that of agricultural and food products, 
the comparative advantage of CEE went through major fluctuations throughout that 
period and then rapidly reached positive values by the end of the last decade, after a 
sudden fall in the previous years. 
Starting in 1990, the CEE economies have strengthened their connections to the 
European Union by means of commercial exchanges and foreign direct investments. 
In this context, a series of questions occurs: Was there a relocation of manufacturing 
activities?; Was there a change in the regional specialisation models?; Have the New 
Member States regions specialized/diversified? If we consider all these challenges, 
we reach at least one clear conclusion: the increase in the EU and global economic in-
tegration is likely to lead to industrial activity relocation as well as to a change in the 
specialisation models at the region levels in the joining countries or in the ones which 
are about to join. While new candidate countries will join the integration process, it 
is very likely that they will be preferred for production relocation in the detriment 
of the EU internal regions. The endowment with production factors as well as the 
geographic proximity to European markets determine the production location in the 
countries which are about to join the EU. Therefore, the ones which were initially 
less advantaged would have the possibility to rapidly overcome disparities so as to 
create extended cohesion. This also served as a model for the states which joined the 
EU in 2004 and which have significantly increased their specialisation in manufac-
tured products (Hungary, Poland) in the last years, the same trend being followed 
by the two countries which joined the EU in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria. In the last 
years, the specialisation trend is linear in the case of the founding countries, which 
confirms that the longer the period since accession, the more diverse the production. 
Overproduction, which triggers the appearance of high-tech products on the market, 
particularly in developed countries, occurs. Figure 5 shows the specialisation dis-
crepancies in “manufactured products”. 
The different specialisation levels lead to different scale economies. Normally, a 
powerful specialisation determines high scale economies, which denotes a consistent 
concentration of economic activities in the high technology fields with good salaries 
and a considerable added value. High scale economy industries have the tendency to 
locate close to industrial centres while the intense work ones tend to locate in the 
regions endowed with extensive workforce. As far as the economic performance at 
the EU level is concerned, it varied in 2012. Some economies in the region still have to 
overcome the crisis-imposed disparities in terms of production. Despite the recent 
slight increase rates of 3 up to 5%, the production in Latvia and Lithuania is still 
below the pre-crisis top level in real terms, thus reflecting the frail post-crisis situ-
ations. Other economies where production is below the pre-crisis level are Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania. However, Poland’s economy went through a cyclic recovery in the 
second semester of 2012 while Hungary went into a recession for the whole of 2012. 
Territory – Identity – Integration| 71 
St
u
d
ie
s
Figure 5. Grubel Lloyd intra-industry specialisation index on manufactures
Source: own representation based on WTO data, 2013
All these facts have caused oscillations at the specialisation level of agricultural 
products. We notice the Grubel-Lloyd index increase after Romania’s accession which 
places it on the most favourable position among the analyzed states. Also, we notice 
the linearity in the case of the EU’s developed countries, France being the most spe-
cialized in agricultural products (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Grubel Lloyd intra-industry specialisation index on agricultural products
Source: own representation based on WTO data, 2013
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At the sector level, the comparative advantage model is different for every coun-
try. The main explanation resides in the fact that the CEE countries have different 
socio-economic, institutional, etc. environments and have liberalized and reformed 
their economies at different degrees and thus, differences in terms of manufacture 
production, political stability, administrative reforms have occurred which finally 
led to a different evolution in terms of comparative advantages. Recent studies have 
shown that the specialisation models in many of the CEECs changed in time, often 
rapidly, when the movement of production towards high-tech and highly skilled 
workforce industries took place (Fertö, 2007). Thus, in terms of commercial services 
have produced some structural changes, although not significant during the analysed 
period (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Grubel Lloyd intra-industry specialisation index on commercial services
Source: own representation based on WTO data, 2013
The crisis macroeconomic climate significantly influenced the specialisation of 
commercial services in the analyzed countries. In Poland, retail sales constantly 
increased, in annual terms, until December 2012, which contributed to the real salary 
increase tendencies, and inflation fell to approximately 1.4% in September 2013. Also, 
industrial production increased by 5% in the third semester (EBRD, 2013). The great-
est economy in CEE, Poland, is relatively protected against the Eurozone problems 
due to its extended commercial relations with Russia. In 2012, it spent massively on 
the Euro 2012 Football Championship infrastructure. Moreover, the fall in internal 
demand and the need for fiscal consolidation slowed down economic growth in the 
second half of the year, being below 3% in 2012 and 2013. These were some of the 
factors, which contributed to a commercial services specialisation a little below 
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Romania’s level. Hungary went through a cyclical recovery, with the second semester 
of growth in 2013. This improvement was mostly determined by the public infra-
structure spending as well as by an improvement in internal consumption due to an 
increase in the real salary. Despite all these, the production level is still the same as 
the one at the beginning of 2009. The forecasts for 2014 predict a positive marginal 
increase of around 1.2% (EBRD, 2013).
In 2013, a modest economic growth was registered and the GDP increased by 1.3% 
in the second semester in Romania. Although inflation fell and fiscal performance 
improved, the economic growth perspectives are still extremely dependent on the 
Eurozone. The government aims to privatize important state corporations like CFR 
Marfă, Oltchim – the chemical products company, copper mines and energy com-
panies. By taking such measures, the government aims, among others, to increase 
the mining and fuel products specialisation. At present, among the analyzed CEE 
countries, the best-positioned ones, in this respect, are Bulgaria and Lithuania (Fig-
ure 8). The economy in Bulgaria shows some slight signs of recovery and the export 
performance continues to improve. The positive elements are related to stable prices, 
to low public debt and to the country’s constancy in reaching EU standards from the 
fiscal point of view despite a modest increase in the governmental deficit target (2% 
of GDP) for 2013. Nevertheless, internal demand is rather weak which means that 
there will be a modest increase in the next period. Lithuania has been affected by the 
external demand decrease. Based on supplementary productivity as well as on the 
export market share increases, the country seems well prepared to take advantage 
of the incipient European recovery.  The increase rates for 2014 are expected to be 
between 2.5 and 3.5% (Eurostat, 2013). Despite all these, industrial production and 
exports can be exposed to changes in individual industries or in individual investors’ 
strategies. 
Therefore, CEE economies are confronted with various economic challenges. On the 
one hand, low incomes increase internal consumption deficit and, on the other hand, 
the public services budget is often reduced. However, there are some positive aspects 
as well: stimulated by the slightly improved economic performance in the Eurozone, 
exports function well and an improvement in the access to markets outside the EU 
is noticed. Also, inflation is generally low in the whole region. Despite all these, the 
progress in structural reforms remains poor, being limited by the difficult economic 
environment. One thing is certain, though: the economic growth perspectives in CEE 
will very much depend on the Eurozone evolution. The developed countries in our 
analysis (France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands) are part of the Economic Monetary 
Union and therefore, for as long as their economies function well, this state of affairs 
will be reflected on the whole Union. In completing the Grubel-Lloyd specialisation 
index, we calculated the Krugman specialisation index for the two EU member cat-
egories: old and new (Figure 9).  
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Figure 8. Grubel Lloyd intra-industry specialisation index on fuels and mining products
Source: own representation based on WTO data, 2013
Figure 9. Krugman specialisation index for new and old members
Source: own representation based on WTO data, 2013
Thus, in the old EU member group, the strongest specialisation is held by the 
Netherlands, followed by Germany. Throughout the analyzed period (2000–2012), 
Italy and France had a 0.2 index, which means that the more developed and better 
integrated within the global economy some countries are, the more probable it is 
for them to give up specialisation and turn towards trade diversification. In the new 
member states group, Bulgaria and Lithuania detach in their average term tendency 
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to reach the other states’ specialisation level, being rather focused on finding new 
market niches than on extending narrow production lines. 
The fields of activity in which states hold a high specialisation degree (the Grubel-
Lloyd specialisation index is close to 100) can be seen in the enclosed annexes (named 
“Specialization or Diversification in Export Production?”). Thus, as far as the CEE 
states are concerned, in the 2006–2009 period, Bulgaria had a strong specialisation in 
agricultural products and then, after 2010, it has had a high specialisation coefficient 
in fuels, mining and manufactures. Hungary stands out in terms of manufactures 
and commercial services; after 2008, there has been an increase in manufactures 
in Poland; Romania witnessed an increase in commercial services in the 2000–2012 
period and, after 2010, in agricultural products. As for developed countries, France 
holds competitive advantages in manufactures, agricultural products, commercial 
services; In the 2006–2012 period, Germany witnessed a significant increase in com-
mercial services; in the analyzed period, Italy registered a strong specialisation in 
commercial services followed by manufactures and the Netherlands saw a high spe-
cialisation degree, with values close to 100, in three domains: commercial services, 
fuels and mining and manufactures.  
Conclusions
Generally, the mechanisms of European integration (internal market, European 
Monetary Union) generate the convergence of the specialization patterns and of 
the European economies competitiveness. On their way to specialization countries 
should go through several stages: 1st stage: specialization based on comparative 
advantage in small number of industries (mostly inter-industry specialization); 2nd 
stage: diversification, with horizontal IIT and vertical IIT (learning and information 
externalities, economies of scale, diversification of domestic demand, inter-industry 
technological transfer and spillover, diversification of the financial sector); 3rd stage: 
horizontal IIT specialization (economies of scale, search for comparative advantages 
in technology, human capital, innovation). 
The results of the study emphasize that growth and economic convergence at re-
gional and national level is sustained on medium term by specialization and on long 
term rather by diversification of production and trade (prior to the establishment of 
the internal market the specialization knows an increase and after its implementa-
tion appears a diversification of production and trade). Usually, the developed econo-
mies (old EU members) have comparative advantages in the knowlwdge – intensive 
industries (horizontal IIT specialization), related to diversification of specialization 
and of obtaining economies of scale while the catching-up EU countries (new EU 
members) have vertical IIT specialisation, according to their comparative advantage. 
Internal market supports a process of convergence regarding the specialization mod-
els and the convergence is stimulated by the periods of economic growth and takes 
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place essentially on clusters of countries/regions. The periods of economic growth 
sustain the catching-up process for the peripheral economies of the EU, especially 
for the Central and Eastern ones (growth rates superior to the European average). 
The increased dynamics of the trade flows (superior to the European average) in the 
peripheral economies proves the important contribution to ensuring the economic 
growth, but their external vulnerability as well. 
The crisis of the European economies shows their reduced capacity of economic 
recovery, risking to increase disparities. The EU27 registers a de-specialisation 
trend, concentrating on high-tech and high-skills industries, with a high potential 
to sustain economic growth, productivity and employment. As economies become 
more developed and more integrated into the global economy, tend to renounce to 
specialization (inverse relationship between growth/integration and specializa-
tion). The tendency of the Central and Eastern European economies is to increase 
the production and trade specialisation, diminishing the potential of growth and 
convergence (e.g. in agriculture: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary; in manufacturers: Ro-
mania, Lithuania Poland; in commercial services: Poland, Romania, Hungary). These 
countries have proved a great catching-up power and this because they had to adapt 
to tougher conditions on the EU internal market (very competitive environment). As 
we have already shown, the study demonstrates the growing trend of specialization 
prior to the establishment of the internal market and the tendency of diversification 
of production and trade after this process (see the annexes). In such circumstances, it 
should be taken into account the following aspects:
• The convergence of the production structures and of the trade patterns is essen-
tial to reduce the economic peripherality of the Eastern European countries;
• It is necessary to improve the functioning of the internal market and to increase 
its contribution to the more efficient distribution of resources according to the 
comparative advantages, to the generation of scale economies and stimulation of 
the processes of spreading the industrial agglomerations/concentrations – the 
development of complementary poles of growth;
• It is necessary for the member states to contribute more to reduce the deficit of 
implementing the directives of the internal market in the national legislations;
• It seems more important for CEE countries to diversify the production and trade 
and to specialize their export based on scale economies;
• The need to develop an European cohesion policy in which the territoriality has 
become one of the basis pillars, along with the economic and social one.
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Annexes
Table 1. 
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EU27 100 63,4 100 1,8 20,2 6 72
EU15 112,7 65,3 110,5 1,6 19,9 6 72,5
Belgium 120 61,1 130,3 0,8 19,2 4,8 75,2
Bulgaria 37 55,8 35,8 9,1 23,2 5,8 61,9
Czech Republic 79 64,8 72,9 2,9 30,1 6 61
Denmark 123 75,9 107,1 1,4 20,1 5,4 73,1
Germany 115,5 65,5 108,4 0,9 25,4 4 69,7
Estonia 61 64,4 60,7 3,5 21,5 7,1 67,9
Ireland 144 67,6 135,4 1,6 24,9 10 63,5
Greece 90 60,1 95,8 4,9 13 6,3 75,8
Spain 102 63,3 101,3 3,2 18,2 11,5 67,1
France 110 63,7 116,3 2,3 15,1 5,7 76,9
Croatia 57 55 74,5 5 21 7,6 66,4
Italy 105 57,6 111,9 2,2 20,7 6 71,1
Cyprus 93 68,5 82,9 2,8 11,3 8,2 77,7
Latvia 49,4 63,3 47,8 4 15,6 6,2 74,2
Lithuania 54 62,6 54,9 4,8 25,2 7,5 62,5
Luxembourg 253 63,6 170 0,4 10,6 6,1 82,9
Hungary 63 56,9 67,6 4,2 25,2 4,8 65,8
Malta 80 53,9 94,5 2,6 17 4,2 76,2
Netherlands 130 73,2 114,4 2,1 18,8 5,4 73,7
Austria 125 68,6 118,3 1,6 22,2 7 69,2
Poland 51 52,8 61,6 4,5 24,7 6 64,8
Portugal 79 67,5 72,8 2,8 18 6,9 72,3
Romania 35 57,6 36,1 9,5 28,1 7,4 55
Slovenia 87 66 83,1 2,7 27,4 6,7 63,2
Slovakia 60 57,7 68,7 3,7 29,7 6,7 59,9
Finland 114 68,4 111,1 2,8 25,8 6,7 64,7
Sweden 121 72,5 111,9 1,2 23,3 4,8 70,7
United Kingdom 124 71,7 114,9 0,7 16,9 6,1 76,3
Source: Eurostat database
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Source: own calculations and representations based on WTO data, 2013.
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Regional Policy Implementation in Romania. 
Inadequate policies, Regulations, or Both?
Cristian Încalțărău1 – Doru Botezat2
Abstract
Although one of the most prosperous areas in the world, there are still major dif-
ferences in the development level among EU member states and regions, differences 
which are inconsistent to the long-term economic and political integration objectives. 
This paper shows that beside the fact that the convergence process can be slowed 
down by various distortions that the European funding mechanism is generating 
the impact can be further hindered by inefficient implementation. The case studies 
we have considered regarding the Competitiveness and Human Resources SOP are 
representative for all the available funding programmes in Romania, pointing out 
the inadequacy of the policy implementation process. The structural funds’ impact 
was rather poor mainly due to a low absorption which was hampered by the delay 
in launching of operational programmes, the lack of coordination between strate-
gies and programmes and the administrative burden caused by gaps in the rules or 
unclear rules.
Introduction
Although the European Union is one of the most prosperous areas in the world, there 
are major differences among member states and regions with regard to their degree 
of development, differences which are considered inadequate when compared to the 
long-term economic and political integration objectives. The rising interest, at the 
European level, in reducing disparities is reflected in the European regional policy 
which has set as its main objective bringing the life standard in less developed coun-
tries to the average level in the EU at the necessary rhythm in order to ensure the 
functionality of the internal market and monetary union, on the one hand, and to 
achieve the Union’s strategic objectives, on the other.
1 Researcher, PhD, Centre for European Studies, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi. 
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On the whole, regional policy is focused both on decreasing the development dis-
parities at the European level (among the regions in various member states) and at 
the national one (among the regions of each country). Beyond justifying this vision in 
economic terms (convergence facilitation), helping the regions reach their maximum 
potential of economic growth represents added value to the EU in general, which ac-
counts for the support of investments at the regional level in the form of European 
funds with the purpose of improving competitiveness and life quality in general as 
well as stimulating economic growth.
Eastern and Central European states, i.e., the ones that joined the EU in the last 
decade are below the development level of older members. In the period 2007–2013, 
approximately half the sum destined to regional policy was allocated to those states 
in order to help them overcome these disparities by increasing economic competi-
tiveness, developing human resources and by improving cooperation at the European 
level.3 Romania was allocated roughly 19 billion euros within the same period through the 
so-called Sectoral Operational Programmes (POS) which were targeted at some important 
development sectors (Increase of Economic Competitiveness, Human Resources Develop-
ment, Administrative Capacity, Environment, Transport) as well as through the Regional 
Operational Programme (POR) – the only one specifically devised to allocate funds aimed 
at regional development. Among the most important programmatic documents, besides the 
programme itself (as a document), there were the so-called Implementation Framework 
Documents which described the funding operations mechanism as well as applicants’ 
separate guides for each operation, which clarified the participation conditions and the 
financial support for financed projects.4 All these documents, at least at a theoretical and 
formal level, were supposed to harmonize with the National Development Plan – a major 
document of the Romanian Government, which was adapted to and agreed upon by the 
EU during the accession negotiations. At the administrative level, each of the mentioned 
programmes had a management authority and some intermediary organisms. The man-
agement authority managed an operational programme as a whole while the intermediary 
organisms were the interface between the beneficiaries and the management authority on 
different specialized axes within the operational programmes. There was never a territo-
rial distribution rule for these mechanisms but the intermediary organisms also had, in 
principle, executive regional offices (though without being decision makers). The actual 
implementation at the administrative level was run according to some procedures in line 
with the guides and programmatic documents which included the whole process from the 
competition organization to the final reimbursement and post-implementation evaluation. 
This whole mechanism required an extremely complex and sophisticated public authority 
as well as a considerable financial effort. 
3 For more details see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy
4 For more details see http://ec.europa.eu/romania
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This study aims to carry out an analysis of the operational programmes imple-
mentation in Romania. The first part offers an overview of the role that structural 
funds hold and their capacity to meet the expectations related to it. The second one 
is exclusively focused on Romania’s case from the perspective of operational pro-
grammes implementation policies as well as from that of the funds’ impact, of the 
effectiveness of the assumed objectives fulfilment (we have dealt with SOP Competi-
tiveness and SOP Human Resources).
Regional development, convergence and structural funds. A theoretical approach 
There are serious disputes in the economic literature regarding the claimed develop-
ment effect determined by the structural mechanisms run by the European Union. 
These disputes are the consequence of academic analyses of the proposed policies 
as well as of the analyses of the practical results of previous programmes run by 
the Union. The main criticism in the specialized literature brought to the structural 
funds financing mechanism is related to the fact that these funds lead to: 
• the shift in economic behaviour and in market orientation (in a “rent-seeking” 
manner) (Forte el al., 2010);
• following the administrative aspects despite sectoral losses;
• the shift in economic activities towards unproductive administration and finan-
cial blockages occurred as a consequence of co-financing allocations – sums which 
are deployed from the market; 
• the artificial increase of lending and consequently, of credit risk. 
Although these programmes appear as a perfectly harmless intervention with 
exclusively beneficial effects, being regarded as a sort of “dietary supplement” for 
healthy economic growth and also taking into account convergence (the elimination 
of disparities among regions) as the main determiner of their initiation, there are 
also arguments against these funds, which can be primarily found in the comparative 
studies area which tries to present them from the alternative perspective to natural 
convergence (the lack of funds). From this perspective, empirical studies note that 
convergence processes were a lot more significant in the years when there were no 
compensatory and/or structural policies (the 1950s–60s) (Boldrin and Canova, 2003). 
In the last 20 years, the European Union has considerably increased the structural 
funds levels though without producing a visible impact on the economic convergence 
rate. Empirical estimations suggest that, since the establishment of structural and 
cohesion policies, convergence has stopped in the West. 
However, despite empirical evidence, the convergence-through-funds hypothesis 
is more popular than ever. The whole research “mechanism” around the European 
Commission and particularly, the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
tried to demonstrate that, due to increasing disparities, larger and larger sums are 
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necessary for structural funds. This, among others, is due to the fact that these funds 
are the most effective propaganda instruments both for the Brussels people, who thus 
propagate a feeling of loyalty among regions (favour lobby and maintain bureaucracy 
in Brussels as well as in the assisted countries) and for local politicians or governors 
in the receiving countries, for whom nothing is more profitable than announcing 
new public spending programmes especially when the invoice is paid by taxpayers in 
another country. Since political players seem unwilling to end these, the questioning 
should revolve around more efficient spending of these funds (The Economist, 2003). 
However, the transfers involved in structural policies make an obvious difference 
in the receiving countries. The goal is to generate sustained growth in less developed 
regions by not serving an income redistribution purpose. Receiving a check of 2-5% 
of the national income every year is nevertheless a benefit for those countries. While 
the overall objective is clear, the actual implementation raises a series of issues. 
Targeting regional inequalities should not be confused with reducing individual in-
come inequalities. But if we take into account the fact that clear-cut transfers, health, 
education, social security and public spending were never below 25% of Europe’s GDP 
in the last decade (Eurostat), we conclude that structural funds are rather meant to 
weaken social tensions, most often embezzled by corrupted politicians. Consequently, 
while a series of income transfers may induce a succession of temporary reductions 
in regional discrepancies, they must not be mistaken for triggering sustained regional 
convergence, which would be the successful conclusion of regional policy. In other 
words, these funds are undoubtedly welcome in the recipient countries but it is ques-
tionable whether they bring economic growth, generate productive infrastructures, 
are assimilated in unproductive spending or not. From this perspective, it is not the 
funds or the financing projects, which produce damage, but the management mecha-
nisms of these funds, which embezzle the administration and market balance. The 
example of some countries (Spain, Ireland) whose rate of growth was high is used 
as an argument in favour of the funds’ effectiveness in a win-win situation. However, 
whether these countries also had other opportunities as well as the combination 
of policies and circumstances which determined such high rates of growth should 
also be analysed.  For example, Spain merged structural unilateral liberalization 
policies with market-oriented ones and managed, in 20 years, to raise its GDP from 
60% to 80% of the European average while the Mezogiorno regions in Italy (Calabria, 
Campania, Sardegna, Sicily), in the absence of structural reforms, although intensely 
financed, stagnated (Martin, 2003). From this perspective, structural funds, in their 
present form, are not efficient or cause damages both to the recipient countries and 
to the net contributors although, at the same time, the expansion of structural policy, 
followed by liberalization, represents a chance for convergence for it would constitute 
an investment support in classic conditions of labour and capital mobility.
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Funds can facilitate economic growth but not in a space which lacks economic liber-
alization or in the absence of some adequate internal policies. In these circumstances, a 
substantial support can temporarily increase the incomes of a recipient region, which 
may suggest the necessity for structural reforms, but it has not yet been proven that 
these incomes also generate rates of growth on the long term. As an argument in 
favour of the fact that regional and structural policies did not cause any miracles, or 
at least the convergences which have been registered up to this moment, the critics of 
the funds discuss examples such as the one of South-Eastern Asia (Bachtler and Wren, 
2006) which had no structural policy to support its spectacular growth in the 90s. On 
the other hand, those who compare structural policies to the Marshall Plan are told 
that Sicily and Calabria were not even close to the level of development in the North of 
Italy despite the fact that they had received, through structural policies, twenty times 
as much as through a Marshall Plan. Also, Boldrin and Canova (2003) have shown that 
structural funds are not effective by themselves, that there are negative effects on 
the growth rates and convergence, and that there is a rather insignificant positive 
effect if the policies are “adequate”; by these “adequate policies” we understand high 
institutional quality (capacity), reduced corruption, unrestricted market and trade 
rather than low inflation, small deficit and austerity budget. 
Therefore, not only that the risk for these funds to be wasted in the absence of ad-
equate conditions occurs but, by creating distortions, they may also alter growth 
rates on the long run. 
First of all, structural funds are normally gathered from distorted taxes which pro-
duce the so-called “dead weight loss” (Lind and Granqvist, 2010), i.e. a fiscal overload 
(the loss in economy determined by tax increases and tax mass decrease). This loss can 
be justified in public policy only if the social rate from the return of structural funds 
financed investments is consistent enough to compensate both for the fund loss and 
opportunity costs. But, usually, things are the other way around. For example, in the 
high unemployment rate regions, there is strong political pressure to adopt massive 
policies of inefficient transfer. And the probability to decide upon such erroneous 
policies is heightened by the external funds availability. Under these circumstances, 
empirical evidence has shown that subsidies and transfer policies have made inter-
regional imbalances even more persistent. A particular case which demonstrates this 
theory is the so-called “Big Brother effect” (big brother’s problem), with reference 
to the former East Germany (Hall and Ludwig, 2006). Unlike the Central and East-
European countries which joined the Union in 2004 and 2007, Democratic Germany 
took advantage, throughout its transition, ever since the 1990s, of the protection and 
support provided by its big brother. Eastern German Lands benefited from abundant 
public subsidies beyond the structural funds received due to the regions’ status in 
Objective 1 (as the convergence objective used to be named in the initial financing 
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periods). 23 years later, the result is a constant lag, a decrease in productivity, mas-
sive unemployment and a lot of subsidies. The question which arises is how has a ter-
ritory provided with valuable resources and assistance managed to fail in delivering 
stimuli for sustainable development. There are many reasons for this, debated in the 
specialized literature by (Bachtler and Turok, 2002; Page, 2003; Boldrin and Canova, 
2003; Snower and Merkl, 2006; Hall and Ludwig, 2006). An abstract, as much as popu-
lar argument is the classic one according to which the support, although significant, 
was either insufficient or inappropriately spent. According to Page (2003), the main 
cause resides in the misleading effects that the income support policies had on the 
East-German inhabitants’ disposition to work, produce and invest. 
Secondly, structural funds are a means to distort priorities in relation to the 
market-generated situation (Pita-Barros, 2002). Businesses will struggle to get into 
the networking and training type financed activities and will consequently forget 
to focus on the real demands of the market. Moreover, in order to qualify for these 
funds, recipient countries must offer a significant part of the sum as co-financing, 
which forces them to impose other taxes for resources (connected to increasing taxes 
and overtaxing in the donor countries). This had painful budgetary effects on some 
countries like Portugal, which had to resort to financial slaloms in order to maintain 
itself within the requirements of the monetary union, but also for the newly joined 
states, which are forced to direct great sums from their budget towards financed 
projects. At the microeconomic level, the phenomenon is similar. After all, the funds 
are not for the poor but for those who can co-finance. Consequently, accessing funds 
can create the premises for social insecurity and tensions due to the increased differ-
ences between “the rich” and “the poor” (Dărășteanu et al., 2009).
Thirdly, structural funds direct great sums of money towards programmes focused on 
advanced technologies and research, and development activities in regions where special-
ized workforce is scarce (the so-called phenomenon of “cathedrals in the desert”) (Hardy, 
1998). Midelfart-Jknarvik and Hernry Overman from the London School of Economics, 
in an article from the journal Economic Policy titled  “Is structural spending justified?” 
(quoted in The Economist, 2003), argue that financed industries do not actually help 
poor regions economically, turning into mere processing centres for multinationals.  
Despite the uncertainty about these funds, considering the fact that they have sup-
ported the development discrepancies reduction in certain regions and also taking 
into account the fact that they represent a type of political propaganda instrument, 
giving up this type of financing seems, at least at this point, rather unlikely. There-
fore, the objectors’ main goal revolves around the financing criteria modification so 
as to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. After all, the principles, criteria and 
reforms which underlie structural funds were, to a great extent, imposed by their 
opponents. They required such criteria as: 
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• Concentration of funds where the need is greatest and/or adjustment of the defini-
tion of disadvantaged regions by using much lower percentages than at present; 
• Cooperation and complementarity must be ensured by exclusive financing of the 
regions which are federal units with autonomous taxation and financing author-
ity and which can directly negotiate with the commission, independently from 
their parent states; 
• Funds must not be granted in order ”to bribe” governments to compromise with 
the regions or for “consensus building”.  
With these arguments, the fact that structural funds are simply transfers, which 
facilitate political harmonization, understanding and coalition building, is finally ad-
mitted. “The convergence objective” by spending these funds is still far and “growth 
enhancement” should only be maintained as a “scientific” objective.    
Another requirement imposed by the critics is the exclusive financing of larger 
scale projects which would enable the recovery from the industrial crisis as well as 
agricultural restructuring. Some anecdotic evidences point to the fact that the sup-
port offered to SMEs through structural funds is rather helping these firms “seem 
small” and create solid political connections in order to gain a comparative advantage 
in rent seeking than in the value added to the economy (Boldrin and Canova, 2003). 
An additional criterion is represented by the project evaluation according to its “pub-
lic good nature”, i.e. by focusing on infrastructure, not as much on the advantages it 
provides as on the fact that it is easier to control.  
By cumulating all these recommendations, from a pragmatic perspective we may 
conclude that the stake of these funds becomes the optimization of their spending in 
order to reach the declared objectives. From this perspective, real evaluation must 
focus on the implementation methods and procedures whose management may influ-
ence, both qualitatively and quantitatively, funds absorption as well as their positive 
or negative effect on the economy. 
The analysis of the implementation process in Romania. Case studies 
General context 
Starting from this general critical view on the role of European funds in decreasing 
development disparities, we will focus on Romania’s case in order to observe the ele-
ments or arguments which can be applied to a recently run process by taking into 
account the numerous variables involved. As we have previously stated, the contribu-
tion of funds to disparity reduction depends on numerous factors among which, the 
extent to which available funds are accessed and invested. Therefore, the impact of 
the funds is primarily limited by their rate of absorption. Romania’s problem is the 
absorption or, otherwise said, the failure to absorb structural funds. At the end of 
October 2013, the absorption rate at the level of all programmes was 24.6% out of 
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the total sum allocated by the EU although 91.2% of the financing contracts had been 
signed. A synthetic presentation of the implementation figures for the 2009–2013 
period (the first competitions were run at the end of 2008), comprising three major 
categories, is given in Figure 1: contracted funds, funds spent by beneficiaries, and 
reimbursed funds. The huge difference between the contracted and the reimbursed 
sums reflects the serious problems in the implementation process. These implemen-
tation problems are generated by various factors: the lack of trained personnel and 
weak budgetary capacity of local administrations, bureaucratic obstacles, thick col-
lections of rules difficult to understand, the lack of transparency in the co-financing 
regulations, poor chances of experience exchanges between the advocates of the 
projects as well as wasted possibilities of inter-regional coordination (Boștinaru, 
2013). Moreover, despite the fact that these funds should be targeted at reducing 
development disparities, it was found that the rich (high budget applicants) are the 
ones with easier access to European funds and consequently continue to grow, while 
economically weak entities cannot benefit from the funds and are thus left behind 
(Dărășteanu et al., 2009). This reflects the limited accessibility which prevents them 
from achieving the goal they were created for, i.e. convergence. 
Figure 1. Contracted funds, funds paid out to beneficiaries and reimbursement from EC5
(% total allocation)
Source: own representation using Romanian Ministry for European Funds data; 
amounts in Lei are converted to Euro by using the inforeuro exchange rate
The present study continues with an analysis of two cases, respectively the imple-
mentation method in two out of seven operational programmes applied in Romania: 
the Sectoral Operational Programme “Economic Competitiveness Increase” (hereaf-
5 The difference between the funds paid to beneficiaries and the European commission reim-
bursements resides in the fact that payment to projects beneficiaries is made from the state 
budget in order to favour ongoing projects, the state subsequently receiving the money from 
the European Commission (actual reimbursements); there are cases when some expenses 
are considered ineligible and the reimbursed sums are lower than the ones initially paid 
from the state budget.
Territory – Identity – Integration | 95 
St
u
d
ie
s
ter named SOP IEC), meant to produce direct effects on economy, more precisely on 
the competitiveness of the economy, whose projection actually comprises changes 
in the competitiveness indicators, and the Sectoral Operational Programme “Human 
Resources Development” (hereafter named SOP HRD)6 which is actually targeted 
at the same global purpose: the economic competitiveness increase. In order to be 
accurate, we have also considered the economic crisis variable, which manifested 
simultaneously with a substantial period of the implementation programme.
 The analysis comprises of two perspectives: 
• the analysis of the implementation policy aspects (the analysis of the procedures) 
focused on identifying the causes which led to the poor fund absorption and its 
consequent insignificant impact. 
• the analysis of the expected impact and effects in Romania after joining the EU in 
January 2007.
Even though structural programmes did not start long ago so as to allow an analy-
sis of structure and relevant effects on the long term – which are generally targeted 
by structural funds -, the evolution of some indicators can lead to some conclusions 
with the limitation that these do not reveal a solid, established tendency able to 
provide a final verdict. 
As far as the analysis of structural funds implementation policy is concerned, 
we have chosen to identify some implementation policy “mistakes” which can be at-
tached to two temporal coordinates: before and during (specific to) implementation. 
Their identification was based on various-sourced data related to the running of pro-
grammes: public information on institutional sites, debates, interviews with funds 
beneficiaries, authors’ participation in expert trainings, seminars and discussions 
with the officials and beneficiaries in the system, question sessions with manage-
ment authorities, online forums.7 In this sense, the enunciations formulated as policy 
error, organizational or institutional deficiency are the result of an analysis performed 
on a broad spectrum of case studies as well as of a convergence of opinions which 
underlie the conclusions. 
Even though some aspects of the analysis of the two programmes cannot be 
extrapolated to the whole implementation mechanism, the study and its results are 
relevant for the entire implementation policy because all operational programmes 
were run according to similar mechanisms and procedures, based on the regulations 
in European legislation, as well as on the usual practice of the Romanian state. In 
other words, the implementation has been a process run according to relatively 
6 For more details see http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/documente-programare
7 We mention that one of the authors worked for six years in an intermediary implementation 
organism of POS CCE (SOP Competitiveness).
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uniform rules, with differences occurring exclusively at the operational management 
level (more or less rigid, within imposed limits). 
By combining the two methodologies (the analysis on the evolution of indicators 
and the identification of policy errors in the case study spectrum taken into account), 
we have devised a composite macro-political analysis by cumulating three fundamen-
tal categories of factors: Actors (institutions, stakeholders), Context and Mechanism. 
As far as Actors are concerned, the errors or accidents occurred during the decisional 
process of the institutions involved, at different hierarchical levels, which either 
determined or prevented a certain course of events, were identified. The Context sets 
these facts into a wider, uncontrollable, institutional and human spectrum. For exam-
ple, the economic crisis was a socio-economic phenomenon which occurred relatively 
independently from the decisions we are referring to, which either enhanced or di-
minished certain effects of the decisional process. Finally, the Mechanism cumulates 
the first two classes of factors and globally describes the breaks which occurred in 
the communication and connection between the situations in the first two classes, 
or at the hierarchical (vertical) or horizontal levels. It is otherwise very difficult to 
separate or delineate real life effects and to assign them to one factor or another. All 
we can achieve is a speculative estimate of the plausibility of some theories gener-
ated by the above-mentioned factors’ activity.  
The Implementation Policy. SOP IEC and SOP HRD
Romania’s adhesion to the European Union on 1 January 2007 was not or should not 
have been an abrupt and radical process. During adhesion negotiations, both the 
European Commission and the Romanian Government agreed to get through some 
adaptability steps in order for the Romanian institutions to reach the Community 
acquis in all adhesion points. The premise was to set up and build such an administra-
tive capacity of managing programs so that Romania might effectively implement 
the structural programs upon adhesion. To this effect and apart from the use of 
pre-adhesion funds which turned out to be good practice, Romania financed and ran 
certain governmental programmes precisely meant to get the population and the 
concerned institutions ready to access funds as early as possible in order to stick to a 
quite ambitious implementation schedule.   
The Pre-implementation Period
The Institutions involved/responsible included the Government, the potential beneficiar-
ies and the European Commission. The Context: an increasing economy, major expecta-
tions due to funding surplus and to the excitement of integration and poor knowledge 
of European mechanisms. The Mechanism may be described by four major symptoms 
that preceded or occurred during the structural programmes implementation:
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a. National budget over-investments in preparing the implementation of structural 
funds and the lack of timing between investments and programme actions 
For instance, while preparing the SOP IEC implementation in 2006, the Romanian 
Government by the Ministry of Education, as manager of a SOP IEC axis dedicated 
to increasing competitiveness by financing research, launched the IMPACT program 
meant to boost the capacity of drafting R&D and innovation projects to be proposed 
for financing from the structural funds towards the strengthening of structural fund 
absorption capacity (quoted from the preamble to the law approving the Governmen-
tal Resolution nr.9309/02.08.2006, http://www.poscce.edu.ro/ro). Although first 
recommended for a longer period (2006–2010), the mentioned program was brought 
to an end in 2008 because of lack of funding and, we may say, due to its failure at-
tested by the constant dropping from one phase to another of both interest (applica-
tions) and number of funded projects. As a matter of fact, this programme turned 
into a loss for both the budget and the economy in general (which was obvious in the 
implementation of structural funds): 
More than 700 feasibility studies or impact studies (on business plans) were 
funded under this program. The state used to spend EUR 10,000 to EUR 25,000 for 
each of these studies under a generous programme with a very loose selection proc-
ess. Assessments were performed by the Intermediate Body staff (civil servants in 
the Ministry of Education) who did not hold the required scientific qualifications and 
by non-specialists. Actually, the drafting criteria were very simple. The underlying 
reason for the looseness and generosity of the programme was to encourage and 
to teach people how to work on projects. In fact, any higher education institution 
could file as many project applications as wanted at any session under the IMPACT 
programme. All this money indirectly financed the beneficiary because it was 
disbursed to consultancy firms agreed by the government. Since the government 
initially performed quite a restrictive selection among these firms, they managed 
to hold a rather significant project portfolio for each region (approximately three in 
each region) and that turned out to be a profitable business. The above-mentioned 
firms seized the opportunity and consequently stimulated, either directly or by sub-
contracting, research institutions to apply for such projects by relying on template 
application forms that firms most frequently provided the academic staff with. This 
was not only to boost project development, but also rather to fuel the feasibility study 
business, as the financing of the feasibility study did not require the actual submis-
sion of a project. Moreover, as we shall see hereinafter, the submission of projects was 
considerably quite limited as compared with to the large number of IMPACT projects 
(feasibility studies). 
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b. Generating unrealistic expectations
With reference to the IMPACT program, we may notice that it indirectly generated ex-
pectations among the academic staff in Romania who expected to get the money as easy 
as the funding for the feasibility studies. Besides, the formal message of the research 
authority at the time was vague; since the contracts for the operational programmes 
were not yet completed, an idea (completely false) was then advocated – that the IM-
PACT programme was a sort of pre-selection phase for the project contest (although 
guidelines and drafts specified that structural fund contests were a distinct matter); 
the public’s awareness of the European funding mechanisms was close to non-existent 
since not even the officials in the system – mostly new comers – knew exactly what the 
connection would be. The connection was next to zero. As the wording of operational 
programmes was gradually completed and agreed upon, it became more and more 
obvious that access to new contests would be indiscriminately granted to anyone 
(whether holding an IMPACT-funded feasibility study or not). 
As already said, any member of the academic world could practically submit a 
project.  Universities covered at least 10 academic fields and it was only in these fields 
that each University received funding for over 10 IMPACT programmes across several 
sessions, plus the projects of research institutions which were not limited in number 
under the IMPACT programme. 
On the first competition launched as late as the end of 2008, the first blow was 
inflicted upon by the competition rule as such: Institutions could only submit one 
project (by operation). This was not a major problem for research institutions which 
are usually single-profiled. However, universities threw away dozens of feasibility 
studies from the start. The only link with the former IMPACT programme was the 
acceptance of applicants whose study was performed under IMPACT (i.e. the benefi-
ciaries holding such a study). In the meanwhile, those not holding such an IMPACT 
study could nevertheless settle their expenses through the project. Moreover, on the 
competition opening, feasibility studies had to be in line with the new legislation 
and upgraded. Although, by derogation, applicants holding an IMPACT-funded study 
were not obliged to align it to the new legislation, all applicants chose to do so, at 
their expense, because they would otherwise have been at a disadvantage in front 
of the applicants submitting new studies. Consequently, any competitive edge of the 
IMPACT applicants was practically annihilated although anyone in the academic 
world considered these projects to be a structural pre-funding and expected the 
programme to enter its course. Very few projects (about 3 to 5 by region) have been 
selected during the first competitions at the end of 2008 on the second axis of SOP 
IER (SOP Competitiveness) and this was utterly disappointing for both beneficiaries 
and applicants. 
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c. Net loss due to the poor quality of studies
As it turned out during the implementation phase, many of the IMPACT-funded feasi-
bility studies were badly elaborated and further amendments had to be made to the 
feasibility studies, which entailed either the non-eligibility of certain expenses or a 
delay in getting the project approved. The IMPACT-funded feasibility study became a 
market product in itself, rather demanded by consultancy firms than by indirect ben-
eficiaries, i.e. the institutions applying for structural funds financing. This market 
shift resulted in the production of some nearly-standard template studies provided 
to beneficiaries upon some little embellishment and customization process in order 
to match the applicant’s profile. Structural funds operators (Intermediate Body staff) 
hold considerable portfolios of projects in which beneficiaries had to accept expense 
cuts on applications for reimbursement because the project featured activities and 
purchases not reflected in the feasibility study. Even when such expenses were ap-
proved for financing, the time and resources spent to make specific clarifications and 
to get further permits were considerable.
d. Institutional deficit and programming inconsistency 
Our focus here is, in broader terms, on the institutional mechanism created for the 
absorption of funds and its timing with the programming objectives: newly set-up 
institutions, whether at the central or local level, reporting to competent ministries 
implementing various uncorrelated policies. The National Development Plan is a vi-
sionary and generous programming document, which is completely unfit for sectoral 
systems in Romania because it is conceived at the macro-level. Although, by formally 
and officially referring to high and low-level programming documents, links may be 
found, according to a simple, unofficial algorithm, these links do not actually exist. As 
a matter of fact, objectives were formally taken from one level to another without any 
negotiation. Such a purely formal link occurs only in the case of institutional hierar-
chies established by competent ministries. For instance, most managing authorities 
report in one way or another to the Ministry of Finance, so one would expect that 
programming documents, through the institutional communication channel, are 
vested across various levels with a “reasonable share of common vision”. However, 
if we consider the strategies laying the foundation of a SOP (sectoral operational 
program) and evolving out of debates taking place via regional development agencies 
(RDAs) which are actually non-governmental organisations under the ministry of 
development, we see no communication link with the sectoral SOPs other than by key 
words and reasonable objectives which cannot truly determine the subsequent line 
of events. For instance, although the National Development Plan is referred to in SOP 
IEC for the second axis addressing the research and development areas and includes 
regional measures as well, it still has nothing to do (in terms of both formal hierarchy 
and strategic vision) with the regional strategies of RDAs or with the actions speci-
100 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
fied in the ROP. At a certain point, even the SOP (Sectoral Operational Programme) 
and ROP (Regional Operational Programme) were providing for the same actions 
(SME development and tourism development projects). Even if we agree that funds 
under the SOP IEC programme were fairly distributed (the decision was nevertheless 
made in Bucharest), they were neither regionally distributed according to the rea-
sonable terms of ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) (the funding source) 
nor had anything to do with the development strategies of regions listed by RDAs 
(Regional Development Agencies). More specifically, the competitions only imitated 
the classification by thematic priorities. For instance, competitions were general in 
nature and the selection criteria did not require a thematic distinction, despite the 
determination of priority thematic areas.
The Implementation Period: 
Although the institutions involved/responsible were the same: the Government, the Ben-
eficiaries and the European Commission, the context is relatively different: an economy 
still growing at the beginning, yet showing the first signs of crisis in 2008, major 
expectations due to a funding surplus and the excitement of integration, in a climate 
dictated by poor knowledge of European mechanisms doubled by major issues in get-
ting acquainted with and enforcing some new rules as well as in the communication 
between the authorities and the population. The mechanism was challenged by two 
major issues: 
a. The congestion of the administrative body
Contrary to the practice specific to structural funds contests in many EU countries, 
another issue was the absence of a pre-selection phase based on project concepts or a 
concept note that would be graded before its actual submission. This would have con-
siderably spared the applicants (especially the unsuccessful ones) from the logistic 
burden in general. All applicants submitted a thick pile of comprehensive documents, 
which required land and building registration in the land books, project drafting 
and feasibility studies. If we take into account that less than 10% of the applicants 
were successful in the competition, the investments made by 90% of them in ensur-
ing project eligibility was a total loss and added more human and financial strain on 
the state apparatus, i.e. on the intermediate bodies which processed and assessed 
all these application files (let alone the paper used and the time spent by beneficiar-
ies - another economic loss). In most European countries and even in Romanian op-
erational programmes (e.g. trans-border programmes), competitions include several 
phases, the first consisting in a preliminary selection of ‘concept notes’ which remove 
project concepts not feasible or inconsistent with the aims of the programme or of the 
sponsor. This eases the logistic burden of legal assistance and land book registration 
fees, is considerably paper saving and lowers the expenses of beneficiaries in becom-
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ing eligible (to be eligible, the beneficiary must satisfy a number of legal criteria 
materialized in certificates, supporting documents, certified true documents, etc). 
Had all beneficiaries not nurtured competitive ideas, they would have been spared 
of such effort and the state apparatus processing the information, documentation 
and legal papers would have been less jammed if a simple pre-assessment of project 
concepts (less expensive) had been in place. 
Figure 2 shows the ratios between applications submitted, in evaluation, rejected, 
approved and contracted. We may note the huge gap between the number of projects 
submitted and that of projects approved, contracted projects counting even less.
 Figure 2. Application evaluation process
Source: Romanian Ministry for European Funds
It is quite natural that the number of applications should be higher than the 
awarded contracts, but the state’s effort under the circumstances of such dispro-
portion is evenly distributed among all categories. However, as we have already 
mentioned, eligibility matters only for those to whom funds are granted: it results in 
major expenses that may be seen as economic loss (as it requires the processing of a 
huge quantity of documents and the labour of institutions and of the state), with the 
proviso that much of this institutional and financial strain would have been saved 
by a preliminary selection of project concepts. The state had no interest in fund-
ing non-eligible entities and everybody knew that funding would not suffice to all 
eligible ones. Competition was therefore performed for the sake of funding and not 
for eligibility as the latter would subsequently become one of the contractual condi-
tions. It is obvious that a non-eligible application would have entailed/called forth the 
applicant’s liability for its own financial loss.
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b. Bureaucratic laborious implementation and equivocal and interpretable proce-
dures. Very rigid formal rules
Once in competition and not accustomed to the implementation of projects financed 
from structural funds, the beneficiaries faced a number of issues which not only caused 
difficulty, but also generated extensive delays which ultimately ended in insuperable 
gridlocks. Whenever reporting – applications for reimbursement rely on hardly-
understandable type forms containing highly rigid formal requirements – drafting 
such a report is always hard work and subject to mistakes. On the other hand, the 
intermediate bodies as new governmental structures (agreed upon during adhesion 
negotiations) relied on preponderantly young staff, recently trained on procedures, 
unversed and tending to be rigorous up to inflexibility. The selection pool on higher 
hierarchy levels where experience was a prerequisite for employment consisted in 
persons who already worked with PHARE funds in Romania’s pre-adhesion phase. 
As these programmes relied on more relaxed procedures, they faced serious difficul-
ties due to frauds and the recovery of amounts spent in a wrong way. In conjunction 
with the nature of trainings focused on the identification of possible frauds, all these 
factors led to the embeddedness of some utterly complex procedures, extremely 
rigorous with formal aspects, which almost breached the beneficiaries’ presumption 
of innocence in the fair implementation of undertaken contracts (e.g. documents in 
excess of those provided for in the accounting laws were further required to attest 
spending or even liability statements from beneficiaries where expenses were docu-
mented in order to avoid any possible doubt on the civil servant). In the EU countries, 
the training experience shows that a formal error rate of up to 15-20% is tolerable 
or acceptable unless it is financially detrimental to the sponsor. As for Romania, this 
rate could be easily attained due to the difficulty of and lack of clarity in instructions. 
However, at least in the first competitions, formal errors entailed the direct rejection 
of the application and implicitly a postponed reimbursement (at every rejection) by 
15 days at least. Even if the application was admitted, clarifications on formal aspects 
were weighting considerably more while waiting for reimbursements in respect of 
applications.
Since three 100% document control levels (two for the intermediate body and one for 
the managing authority) were in place, plus other partial control levels by specific area 
(procurement, constructions, accounting – e.g. the procuring authority was on its turn 
authorized to check higher-rated applications at any time against the control exercised 
by the intermediate body) and taking into account that each level and objective had 
to be justified (according to bureaucracy principles), such authority was inclined to 
point out to issues/mistakes. Adding the various ambiguities and relativities and even 
contradictions between overlapping laws applicable in various fields, the verification 
of applications for reimbursement raised constant disputes and beneficiaries were 
overwhelmed with clarification notes asking them to justify each of their actions 
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up to the smallest detail. The issues, even when settled in beneficiary’s favour, were 
considerably extending the reimbursement period and adding weight to the not a bit 
ignorable quantity of files. All these called beneficiaries away from the implementation 
activity to administrative clarifications and further expenses (proof on delays in the 
reimbursement of funds already contracted). And all these under the described proce-
dures were standing only for a formal and documentary control of operations. It was 
then followed by the actual control and new problems were definitely discovered. The 
beneficiaries, stifled anyhow with the unexpected administrative problems, did not 
have the courage or the financial capacity to take the case to court. The entire process 
was therefore controlled by the implementing authorities. 
To that effect, the spending figures point to the failure in meeting the programme’s 
objective (and therefore to its lack of efficiency). The absorption rates per annum 
(periods) by staged category (money contracted versus money spent) and by various 
stages of reimbursement by funding source (national budget versus the European 
Commission), with a specific accent on the two programmes of concern and on total 
figures are included in the comparative charts illustrated below (Figure 3) for dem-
onstration purposes. 
Figure 3. Contracted funds, funds paid out to beneficiaries and reimbursement from EC 
(mil. EUR)
Source: own representation using Romanian Ministry for European Funds data; 
amounts in Lei are converted to Euro by using the inforeuro exchange rate
By analysing Figure 3, several gaps are noticed:
First of all, the period 2007–2009 shows several disproportions over the period 
2010–2013. The first is a subcontracting period and, consequently, of endemic poor 
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spending due to the lack of programming documents. The first competitions actually 
took place in late 2008, i.e. almost two years after Romania’s joining the EU. There-
fore, we are talking about an absolute waste of time during the first two years of 
implementation. An actual pending of the structural funds occurs after the beginning 
of 2009. After 2009, the run-up of implementation mechanisms took about one year 
more during which the contracting process continued its slow motion despite the 
existence of competitions. 2011–2013 is a period of intensive recovery of contracting, 
especially due to public pressure in relation to absorption and implicitly to a particu-
lar relaxation (provided by the run-in) of the funds managing institutions. 
However, the largest gap lies between the contracted funds and the funds paid-
out. One may note that fund absorption (actual spending and settlement) maintained 
its nearly constant slow pace. The ratio between the funds actually spent and those 
absorbed (first from the budget and then, by the national budget from the Com-
mission) continued to be very small compared to contracting. As this period also 
includes the uncompleted contracts from the previous years, the difference between 
contracted and spent funds is constantly growing. Therefore, although about EUR 19 
billion was allocated to Romania, nearly EUR 17.5 billion was contracted in October 
2013 and just EUR 5 billion actually paid-out (Figure 3). So, in 2013, almost 90% was 
contracted versus approximately 25% spent, with the likely coverage of the gap by 
the end of 2015 (n+2) at the latest (see Figure 1). It is actually hoped that two years 
would suffice to absorb 70% when it took seven years to spend 25% (let alone that 
absorption may only be effective when the budget money used is fully recovered). To 
extend the implementation period negotiated by the Government with the European 
Commission for another year only means to postpone a painful verdict and to slightly 
mitigate loss and not to find a solution to the problem. Figures are even worse for SOP 
Competitiveness than the general outlook on all programs at the same date (Figure 1 
and Figure 4).
Romania contracted only 83% out of the EUR 2.5 billion granted and absorbed only 
0.4 billion (14.5%). On the other hand, figures concerning SOP Human Resources are 
similar (figure 1 and figure 4). Romania contracted EUR 2.8 billion out of 3.4 billion 
granted (i.e. 81%) and absorbed a little bit more, i.e. 0.9 billion (25%).
Charts above prove that the issue of fund absorption is a question of procedure 
policy. Once absorption could not speed up the pace despite better contracting, the 
lack of an institutional capacity to quicken the implementation process and reim-
bursement documents is a fact. As a previously explained mechanism, the congestion 
of the implementation system was the consequence of procedures inconsistent with 
absorption objectives. 
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Figure 4. Contracted funds, funds paid out to beneficiaries and reimbursement from EC 
(million EUR) – SOP Competitiveness & Human Resources
Source: own representation using Romanian Ministry for European Funds data; amounts in Lei 
are converted to Euro by using the inforeuro exchange rate
c. Adverse effects on economy
On the banking market, the beneficiaries compelled by the reimbursement principles 
had to/could take loans with maturity dates matching those specified in the initially-
approved reimbursement plan, but delays generated extra costs and gridlocks. 
Therefore, not only that the co-funding rate was quite high (approximately 40%; see 
figure 5), but also delays to the planned repayment gave rise to various locks.
As reimbursements were again conditional upon the implementation of the 
project on the agreed dates, delays placed the beneficiary inside a vicious circle: 
apart from exceeding the charge of banking costs, the beneficiary was also punished 
by the lender with other delays or money cutbacks. Implementation was therefore 
impacted by the cash flows as well.  
It is worth noticing that the negative outlook conveyed by the gridlock and the 
shortage in cash was deepened by the late 2008 turmoil. The first and utmost conse-
quences included the variation of prices which considerably affected the first wave 
of competing projects in 2008. Such projects had a budget built on a foreign exchange 
rate of 1 EUR = 4 RON; on the contracting date, 1 EUR was worth RON 4.4-4.5. Later on, 
the plunging of real estate prices was just apparently beneficial because budgetary 
savings were hard to transfer in terms of procedures and could only be transferred 
up to 10% of the category, which ultimately resulted in money freezing (failure to 
absorb). 
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Figure 5. Contracted funds (EU contribution and total value, million EUR)
Source: own representation using Romanian Ministry for European Funds data; 
amounts in Lei are converted to Euro by using the inforeuro exchange rate
Another loss may be identified in the over-funding of one per cent from the wages 
due to the civil servants working for the bodies that managed the money. With av-
erage salaries higher than in the public system, as agreed with the EU in order to 
draw in highly-qualified personnel, it may be a loss that such an advantage (that of 
extra competence brought by better wages) was overrun by the chaos of inconsistent 
procedures. 
After all, other implementation losses were caused by the inconsistency of eli-
gible expenses lists with the concrete needs of beneficiaries and the inflexibility of 
projects. We may agree that beneficiaries made a wrong calculation of the budget 
for lacking in knowledge of funding procedures and the experience in working with 
financed projects, or merely for being negligent. Secondly, at all implementation 
levels, on forums and during the Q&A sessions organized for them, the beneficiaries 
challenged/raised the issue of a profound inappropriateness of budget categories in 
the implementation guidelines with the real economy (let alone that such categories 
compel beneficiaries to build their budget on the same pattern, irrespectively of their 
business profile). What weighted more in absorption was the procedural stiffness 
kept up in adapting categories to facts or to the changes determined by the turmoil.
Various delays and obstacles therefore occurred which considerably slowed down 
the absorption of structural funds in Romania. Although we first highlighted the 
reasons for which funds may adversely affect the convergence process, the beneficial 
impact of structural funds is even more confined by the low absorption rates. We 
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shall hereinafter focus our attention on the effectiveness in meeting the objectives of 
the two operational programmes concerned.
The impact of programmes compared to the set objectives and engaged 
amounts 
The implementation of European regional policies within Member States is rather 
an issue of impact compared to the operational and strategic aims than one of ab-
sorption. In this light, the present analysis relies on two compound indices we have 
created to measure the extent to which the use of European funds under the subject 
operational programmes, i.e. SOP IEC and SOP HRD, succeeds in achieving its goal. 
According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the general objective of SOP is 
the increase of Romanian companies’ productivity, in compliance with the principle of 
sustainable development, and reducing the disparities compared to the average produc-
tivity of the EU. While the general objective of SOP HRD is the development of human 
capital and increasing competitiveness, by linking education and lifelong learning with 
the labour market and ensuring increased opportunities for future participation on a 
modern, flexible and inclusive labour market. As each of these general objectives is 
grounded on a number of particular objectives matching the structuring of opera-
tional programmes into priority axes, the two indices created integrate one or several 
indicators corresponding to each priority axis of the operational program (except 
for Axis 5 of SOP Competitiveness and Axis 7 of SOP Human Resource Development, 
which refer to technical assistance, in order to provide support for the programme 
implementation). The weight of indicators in building the said indices varies under 
each axis according to the weight of funds assigned out of the total financing granted 
under the operational programme. As for priority axes, the indicators used are 
equally important. 
Since the overall aim of the operational programmes is to narrow the development 
gaps between Romania and the other EU countries, the data used was normalized by 
assigning the value 100 to the best performance obtained by an EU28-country:
If the best performance is the lowest value of the indicator, normalization relied 
on the expression below:
Unfortunately, the availability of certain indicators forced us to stick to the year 
2011 although funds under the operational programmes in question were granted 
over the period 2007–2013. Where certain values were not available for specific coun-
tries, the highest value out of existing ones has been considered.
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The annex at the end provides raw data (before normalization) that have been 
used in computing the compound indices both for Romania and for the best perform-
ance in EU28 over the 2006–2011 period.
Figures 6 and 7, with separate figures for the two SOP, show the evolution by year 
of involved (contracted) funds in absolute amounts that we may take for money in-
jected in the economy and intended for use in competitiveness. Also, the chart makes 
an account of the evolution of the global competitiveness indicator and of the human 
development indicator specific to SOP HRD. 
Figure 6. Competitiveness SOP Index
Source: own elaborations using data in Annex and Romanian Ministry for European Funds data
The years 2006–2009 witness an increased competitiveness (a variable increase 
for the human development) within the context of Romania’s overall growth. 
Likewise, it is too early to count in a possible impact of the funds during the first 
implementation period which is almost absent. Consequently, such an increase is 
purely attributable to the natural course of economy during that period. The period 
2009–2011 saw a drop of the productivity index against the global financial turmoil, 
but also considerable sums of money pumped in the market for this specific indicator. 
It is true that the contracted funds have been little spent and that using it all would 
have raised productivity, and also that the indicator could have lowered even during 
the crisis if the impact of the programme on competitiveness had been a positive 
one. However, due to the impossibility of separating factors and consequences in 
quantitative terms, no one can see the positive impact of such programmes. 
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Besides missing the opportunity to invest in the competitiveness increase, the 
Romanian State also failed to exploit the investment in human capital. This justifies 
the situation illustrated in Figure 7. For instance, the Romanian research & develop-
ment and innovation system (RDI) did not succeed in getting over the hard period 
Romania got through after 1989. The lack of funding in the 90s and recurrent restruc-
turing made the alignment to global trends in science and technology possible only 
in a few cases. Romania still has the lowest budget allocation for RDI across the EU 
and its economic sectors which may boost a demand for research, development and 
innovation are too weak to hold the resources or to put pressure on public spending. 
Actually, the economic crisis and the endemic problems in the educational system 
due to poor funding and payroll, the poor quality of the infrastructure, the lack of an 
assessment system that fosters actual performance and excellence, the absence of 
clear-cut, transparent, equitable and uniform criteria resulted in a reduced interest 
of people in a research career. Therefore, the number of researchers saw a dramatic 
downturn. At the same time, the average age of research staff has considerably in-
creased due to job freezing in public research institutions generated by the crisis, 
which is seen as bad for the industry.
Figure 7. Human Development SOP Index
Source: own elaborations using data in Annex and Romanian Ministry for European Funds data
Studies show that researchers are at the peak of their productivity during their 
PhD and post-doctoral studies (in the years following the award of the PhD degree) 
and that they are better fit for teaching and/or for supervising research activities in 
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the second part of their academic career. Best practices in Western countries rely 
on this pattern. Although, according to Eurostat, Romania is above the European 
average of young human resources (25-34 years old) dedicated to science and technol-
ogy, it is hard to anticipate the actual and fair situation of human resources in the 
research field as this includes both the teaching and research personnel. The fact is 
that the major Romanian universities have quite recently created separate research 
departments (after 2000). Until then, research was given a small share in the almost 
exclusively teaching-dedicated workload of university staff, as well as in the univer-
sity centres or in the institutes of the Romanian Academy. This as well as the reduced 
number of scientific publications by researchers from Romanian institutions in ISI-
listed journals point out the poor productivity of human resources in the research 
field. Such shortage contributes to the continuity of programmes (sharing knowledge 
between generations) and deepens the labour productivity deficit which results in 
lower research performance. 
On the other hand, major changes in the sectoral structure occurred in the Roma-
nian economy during the last decade. The industrial contraction of the 90s generated 
massive unemployment, which was hardly absorbed by new activities. Likewise, new 
sectors grew disproportionately, especially in the service supply industry, which 
is largely fuelled by newly-trained human resources. Under the circumstances, the 
poorly reformed Romanian educational system could not produce in the shortest 
run the human resources adapted to the new demands on the market. A programme 
financing the re-qualification of human resources is therefore perfectly justified in 
economic terms. The SOP HRD program, despite the same implementation issues 
mentioned above, provided in this respect a good opportunity to safeguard these net 
economic losses. One objective was however achieved with this opportunity: despite 
the slow absorption process, projects undoubtedly brought a notable contribution to 
the labour resource. However, despite the massive inflow of PhD, post-doc, re-quali-
fication, life-long learning and other programmes dedicated to the (re) specialization 
of human resources during the past years, neither the public sector nor the private 
one (affected by the economic turmoil) could absorb the increase in value of these 
programmes. The problem would be an objective one if it were exclusively caused by 
the economic turmoil which restricted business activities in general. Nevertheless, 
the economic crisis did not prevent growth in certain sectors and, what is more, it 
is precisely the crisis that stimulates, in some states, anti-cycle policies specifically 
focused on professional conversion or research boost. Romania actually spent the 
money dedicated to the programme operations agreed with the EU, but did nothing 
to link such operations with its demand of human capital, which makes such spending 
useless to a great extent. For example, Romania still has to catch up with countries 
of tradition in terms of number of PhDs and post-docs compared to the population. 
In the same context of alignment to European trends, according to Eurostat, the HR 
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indicator in science and technology HRST (25.8) in Romania is far below the European 
average (40.2) despite the tendency towards an increase in the number of academic 
staff revealed by most European studies. The biggest political mistake in this direc-
tion was to finance PhD and post-doc programmes while freezing jobs in academic 
institutions. There has been no coherent policy so far to integrate PhD schools in 
an academic and scientific circuit. PhD or post-doc graduates in the past years had 
no possibility to enter the academic system as jobs were frozen and wages kept low. 
This means that the investments made in their training was a waste, at least for the 
system.  
Unemployment figures by 2012 once again emphasize the failed impact of the pro-
gramme on occupation (apart from its lack of effectiveness in terms of productivity, 
as illustrated above) and despite quite massive allocation of funds in (re)specializa-
tion programmes (Figure 8).
Figure 8. Unemployment rates
Source: Eurostat
Unemployment rates remained constant and even saw a considerable increase 
among the young population as main beneficiaries of structural programmes.
Therefore, taking into account the two sectoral programmes analysed herein, the 
evolution of the compound indices created points out that neither the increase in com-
petitiveness nor in human development was supported by structural funds since the 
relevant figures for 2011 are lower than in 2007. It is however extremely hard to estimate 
how much of this evolution is due to the distortions caused by the European funds, 
as often alleged by their critics, to the low absorption rates caused by inappropriate 
implementation policies in Romania and to the impact of the recent economic turmoil.
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Conclusions
The mechanism of European funds is highly contested and generates many economic 
distortions which most of the time impede the achievement of their main purpose, 
namely a reduction of development gaps. Their contribution to the convergence of 
the regional development level depends on a number of factors and this guarantees 
neither their effectiveness nor efficiency. Romania’s experience bears testimony that 
the European funds are hard to access and extremely difficult to put into practice. If 
problems are discovered upon implementation, even the money spent must be paid 
back and this confirms both distortions and the locks it may generate. With the low 
absorption rate, we are not yet sure whether Romania was indeed granted financial 
support by the European Union or if it is still a net payer to the EU budget. Today, even 
the beneficiaries who earned projects with budgets badly shaken by the economic 
and financial turmoil will probably face problems in the implementation process. 
Although European funds are seen by many (especially by the ruling class according 
to their public statements) as a solution to overrun the crisis, things may be totally 
different in reality. Once not absorbed, European funds may become a burden or may 
result in uncertainty and social tension precisely due to the increasing differences 
between the various categories or the target regions.
As pointed out in this analysis, one of the major causes of the low (default) ab-
sorption, unless its trigger, seems to be the delay in the launching of operational 
programmes. At the time of Romania’s joining, all programming documents were 
actually drafts and technical debates were under way. To compensate for the loss of 
speed, public awareness campaigns initiated by the Government started simultane-
ously with the adhesion or even before it towards “getting ourselves ready” when 
the time comes to adopt programmes. Moreover, the implementation structures 
agreed upon with the European Union already started to run idle for some time and 
therefore joined with potential beneficiaries in a relationship and paradoxically well-
connected system that was however resting on provisional information. This ended 
in two negative consequences: first of all, the game started before the rules of the 
game were settled (hence the rules of the game subsequently changing while play-
ing); secondly, wrong reflexes were formed (expectations or practices not appropri-
ate for the defined programmes). The second consequence also put the intermediate 
bodies in a bad light and weakened the trust in the system from the very beginning.  
Another primary cause for the failure was the absence of strategy and programme 
coordination. Due to the same rush generated by the draft-based adhesion, pro-
grammes reflected the institutional vision of the persons directly involved in it. There 
was no time to make correlations and to avoid overlaps and redundancies. Obviously, 
the National Development Plan was called forth in any situation, but only at a formal 
level and without any underlying comprehensive studies. In fact, the objectives of the 
Plan were inferred from natural visions of the future that a subsequent plan would do 
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nothing else but confirm. This way, the SOP IEC and the ROP featured from the start 
the same operations and this caused new delays in adopting the final documents. A 
national strategy linked to regional strategies, and all these in conjunction to the 
involved institutions’ own strategies were needed. Later on, the absence of action 
strategies on domains was discovered along with implementation issues (starting 
from the support of and assistance to inexperienced or disadvantaged institutions, 
up to the shortage of co-financing money in the public institutions). 
Legal inconsistencies between the funding institutions and beneficiaries arising 
from the old and unaligned legislation that did not affect the smooth running of 
public mechanisms so far because they did not interfere (e.g. regulations on various 
expense settlements before the State and the private sector needed upgrading or 
stirred disputes between the beneficiary and the sponsor) added to all these. 
The implementation of the operational programmes SOP IEC and SOP HRD were 
finally meant to increase the competitiveness of the Romanian economy as a whole 
and also that of regions (the second requirement was urged by the quality of EDRF 
funds dedicated to this programme) and to enhance labour productivity at the 
macroeconomic level, i.e. increasing competitiveness, by linking education and lifelong 
learning with the labour market. Consequently, apart from the general objectives of 
the programme and despite the lack of a preliminary distribution of funds among 
regions, the managing authority and the intermediate bodies involved believed that 
an even spreading of projects earned by region was required. From the start, this was 
conducive to a competition relying on loose criteria since a classification of projects 
according to the quality of the competitiveness increase criterion had to be limited 
by the regional distribution. Therefore, the best projects could be outrun by poor 
projects submitted by other regions. This fact was not consistent with the possible 
economic or sectoral requirements of the regions not involved in the decision-making 
process. As such, the award of contracts was hardly linked to the regional sectoral pri-
orities. Under the circumstances, the upward or downward evolution of the economic 
competitiveness indicator could only be attributed to the overall cumulated impact 
of projects approved without sectoral or regional weight as the governmental sector 
adjudicated. 
The case studies we have considered regarding the Competitiveness and Human 
Resources SOP are representative for all the available funding programmes, point-
ing out the inadequacy of the policy implementation process in Romania. This is 
what kept absorption rate at a low level, further limiting the convergence process. 
However, it is difficult to estimate whether getting closer to the stated objectives of 
these programmes was prevented by only the low rate of absorption or by the diverse 
effects generated by the funding mechanism as well.
In conclusion, the mistake resides in the implementation policy (a procedural 
mistake) because it is impossible to attach the situation to one of the critics brought 
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to structural funds. We could have talked about a lack of impact of the structural 
funds mechanism if the programme had been running to its full effectiveness. Given 
an implementation that may be estimated to 20% of what was actually planned, the 
causes of the missing impact are much easier to attach to the procedural management 
of the programme. The sponsor had to keep an eye on money spending and project 
as well as on project objective performance and not on the accounting accuracy of 
beneficiaries. The state already had institutions in place to control such issues that 
the intermediate bodies did not even have the competence to deal with. As a mat-
ter of fact, these institutions exercised a right to control superior to the sponsor’s, 
which only added to the chain of control. A lot of time was therefore wasted during 
the implementation phase and institution conflicts occurred. Once the mechanism 
built on this pattern, it was embedded this way. Applications already processed were 
repeatedly submitted to control by such bodies and this deviated/blocked the activ-
ity of intermediate bodies. To this was added as damages: diversions of activities to 
unforeseen actions of beneficiaries (lower productivity in the industry) in favour of 
administrative work, the payment of huge interest rates by the public institutions, 
private companies and even the state, as they all borrowed money to run projects, 
the bankruptcy and loss of thousands of jobs upon the failure to pay for the projects 
approved, implemented for which reimbursements were not made in due time. We 
may also add a loss in competitiveness in the long run as the Romanian economy, far 
from being powerful enough to create its own reflexes after the crisis, was affected 
by this programme in terms of rent seeking. 
The convergence process can be slowed down by various distortions that the Eu-
ropean funding mechanism is generating. Therefore, beyond the general reluctance 
regarding the use of structural funds, the inefficient implementation of such funds is 
a net loss in the development and convergence processes targeted at and anticipated 
for the new Member States. Moreover, the Romanian case confirms that the funding 
programmes capacity to reduce development gaps can be also limited by a low rate 
of absorption due to an inadequate policy implementation, which further complicates 
access to funding programmes.
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Annex a) Competitiveness SOP Index
Territory – Identity – Integration | 117 
St
u
d
ie
s
Annex b) Human Development SOP Index
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Discovering Europe? 
Identity of the Migrants in the EU1
Danilo Di Mauro2 – Irena Fiket3
Abstract
This paper focuses on migration in Europe and European identity. Above all, it aims 
to explore the capacity of European identity to offer an inclusive form of collective af-
filiation both for intra- and extra-European migrants. We argue that the probability 
for both, extra- and intra-EU migrants, to develop European identity is higher than 
the probability to develop country-of-residence identity since the later one is based 
on ascriptive criteria and therefore exclusive in its nature. Social scientists from dif-
ferent traditions started only recently to deal with those questions focusing, above 
all, on the effects of mobility within EU borders on identity and attitudes towards 
Europe (Favel, 2009; Recchi and Favel, 2009). Our research aims to contribute to this 
theoretical and empirical debate by analysing also extra-European migrants. The 
high magnitude of extra-EU immigration (more than 30 million, out of the total 47 
million of migrants that reside in EU countries were born outside the EU according to 
Eurostat 2011) clearly shows the importance of the relationship between migrants 
and European identity. In our empirical analyses we will rely on 2009 Eurobarometer 
(EB) and 2009 European Election Survey (EES) data. 
Introduction
This paper is inspired by the cosmopolitan reading of European identity and democ-
racy, and the idea of inclusiveness of European identity. Cosmopolitan European identity 
is conceived as based on universal principles and as framed in apparent tension with 
national identity. The last one, on the other hand, is based on territory, ethnic and cul-
tural heritage or the nation state (Habermas 1992, Beck–Grande, 2007). It follows that 
such European identity could act as an inclusive form of collective affiliation also for 
migrants. While its more difficult to imagine that migrants could develop the identity of 
the nation state that “host” them, since such collective identity is mainly ethnic-based, 
the cosmopolitan vision of European identity offers some hopes in this direction. 
1 The first draft of this manuscript was presented at the Workshop on European identity in 
times of crisis 11-12 June 2012, European University Institute, Florence
2 PhD, Alumnus, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. 
Danilo.DiMauro@EUI.eu
3 Post-Doc, Centre for the Study of Political Change, University of Siena. irenafiket@yahoo.com
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The inclusive European Identity is not only seen as appropriate but as necessary 
for coping with the challenges represented by the multinational character of the EU 
(Beck–Grande, 2007). The idea of European democracy and identity as inclusive is not 
only exposed in arguments of the theoretical literature on European integration, but 
is also visible in regulations and discourses of the European institutions, before all in 
the Draft of the Constitutional Treaty (Fossum–Menendez, 2005)4. 
Although this view animated academic debate theoretically, little empirical evi-
dence has been provided until now on its favour. 
By investigating the relationship between migrants and European identity we aim 
to contribute to this debate empirically. Our chapter will be structured as follows: the 
first section will outline the theoretical debate in the literature and define the main 
concept(s) of our study. It will also include a brief review of the empirical evidences 
from previous studies and will expose our main hypotheses. Section two will reports 
the empirical evidences while the last section will discuss our main findings, drew 
the conclusions and underline possible limits of our study. 
Theoretical framework
1. Inclusiveness of European identity 
One of the main goals of the united Europe was to overcome nationalism and nation-
based particularism. In this sense, the EU legal order aimed to create its bases on 
universal values of humanity. However, European democracy and identity are not 
unanimously conceived as cosmopolitan neither in literature nor in political discourse 
of European and national elites. The famous debate on European Constitution and 
Christian values represents the valuable piece of evidence that confirms the exist-
ence of two different meanings given to Europe and European identity. The European 
institutions in fact, make use of both versions of European identity. Coherently, in the 
literature, European identity was mainly discussed in terms of these two main visions.5 
National European identity is an ethnic-based form of identity and it is founded 
on ascriptive criteria related to birth, religion and culture. It is based on “individu-
als’ perceptions that fellow Europeans are closer to them than non-Europeans” in 
terms of common European heritage (Bruter, 2003: 1155) and it includes precise 
definition of “others”, that are excluded from the vision of Europeanness (Fligstein 
4 However, the European identity is not always conceived as cosmopolitan and inclusive 
(Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). The conceptualization that European studies gives to 
European cosmopolitan identity has been criticized for remaining exclusive, since based on 
“universal” values that speaks in language of liberal individualism of the elites which itself 
cannot be considered as universal (Calhoun, 2008).
5 Although different authors use different terms to name this two versions of European iden-
tity they agree on the main characteristics of both types.
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et al., 2012). It relies strongly on the ethnic elements of collective identification and, 
as a consequence, the EU is conceived as Fortress Europe. The debates over Turk-
ish membership, the European Constitution and Christian values, and the complex 
relationship with Islam, made the national version of European identity visible more 
than ever (Checkel–Katzenstein, 2009). This is particularly the case in the discourse 
of right-wing parties that rather see Europeans as people that share common his-
tory, common Christian religion and therefore non-European peoples (immigrants, 
in particular) are, and should be, excluded (Holmes, 2009). This ethnic-based version 
of European identity is compatible with a strong exclusive national identity (Holmes, 
2009; Risse, 2010). Needless to say that while for the intra-European migrants this 
vision of identity still can be manifested, in the case of extra-European migrants this 
is not an option, giving its exclusionary nature.
More hope for the possibility of development of European identity of migrants is 
offered by the concept of Cosmopolitan European identity. According to this vision, 
Europe is an inclusive community and European identity can develop from the sense 
of cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2006; Delanty, 2006). Cosmopolitan European identity is 
mainly conceived as political, civic identity based on political citizenship and rights 
(Checkel–Katzenstein, 2009). It is related to the individual feelings of membership 
and recognition of universal human rights, role of law and belief in core democratic 
institutions. This vision draws the inspiration from Habermas and his theoretical 
concept of “constitutional patriotism” (1992) but it did not remain only theoretical, 
since its empirical existence was confirmed, among others, by Bruter (2003). Euro-
pean Identity is seen as inclusive: all individuals can become members of the com-
munity that recognize democratic constitution and universal human rights. It is not 
therefore compatible with a strong sense of belonging to the ethnic/national group.6 
This broad debate exposed by the literature made us hope (and doubt) that mi-
grants, in particular extra-European, could develop attachment to Europe. The idea 
of European identity as cosmopolitan and, before all, inclusive is indeed the main idea 
that guides our study. 
2. Why should migrants feel European?
The analysis of the sense of belonging to a European community strongly grew in 
the last two decades. A great amount of studies investigated both theoretically and 
empirically the characteristics of this sentiment trying to understand its causes. 
Before presenting our main theoretical arguments and hypotheses, it is necessary to 
take into account previous theoretical approaches that have been proven by empiri-
6 However, even if the idea of Cosmopolitan European Identity share basic postulates of 
“constitutional patriotism” it was further developed in the literature that underlined the 
difficulties of reconciling (European) universal values with “others”(Beck and Grande, 
2007).
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cal analysis. The factors that in previous studies were considered as the main causes 
of a European sense of belonging will be included in our empirical analysis and their 
impact will be tested. Our aim is not to reiterate the test of those factors but rather to 
include them as control variables while assessing our main hypotheses. 
The first approach we will consider is the theory of cognitive mobilization (Ingle-
hart, 1970,). According to this approach, people with higher level of education much 
easily grasp complex issues and learn to cope with increasing complexity of political 
communities (Norris, 2000). They are capable of elaborating complex political issues 
since they are more politically informed, better educated and discuss politics more 
frequently. Inglehart accounts for another source of European identity; since European 
integration represents a challenge to nationalism and is based on post-materialist 
values it follows that ‘post-materialist individuals’ are more attached to Europe. 
Coherently, higher social and economic status is found to be correlated with higher 
levels of EU identity (Citrin–Sides, 2004) while individuals with lower status are more 
likely to suffer higher levels of competition in an “open” labour-market (Gabel, 1998) 
such as the European one. 
At the same time, young people have more possibilities to develop European 
identity (Citrin–Sides, 2004) since flexibility to social change is strongly related to 
younger age (Moes, 2009). Urbanization is another factor that was proved to have sig-
nificant impact on cosmopolitan identification (Norris, 2000) and therefore we could 
assume that we can find more Europeans in urban areas than in small communities. 
In contrast to this view, many scholars opted for a “domestic politics” explana-
tion. Because of the low level of information and complexity of European politics, 
citizens use ‘proxies’ in their evaluations of the EU issues (Anderson, 1998; Franklin 
et al., 1994). As a result, their attitudes toward integration are affected mainly by the 
perceptions related to the national governments’ performance (Franklin et al., 1994; 
Franklin et al., 1995; Anderson, 1998). 
Our analysis will take into account all above-mentioned factors and we expect 
them to affect European identity in the directions already briefly mentioned. Fol-
lowing empirical studies on the collective identities we will also test the effect of 
left–right ideology despite the fact that there are many contradictory results on this 
point (Norris 2000; Moes, 2009). 
Finally, a valuable perspective on European identity is offered by the constructiv-
ist approach to European identity that conceptualizes European identity as a process 
of becoming, through the practices of interaction, socialization and dialogue (Checkel, 
2001; Herrmann–Risse–Brewer, 2004; Checkel–Katzenstein, 2009, Risse, 2010). Em-
pirical findings speak clearly in support of the socialisation thesis, emphasised by 
the above-mentioned studies: those who are in close and frequent contact with EU 
institutions, policies and symbols are those who show higher level of identification 
with the EU (Castano 2004, Risse, 2010, Sigelas, 2010, Fligstein et al., 2012). So, the 
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main assumption that follows from the socialisation thesis is: the more citizens are in 
“contact” with EU, the more EU will become real in their life and therefore the more 
they will fell as being part of the EU community. In this sense, intra-EU migrants, given 
that they are the main users of the right of free movement of persons, are those having 
high levels of identification with Europe (Sigalas, 2010). Still, we do not know if the 
socialisation hypothesis works for the extra-European migrants, too.
The relationship between migration and European identity only recently started to 
attract the attention of social scientists (Favel, 2009; Recchi–Favel, 2009). Favel made 
the distinction between three types of migrants: traditional non-European “ethnic” 
immigrants; West European “Eurostars” and the new East-West post-Enlargement 
movers (Favel, 2009: 171–172). 
• The first group of migrants – “Third country nationals” – are non-European immi-
grants, described as classic post-colonial guest workers. According to Favel, it is 
not easy to assume that they could identify themselves with Europe. In countries 
of the EU it is possible to acquire only national citizenship of the host country 
through naturalization and this can have negative effect on European identity 
since the naturalization is inevitably a nationalizing process. Still, this assump-
tion was not yet tested empirically and we do not know much about the identity of 
extra-European migrants. 
• Second group – Eurostars and Eurocities – consists of free-mover EU nationals. 
They have European citizenship so they do not need to worry about integration; 
they are free of pressures of race, class and ethnicity since they are skilled, highly 
educated professionals. Such talented and “urban” migrants are found to have 
post-national European identity (Rother–Nebe, 2008).
• Third group – East-West movers or post-enlargement (2004–2007) movers – con-
sists of new East European movers, citizens of the EU who migrate to Western EU 
countries. They represent the in-between category and both of the two above-
described scenarios of identification could apply to them.
Coherently with our research interest, in our paper we will distinguish between 
intra- and extra-EU migrants. In order to assess if there are any differences between 
Western and Eastern EU-born migrants as suggested by Favel (2008), we will, however, 
include this ulterior distinction as a control variable for the possible variations between 
those groups.7 Moreover, given that our previous knowledge on European identifiers 
is mainly based on groups of non-migrant native Europeans (natives), in our empirical 
7 However, given that EB 2009 does not include questions that would allow us to distinguish 
between Western and Eastern intra-EU movers the analysis that use EB data will not control 
for the effects of this later group.
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analyses they will be considered as a point of reference and therefore included as a basis 
for comparison. We will proceed through two analytical steps aimed to: 1) understand 
whether migrants could develop a sentiment of attachment to Europe; 2) understand 
whether migrants could develop a sentiment of attachment to the host country. 
Hypotheses
Following the interpretation of European identity as a cosmopolitan inclusive form of 
identification we would expect that being in condition of migrant should be positively 
related to the feeling of attachment to Europe (H1). Moreover, following Favel (2009) 
we would expect that intra-EU migrants show higher level of identification with Europe 
than extra-EU migrants (H2).
The second analytical step concerns the migrants’ feelings of attachment to Eu-
rope vis-à-vis their sentiments towards the host country. Is migrants’ attachment to 
Europe higher than their sense of belonging to the host country?  
As far as EU citizens are concerned, national and European identities are not 
negatively related, they are rather compatible (Risse, 2010; Bruter, 2004; Citrin– 
Sides, 2004). This evidence could be inferred to intra-EU migrants, but it does not tell 
us anything about extra EU migrants. For the migrants, both intra and extra EU, the 
question of identification is complex not only because they could have three targets 
of identification (the country of origin, the host country and Europe) but because the 
literature does not offer clear indications on this point. On the one hand, European 
studies often underline that European identity is inclusive and not compatible with 
strong sense of belonging to the national group. On the other hand, according to Favel 
(2008) since in EU countries it is not possible to acquire European citizenship but 
only citizenship of the host country, through the process of naturalization, migrants 
should “prefer” national identity rather than European because of the benefits com-
ing from the first. At least, the possession of the host country citizenship could have 
a negative effect on European identity of the extra-EU migrants. 
In order to empirically explore the puzzle exposed above, in our analysis we will 
test the following hypothesis: Given the inclusive nature of European identity and 
the exclusive nature of host country identity the probability that intra- and extra-EU 
migrants could develop European identity is higher than the probability to develop 
country-of-residence identity (H3).
Data and methods 
The theoretical framework discussed in the previous paragraph, and the hypotheses 
we formulated accordingly, are tested empirically. 
First of all, as far as H1 is concerned, we test it relying on 2009 EB dataset (n.71.3) 
that was conducted after the European Parliamentary elections and included a 
representative sample of the residents of the EU-27 member states. Our dependent 
Territory – Identity – Integration | 127 
St
u
d
ie
s
variable, European identity, has been operationalized by using the following ques-
tion: “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are European?” 
Possible answers were organized in a hierarchical order according to the degree of 
feelings: “to a great extent, somewhat, not really, not at all” (and do not know). We 
kept the original format of the question and changed only the direction of scale (from 
the lowest to the highest sense of belonging). 
The main independent variable is the origin of the respondents. The respondents 
were classified into two categories: intra-EU and extra-EU migrants8. 
In order to test H1 and H2 hypotheses we used a multinomial logistic regression 
model since the formulation of the question (dependent variable) appear to be par-
ticularly suitable for this kind of model, where the basic category is “not at all” (Euro-
pean). Control variables are represented by those factors proved by empirical studies 
to affect European identity, and exposed in the first part of the paper. Although we 
managed to include most of the relevant factors the data about respondents are far 
from being fully satisfying.9 Before all, indicators of cognitive mobilization (political 
interest, level of knowledge and political efficacy), of trust in national institutions of 
government (“domestic politics” explanation) and of post-materialism10 have been in-
cluded. Socio-demographic variables included are: education, gender, age, economic 
status, size of the place of the residence and left–right self-placement. Finally, we 
added also dummies for countries in order to control for latent factors related to the 
national contexts.11 
The second step of our exploration aims to understand what the preferred level of 
identification for the migrants is when they need to “choose” between identification 
with Europe and with the host country. This analysis provides the test of our third 
hypothesis (H3). Given that EB dataset did not include any questions that would allow 
us to analyse this hypothesis we used the data from 2009 EES based on similar sample 
of population. Our dependent variable is built from question that measures national 
(i.e. the country of residence/host country) versus European sense of belonging. 
8 The original formulation of the question was asking where the respondent was born: in 
the country where the interview took place, in another EU country, in “Europe but not in 
the member country of EU”, “Asia, Africa or Latin American”, and in “North America, Japan 
or Oceania”. We recoded those locations into three binary variables: natives, intra-EU mi-
grants and extra-EU migrants. The last one included all those who were born outside the EU.
9 For example, the dataset does not provide any information about the length of the stay 
in the country were respondents have been interviewed that could have given us better 
understanding of “socialisation” assumption.
10 The question used to measure materialism reads as follow: If the following changes to our 
way of life were to happen in the near future, do you think it would be a good thing, a bad 
thing, or neither a good nor bad thing? (1) Less emphasis on money and material posses-
sions. 
11 A complete list of the questions and the their recoding are available under request.
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The exact question wording is: “Do you see yourself as...?” 1) NATIONALITY only; 2) 
NATIONALITY and European; 3) European and NATIONALITY; 4) European only. It 
should be noted that “nationality” refers to the country where the interview took 
place since in the questionnaire the word “nationality” was substituted by the name 
of that specific country. Following abundant empirical studies that made use of this 
question (Isernia et al., 2012) we decided to recode it into two categories: “nationality 
only” and “European” (i.e. National and European, European and National, European 
Only). Coherently, the statistical model we use is a binary logistical model. The main 
independent variable remained the same as in the previous analysis: natives, intra-
EU migrants and extra-EU migrants. Since this dataset includes the information on 
the specific country of origin, in this case we were able to test for differences be-
tween Eastern and Western EU migrants.12 Control and socio-demographic variables 
included in the model remained almost the same with some additional information 
provided by the question on religious orientations and on political knowledge. The 
level of knowledge was measured through an index based on 4 questions asking for 
true/false characteristics of Europe. 
Results
European identity (H1 H2)
The results of the multinomial logistic model, where the reference category is “not at 
all”, allows us to understand whether each variable has an impact on the degree of the 
sense of belonging to Europe and if this is significant in statistical terms. 
Among the socio-demographic variables only gender does not produce any significant 
coefficients. Size of the city of residence does not have any significant effect on higher 
levels of identity (“somewhat” and “to a great extent”), while political interest, political 
sophistication and efficacy do not significantly affect the choice of “not really” category. 
Economic status and education are positively related to European identity (and the 
relationship is significant); the higher their values are, the higher is the probability to 
choose a high sense of belonging to Europe. On the contrary, age is negatively related (and 
significantly) to the European identity: younger people feel less attached to Europe.13
12 The dataset included an open question asking whether the respondent was born within or 
outside the country where the interview took place and ask specifically for the name of 
the country of origin. This allowed us to identify, and distinguish, between Eastern and 
Western intra-EU migrants. 
13 This result reveals that the effect of age is not so easily associated with European identity: it 
could be the case that older people feel more European than the younger generations since 
the positive image of Europe as opposed to the disaster of the two World Wars pertains 
to the older generation. In any case the complexity of the question (and the necessity to 
provide a deeper analysis) goes beyond the purpose and possibilities of this study.
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All other control variables confirmed previous findings about the determinants 
of European identity: cognitive mobilisation (except for category “not really”), 
post-materialism and “domestic politics” explanation have significant and positive 
relationship with the degree of the sense of belonging to Europe. Those variables 
make respondents more likely to feel to some extent as Europeans (rather than “not 
at all” European).
The two binary variables that classify respondents according to the country of 
origin are acting in an unexpected way. Intra-EU migrants have higher probability 
to choose a high sentiment of identity (“to a great extent”) than to feel “not at all” 
European (16% more likely, LRX2=54.903, df=3, p<.000). At the same time being an 
intra-EU migrant does not affect the choice of feeling “not really” and “somewhat” 
European. Extra-EU migrants are more likely to manifest lack of EU identity, but 
those coefficients are not significant for p<.05.
Figure 1 shows probability changes for intra-EU-born and extra-EU-born. Bearing 
in mind that only the effect of being born in EU on category 4 (to a great extent) is 
significant, the two variables present opposite patterns: negative probabilities for 
lower EU identity in case of intra-EU-born, and positive in case of extra-EU-born.   
Figure 1.  Changes in predicted probability for European identity
The interpretation of the results showed brings us to accept our hypotheses as 
partially true. While the intra-EU migrants have a high probability to feel “to a great 
extent” European as hypothesized, the extra-EU migrants are less likely to feel Eu-
ropeans.   
Europeans or host-country identifiers? (H3)
In order to understand what is the “preferred” level of identification for the migrants 
when they need to choose between European and host-country identity we followed 
a second path of analysis, already discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Table 1 shows the coefficients of our three binary logistical models. The socio 
demographic and other control variables showed effects coherent with the previ-
ous findings. Variables concerning religiosity and level of information do not show 
significant coefficients, while ideology is significant (and negative) only for migrants. 
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Until this point our results show consistent patterns with both, previous analyses 
and literature on European identity. Interesting results, instead, concerns the three 
categories used as main independent variables. First, as expected, native residents 
have a higher and significant probability (around 10%) to feel “national only” than 
the other two categories. Being migrant, instead, is positively related with European 
identity; the probabilities to feel more European than “national” (host country/coun-
try of residence) are respectively 10% more for those born within the EU and 7% 
more for those born outside the EU (holding other variables at their means).14 
On the other hand, the probability of extra-EU migrants to feel “European and 
National” or “only” European is higher than observed in previous models, reaching 
the 10%. All in all, migrants (no matter their origins) show a clear preference for the 
European level of identification against the host country one as hypothesized in H3. 
Table 1. Probability Changes for being Natives, Intra-EU migrants and Extra-EU migrants 
and National versus European identity (holding other variables at their mean). 
 
Remarks 
In this paper we focused on European identity for both intra- and extra-European 
migrants. According to our theoretical framework we hypothesized that migrants 
could develop a sense of belonging to Europe. Accordingly, we tested three main 
hypotheses.
While H2 has been clearly proved, hypothesis H1 could be only partially accepted. 
Intra-EU migrants have a higher and significant probability (around 16%) to feel “to 
a great extent” Europeans than having no sense of European identity. Hypothesis 
14 Moreover, in order to explore only the highest level of belonging to Europe, we calculated 
probability changes for the three categories of respondents in identical models with a dif-
ferently recoded dependent variable: “Europe first” and “ Europe only” equal to 1 and na-
tional “only” and “national and European” equal to 0. The results after recoding (results 
not showed) are quite similar for natives and intra EU migrants: respectively around 10% 
lover probability to feel strongest degree of European identification for natives and 10% 
higher probability to feel “European and National” or “only” European for intra-EU migrants 
(holding other variables at their means).
 Feeling European
(not really, somewhat, to a great extent) 
Natives
0->1 -.10
Intra- EU migrants
0->1 .10
Extra-EU migrants
0->1 .07
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one, on the contrary, cannot be accepted for extra-EU migrants, since results are not 
statistically significant. 
At the same time, the analysis showed that there is a higher probability for both 
intra- (around 10%) and extra-EU migrants (7%) to feel as Europeans rather than to 
develop a host-country identity. This indirectly confirms the inclusive nature of Eu-
rope, in particular, when compared to the exclusive nature of national/host-country 
identity.
We consider this result as a very important one, at last for two reasons: first, 
people that were born outside the EU – having nothing to share in terms of attributes 
such as culture, traditions, history and (often) religion – show an attachment to this 
new supranational entity; second, this attachment is unusual in cost/benefits terms 
since, as Favell (2008) pointed out, the only way for extra-EU migrants to acquire 
rights of citizenship within the EU borders is through a naturalisation process inside 
of the host country. As a result, we argue that migrants, no matter their origin, tend to 
see Europe as an inclusive and cosmopolitan community. 
As pointed out through the text, unfortunately, empirical data on the topic we ad-
dressed in this chapter are still poor, and there is a need for further and specific data 
collections and specific studies on migrants’ perceptions of the EU and European 
identity.
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Halfway or No Way?
Zoltán Bretter1
Abstract
I am going to sketch a general picture of Hungary today. This will require to present 
in some detail the road on which we have arrived here: the peculiarities of the 
Kádár-regime, i.e. the “goulash-communism” and of the Hungarian “refolution” (self-
contradictory mixture of revolution and reform) i.e. the constitutional revolution of 
1989; the features and failure of the liberal enterprise. I will describe the present 
situation in Hungary as a halfway in the learning process of a democratic political 
culture that already owes a lot to its established traditions: the state-centrism, 
paternalistic leadership, occasional outbursts of nationalism. Methodologically this 
essay is a mid-level theorizing: neither Big Theory, nor historical account; neither 
philosophy, nor sociology. We will follow Alexis de Tocqueville’s guidance (signalled 
mainly in the footnotes) to explain what happens under one’s very eyes. Is an attempt 
at defining a special feature of Hungarian political culture: “kádárism”.
Qui cherche dans la liberté autre chose qu’elle-même est fait pour servir. 
(L’ancien régime et la Révolution, livre III, chap. 3) 
He who seeks in freedom anything else than freedom itself is fit to become a slave.
Alexis de Tocqueville2
Introduction
By now it seems quite obvious that something is going on in Hungary and we are not 
entitled to dismiss this “something” as merely “democracy’s business as usual”. Either 
the friends or foes of Hungary’s actual government, the government notwithstand-
ing, agree that we may speak about a kind of revolution. Viktor Orbán, prime minister 
of Hungary, in several public appearances talks about the “unfinished revolution”, 
“failed revolution” of 1989, or he defines emphatically the 2010 elections as a “revolu-
tion in the voting booths”. On the other hand the very recent, so-called Tavares-report3 
1 PhD habil, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Studies, 
University of Pécs. zoltan.bretter@gmail.com
2 A. de Tocqueville, ‘The Old Regime and the Revolution’, p. 204.
3 2012/2130(INI) Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary (pursu-
ant to the EP resolution of 16 February 2012), 2 May 2013. Preparatory document: Working 
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speaks about the “dismantling of the Rechtsstaat” or even more recently, Adam Michnik 
about a “gradual coup”4—all that seems to be a counterrevolution. Bear in mind that 
every revolution entails a counterrevolution, and without it is not complete.5
To be able to discuss the context within which Hungarian politics unfolds today 
we will investigate one (and only one) of the constituting elements of the Hungarian 
political culture: “kádárism” and try to be as consistent as possible to present what 
follows from it in regard to the process of transition from communism to democracy 
and policymaking in the new regime.
If we all, fathers, mothers, children and even grandchildren, are the bastards of 
communism—as Adam Michnik puts it—it is by no means a wonder why our regime 
is a bastard of the communist system—despised by the enlightened classes, hostile to 
liberty, governed by intriguers, adventurers, and valets.6 But we will have no clearer 
picture of what goes on in Hungary until we investigate several other sources of the 
Hungarian political culture as well: authoritarianism and nationalism and social 
structure. But this paper has to have its limits; we will not be able to accomplish all 
that, except some scattered remarks when analyzing the present “state of affairs”. My 
analysis is a political one and I will not engage in discussing in detail the economy, 
economic development—this is indeed a serious self-limitation.
Document 4: On the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary 
(pursuant to the EP resolution of 16 February 2012) – The Principles of Democracy and the Rule 
of Law, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 5 March 2013, at <http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/draft-reports.html?linkedDocument=true
&ufolderComCode=LIBE&ufolderLegId=7&ufolderId=09747&urefProcYear=&urefProcNu
m=&urefProcCode=#menuzone>, 6 June, 2013.
4 ‘Polish dissident Adam Michnik: “We Are Bastards of Communism”’, Der Spiegel, 29 July 
2013, at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/polish-dissident-adam-michnik-
on-eastern-europe-after-communism-a-913912.html>, 3 August 2013.
5 Alexis de Tocqueville speaks in his memoirs about the social revolution of 1848 and the 
bonapartist counterrevolution – the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte – as being 
parts of the same process within which the claims for social security, order and state in-
terference with all the affairs of people call forth the destruction of liberty. Being very well 
aware that history never repeats itself, I might recall – again with Tocqueville: On voit que 
l’histoire est une gallerie de tableaux où il y a peu d’originaux et beaucoup de copies – A. de 
Tocqueville, L’ancien régime et la Révolution, ed. by J. P. Mayer, Paris 1967, Idées  – that in the 
gallery of history are very many reproductions and just a few new pictures: the resemblance 
between bonapartism and the NCS (see last part of this paper) is striking.
6 „Louis Napoleon alone was ready to take the place of the Republic, because he already held 
the power in his hands. But what could come of his success, except a bastard Monarchy, 
despised by the enlightened classes, hostile to liberty, governed by intriguers, adventurers, 
and valets?” Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, 1896. p.283. 
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However, the aim of this paper is to give an insight into the Hungarian political cul-
ture. The “cultural turn” approach came about in political science some 20 years ago7, 
when professionals and commentators alike were unable to explain the differences of 
the revolutions of 1989 and more importantly, the differences in the prospects of the 
newly established democracies. Shall we look in the pre-revolutionary period to find 
the answers?8 Clearly, this is an insight that would go back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
7 In international scholarship, political culture studies – we may say – always were of 
a concern for authors. The modern history of the concept started with G. A. Almond, 
‘Comparative Political Systems’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1956), at <http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/2127255>. Of course, the most influential work is G. A. Almond, S. Verba, The 
Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton 1963 and under 
the form of “social capital” R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, R. Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work. 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 1993 and R. D. Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone: America’s 
Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1995). Although Putnam denies 
that he ever thought of political culture, the works inspired by his analysis make frequent 
reference to it. Several attempts were made to adopt, criticize, expand, restrict, and recast 
the original concept. An overview and a new operational proposal is to be found in: R. Lane, 
‘Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 
25, No. 3 (1992). A systematic categorization is found in: W. Mishler, D. Pollack,  ‘On Culture, 
Thick and Thin: Toward a Neo-Cultural Synthesis’ in D. Pollack [et al.], (eds.), Political Cul-
ture in Post-Communist Europe. Attitudes in New Democracies, Aldershot 2003, which take 
into account post-communist experiences as well. These experiences are dealt with in many 
other studies. A summary of these is to be found in J. Kubik, ‘Cultural Approaches’, in R. 
Kollmorgen, W. Merkel, H.-J. Wagener (eds.), The Handbook of Transformation Research, Wi-
esbaden 2012. The most comprehensive inventory of theories and approaches for students 
is G. Pickel, S. Pickel, Politische Kultur- und Demokratieforschung. Grundbegriffe, Theorien, 
Methoden. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2006, Lehrbuch. 
8 It is very instructive to re-read now Gabriel Almond’s once-famous article: G. A. Almond, 
‘Communism and Political Culture Theory’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1983). With 
his own theory in mind, without a thorough knowledge of how the Soviet system operates, 
with barely any survey support or of evidence gathered in the field it is by no means a wonder 
that Almond failed to assess the correct relationship of political culture and communism, 
and this is true especially for Hungary. However, there is a sentence in this article that might 
help in a post-factum analysis. What the scholarship of comparative communism has been 
telling us is that political cultures are not easily transformed. A sophisticated political move-
ment ready to manipulate, penetrate, organize, indoctrinate, and coerce, given an opportunity 
to do so for a generation or longer ends up as much or more transformed than transforming, 
p. 137 – emphasis added. If this is true, than we are guided to investigate even further in 
time and social structure; it is possible that the “kádárism” is an expression of a much more 
deeply rooted political culture and not so much a “special Hungarian way” of communism 
(“goulash communism” as it was called). On the other hand, a dynamic concept of political 
culture is needed, because it seems also true that Hungarian-style communism has shaped 
political culture with lasting effects. By now there is a growing amount of literature that 
deals with communist legacy as influencing, determining in various ways and degrees the 
prospects of post-communist democratization. Some (more successful) examples include: 
R. Rose, Understanding Post-Communist Transformation. A Bottom up Approach, London–
New York 2009; ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political 
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The Old Regime and the Revolution. It would be undeniable that this paper owes a lot 
to the spirit of Tocqueville’s oeuvre9.
The failure of the regime or system change?10
Ultimate failure: this is the overall consensus on the regime change in 1989. Gáspár 
Miklós Tamás the anarchist, left-wing theoretician, the extreme right, quasi-fascist 
Jobbik party, the greens, and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary share the same 
belief, which is based upon a wide-ranging popular feeling. The only exception is the 
socialist-liberal elite, but even they remain silent confronting the consensus, because 
they have to take upon themselves the guilt that probably is not theirs: being in power 
for 12 years out of the 23 years since the regime change, they are considered to be 
responsible for that failure. 
The essence of the consensus is very simple. The regime-change created a world 
where things fare badly; or created a bad world, that from the moral, political, eco-
nomic point of view is disaster itself, Hell on Earth.
Moving against the flow, we have to carefully analyze the results of the first decade 
of the new, democratic regime, and then ask again, why the disappointment has risen 
with such a force?11 (From the point of view of a political analysis, we are confronted 
Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 2 (1997), at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998171>; R. Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy. Democratic 
and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford–New York 1999, Comparative European Poli-
tics; G. Pop-Eleches, J. A. Tucker,  ‘Communism’s Shadow: Postcommunist Legacies, Values, 
and Behavior’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2011), at < http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/00
1041511796301588>; D. Pollack [et al.] (eds.), Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe...
9 When debating the “social capital” notion and research, Foley and Edwards (idem, ‘Escape 
from Politics? Social Theory and the Social Capital Debate’, American Behavioral Scientist, 
Vol. 40, No. 5 (1997), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764297040005002>) basically dis-
tinguish between the rational choice-based school (see J. S. Coleman, Foundations of Social 
Theory, Cambridge (Mass.) 1994) and neo-Tocquevillians. They analyze the Democracy in 
America and Tocqueville’s picture of the American associational life, but I take inspiration 
from the whole Tocquevillian approach to politics in designing a broader concept of political 
culture. The “cultural turn” in political science means also a “sociological turn” in culturalist 
approaches, an attempt to define notions, find variables, research significant correlations... 
My references to Tocqueville result in a far less operational – systematic and scientific one 
may say – inquiry and will be more theoretical-descriptive in nature.
10 I make a distinction between “regime” and “system”. Regime is defined as a primarily po-
litical notion, as “ruling”. If one party rules, within undemocratic or seemingly democratic 
circumstances (some elections, however fake, are held), then we may speak about a regime: 
like fascist, nazi, communist regime; or democracy, when the “people rule”. The “system” 
refers to governance: a set of interrelated policies which would be recognizable by one 
common ground they constitute: market economy or state-centered policies; “statism” may 
refer to a system of governance that can operate within democratic or autocratic regimes.
11 In 2003 András Bozóki could describe the East Central European transitions as “success 
stories” (idem,‘Success Stories: Lessons of Democratization in Central Europe’, Regio: 
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with an intriguing methodological question: something that is considered a fact by a 
citizen could be considered a non-fact from a theoretical point of view?)
The Liberal Revolution
At the beginning of the 1990s, Stephen Holmes, reflecting on the “end of history” and 
the liberal revolution as the last stage of history thesis of Francis Fukuyama, wrote: 
Throughout the post-Communist world . . . we are observing waves of radical change that 
look so far like a liberal revolution. Is liberal revolution, he asked rhetorically, not the 
most significant fact of contemporary political life?12 But the heralds of a new – liberal 
democratic – era in the history of East Central Europe were many, so no complete listing 
is possible (an overview is given by Jeffrey Isaac13). Beneath this somewhat eschatologi-
cal surface, questions and doubts were lurking. These were expressed most strikingly by 
a headline in the New York Times that predicted that East Central Europeans are likely 
to discover the “The Tunnel at the End of the Light”.14
What went wrong with these high hopes? What do the scholars and what does the 
public expect from “liberal democracy”?
For theoreticians it was doubtless clear that “liberal democracy” means consti-
tutionalism and the Rule of Law (Rechtsstaat) as components of liberalism, while 
democracy means a democratic political regime with its institutions and, above all, 
free elections. According to this recipe formulated by most of the thinkers, an ef-
fervescent period of constitution- and institution-building began in 1990.
If we consider the written, one-single-document constitution, seemingly, Hungary 
lagged far behind: there was no new constitution adopted until 2012. Bruce Acker-
man’s advice to East Central European countries to use “the window of opportunity” 
Minorities, Politics, Society – English Edition, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2003)). Nonetheless, Bozóki’s 
systematic and comparative account is worth consulting. (Downloadable version: http://
epa.oszk.hu/00400/00476/00003/pdf/01.pdf). Christian Haerpfer, in a classical collection 
of studies on East European political culture, writes in the same vein: Over 15 years after 
the events of 1989, the democratic transformation of the Hungarian political system is almost 
complete. (idem, ‘Hungary – Structure and Dynamics of Democratic Consolidation’ in H.-D. 
Klingeman, D. Fuchs, J. Zielonka (eds.), Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, 
London 2006, p. 148, Routledge Research in Comparative Politics, 15.) It looks like a democ-
racy, it talks like a democracy – is it not a democracy? (See footnote no. 41. It is indeed hard 
to find the proper concepts, theoretical tools to evaluate a democratic performance.)
12 S. Holmes,  ‘The Scowl of Minerva’, The New Republic, 23 March 1992, pp. 27, 33.
13 J. C. Isaac, ‘The Meanings of 1989’, Social Research, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1996).
14 Regarding the prospects and achievements of privatization in East Central Europe, Stephen 
Cohen uses the same metaphor (idem, ‘Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Tunnel at the 
End of the Light’, The American Prospect, 19 December 2001.)
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to frame a brand new constitution that will respond to the desires of those billions 
detaching themselves from communism, in Hungary was not accomplished.15
On the other hand, the (“communist”) constitution being in effect from 1949 until 
1989, was first largely revised in 1989 by the last communist parliament, allowing the 
multi-party system to be formed and consequently the organization of democratic 
elections; and it was completely changed by the newly elected parliament in 1990 by a 
compromise of the conservative majority and liberal opposition. There was a saying 
that time that except the title of the constitution and that the capital city of Hun-
gary was Budapest, nothing else was left from the old constitution. Apart from this 
thorough transformation of the constitution, more important was the development 
of constitutionalism that began with the establishment of one of the most power-
ful constitutional courts in Europe, comparable with the Gerichtshof in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and that of the US Supreme Court.
Indeed, the Hungarian Constitutional Court relied heavily upon the rulings of the 
German and American courts. Its first president, László Sólyom, developed a whole phi-
losophy for the necessity of “amending” the democratic law-making process, guiding it 
along higher principles inspired by the Natural Law (conservative-liberal) tradition.
While the triumphal march of liberalism went on undisturbed, the democratic 
component of the term “liberal democracy” suffered heavy practical blows – and I am 
going to mention some of them.
Firstly, as I have already suggested, there has been no brand new constitution adopted 
in Hungary that would foster democratic allegiance, and one that would have con-
ferred democratic legitimacy to the new regime. But the situation was even worse. 
15 When “the window of opportunity” had been long ago closed, capitalizing on the sym-
bolic failure, the Orbán-government adopted a new constitution in 2011, which entered 
into effect “for another 1000 years” on 1 January, 2012. It was officially celebrated in many 
ways: commissioning illustrations from artists, placing the book in every local council on 
a specially-engineered uniform table (“the table of the constitution”), holding festivities 
at Ópusztaszer (according to the tradition, this is the place where the nomad Hungarians 
first agreed to settle and “made the basic arrangements for the country”). As regards the 
“novelty” of the constitution, there are two, perhaps not so distinct views: the first, most 
clearly expressed by László Sólyom, former president of the Republic and first president of 
the Constitutional Court is that the new is not at all new, and it preserves the basic liberties 
provided for by the old one as well. The serious backlashes are the curtailing of the powers 
of the Constitutional Court and dismantling the system of checks and balances. The other 
opinion agrees on previous two issues but adds that the constitution is new inasmuch that 
it reflects a certain worldview, introduces a certain kind of historical interpretation and 
a conservative-Christian philosophy into the text (mainly into the legally un-enforceable 
preamble of it, but giving guidance to the interpretation of the whole constitution). Ongoing 
debates are emphasizing another aspect of the adoption: it is uncertain how much public 
support the new constitution has got; there was no popular referendum on it, but it was 
crafted and voted by two-thirds in the parliament that “represents the majority”.
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The constitution that took shape in 1990 was either discussed in the Round Table 
Talks by communists and self-proclaimed politicians—the so-called “democratic 
opposition”—and then voted by the communist parliament, or was changed trough 
a parliamentary compromise between the governmental majority and opposition in 
the newly elected parliament. All was done above the heads of the people. As if the 
liberal revolution would say to its soldiers: Constitution? None of your business!
Interestingly enough, this “democratic deficit”, accumulated during the events, 
which is usually called “negotiated revolution” or “refolution” (a mixture of reform 
and revolution; the term belongs to Timothy Garton Ash) didn’t really bother the 
mass of people. Liberty just in one aspect was its concern: regaining the freedom of 
the country, regaining sovereignty, drawing out the Soviet Army from Hungary. Of 
course, there were some popular movements, incipient green rallies against a dam 
to be built on the Danube, or protests against the destruction of villages in Romania 
by the most oppressive communist regime, that of Nicolae Ceauşescu... None of these 
entailed the element of individual liberty.16
The reason of this “liberty-blindness” lies in the nature of the Kádár-regime and 
the history of Hungarian communism, the least oppressive—most liberal17, I would 
say—communist regime in the region. (I shall return to this controversial subject.)
Secondly, there were some rulings of the Constitutional Court that went straight 
against the public opinion. The first ruling of this kind was the one that abolished 
capital punishment. In October 1990, the ruling of the Constitutional Court18 was cer-
tainly a landmark decision. László Sólyom, in his concurring opinion acknowledged 
that the abolishment of capital punishment was made possible solely on the ground of 
the personal opinions of the judges and the requirements of the “present time”—and 
had no foundation whatsoever in the written constitution. To be sure, this ruling 
ran completely against the opinion of the majority of citizens. The “right to life and 
16 There is good reason to make a distinction between the two notions, liberty and freedom. 
Liberty would mean constitutionally protected individual rights and civil liberties. The 
sense of freedom would be “independence”, sovereignty linked to the liberty of a commu-
nity, usually a nation. As with its republican aspect, the concept of freedom also entails the 
freedom of a citizen to have the possibility to be involved in political decision-making. The 
distinction of liberty and freedom is derived from H. Arendt, On Revolution, New York 1965, 
Compass Books, C166 and seems to be useful in approaching East-Central European politics: 
the crippled nature of freedom and the lack of a tradition in the development of individual 
rights. (See also: H. F. Pitkin, ‘Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?’, Political Theory, Vol. 16, No. 
4 (1988), at http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591788016004001.)
17 Though Artur Zwolski remarks in a comment: Every representative of a communist country 
claims that his or her communist regime was the least oppressive we, as analysts, are entitled 
to compare these regimes according to their true merits. Meanwhile I would like to thank 
wholeheartedly Artur Zwolski for his tremendous help in proofreading my essay.
18 L. Sólyom, ‘A halálbüntetés eltörléséről’, ABH 23/1990, The Constitutional Court of Hungary, 1990.
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dignity of the human being” thus found its way into the non-textual content of the 
constitution, in the last instance getting its philosophical underpinning in the natural 
law, and demonstrated once again that there are cases when liberal principles out-
weigh democratic decision-making.19
Beside the aforementioned conflict, the immediacy of the ruling also should be 
noted (the arguments consisted within the opinions already doing this). The US and 
its Supreme Court has arrived—after centuries—to the election of Barrack Obama 
and dismantled the discrimination in the country. But the leaders of the new democ-
racies in East Central Europe could not tell the world and the European Union as 
they awed and later wanted to join: “please wait a little bit, we will assure you, that 
in the foreseeable future we will conform to your set standards, we will improve 
our record”. The paradox of latecomers is this: they join the club, but they will feel 
uncomfortable.
To sum up, there was no “developmental model” at hand, just the revolutionary 
road was open. A constitutional, liberal revolution could not and indeed, should not 
have been avoided, but in this way the “real”, popular revolution was averted, and 
instantly, political conflicts within the democratic regime itself were created. (But 
even the constitutional revolution has not been carried out consistently, introducing 
the element of gradualism referred to in the first remark.)
Thirdly, the first impressions of a liberal democracy in working were to some extent 
disappointing.
Several facts should be mentioned here.
a. The first free elections (March 24th and a second round on April 8th) were won by 
the MDF (Magyar Demokrata Fórum – Hungarian Democratic Forum20), a moderate-
conservative party which traced its ideological roots to a “völkisch”, “narodnik” 
intellectual tradition, both left and right wing, being socially sensitive but cultivating 
also nationalist issues. Its leaders, fully active between the two world wars, during 
the 1960s, ‘70s, ‘80s, were half-heartedly anti-communists meanwhile collaborating 
with the communist regime that in exchange allowed some of their ideas to reach 
the public. When formed in 1987, the “party” has had no clear ideology and in its 
ranks we would encounter the representatives of “narodnik” traditition, would-be 
right-wing extremists, some people of the old aristocracy and socialists (even former 
members of the ruling communist party), and a few liberals. Its success at the elec-
tions can be attributed exactly to this unstructured character, representing to large 
extent an equally unstructured electorate. Their only pledge before the elections was 
19 For a good discussion of this eternal conflict see for example J. H. Ely, Democracy and Dis-
trust. A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge 1980.
20  Note that there is no mentioning in the name of a “party”.
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“don’t be afraid”, we are the “Calm Power”21, we won’t turn your life upside down, we 
are not radicals and we won’t hang communists by their neck to streetlamps. Anyone 
could find something for himself/herself in this promise, without being worried 
about making choices. The promise referred in a subtle way even to a well-ordered 
society; one that is served by a caring state and gets rid of open conflicts and leaves 
the individual alone in its business. The image that the electorate saw behind the 
slogan was that of the continuation of the Kádár-regime without János Kádár and 
without communists. It was already seen what four years later became clear, when 
the socialists, the reformed former communist party took power with overwhelming 
majority, that the past is an unchallenged promise.
b. On October 25 the largest protest in the new democratic regime took place. The so-
called “taxi drivers’ blockade” paralyzed Budapest and in many places of the country 
road traffic was severely obstructed. The protest broke up because fuel prices went up.
The case was a perfect exhibition of a comedy of errors, where every participant 
misunderstood its place in the democratic play and acted according to old instincts. 
The cab drivers were revolted and asked vehemently for government regulation to 
serve their particular interests. Although the law on freedom of assembly was one 
of the most important laws agreed upon at the Round Table Talks and permitted 
free elections to be organized, furthermore restricted wanton actions of the com-
munist police in the last phase of regime-change, drivers didn’t ask for permission 
for demonstration. It was a spontaneous movement which for the protesters and the 
government alike looked as if it were a true upheaval, revolution even. The govern-
ment had a certain moral sympathy for “the poor people” that had to suffer under 
the unjust capitalism which suddenly appeared. At the beginning, they had no clue 
how to solve the situation, oscillating between using the army to clear the roads 
and withdrawing altogether. The opposition—mainly liberals (socialists, former 
communists were quiet: in “good old times” something like this couldn’t have hap-
pened they thought)—though in parliament, went on to the streets and brought tea 
to protesters; they felt that alas! the real revolution has come and hoped in secret that 
government would collapse. In the end, the situation was solved peacefully, but many 
questions regarding democracy remained open. In the following period conferences 
were organized that aimed to somehow define the relationship of the rule of law and 
civil disobedience. Even today, from time to time, the issue comes to the fore and 
theoretical and practical consequences are weighed. One thing is certain: being in 
office for only few months, the government lost its popularity, it was considered that 
it deceived the people and never recovered. The new democratic regime began by 
21 “Force tranquille”, initially the slogan of François Mitterand back in 1981. Sometimes the 
“calm power” is associated with Martin Luther King.
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proving itself unable to meet the expectations of the regime change; proving that 
democratic politics is nonetheless politics and not a community dream.22
c. The intrinsic interest of politics (and not much later that of the politicians taking 
on the form of corruption) prevailed over the interest in participation of the masses 
in politics.
Many provisions of the new constitution favoured governability, reducing the 
area of participation of citizens in direct political decision-making. Some of these 
provisions stand out and should be mentioned here.
Perhaps the most important of them is the election of the president of the Republic. 
In 1989, on November 26th a referendum was held to establish the form of government 
in the 3rd republic of Hungary. Among other things, the main question the citizens 
were asked to respond to was if president should be elected directly by the popula-
tion or should be elected in parliamentary procedure. The result was extremely close, 
just only about 6000 votes deciding that the president should be elected by the parlia-
ment. The most ardent champion of this solution was the already formed Alliance 
of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége) that succeeded to become the 
second largest party during the campaign, even with good prospects for winning the 
elections next year.
The argument for the position of AFD was a clear anti-communist message: we 
don’t want any dictators anymore! A presidential republic will always carry the 
danger that a single person will seize more and more power and will be able to influ-
ence the political decisions more than the representatives of a democratically elected 
parliament. Furthermore, the long authoritarian, non-democratic history of Hungary 
should be interrupted.
This argument has been very popular those days, but equally popular was the 
more democratic counter-argument that wanted the people to retain as much 
decision-making power as possible, and the direct election of the president is cer-
tainly the most important of all of them. This latter position, paradoxically, could 
have served as much the other position as well: to avoid one-man rule is good to have 
a balance of powers.
In more general terms, we can say that one position was rooted in an egalitarian 
political philosophy and the other was embedded in a hundred year political tradition 
of one-man rule in Hungary. Since the end of the 19th century, Hungary has always had 
a ruler: the Tisza-family, giving prime ministers, Admiral István Horthy, the Stalinist 
Mátyás Rákosi, János Kádár.
22 Of course, politicians knew this, they were well aware that “dirty politics” will clash with the 
fairy tale of democracy. József Antall, prime minister in 1990 declared that we are doomed 
to be a kamikaze-government and, during a discussion with MPs of his party: We won the 
elections now, but we have lost the forthcoming ones.
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At the end of the day, a very strong parliament has been created, somewhat re-
stricting the participation of citizens in direct decision-making, meanwhile creating 
a fertile ground for parliamentary dictatorship and thus the possibility of one-man 
rule couldn’t be avoided.
Other provisions of the new constitution pointed in the same direction. Not the 
parliament got the cabinet and the prime minister, but the cabinet and prime minister 
got the parliament—the executive always can dominate legislation. The prime min-
ister can be removed only by a “constructive” vote of no confidence as in Germany, 
Spain or Israel, meaning that a vote of no confidence requires that the opposition, in 
the same ballot, propose a candidate of their own. Ministers have to face only “cen-
sure motion” and no “no confidence vote” (“No Confidence” would lead to compulsory 
resignation of the minister whereas “Censure” is meant to show disapproval and does 
not result in the resignation of a minister.)
The governability of the country was a paramount concern for those who shaped 
the constitution of the newly established democracy, that issuing from dictatorship 
risked to slip into anarchy. Thus, the road towards democratic authoritarianism was 
paved.
Fourthly, we have to dwell a little bit on the nature and achievements of the “demo-
cratic opposition” that was thought to be the avant-garde of the regime-change.
“Democratic opposition” is a generic term which covers a multitude of attitudes, 
groups, acts, outlooks. Basically, it is a rejection of the Kádár-communism, a rejec-
tion of the compromise it offered after the retaliation of 1956. Following the birth 
of Solidarnosć in Poland and the introduction of martial law, democratic opposition 
in Hungary began to institutionalize: samizdats (half-clandestine publications) were 
edited (with the spiritual leadership of János Kis, later first leader of the Alliance of 
Free Democrats) and distributed (mainly through László Rajk’s “boutique” and by the 
future mayor of Budapest, Gábor Demszky), “flying universities” (private gatherings, 
where a professor held courses, for example on the true story of the Soviet Union by 
Miklós Szabó, a famous historian, or Mihály Vajda about the Hungarian Jews and the 
“Jewish question”) were organized, civil organizations were formed (like the SZETA 
– Organization for Supporting the Poor, with the leadership of some sociologists, Ot-
tilia Solt and Gábor F. Havas).
The list is not intended to be a comprehensive one, but it exhibits the main threat 
of the democratic opposition: neither had a single, unified ideology or organization, 
nor was it a well-defined political movement. On the other hand, what united these 
scattered political movements was the hope that by its sheer presence they would 
force the communist regime to show its own limits; that they would reveal that 
behind the façade of the “most happy barrack” Hungarian communism is the same 
ghetto as all the others.
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“Democratic opposition” was above all a moral attitude open even to a large 
public, resting on the rejection of “goulash socialism”. The problem though was that 
Hungarians felt quite well boiling in that goulash (see the Kádár’s legacy chapter 
below). For the majority of Hungarians, the democratic opposition was a rebuked, 
strange “movement”.
This moral attitude drew much of its force from Václáv Havel’s Power of the Power-
less23 and György Konrád’s Antipolitics24. When Konrád’s Antipolitics25 has been published 
in Hungarian in a “samizdat” edition in 1986, there was a clear sign that “something 
political” happened, without being clear what kind of politics it was all about. The publi-
cation was a proof of political courage, but the political aims were unclear. So the demo-
cratic opposition began to organize itself and emerged as a political movement with the 
publication of the first truly political document. “Social Contract” appeared in June 1987. 
The first line reads: Kádár has to go. Shortly after—in November 1988—the Alliance 
of Free Democrats party—one of the main driving forces of the regime-change—was 
founded. Later, this party called itself AFD – Hungarian Liberal Party.
From this short account of the history of the democratic opposition follows that in 
the wake of the would-be democratic regime we encounter a republican rather than a 
liberal movement at the forefront of the regime-change. 
The overlapping difference of civic republicanism and liberalism is defined by 
William Galston in this way: An instrumental rather than intrinsic account of the value 
of politics forms a key distinction between liberalism and civic republicanism.26 For the 
republicans, politics has got a value for its own sake (it is intrinsic), for the liberals, 
politics is not as good, but is needed to achieve some goals, fundamentally safeguard-
ing by political means the moral liberty of individual.
So, when the AFD, during the 90’s increasingly labelled its position as being a 
liberal one and definitely when it assumed power in 1994 in coalition with the former 
communists (Hungarian Socialist Party – MSZP) seemed to betray its own tradi-
tions, the morality of anti-politics and was accused even of giving legitimacy to its 
former enemy, communism. When confronted with the day-to-day business of “dirty 
23 V. Havel [et al.], The Power of the Powerless. Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern 
Europe, ed. by J. Keane, Armonk 1985.
24 Though Havel and Konrád did not say the same, as János Kis (idem, A politika mint erkölcsi 
probléma, Budapest 2004, p. 351) pointed out, the political messages of the two approaches 
overlap. The state power – even in a liberal-democratic regime – has to be resisted, has 
to be confronted either with a civil politics (Havel) or with the intellectual power of the 
individual. Havel speaks about a distinct politics to be constituted outside the sphere of 
government; Konrád speaks about the intellectual dignity and moral supremacy of the 
individual over the state.
25 G. Konrád, Antipolitics. An Essay, transl. by R. E. Allen, San Diego 1984.
26 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism. The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and 
Practice, Cambridge 2002.
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politics”, party wars and hatred, emerging right wing extremism, scrappy parties, 
corruption and politician’s self-interest—all what was utterly unknown in the previ-
ous 40 years and now is called the “normality of democracy”—the citizens suffered a 
serious shock. Liberals desperately argued for long-term beneficial constitutional ar-
rangements, liberty of the individual, self-government, Roma, gay, minority rights… 
Overall, the general feeling was that liberal issues, when carried out successfully, 
will just worsen the situation. Thus, the need for order was already born, and again, 
the kádárist order that knew nothing about open conflicts, fuelled nostalgia even in 
those generations that were born after its extinction.
Until now, I have sketched the meaning of “liberal revolution” in Hungary during 
the regime-change. As we have seen, “liberal revolution” did not rest on a clear-cut 
liberal ideology27, was not entirely liberal, at some points was undemocratic and has 
not had straightforward political representation. The “liberal revolution” seems to 
be more a republican movement that lost its appeal to the public exactly when it car-
ried out its primary goal, the establishment of a liberal democracy.
The Kádár-legacy
Without Kádár there is no way to govern today in Hungary – this is the main lesson 
learned from 20 years of democratic transition. The “Social Contract” was excessively 
self-confident when it stated that Kádár has to go. János Kádár, the successful com-
munist leader died on July the 6th, 1989 (born 1912, Fiume, today Rijeka, Croatia).28 
Few days earlier, on June 16th a large demonstration took place in Budapest during 
the reburial of Imre Nagy, prime minister during the 1956 revolution, later hanged 
probably by the orders of Kádár himself. The reburial of Nagy was considered the 
burial of “kádárism”.
Today, in 2013, a headline of an Internet newspaper reads: Kádár did so well that we 
cannot give him up. The article sums up a conference that was held when the research 
papers of a defunct research institute29 were deposited at the Open Society Archives. 
From those research papers, prepared for the communist leadership and state owned 
Radio and Television, we gain a fairly detailed picture about the mood and thinking of 
the people living in Kádár’s regime.
27 One has to ask whether there is anything “clear-cut”? But for the purposes of this paper, I 
stick to Jerzy Szacki’s methodological advice. We will use a “situational” definition of liberal-
ism and not a substantial one: what has been the role of liberalism at different points in 
history. (J. Szacki, Liberalism after Communism, ransl. by Ch. A. Kisiel, Budapest 1995, pp. 
23-24.)
28 For a good biography of János Kádár in English, see R. Gough, A Good Comrade. János Kádár, 
Communism and Hungary, London 2006.
29 Established 1969 as Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont – TK, from 1988: Magyar Közvé-
leménykutatási Intézet – MKI: “Mass Opinion Research Institute”.
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In 1989, after the death of János Kádár and in the wake of the regime change, the 
public opinion ranked high some of the main features of kádárism and the personal-
ity of its architect.
More than half of the respondents (50-60%) acknowledged the positive achieve-
ments of Kádár’s policy. Roughly 20% “loved truly” Kádár: in their eyes “Kádár was 
the undisputed greatest Hungarian political personality” and the “Benefactor of 
Hungarians”. 87% said that always has had a “good impression” of him30.
Among the policies which were highly valued by the public was: education pro-
vided free of charge (61%), health care provided free of charge (58%), state provided 
pensions (55%). The people would preserve these.
From the economic point of view, the introduction of the “New Economic Mecha-
nism”, back in 1968, was very much appreciated, when small businesses, ownership 
of small plots of land (those “surrounding the house”), “a second job”, and “private 
entrepreneurial communities” were allowed.31
Normal everyday life seemed to include central heating, long holidays, the posses-
sion of a fridge, colour TV, stereo player, and the possession of a car wasn’t considered 
something completely out of the ordinary.
How could the killer and communist János Kádár achieve this high degree of legiti-
macy for his regime that seems to be a lasting legacy?
By now, it is already a commonplace thing among scholars and all sorts of intel-
lectuals that Kádár, out of fear for another revolution, came up with a political and 
economic gimmick that he himself summarized in the following words: “those who 
are not against us are with us”. (Compared to the other communist regimes based 
30 It is no wonder that opinion polls after the regime change show high acceptance of the old 
regime compared to the new order. A survey carried out by TÁRKI, a renowned Hungarian 
research institute in 1991 and 1995, asking whether the old or the new regime is better, 
showed the following figures for the Visegrád countries: 
Czech 
Republic
Poland Slovakia Hungary
The new regime is worse
1991 14 23 35 40
1995 23 39 51 51
The new regime is better
1991 71 51 43 31
1995 57 44 32 26
 (Source: Z. Ferge,  ‘A rendszerváltás nyertesei és vesztesei’, Társadalmi riport, No.? (1996) – 
“The winners and losers of the regime change”)
31 These were the key elements of a partly liberalized economy, where the monopoly of state 
ownership was left intact, but in small breaches the private enterprise was allowed to flour-
ish. This “goulash” system, a mild mixture of socialist ownership and capitalist functioning 
gave rise to the so called “second economy” and of a class of entrepreneurs that was better 
off than the official “driving force” of the regime, the proletariat.
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on: “those who are not with us are against us”.) If one did not challenge publicly some 
basic taboos of communism and the restricted sovereignty of the country (the pres-
ence of Soviet Army as the occupying force), one was not considered the “enemy of 
the proletariat” and was allowed to mind his business, chase around after extra earn-
ings, build houses, and grow vegetables. Compared to other East Central European 
countries, a relatively high and ever-increasing standard of living was granted, of 
course financed by the state, and from the middle of the 1970s from foreign loans. 
While the economy was not as sound as it was presented by the official propaganda, 
the people did not notice anything but the crumbling of the planned economy.
Two decades (until the mid-1990s, more precisely until 1995, the austerity meas-
ures introduced by Lajos Bokros, socialist finance minister) the constant policy of 
consumerism is presented by János Kornai, the Harvard economist, as follows: Hun-
garian economic policy for at least two decades could be described as seeking at any time 
to maximize consumption in the present and immediate future at the expense of debt 
that would devolve on later periods. Initially, this ensured a rapid growth of consump-
tion, but it was already beginning to backfire to some extent after a decade: the rise in 
production, and with it consumption, began to slow down. Later, a decline in production 
and consumption set in, partly because of the policy resulting in debt accumulation in 
previous years. Yet the objective function, maximization of short-term consumption, was 
still unchanged. It continued, of course, with its sign changed, as minimization of the fall 
in consumption, and the price of this aim was still accepted: further accumulation of 
debt.32
Of course, this steady consumerism-based economic policy that overarched into 
the transition period had a price and had consequences affecting the “morality”, 
“mentality”, “mores” or as I prefer to put it, “the political culture” of the population 
at large.
Although a sound interpretation of this claim is still under discussion and further 
research in undoubtedly needed, I will attempt to make some preliminary remarks 
that refer first of all to the relationship of the state and the individual.
Péter Tölgyessy sums up the essence of the Kádár-system in a few words: Taking 
distance from the Soviet model already had begun in 1953, with Imre Nagy’s new phase. 
Throughout the whole period, the elites in power acted scared by the events of 1956, and 
willy-nilly, they made more and more concessions to the people they were afraid of. The 
party state abandoned permanent mobilization of the society, it yearned for the depoli-
tization of it. It did not tolerate the uncontrolled organizations, but seldom made use of 
criminal law. It concentrated mainly on raising the living standards of every strata of 
32 For a comprehensive economic discussion of the “goulash communism” see J. Kornai,  ‘Pay-
ing the Bill for Goulash Communism: Hungarian Development and Macro Stabilization in a 
Political-Economy Perspective’, Social Research, Vol. 63, No. 4 (1996).
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society and for this purpose launched newer and newer reforms. It opened up the country 
for foreign influences and lived out more and more from loans. An increasingly larger 
part of the life of the country was regulated by non-market and non-planned economic 
private deals, non-centrally organized activities gained ground. The autonomy of small 
circles of citizens advanced slowly.
The individual in the Kádár-regime told the power: I am willing to accept your rules, 
if you are willing to provide me with entitlements. In contrast, the “liberal revolution” 
will tell the citizen: I will not interfere with your desires, but I am willing to provide you 
with the rules that will enable you to accomplish what you want. These two maxims 
differ to such an extent that is almost impossible to bridge the gap—a seemingly 
abortive tentative in Hungary.
The equality of entitlements (employment, wages, state provided free education, 
free health care, passport for travelling to the West) and the inequality of oppor-
tunities (housing, licenses for doing business, land ownership) developed a double 
thinking concerning the state. As far as equality is concerned, the state was able to 
protect the citizen against sudden changes in his or her life, and along the inequality 
dimension forced the citizen to bargain, to escape state control and pursue individu-
alistic ends that would enable him or her to be better off than one’s fellow citizens. 
Everyone could feel that one is part of the middle class, but within that middle class 
there were those fortunate who succeeded in finding loopholes. (Of course, there 
were poor people, but they were well hidden behind a full employment policy. After 
the system change, the so-called “unemployment behind the gates”33 surfaced sud-
denly, affecting the poorest strata of society, mainly the Roma population.)
Basic security was granted, but one had to bargain, cheat, and have good connec-
tions, find back doors, be cloaked. Competition that was encouraged ran for favours, 
class envy and egoism poisoned the relationship of people, making them unfit for 
cooperation. Market economy behaviour made its way into a community that was 
stripped of a market able to foster trust.
State interference is deeply penetrating everyday life and the citizen has a per-
sonal, twofold “hate-love” relationship to it.
Parallel to the “liberalization” in economy, there certainly went on a “liberaliza-
tion” in culture as well. Except the aforementioned taboos that were untouchable in 
public and private discourse (the latter monitored by the secret police) a relatively 
33 A very important notion of socialist – i.e. based on state ownership – economy. In commu-
nism, it was compulsory to work and the state had to offer a workplace for everyone. On the 
other hand, socialist companies were interested to employ people with low wages, because 
after the New Economic Mechanism was introduced, they paid taxes according to the me-
dium wage at the company. This created the so-called “unemployment behind the gates” 
resulting in people having a workplace, without having work. This kind of “unemployment” 
is estimated to reach even 20% at its peak.
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free flow of ideas was permitted or tolerated. The already mentioned systematic so-
ciological research has been possible, even if it was controlled by the party, and done 
for the political leadership. Although censorship was in place, it was mild. The other, 
dark side of this cultural policy seldom was to be seen, but nonetheless manifested it-
self. When in 1977 some intellectuals signed a petition as a token of solidarity with the 
’77 Charter, they were sacked and forbidden to publish, when Miklós Haraszti wrote 
a book about the situation of the worker in communism, the book was prohibited to 
appear, and so on and so forth.
The cultural policy was framed by György Aczél (Budapest, August 31, 1917. – Vi-
enna, December 6, 1991), comrade and companion to János Kádár since 1956. He was 
the one who formulated in 1957 in a letter the famous principle of the TTT (Tiltani, 
Tűrni, Támogatni—in English PPP—Prohibit, Permit, Promote) that later became 
the slogan of the official cultural policy until 1985. The PPP meant a careful, rather 
pragmatic equilibrium and the abandoning of ideological indoctrination. Besides the 
atmosphere of a “liberal” cultural and intellectual life, the policy achieved an impor-
tant goal that even hadn’t been intended. In a non-coercive manner, it succeeded in 
creating the impression—and the practice, indeed—that only a discourse with the 
power can generate “results”, and that it is utterly useless for intellectuals to com-
municate with each other. A very effective fragmentation of intellectual life emerged, 
and an equally effective control of the intellectual life had been made possible for the 
communist leadership, disarming from the outset any disarray.
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Thus, the political culture of “kádárism” is characterized by a highly distorted en-
trepreneurialism, a shortage-bond consumerism, a civic culture that is broken up by 
individualism, slipping into egoism, trust-less competition, a hierarchical discourse, 
where the partner is the power and horizontal, peer-to-peer discourses are rare or 
missing.34
34 Is this what Piotr Sztompka (idem, ‘Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist 
Societies’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol. 2, No. 22 (1993)), in terms of political culture, calls 
“civilizational incompetence”? In the case of Hungary in some respects yes, it is, in others 
no, Sztompka cannot capture the peculiarities of the Hungarian situation. But I have made 
good use of Sztompka’s “political culture” definition and have analyzed the Hungarian case 
according to the components proposed by him: “entrepreneurial culture”, “civic culture”, 
“discourse culture”, “everyday culture” which are the elements of a democratic political 
culture. Besides, I fully agree with Sztompka’s methodological approach (and his reference 
to Tocqueville): The real meaning of the revolutions of 1989 cannot be grasped if we do not 
take the cultural-civilizational dimension into serious account. Without turning our focus to the 
level of culture, to the realm of intangibles and imponderables, “soft” variables, we shall neither 
be able to comprehend nor to overcome the obstacles and blockades that inhibit the processes 
running at the more tangible, “hard” institutional, or organizational level (P. Sztompka, ‘The 
Lessons of 1989 for Sociological Theory’ in idem (ed.), Building Open Society and Perspectives 
of Sociology in East-Central Europe, Madrid 1996, p. 19.) This lesson is drawn from those 
misconceptions that were forwarded by the “institutionalist” advisors in the first period of 
the transition. From ashore it was hard to see how “a ship is rebuilt at sea”. One mechanism 
by which the past makes itself felt in the present is socialization and cultural tradition. Citizens 
in post-communist societies developed their beliefs and desires, values and frames, roles and 
routines in past periods of life that is under the communist regime or even earlier. We cannot 
expect those value patterns and ways of thinking to change all at once. They will continue to 
be pervasive after the political regime change, at least for a certain period of time. “Mental 
residues of communism” are usually stereotyped in the following way: people in Eastern Eu-
rope developed, under the old regime, bad work habits, contempt for effort and initiative, a 
fear of innovation, and an inclination to trade the expression of their loyalty for patronage and 
protection. Egalitarian and envious attitudes create reactions both against excessive poverty 
and excessive wealth. Due to their experiences under communist rule, citizens do not believe 
in the rule of law, tend to distrust political elites, and they are rather skeptical that political 
and economic reforms will bring about the desired outcomes. Conversely, we should bear in 
mind attitudes and skills unofficially cultivated under the old regime. People in Eastern Europe 
developed virtues such as self-reliance, flexibility, effort, and inventiveness in order to cope with 
the vast inefficiencies of the past system. Those “unofficial virtues” turn out to be well-suited to 
the needs of a market economy. In addition, we can observe the survival of pre-1949 attitudes 
throughout the region. Traditional values such as religion or various craft traditions which were 
preserved during the communist period could become important again. Likewise, traditional 
animosities between ethnic groups may reemerge (J. Elster, C. Offe, U. K. Preuss, Institutional 
Design in Post-Communist Societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge 1998, Theories of 
Institutional Design p. 61 – emphasis added). A full “translation” into plain English should 
be provided here! But if we concentrate only on the sentence in bold we have the following 
list of “unofficial virtues” which in fact were the “official” ones: “self-reliance” = egoism; 
“flexibility” = cheating and lying; “effort” = theft, corruption; “inventiveness” = duplicity 
and tax-evasion. All these developed during the communist era in relation with the state 
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As an ultimate consequence, communism went almost unnoticed, and the ex-
pectation of the population after the transition negotiated by the elites was clearly 
the continuation of the practices of the old regime. A revolution which in fact was a 
counterrevolution without revolution.
Of course, the expectations for a counterrevolution that won’t change too much 
couldn’t be fulfilled during a revolution. However, gradualism remained the order of 
the day for politicians. When forced by external, mainly economic circumstances, 
politics had to abandon gradualism and ran straight into defeat.
In 1990, the Antall-government had to retreat when it wanted to introduce market-
prices for gas (the taxi drivers’ blockade which was discussed earlier).
The second free government led by Gyula Horn, after creating the self-image that 
would bring back the “kádárism”35, at the brink of economic collapse had to introduce 
austerity measures in 1995. The socialist-liberal government, to a large extent due to 
these measures, lost its majority in parliament in 1998.
The first Orbán-government (1998-2002), building on the macroeconomic results of 
the austerity program of the previous government, at the beginning dared to pursue 
a reform agenda, but as elections were approaching, from 2000 onwards, it couldn’t 
withstand to dishing out again. Surprisingly, the government lost its popularity at the 
elections, partly because the leadership didn’t conform with Kádár’s picture – “they 
were too arrogant”.
The socialist prime minister Péter Medgyessy boldly introduced “kádárist” meas-
ures by raising the salary of a teacher by 50% and led the country in big economic 
trouble, debalancing the budget for 10 years. Although very popular (“a politician that 
has kept his promise”) he was overthrown by his fellow party members because they 
saw that his policies would lead to an economic breakdown.
Ferenc Gyurcsány followed Medgyessy with extended “reform-programs”. After 
he won the elections in 2006, he confessed at a party meeting with the MPs that “day 
and night we have lied to the people”. He meant to say, that reforms are inevitable, 
and marked the “manners” in society and are especially ill-suited for a market economy. 
The enormous difficulties of institution-building are suggested by Tocqueville: Laws are 
always unstable unless they are founded on the manners of a nation; and manners are the only 
durable and resisting power in a people (idem, ‘Democracy in America’, ch.XVI - Of the Jury in 
the United States Considered as a Political Institution. p.447.
35 The “bread that costs 3,60 Forints” (last time in 1979 this was the price of 1 kilogram of 
bread). Though a topic for discussion even in 2013, when the former prime minister died, 
this “campaign promise” never had been uttered. Gyula Thürmer, the leader of the Worker’s 
Party (the outspoken heir of the former communist party), in the party newsletter wrote an 
obituary: We need someone who will make Hungarian people believe that they need not worry. 
What was good in socialism, will be carried along, just we will add everything that is good in 
capitalism. This someone became Gyula Horn. He stood in front of the people and for a moment 
the people saw Kádár re-appear, and everything good that Kádár meant. The 3,60 bread, safety-
of-life, work (Szabadság, 29 June 2013.)
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and “kádárist” consumerism should be abandoned. It was a true sentence, which 
caused one of the most dangerous turmoils in the country.
The last blow for his government was the so-called “social referendum” in 2008. 
A referendum on revoking some medical and tuition fees was held in Hungary on 
9 March 2008. The proposals would cancel government reforms which introduced 
doctor visit fees paid per visitation and medical fees paid per number of days spent 
in hospital as well as tuition fees in higher education. All three were supported by an 
overwhelming, (82-84%) majority of voters.
From this point on, it was absolutely clear that “kádárism” cannot be overlooked 
if one wants to preserve power in Hungary.
But this snapshot is a deliberately one-sided presentation of the political events 
that is meant to underline the policy heritage of “kádárism” and to single out the role 
of the state in maintaining those policies. 
Some conclusions
Now, we are ready to make one more step closer to the actual situation, refraining 
ourselves from taking a stance or to enter into a detailed description.36
Instead, we have at our hands the texts, speeches of Viktor Orbán in which he 
makes pretty clear what will be, or what the cultural background of his governance is.
In September 2008, one and a half year before the elections, already with more 
than fair chances of winning, at Kötcse (a regular gathering place for right-wing 
intellectuals and politicians), he delivered a talk in which he openly spoke about the 
political culture he intended to replace with a different one.
In his interpretation the “leftist liberal political culture” has got two pillars: the 
relationship between the individual and the community that has lost its equilibrium 
in favour of the individual, the other one being the failure of the faith in “scientific 
capitalism”, in the “omnipotence” of the market. This culture has failed not only in 
Hungary, but in the whole world. Now the gates are wide open, and a new culture is 
ready to enter the scene: the state should be strengthened, a political alliance with 
36 For anyone who wants to join the debate over the “nature” of the actual Hungarian gov-
ernment the Internet offers plenty of pros and cons. In English one of the most informed, 
though naturally biased (or objective – depends on standpoint) sources are the Hungarian 
Spectrum blog of Eva S. Balogh at <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/>. For an 
account of two years of Fidesz-government see a highly critical one: A. Bozóki, ‘The Crisis 
of Democracy in Hungary, 2012’, Deliberately Considered, 3 February 2012, at <http://www.
deliberatelyconsidered.com/2012/02/the-crisis-of-democracy-in-hungary-2012/>, 20 Au-
gust 24, 2013. Maybe the best analysis of the first 20 months of the Orbán-government and 
the far reaching consequences, mainly from economic point of view, but not only, is J. Kornai, 
‘Centralization and the Capitalist Market Economy’, Népszabadság, 1 February 2012.; also 
at <http://nol.hu/belfold/centralization_and_the_capitalist_market_economy?ref=sso>, 20 
August 2013.
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the Catholic Church forged, and a genuine “Hungarian thinking” has to be placed at 
the starting point of searching for solutions for all the problems that a government is 
confronted with. 
What is needed for this culture to win a definitive victory? Money, ideology and 
voters. These resources then will allow a “central political force field” to be created. 
That will allow Fidesz to exercise37 (and by the same token: to stay in) power for the 
following 20 years.
In this talk all the elements of a political creed and even an outline of a political 
direction are present.
“Strengthening the state” means centralization, a policy that constantly is cov-
ering more and more fields: health care, education, pensions, tobacconist shops, 
casinos, state ownership in companies…
The Catholic Church became a political force, the Fidesz made an alliance with a 
barely existing party, the Christian Democrats, the brand new constitution is perme-
ated with the tenets of the church. This means also that the balance between indi-
vidual and community has been shifted towards the community. On another occasion 
Viktor Orbán acknowledged that the constitution of 2012—that is “solid as granite” 
and is perceived as representing the organization of the “Magyar life” for the next 
millennia—is not a liberal constitution anymore; is not the safeguard of individual 
liberty, but the “right balance” between “responsibilities and entitlements”.
The “Hungarian way of looking at the world” manifests itself in the “freedom-
fighting” against the European Union and for the “Magyars outside the borders 
of Hungary”, Hungarian citizenship granted for them, thus “national unification” 
without changing the borders, continuous tensions with the Romanians over the 
autonomy of the Hungarian “Székely38 land.
But the more interesting notion is the “central political force field” that has a 
twofold meaning.
37 “Exercising power” means that one has extensive institutional and non-institutional powers 
even if he or she is not in the government. This “external power” (“outside” the government) 
is exercised through individuals that were appointed for a long period as leaders of different 
governmental institutions, extra-governmental bodies, through granting ownership to dif-
ferent loyal groups in society, through an equally loyal administration, bureaucratic corps. 
The distinction between “force” and “power” might be the key to understanding the po-
litical ideals of Viktor Orbán. Interesting research proposal is that of Robert Rohrschneider 
(idem, ‘Learning Democracy: Do Democratic Values Adjust to New Institutions?’ in Pollack 
D. [et al.] (eds.), Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe...). He distinguishes between 
three core democratic values: restraint (willingness to accept losing a political or economic 
competition and not abusing a victorious one); self-reliance (acting on one’s behalf, basically 
autonomy) and corresponding societal values (pp. 49-50). These categories, at first sight, are 
utterly different from those embedded in the “force-theory”. 
38 A compact “székely” population of roughly 600.000 people, living in South-East Transylva-
nia, representing 65% of the population in three counties.
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It is the name of the constant, all-encompassing effort to provide the means— 
money, ideology, voters—for the building blocks of the new politics. In its second 
meaning, it is a communication strategy that is intended to limit debates within the 
borders of the new culture: to define the topics of the public debates, direct commu-
nication of the power with the population, media regulation, outcasting any “alien” 
approach as illegitimate. 
Is this foundation an appealing conservative nationalist ideology, a new interpre-
tation of democracy and state, populism, or just an emerging autocracy39 in building 
up its powers? These are the questions that are discussed at length and breadth not 
only in Hungary, but in Europe and even in the US.
Anyway, for the purposes of this paper we may conclude that the counterrevolution 
we have discussed earlier has got a name—National Cooperation System (NCS)40—, 
an ideology, a leader, backing—two-thirds in the parliament and large rallies under 
the guise of an-NGO called “Peace March” (partly organized by the government itself 
for its own support) and finally policies.
More importantly, the NCS stems from a general disappointment with what hap-
pened in the last 20 or so years. As we have seen, its leader has capitalized on the 
perception of the failures of the liberal revolution, launching a counterrevolution 
without revolution, comprising different restoration tendencies.
Most recently (July 26, 2014 at the Summer School in Tusványos, Romania) Viktor 
Orbán uttered the final sentences: “Hungarian nation is not a mere composition of 
private individuals, is a community which must be organized, strengthened, built. In 
this respect the new Hungarian state that we build today in Hungary is an illiberal 
state and not a liberal one.” And shouldn’t be thoroughly democratic as well. It has to 
take into account those successful examples of China, India, Singapore, Turkey and 
Russia.
The NCS is based on a thorough learning of history. Anti-Trianon feelings (in 1918 
the Paris peace treaty—known in Hungary as Trianon—dismembered the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the partly sovereign Hungary, leaving a large Hungarian population 
in successor states, as Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria), the 
39 It would be very easy, and indeed very misleading, to say, that authoritarianism has a long 
tradition in Hungary, and democracy has not. From the end of the 19th century we always 
encounter a “strong man” who is able to have more influence on the course of events, even 
holding a certain monopoly of the power, that any other politician. The Tisza family, István 
Bethlen, Béla Kun, István Horthy, Mátyás Rákosi, János Kádár and now Viktor Orbán. Some 
of them acted within a quasi-democratic framework, some were dictators and nowadays 
formally there is a democratic system. “Strong man” doesn’t mean unequivocally authori-
tarianism. Nonetheless in Hungary, as in many, if not all, post-communist countries, the 
need for a “strong man” is somehow linked to the “disorderly democracy” that emerged 
after the transition.
40 Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere – NER.
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symbolism of the 1930s and ‘40s, antibolshevism (1920s and ‘50s), the Kádár legacy 
(1960s, ‘70s, middle of the 80s), statism (state ownership and state care and the state 
providing order) are a perfect mixture of nationalistic and non-democratic elements 
that gain democratic, i.e. populist, support today. Most of the public policies, in one 
way or another, are based on this bulk of historical reminiscences, disappointments, 
past glories and political failures of the present.
So, we may reiterate the main argument of our paper: the past is an unchallenged 
promise.
However, the question in the title of this essay is rather a rhetorical one, and can-
not be answered right away. If Hungary is halfway on the road of learning democracy, 
establishing a democratic tradition in a country that has got barely any democratic 
tradition or is moving loftily ahead on a dead end road—is to be seen in the future.41 
Is it a “Sonderweg” (“excepcionalism”, special path) or is a typical case of all post-
communist countries? Of course, further comparative studies are needed and further 
developments must occur. However, from the intellectual point of view, it is an inter-
esting story.42
41 The same questions arise, perhaps not so strikingly, in many post-transitional democracies. 
Delegitimizing the regime-change and creating an institutional and cultural framework for 
an illiberal democracy is a challenge for these countries: nearly twenty-five years after the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the transitions to and consolidations of democracy 
in the region remain incomplete and, in some cases, face grave threats (R. D. Kelemen, ‘Mes-
sage from the Editor’, European Politics and Society – Newsletter of the European Politics 
and Society Section of the American Political Science Association (Winter 2013), pp. 3-4, at 
<http://www.academia.edu/2773381/Reflections_on_Democracy_in_Eastern_Europe_5_
author_forum_>.) Jan Kubik suggests that: In order to develop a robust theory of the illiberal 
and authoritarian challenge in post-communist Europe, we need to explain both the nature 
of the delayed popular response to the tribulations of early transformations and the success 
or failure of illiberal discourses (‘Poland: Illiberal Temptation Rejected (so far)’, European 
Politics and Society – Newsletter of the European Politics and Society Section of the American 
Political Science Association (Winter 2013), p. 23, at <http://www.academia.edu/2773381/
Reflections_on_Democracy_in_Eastern_Europe_5_author_forum_>.)
42 In very harsh words Kim Lane Scheppele, a Princeton legal scholar calls this story a Franken-
stein-experiment in constructing a “Frankenstate”: Victor Frankenstein’s monster brought 
fear and horror to all those who saw it. But Viktor Orbán’s monster state does Frankenstein one 
better. Orbán has mastered the art of legal suture so well that his Frankenstate can live and 
work in the European Union. People can tell that there is something not normal about this state, 
but it is hard to say what it is. It looks like a democracy; it talks like a democracy. It doesn’t look 
or act like your father’s authoritarianism. It is the new, improved, democratic-edition Franken-
state (‘Not Your Father’s Authoritarianism: The Creation of the “Frankenstate”’, European 
Politics and Society – Newsletter of the European Politics and Society Section of the American 
Political Science Association (Winter 2013, at <http://www.academia.edu/2773381/Reflec-
tions_on_Democracy_in_Eastern_Europe_5_author_forum_>).
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The Situation of the Third Sector 
and the Impact of the Economic Crisis in Hungary
László Kákai1
Abstract
In my paper, I intend to review the situation of the Hungarian civil sector after the re-
gime change. I present its structure, the systemic characteristics and the time-series 
changes. The study undertakes the modelling of the Hungarian non-profit sector by 
surveying previous attempts. Emphasis will be laid, in particular, on the effects of the 
economic crisis (affected Hungary in 2008) and the impact of structural and territo-
rial effects on the sector.
Introduction
My study may seem quite eclectic because it concentrates on two questions, which 
can be regarded controversial. One of them is about the effect of the economic poten-
tial on the development of the Hungarian nonprofit sector, while the other deals with 
local and regional identity influencing the growth of the organizations, its presence 
or lack in the world of civil organizations. First of all, I will concentrate on some 
inconsistencies in the development of Hungarian non-governmental organizations. 
Before I come to this point, I want to touch on a number of effects and tendencies, 
which have significant implications for our subject and serve as a framework to bet-
ter understand the Hungarian process.
In every developed, democratic country of the world, non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) are indispensable components of the democratic political systems, 
playing an important mediatory role between the society at large and the political 
institutions. Their number, role, and influence have been increasing since World 
War II. The attention directed at NGOs may primarily be attributed to the more than 
two-decade-long crisis of the state as well as the crisis phenomena of representative 
democracy based on political parties (Kákai, 2013).
In Europe, this crisis manifested itself in various forms. In the developed North, 
the traditional welfare social policy was questioned; in a considerable part of the 
developing South, people became disillusioned with state-controlled development; in 
Central and Eastern Europe, state socialism collapsed. 
The incredible growth of the European non-profit sector in the past 20 years 
(particularly in terms of public services) can be explained by a number of factors: 
1 PhD habil, Associate Professor, Head of Institute, Chair, Department of Political Science and 
International Studies, University of Pécs. kakai.laszlo@pte.hu
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• Following the financial crisis of the 1970s and the early ‘90s, several governments 
looked for alternative solutions to replace the organization of the welfare serv-
ices previously offered by the state. The privatization process of services can be 
observed in all Europe, and many NGOs have taken over from the state significant 
segments of services in extensive demand; 
• Voluntary organizations have been increasingly assigned to provide services 
generated by community institutions;
• Public preferences have changed, and instead of the typically standardized and 
relatively impersonal services offered by public institutions, people increasingly 
demanded to receive tailor-made and more client-oriented services, generally 
preferred by voluntary organizations; 
• More and more new needs are acknowledged, and a growing number of social 
needs are formulated (e.g. gender equality, protection of the biosphere, etc.);
• Employment crisis of the late 1970s and ‘80s led to the launch of employment 
programmes with the involvement of voluntary organizations2 (Tarling, 1998).
The burgeoning NGOs were supported by the fact that the problem-solving abilities 
of the state are seriously challenged, and it seems more unlikely that the state itself is 
capable of solving social, developmental and environmental problems, which modern 
nations must face (Salamon–Anheier, 1999: 12). Furthermore, we need to mention the 
technological and communication revolution of the past decade which had a profound 
effect on the majority of population: people have acquired capabilities thanks partly to 
the widespread learning opportunities, and partly to the technological and communica-
tion revolution [Internet, commercial TV channels, for example], which challenge past 
hierarchies, national institutions, and the problem-solving capabilities of traditional 
parties and the political elite (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart, 1997).
This process is clearly indicated by the average voter turnout in elections: in West-
ern Europe in the 1960s it was 85%, while in the 1990s it was “only” 78%. A significant 
decrease could be witnessed, for example, in Austria, Denmark, France, Portugal and 
Switzerland (Lane–Ersson, 1991: 182; Lane–Ersson, 1999).
Parallel with the decreasing voter turnout, there has been a decline in party 
membership too. In 14 out of 19 Western European states, the rate of party members 
among the franchised population decreased. The lowest rates were measured in Eng-
land, France, the Netherlands and Germany where only 2% of the franchised popula-
tion are members of a political party, and their proportion significantly decreased 
compared to data of the 1960s and 1980s (Enyedi–Körösényi, 2001:123). Along with 
the low rates of party membership, there was a fall in the rate of those with a strong 
party-identification (that is, voters who give their vote to the same party each elec-
2 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities on Promoting the Role of 
Voluntary Organizations and Foundations in Europe. Brussels, 6 June, 1997 COM (97) 241 final
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tion) Germany or England can be mentioned as an example where their proportion 
almost halved compared to the 1970s (Ibid: 270).
The predictable decline of political loyalty increased the fragmentation of party sys-
tems: while in the 1950s in Western Europe the average number of parliamentary parties 
was 6, it went up to 9 in the 1990s (Lane–Ersson, 1991: 182; Lane–Ersson, 1999: 142).
The above-mentioned theoretical approaches show very well that from the 1980s 
on, the understanding of the non-profit sector’s situation is closely related to finding 
the way out of the crisis of welfare state. This era is mainly characterized by the priva-
tization and marketization3 of state duties and public services, especially in health care, 
education and social services, which up until then were areas dominated by non-profit 
organizations through their indirect (e.g. tax allowances) or direct (subventions) sup-
ports, and also through their so-called outsourced services. According to Lester Sala-
mon, the government can, in the welfare state, take a controlling and a financing role 
in providing welfare services, and can act as the producer of services. In the USA, as a 
welfare state, the government rather takes the function of controlling, where it relies 
on external service providers to fulfill governmental tasks (Salamon, 1991: 62). Sala-
mon calls the ensuing network of relationships a ‘third party government,’ by which 
he means that both the spending of public funds and the provision of public services 
takes place with the involvement of external service providers. These external service 
providers are often private and non-profit organizations (Bartal, 2005: 85).
The social and economic embeddedness of NGOs varies between nations. Hereby 
there are several models of NGOs partnership with the state. In the early 1990s, Ben-
jamin Gidron, Ralph M. Kramer and Lester M. Salamon distinguished four models of 
NGO partnerships with the state.4
Table 1. Models of Government-Third Sector Relations
Function Model
Government 
dominant
Dual Collaborative
Third sector 
dominant
Funding Government
Government/third 
sector
Government Third sector
Service Government
Government/third 
sector
Third sector Third sector
Source: Gidron-Kramer-Salamon, 1992: 18
3 Its possibilities are interpreted by T. M. Horváth in various ways. In a broader sense, it can 
be understood as the renouncement of a public duty (privatizing and the withdrawal of gov-
ernment); the separation of responsibility for services and their actual provision (by way of 
outsourcing); compulsory payment for public services. In a narrower sense, the following 
arguments can be mentioned: influence to stimulate competition (tax reductions, savings), 
efficiency based on incentive systems and ideological arguments (Horváth, 2005: 44-45).
4 This typology is valid in the framework of the welfare State model (Boris–Steuerl, 2006: 152).
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The government dominant model is characterised by the government’s leading 
role in both the funding and delivery of human services, as well (e.g. Scandinavian 
countries or Japan).
The third sector dominant model is very much located at the opposite extreme: the 
major feature in this model is the dominant role played by NGOs both in the funding 
and delivery of services. However, this is a typical ideal model, which actually does 
not exist in that form. The authors identified the New Deal era of the 1930s, i.e. the 
period preceding the governance activity, with this model.
Concerning the dual model the role played by governments and civil society in the 
funding and delivery of services is obvious. Nevertheless, these roles are separated, 
therefore, this model is also known ‘parallel track model’. It means that NGOs play a 
supplementary role by providing services that governments cannot deliver to con-
sumers. In other words, NGOs fulfil needs that the governments do not (e.g. France, 
Italy).
The fourth model is the collaborative model. This model emphasises more coopera-
tion than separation: in this model NGOs and governments work together under the 
aegis of a common intention. In the framework of this model, governments provide 
financial support, while NGOs deliver services. However, it should also be highlighted 
that this model has two sub-categories. One of these is named ‘collaborative-vendor 
model’, which means that NGOs practically working in umbrella organisations 
network mediate the government’s need to the population. In this sub-category, 
NGOs can act as agent of government programming, but they also dispose of some 
limited discretionary and debating power (e.g. the Netherlands and Germany). The 
other subcategory is the ‘collaborative-partnership model’. In the framework of this 
sub-category, the organizations of civil society can retain a considerable amount of 
discretion and autonomy in the programming. Furthermore, the more active par-
ticipation in political processes is also possible. (e.g. United Kingdom, France (after 
1982), Italy, Israel).
The authors, taking into account the developments at the end of the 1980s and in 
the 1990s, have found in almost every country a shift towards the collaborative model 
in respect of the developed Western European states, even in the states described by 
the traditional government-dominated model (in England after the Thatcher era, in 
France following the reforms in the public administration in 1982) (Gidron–Kramer–
Salamon, 1992: 28–29.).
At the end of the 1990s, Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anhier developed a spe-
cific model based on a country-group classification. This new model adopts several 
elements from the above-mentioned typology. This model developed at the end of 
the 1990s distinguishes the following four development scenarios (Salamon–Anheier, 
1999; Jagasics, 2001: 22).
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• Liberal model (e.g. USA, Australia): In this model, low social welfare spending by 
government is associated with a relatively large non-profit sector. Public serv-
ices are delivered by the central government and the states.5 In this system, the 
government practically orders the outsourcing welfare services, and supports fi-
nancially, on the basis of contract, under strict conditions, NGOs having intention 
to participate in the provision of services. In this model the private and the public 
sectors are clearly separated, and this separation is supported by the law, as well. 
The role of trade unions is limited: their dominance in the triangular negotiation 
involving employers and government is relatively low. Under the influence of the 
decreasing of state provision and public finance, NGOs have acquired wide au-
tonomy and have become organizations appropriate for the self-management and 
self-sufficiency. Their functioning and activity are, in general, characterised by a 
high level of professionalism and competence. Furthermore, in these countries 
the social solidarity with the civil society and foundations is important. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that volunteer work and private donations have become 
tradition in daily life. The number of volunteers, compared to the civil sector of 
other countries, is considerable in these states.
• Social democratic or Scandinavian model (e.g. Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark): 
The state is the universal service provider, and the room left for service-providing 
non-profit organisation is limited. Because of the universal role of the state in 
service-provision, the non-profit sector provides only very limited services, and 
therefore is mainly expressing political, social or recreational interests. Similarly 
to the liberal model, in case of the social democratic model also the major source 
of the non-profit sector consists in private donations. Since the level of state pro-
vision in the Scandinavian countries is the highest, the role of NGOs in this field is 
low. The NGOs play a complementary role vis-à-vis the government’s role services 
without performing its duties (Sasvári, 2008: 39).
• Corporatist or welfare partnership model (e.g. Germany, Italy, France, the Nether-
lands, Spain): In this model, high social welfare spending by government is associ-
ated with a developed non-profit sector. The major source of the non-profit sector 
consists of public funds. In the corporatist model, public actions play an important 
role in civil society. Basically, there is a symbiosis between NGOs offering public 
social services and the state. Therefore, the distinction between public and pri-
vate sector is vague. The biggest part of NGOs receives indirect (tax reduction) 
or direct (normative) state aid (Ibid: 40). There is a well-established, traditional 
framework of the cooperation. Furthermore, a complex system of network and 
interaction has been established between NGOs and the state. However, concern-
ing the culture of voluntary work, donation at private and company level, there 
5 England can be characterized as the mixture of the liberal and the social democratic model.
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is a huge gap between the different countries: while, for example, the voluntary 
work is important in the Netherlands, its level is particularly low in Austria.
• Statist model (e.g. Japan): There is a limited government welfare protection, which 
serves the interests of some social, political or economic elites.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Central and Eastern European Countries could 
not be clearly classified in any of the above-mentioned models. These countries can 
principally be described as the mixture of the American and Western European 
models (Lévai–Széman, 1993).
Civil society tendencies in historic context
In Central and Eastern Europe, the development of the nonprofit6 sector is essentially 
linked with the 1989 revolutions. During Communist times, except for a short period, 
civil society was disrupted. After the 1956 revolution, it was only Hungary, Poland 
and the former Yugoslavia where limited pluralism was allowed at the universities 
and in the arts and cultural sectors. A newly emerged civil society was prepared by 
the Solidarity movement in Poland; by a range of small clubs and societies in Hungary; 
and by peace and green movement groups in Czechoslovakia.
The escalation of the economic, political and social crisis from the mid-1980s gen-
erated a “revival” of organisational life in Hungary. At the beginning of the ‘80s, new 
types of social self-organisation emerged from peace movements to eco movements, 
which were later followed by a “new wave” of student movements, self-governing 
college movement and the club movement within and outside universities, as well 
as politically-oriented associations and forums. The beginning of opening up was 
marked by the re-appearance of the ‘foundation’ as a legal entity in 1987, then it went 
on with the ratification of the Associations Act in 1989, and it was concluded with the 
amendment of Civil Code (enacted in 1990) which abolished the former restriction 
that a foundation could only be set up with the approval of the relevant government 
authority. Following the 1989 Act that guaranteed the conditions of freely setting up 
organisations, taking advantage of the historical opportunity and the erosion of the 
political system, the number of organisations was growing continuously. While in 
1982 there were 6,570 registered organisations, in 1989 there were 8,514. The internal 
structure of the sector also changed: between 1987 and 1989 the number of art, city 
preservation, and cultural organisations increased sevenfold, and the number of 
6 From the content point of view, all the organisations where the prohibition of profit dis-
tribution, organisational independence from the governmental sector, institutionalisation 
(independent legal personality), self-governance (self management, own leadership), and, to 
some extent, voluntariness and self-activity prevail, can be considered nonprofit organisa-
tions (Kuti, 1998; Salamon, 1995; Bartal, 2005).
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other, typically self-starting associations (environmental protection, humane, pen-
sioner, economic/professional) also increased tenfold.
We also need to highlight the counter process during which double transformation 
of the former state party power took place. By breaking up the former assets of the 
state party and building on the infrastructure of some of its satellite organisations, 
new associations and foundations were formed, this time within the legal framework 
of democratic laws. Their officials were “scattered” but they were able to carry on 
with their personal networking outside the party. Some of them really worked to es-
tablish an independent civil society, while others retained their political connections.
After 40 years of state socialism which resulted in the forced abolition of civil 
society and the erosion of social capital, the patterns and conventions of society’s 
self-organisation and representation were not present in every walk of life. There-
fore, there were no opportunities for the various social groups to satisfy the different 
social needs. We have to say that the fast economic and constitutional changes could 
not be followed by the development of the bourgeois society’s civil culture. Most of 
the political élite and the active civilians of the post-communistic countries were so-
cialised in the old communistic system. Their expectations concerning paternalism, 
stability and the welfare state are unbroken, they expect the maintenance of all those 
under the conditions of market economy, too (Kákai, 2009).
After the transition, the number of the civil organisations multiplied rapidly, 
the sector kept expanding dynamically and continuously until 1997. This process 
was mainly due to the intensive spread of foundations that had been very small in 
number in the previous era. In 1997, the “phase of extensive growth” had finished, and 
between 1998 and 2000 the number of the operating organisations hardly changed 
(Kákai–Sebestény, 2012). However, the studies done by the Central Statistical Office 
in 2000 marked a clear slowdown in the sector’s development dynamics. It means 
that since 1997, the number of organisations has not actually changed. Moreover, 2000 
was the first year when the size of the sector did not increase but actually decreased. 
Following the decline, or “flatting out,” of the development tendency, again there has 
been a growth trend since 2003.
Then came a slight increase, which was principally due to the membership non-
profit organisations; foundations were seldom founded in this period of time.
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Figure 1. The number of nonprofit organisations between 1989 and 2011 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013
By the end of the decade the number of the organisations seemed to have reached 
a constant level, the nonprofit sector “became saturated” at a level of 65 thousand 
organizations.
Figure 2. The percentage distribution of non-profit organisations by fields of activity, 1993-2011
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013
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During the years, the activity structure in the nonprofit sector also changed 
gradually. Those engaged in health care, education and research, economic develop-
ment and social care are characterised by a dynamic and rapid growth throughout 
the whole period.
A slowing growth is visible in the fields of culture, environment, sports and 
recreation, international relations, and nonprofit federations. However, the number 
of economic and professional advocacy organisations and voluntary fire brigades de-
creased (Nagy–Sebestény, 2008: 127). It is essential to mention that the composition 
of the sphere of foundations and associations differs fundamentally as far as the ac-
tivities are concerned. The fields, which were definitely underdeveloped in Hungary 
compared to the developed, democratic countries, represented much higher shares 
in the foundations sector than among voluntary associations. The most striking dif-
ference was the relatively low share of Hungarian voluntary organisations in welfare 
services, which are the most important fields of voluntary activities in developed 
countries. It could be explained by the state monopoly of education, social and health 
care under state socialism. While voluntary organisations such as service providers 
were tolerated in culture and even promoted in sports, recreation and emergency 
prevention, they were not allowed to establish schools or hospitals. Recently, the 
structure has become more balanced. The largest number of civil organisations is 
engaged in sports and recreations, traditionally in the form of voluntary associa-
tions. Many nonprofit associations can be classified within the fields of the arts and 
culture, too. The field of education and health is characterised by the dominance 
of foundations. The smallest groups of the Hungarian nonprofit sector are politics, 
multipurpose grant-making and nonprofit unions (Ibid.).
Hungarian nonprofit organisations have nearly 4 million members, which, 
regardless that one person can be a member of several organisations, is a remark-
able achievement in a country of 10 million. In contrast, looking at the volunteers of 
nonprofit organizations too, statistical data show that less than half a million people 
carried out such activity, which makes only 5% of the population over 14. 
In the entire period here examined, the two most important indexes that reflect 
the development of the sector are the number of nonprofit organisations and the real 
value of revenues. The total income of the sector exceeded HUF 1 202 billion7 – it grew 
to ten times as much at current price, as compared to the HUF 118 billion in 1993, and 
to nearly two and a half times as much as the HUF 496 billion in 2000.  Despite this 
fact, the proportion of the organisations with less than HUF 500 thousand annual 
income was still 43 percent. The annual income of the nonprofit sector in 2010 more 
than HUF 1200 billion, which appears to be a huge sum, but it was actually less than 
5% of the GDP. 
7 App. €4.4 billion.
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Figure 3. The revenues of non-profit organisations, 1993-2011
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013
Figure 4. Development of the non-profit sector: according to numbers, 
revenues and employees, 1993-2011
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013
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The two main indicators of the sector’s development, the number of the organisa-
tions and the real value of the incomes kept increasing, although showing some fluc-
tuation, from 1993 throughout the whole period; the previous one grew by 88 percent 
and the latter by 91 one percent.
The two growth paths, however, had different curves. The real value of the reve-
nues slightly decreased in the first years, then started to grow very slowly; from 1997 
it began to rise more dynamically, in 2000 it caught up with the previous indicator, 
and then, until 2008, it exceeded the growth rate in the number of the organisations. 
In the last two years, the two figures were practically stagnating at the same level 
(Nagy–Sebestény, 2012).
This positive tendency, however, gains another light if we take a look at the real 
income in terms of one organization. During the nearly twenty years this figure hardly 
changed. This means that the growth indicated in the number of organisations and the 
real income did not appear at the unique organisational level, the previous figure actu-
ally “eliminated” the latter one: the financial situation of an average organisation was 
the same in 1993 and in 2010 (Kákai–Sebestény, 2012: 119).
Employment, however, grew a lot more consistently and rapidly.8 The nonprofit 
sector employed almost twice as many people in 2000 and more than three and a half 
times as many in 2010 as in 1993.  
Employment, however, is typical within only a narrow range of nonprofit organi-
sations. In 2010, merely 16 percent of them had a paid employee, and, within that, only 
11 percent had a full-time employee. 
By the end of the decade the number of those working for nonprofit organizations 
reached 143 thousand. The number of the people employed in full-time regular jobs 
rose over 119 thousand. The performance of the 47 thousand people employed in part-
time jobs equalled to that of almost 20 thousand full-time workers (Ibid: 120).
The low rate of civilian participation and low subjective competence can partly be 
explained by a tendency, experienced in other Eastern European countries too, which 
indicates that the altered social and economic environment brings new challenges and 
demands to its citizens. Besides the sector growth, we also need to consider the role 
the sector plays in employment. Affected by the transformation crisis and globalisa-
tion, the state is continuously withdrawing from the fields of education, healthcare 
and social policy. Many expected that the empty “space” would be increasingly filled 
in by a growing non-governmental sector, together with other players (business, 
entrepreneurs), and thus would dominate the employment and public services. In 
Western European countries, the size of non-governmental sector is generally large. 
8 In the comparison, we use the indicator of the number of staff calculated in terms of regular, 
full-time employees. This is the Hungarian version of full-time equivalent (FTE) used in the 
international literature.
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The rate of labour force it employs is 7.8% on average compared to economically ac-
tive population. In three countries (Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands) this rate 
exceeds 10%.
The tendency of Hungary does not differ much from Central and East European 
tendencies, since the non-profit sector can employ less than two per cent of full-time 
employees and only 5 per cent of the organisations are contracted to carry out public 
tasks.
The revenue of the nonprofit sector was about HUF 1238 billion9 in 2011. This 
sum came from four major sources. In 1993, nearly 55 per cent of the total revenues 
derived from investment, unrelated business and private donations. By 2011 the form 
ratio had changed, around 67 per cent of the total income came from revenue from 
the basic activity and state support.
The state contributes 42% to the nonprofit sector’s income, which is relatively low 
compared to nearly 60% of Western European contribution; however, it is regarded 
high among former socialist countries. I should remark that perhaps the way of fi-
nancing itself reveals the inherent distortions of the sector. 
Figure 5. The distribution of the revenues of non-profit organizations by source, 1997-2011
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 1993-2013
The income structure, however, considerably changed. In 1993, the bigger part 
(55%) of the total income was gained from economic activities and private support. 
9 App. €5 billion.
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By the late 1990s, this rate considerably changed. From that time on, a growing pro-
portion of the sources were made up of incomes gained from basic activities and gov-
ernmental grants. The previous had grown permanently until 2000, and then came a 
serious recession, which was followed by stagnation. The rate of governmental sup-
port had remained practically unchanged through long years, but began to increase 
after 2000 and was always above 40 per cent after 2003; this type of contribution 
reached HUF 514 billion in 2010.10 
From the mid-1990s, partly taking advantage of legal possibilities, the government 
and the local councils were busy starting public foundations whose actual purpose 
was to distribute state subsidies among various fields and target groups (e.g. public 
education, sport, Roma minority, needy university students, etc.), as well as to carry 
out prominent activities (mainly in research and teaching). 
Within a few years’ time, these big public foundations and public benefit compa-
nies operating mostly nationally or regionally “absorbed” a significant portion of the 
rather scarce central (state) subventions dedicated for the nonprofit sector. 
As shown in the following graph, the income of public benefit companies and 
public foundations set up by the state and local governments have been dynamically 
growing at the expense of other organisations. It all happened despite the fact that 
the proportion of these two types of organisation within the whole NGO sector is 
basically insignificant. 
Figure 6. Rate of revenues and sectoral weight of public foundations, 1994-2011
10 App. €1.9 billion (Kákai–Sebestény, 2012: 119).
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Figure 7. Rate of revenues and sectoral weight of public benefit companies (nonprofit business 
corporations), 1994-2011
* From 2007 the public benefit companies instead of the nonprofit business corporations
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 1993-2013
If we look at the distribution of revenues in 2011 only, we can see that public benefit 
companies and public foundations received more than 54% of the financial support. 
Figure 8. Rate of revenues of public foundation and public benefit companies, 1994-2011
* From 2007 the public benefit companies instead of the nonprofit business corporations
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 1993-2013
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This process reinforces the tendencies that caused the evolution of a “second” 
nonprofit sphere in Hungary (public foundations and public benefit companies) – 
which could also be called state or municipal nonprofit – which are essentially not 
non-governmental organisations and handle not private but rather public assets.
For a number of different accounting, budgetary, taxing and organisational rea-
sons, this type of organisation has become increasingly popular with the state and 
the local governments as it is basically a disguised way for the state and local govern-
ments to finance themselves. This is because tax concessions are in fact savings for 
the public body assigned with the task and funded from the central budget.
I would like to mention another distorting effect, a so-called regional concentra-
tion of resources. Studying the territorial division of the revenues of the nonprofit 
sector, it can be stated that the major part of revenues is still concentrated in Buda-
pest.
Figure 9. The division of the total amount of revenues within the non-profit branch and its 
organisations by the settlements types, 2011
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013
It means that nearly two-thirds of the income lands at certain organisations in 
the capital, while only less than a third of them are located there. Although its extent 
decreased somewhat compared to that of 1993, when 28.2 per cent of the non-profit 
organisations operated in the capital (where one-fourth of the population lives) and 
71.1 per cent of the total revenue was channelled there. The same two ratios in the 
year of 2011 were “only” 24 and 54 per cent, which can be still considered a bit high. 
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This tendency forecasts a regional polarisation between “country and capital,” as 
well as a polarisation of resources between the “rich and poor”. 
All this may result in the division or “duplication” of the Hungarian nonprofit sec-
tor, where, on one side, we find “grassroots organisations” (mostly associations and 
private foundations). These constitute the majority, but due to scarce resources, they 
struggle for their daily survival, which depends largely on their leaders’ skills and 
creativity. On the other side we find a limited number of organisations with substan-
tial resources (public foundations, public benefit companies), which are strongly 
connected (through contracts and subsidies) with the state and local governments 
or their institutions.
Some local and regional aspects of the sector 
It is a very difficult undertaking to group countries or state establishments based 
on the extent of their decentralisation or the models they follow to divide power in 
space. Territorial division by ways of public administration largely depends on the 
actual size of states, the size of population, but most importantly, on the political-
ideological objectives and conditions of organising and controlling society, and the 
way of exercising power. Under different conditions, the national characteristics of a 
given country play a crucial role in defining the principles (e.g. based on a constitu-
tion or unwritten law), which govern the relationship between the categories and 
levels of public administration. Therefore, before observing the regional setup of 
NGOs, some remarks have to made about the relationship between regional and local 
models of Hungarian public administration and civil society.
The decentralisation of local governments in Hungary has not relied on strong 
traditions. Strong centralisation and also the majority of earlier periods of state 
development characterised the period of state socialism between 1950 and 1990. 
In Hungary, the most important decisions are made by national bodies – the 
parliament and the government – but the so-called devolutionary processes which 
were seen in other European unitarian countries11 have not taken place here since 
the change of regime, delegating major rights articulated in the constitution to sub-
national levels within the unitarian system. At the same time, the mid-level institu-
tions of regional self-government were gradually built up and gained power (general 
county assemblies, regional development councils), but they have not reached the 
level of “regionalism.” Thus, the area of Hungary is divided into three NUTS 1-level 
parts. NUTS 2 consists of seven regions, NUTS 3 level (the lowest one) corresponds to 
the counties and Budapest.
11 In reference to that, the territory of state is governed in a uniform and central way, the 
legislative power of the central government is not divided among the member-state govern-
ments. Further classifications are possible within the unitarian state, such as the classic 
unitarian state, devolutionary and regionalised unitarian states. Examples include the con-
stitutional development of Greece, Portugal and Belgium in the past decade.
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Figure 10. Regions of Hungary
The reason for this is that both the decentralisation of self-government and re-
gionalism has had no traditions. As regions today have neither organisational, nor 
other relevant functions, the “setting” of regional problems continues to be the coun-
ty, defined by hundreds of years of tradition. In the framework of national regional 
policy, the county is a regional unit exhibiting decades- or centuries-long traditions, 
regional identity, and administrative powers. Professional and political debates on 
the county system since 1989 – concerning mostly the public administration role of 
the middle level, and the distribution of tasks and resources between the county and 
local governments – have resulted in the weakened position of the county and the 
appearance of other regional categories as a decision-making framework.12
As a summary, Hungary’s regions are extremely divided, both horizontally and 
vertically. The large number of municipalities, while horizontal division is due to 
the separation of four regional levels, i.e., settlement, sub-region, county and region 
causes vertical division (Soós–Kákai, 2010).
Centralization had a significant impact on the build-up and strengthening of com-
munities as well. 
The size of Hungary’s nonprofit sector increased in a relatively short time. The 
initial period presented an extremely extensive and dynamic picture, although the 
establishment of organisations cannot be considered even (regarding the different 
types of settlement and regional aspects). Hungary has nearly 3,200 settlements; the 
average size of population per settlement is 3,100, which means that the Hungarian 
settlement structure is particularly divided. 
12 An example of this is the rapid extension of regional public administration, as well as the 
“stealth” expansion of sub-regional and regional development institutions.  
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Table 2. Settlements by size of population in Hungary
Size of popula-
tion*
Village Town
City of county 
rank
District of 
capital
Capital Total
– 10 000 2824 185 – – – 3009
10 001 – 50 000 2 124 3 4 – 173
50 001 – 200 000 – – 19 19 – 39
200 001 – – – 1 – 1 2
Total 2826 309 23 23 1 3168*
*Including the districts of the capital.
Source: Gazetteer of Hungary 1st January, 2012
Hungarian Central Statistical Office Budapest, 2012
This table also shows the division of organisations by settlement. 23 per cent of 
the settlements – all of them are small villages – have no or only one active NGO. Over 
half of the settlements (55%) have more than 1 but less than 10 NGOs, and only 22 per 
cent have 10 or more such organizations. 
The connection of organisations to the settlements can be analysed in their 
scope of activity as well. The activity of more than half of all the organizations13 is 
connected to a settlement or a smaller area of it. A quarter of them have a regional 
scope14 and less than one-sixth operate across the country borders. The data suggest 
that Hungarian NGOs largely developed locally, although this fact in itself does not 
exclude the possibility of establishing broader relationships; but, as I will present it in 
detail in the section of relationship networks, they can rarely be connected with the 
political and representative processes on a county or regional level.
In 1993, most organisations worked in Budapest. Its high population and the avail-
ability of potential resources can perhaps explain the role of Budapest by 2011, it slid 
back to third in terms of number of organizations. Data show that Budapest-based 
organisations were superior in numbers within the sector only until 2000.
Since 2000, urban nonprofit organisations have advanced to be the dominant 
organisations that define the division of settlements within the sector. The rate of 
village-based organisations decreased between 1993 and 2011,15 and has since re-
mained largely unchanged, similarly to county-based organisations. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that in the past 14 years, nonprofit has become an urban phenomenon 
in Hungary (Bartal, 2005: 248). The dominance of rural organisations can also be 
attributed to the increasing effects of suburbanisation in the past decade, which, at 
least in the number of organizations, diminished the “fault line” between capital and 
countryside in the 1990s (Kákai, 2009b: 62).
13 The lowest rate is in the capital and in the county seats; the highest rate is in villages.
14 70 per cent of regional organisations are active in cities and county seats.
15 Between 2006-2011, another major decrease occurred in this municipal category.
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Figure 11. Division of nonprofit organizations by settlement type, 1993-2011
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013
The rate of nonprofit organizations per thousand residents indicates the regional 
division of organisational density, or in other words, non-governmental activity. In 
1996, there were 4.5 organisations per thousand residents on average, in 2006 there 
were 5.8, while in 2011 there were 6.6 organisations, showing that organisational 
density rose in every county in the past ten years.16 While growth could be observed 
in every county, there was above-average growth during the 10-year period in Tolna, 
Békés, Vas, Csongrád, and Zala counties. The lowest growth was seen in Jász-Nagykun-
Szolnok, Komárom-Esztergom, Baranya, Somogy and Bács-Kiskun counties.
A regional analysis of the number of NGOs per thousand residents shows that the 
central region is followed by South Transdanubia as first, and the North Great Plain 
as last.
During the past ten years, regional inequalities, although slightly, have increased 
(and fluctuated in time). The difference between the highest (Central Hungary) and 
lowest (North Great Plain) regional indicators of nonprofit organisations per 10 thou-
sand residents was 21 in 1996, which sank to 19 in 2000 but increased again to 22 in 
2006. 
16 However, the data have to be treated carefully as growth was accompanied by a 2.5 per cent 
reduction in the size of population.
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Figure 12. Number of non-profit organizations per thousand residents by region, 1995-2011
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1995-2013
Overall, the changing number of NGOs displays regional and local differences but 
they do not adapt to centrally “defined” regional boundaries. Whereas along with Bu-
dapest and Pest county, Veszprém, Zala, Vas, Somogy, Heves counties have the highest 
(5 on average) number of nonprofit organisations per thousand residents, the eastern 
regions of the country regularly have a lower number (4 on average). 
The large number of Budapest-based NGOs may be due to that the capital “drains” 
nonprofit organisations away from the neighbouring counties (Fejér, Pest). A com-
parison of the years 1997–1999 reveals that while there used to be a strip across 
Nógrád, Heves, Szolnok, Csongrád counties comprising relatively many organisations 
in 1997, it fell apart by 1999. The period since the millennium shows a much more 
“mixed” picture when comparing counties and regions;17 however, the growth in the 
number of organisations did not lead towards the convergence of regions, but rather 
conserved the advantages and disadvantages already observed. 
The data related to the regional location of nonprofit organisations and the size 
of population generally suggest that nonprofit organisations are much more concen-
trated in the capital and the Transdanubian counties than in the Great Plain and the 
north. This can probably be explained by the earlier historical, cultural traditions 
17 With some structural rearrangement (i.e. mutatis mutandis).
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and the current level of economic development of the given region, the needs of the 
unsatisfied population and the co-operation of local governments and other institu-
tions with nonprofit organisations.
Regional economic potential and the non-profit sector
Economists have been seeking an answer to the following question for a very long 
time: why can a country be successful, or rather what the chances of a country are for 
catching up with the rest of the world? Edmund S. Phelps, a Nobel Prize winner, tried to 
answer the question of how much cultural variables affect the growth of productivity, 
economic activity and employment (Phelps, 2006). He refers to the survey published 
in 2006 (World Values Survey) in which he divides cultural factors into two groups: 
individual and public cultural values. Individual values are civil and political freedom, 
the support of the participation of the individual in public decisions (elections) and 
its frequency, tolerance of verbally non-conformist behaviour, the freedom of self-
determination and the expression of trust toward other people. Public factors consist 
of religion, emphasis on national feelings, the strength of authority and obedience, 
as well as family traditions. The results of the survey show the existence of homo-
geneous country-groups such as protestant Europe, where both the individual and 
public cultural values represent great opportunities for choice, Confucianist Far East, 
Anglo-Saxon and Latin world. A surprising result of the survey is that there are some 
“odd-ones-out” in some cultural groups regarding geographical locations. For exam-
ple, Hungary does not show qualities which characterise the western ex-communist 
Visegrad Group or the Baltic Group but it is closer to the Eastern and the Balkan18 
ex-communist nations. Maybe, this inspired me in my analysis of the influence of the 
economic environment on the number and the situation of civil organizations regard-
ing the interaction between economic parameters and nonprofit organisations.
Apart from considerable amount of research on the sector, there were very few 
surveys made about the relation between nonprofit organisations and certain eco-
nomic indicators, and, in light of these relations, about the impacts of the economic 
crisis on the sector. How did the economic position presented above and the lack 
of resources typical of most of the organisations result from the narrow resources 
and the withdrawal of finances attending the crisis, and to what extent were the 
organizations able to counterbalance these factors? Did the crisis shake the unstable 
economic basis of the sector? 
Economic and regional potentials of the sector before the crisis
János Rechnitzer started an interesting experiment by which he wanted to discover 
the way in which certain economic indicators influence the geographical localisation 
18 For example: Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, Serbia, Latvia and Ukraine etc. 
184 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
and the activity of nonprofit organisations. In this survey, the indicators were applied 
as follows.19
Table 3. Variables used in the analysis
Name of variable Content of variable
Economic income potentials Regional income per capita (HUF thousand/capita)
Foreign capital attraction Foreign investment per capita (HUF thousand/
capita) 
Employment level Active earners per 100 capita (%)
Entrepreneurial activity Number of enterprises with or without legal 
personality per 100 capita (organization/100 capita)
Income potentials of popula-
tion
Personal income tax per capita (HUF/capita)
Higher grade qualification Rate of persons with completed higher-grade 
(college, university) qualification per 100 capita (%)
Nonprofit activity Number of nonprofit organizations per 1000 capita 
(organization/1000)
Inclination to donate Taxpayers offering 1% of PIT in terms of total 
number of tax payers (%)
Potential to donate Amount of offered PIT in terms of one tax payer 
(HUF/tax payers)
In these data analysed, the closeness of the relations between the certain dimen-
sions was studied especially in terms of the evolution of the three variables that are 
most typical of the nonprofit sector (nonprofit activity, inclination to donate and the 
potential to donate).
Relying on the above variables, János Rechnitzer formed various groups from 
the regional units of the country, and his main conclusion was that the country is 
stratified and has a strongly echeloned structure in terms of the regional economic 
potentials, the activity of the nonprofit organisations and the support obtained by 
them. Consequently, the country can be divided into the following groups of regions 
(Rechnitzer, 1998): 
• The first, one-member group consists of Budapest. The capital showed outstand-
ing values concerning each compacted variable, and so it is incomparable to the 
other groups.
• The second group included the two counties in Western Transdanubia, Győr-
Moson-Sopron and Vas. In these counties, the willingness to donate is a lot higher 
than it is in the other groups, however, nonprofit activity and the potential to 
19 The author strove to choose uniform dates concerning the variables and figures used in the 
analysis, and as the data were available only after long delay, the analysed data are from 
1996.
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donate does not reach this level, although they are still higher than in the rest of 
the groups.
• The third group is Central Transdanubia20 where nonprofit activity is high, higher 
than it is in the previous group, but the economic position is worse, and this goes 
hand in hand with the lower values of potential and willingness to donate. 
Figure 13. Regional structure of the relation between nonprofit features 
and economic potential, 1996
Source: Rechnitzer, 1998: 553
• The fourth group21 is primarily separated from the fifth group, which consists 
of the counties in Eastern and East-Northern Hungary, not by the indicators of 
nonprofit activity or the willingness to donate. We could rather say that in the 
middle part of the country the activity of the nonprofit organisations, and so the 
donation activeness of the population is weak, but the economic potentials are 
stronger than those in the Eastern region.
• In the fifth group, the unfavourable economic potentials are among the reasons 
for the low level of nonprofit activity and donation, and for the regional group 
organisation.
20 The author calls it a “transitional” region. 
21 Which includes the counties situated in the middle of the country, along the river Danube 
and Csongrád County.
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I was also keen to know whether the stratified and echeloned structure described 
above changed during the ten years, and if did so, what the extension of this change 
was.22
According to the data, the stratified structure did change to some extent during the 
ten years. The former groups no. 1, 2 and 3 came closer to each other. According to the 
data of 2006, the country showed a picture of triple division in terms of the number of 
civil organisations and the economic indicators. The Eastern part of the country pos-
sessed uniformly low civil activity and was attended by weak economic potentials. 
Among the Eastern counties, Csongrád was the only exception where nonprofit 
activity was relatively high, and the economic conditions were better than the aver-
age. This combination was only present in the capital and the Western counties. There 
were several reasons of that: first, in the last ten years, the growth in the income 
within the civil sector exceeded 10 per cent in the Southern part of the Great Plains of 
Hungary and within that Csongrád; second, the number of the nonprofit organisations 
by 1000 persons, too, rose above the national average. As far as domestic migration is 
concerned, the only county with a positive balance in the region (Bács-Kiskun, Békés 
and Csongrád counties) was Csongrád: the domestic migration difference in terms of 
one thousand inhabitants indicated positive (0-2.9) data, and the impacts of the crises 
did not affect this trend, either.
The transition between the two groups of extreme features was provided by the 
counties lying in the middle part of the country. In this region, the level of nonprofit 
activity was low and was accompanied by a moderate level of economic potentials 
equalling about the national average.
Therefore, if we consider both indicators, the national average was made up of 
very good and very bad regions of about the same number, which were completed by 
an average regional category of approximately the same size.
The situation of group no. 4 practically did not change, except for the very im-
portant difference that Csongrád County “joined” the more developed regions of the 
country. 
Finally, group no. 5, although its nominal values improved, was unable to catch 
up with the other groups, and no equation between the regions took place (Kákai, 
2009a).
22 Concerning the variables used in the analysis, for the sake of comparability, we also chose a 
common date; the data are from 2006, and so the developments of a 10-year period can be 
followed. We complemented the analysis by comparing these data to the figures of 2000, as 
well. First, we studied the relations between the certain social and economic indicators and 
the organisational number by doing correlation analysis, and then – in order to select the 
possible indirect impacts – by doing path model analysis based on regression analysis. 
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Figure 14.  Regional structure of the relation between nonprofit features 
and economic potential, 2006
Source: own calculated
The same regional differences are shown by the location of businesses.23 Before 
going into details, it should be mentioned that in 1989, the year prior to the change of 
regime, nearly 360 thousand businesses were registered in Hungary, of which 89 per 
cent were individual enterprises. In 2000 the number of businesses exceeded 1 mil-
lion, of which the rate of individual enterprises decreased to 62 per cent. The latest 
study reveals that in 2008, the number of businesses was over one and a half million, 
64 per cent of which were individual enterprises.
Companies registered in Budapest are about twice as much overrepresented 
among the Hungarian businesses compared to the population size of the capital. As 
to indicators of business intensity, the figure for businesses per thousand residents 
in 1995 was three times bigger than the national average; Budapest was leading the 
enterprising boom. In the following years – slowly and not in every region – the con-
vergence process prevailed. 
Whereas the number of businesses grew by 58 per cent in the capital, it was 15 
per cent in Pest County, about 5 per cent in West and Central Transdanubia and in 
Northern Hungary, and 65 per cent in the North Great Plain. Convergence failed to 
materialise in South Transdanubia and Southern Hungary, regions considered back-
ward, with about 45 per cent growth, which only increased their lagging behind the 
average.
23 Such businesses were involved in the study that filed tax declaration in the given year to the 
corresponding tax authority.
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In 2006 in Hungary, there were 25,800 businesses with foreign interest, most of 
which (68% of all) were located in Central Hungary, the least (2.5%) in Northern Hun-
gary. In 2006, the number of businesses with foreign interest decreased by one per 
cent on national level compared to the previous year, and with significant regional 
differences. The only region that grew was Central Hungary (by 2.6%), the rest fell 
back. Especially Northern Hungary (by 7.3%) and the North Great Plain (by 35.8%) 
were standing out. The presented data suggest that in terms of number of businesses, 
the level of foreign investment is the lowest in Northern Hungary; in terms of all 
other indicators (sales income, own capital, foreign investment within own capital), 
it is South Transdanubia. 
Comparing civil penetration to the economic figures of Hungary in 2000, the 
indicators connected to personal taxpayers (number of tax payers, amount of tax base, 
amount of tax paid) proved to be factors of considerable importance. The amount of 
GDP per capita and foreign direct investment possessed influence of medium strength. 
The indicators reflecting the general situation of the enterprises (number of enterprises 
with or without legal personality) were only of weak effect.   
After all, it can be stated that in 2000 the civil sector mostly depended – beside the 
governmental supports and entrepreneurial earnings – on the citizens’ “conditions”, 
or in other words, the positions of the organisations were most influenced by the in-
tensity of the citizens’ contribution to their activities or financing. It is also important 
to remark that the impact of the economic sector began to be considerable, however, 
it did not arrive from the direction of domestic enterprises, but from foreign and 
multinational companies. There may be two factors hiding in the background. On the 
one hand, at this time CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) activities that started in 
our country later, had already spread to other countries.24 CSR is based on the con-
cept of sustainable development, on the vision that today’s economy and life must be 
organized in a way that allows future generations to have conditions and experiences 
similar to ours (CEC, 2004; Kuti, 2010). This approach includes the environmental, 
social and economic (altogether: social) aspects of development. Instead of focusing 
on the quantitative advance, it focuses on qualitative improvement.
Thus, CSR is not only a fashion wave in relation to which some publications, stand-
ards or interesting researches have been released. It is more than that, it includes 
basic principles and methods that companies and other stakeholders are urged to uti-
lise. Today, foreign companies all over the world pay attention to CSR, i.e. to spending 
a part of the produced capital on objectives of social benefit. One of the most frequent 
forms of this is the support of the civil sector. The multinational companies, of course, 
24 By this term we mean that a company operates in a way that – through internal regulations 
and practical solutions – it reaches or transcends the ethical, legal, trade and public require-
ments the society lays for the business sector. 
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introduced this practice in their Hungarian subsidiaries, as well; this is the reason 
why in 2000 the situation of the civil organisations was more influenced by foreign 
companies than by Hungarian ones. On the other hand, we must not disregard the 
fact that these big companies possessed much stronger economic positions than the 
Hungarian firms, so it was easier for them to spend financial resources on support.
Moreover, the regional distribution of the civil organisations supports these 
statements. The number of the organisations per 10 thousand capita is higher in the 
regions (mainly in the Western part of the country, e.g. Middle-Transdanubia, Middle-
Hungary and the capital) where the population’s income exceeds the average, and where 
many foreign companies are located. 
In the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, important changes took 
place in the Hungarian society, which affected the conditions of the civil organisations 
as well. A great modification in the correlation between the economic conditions and 
the position of the civil organisations could be observed in 2006. The population-
related variables kept strongly influencing the situation of the organisations, while 
the impact exerted by foreign and domestic companies reached about the same level. 
Thus, by 2006, all of the non-governmental stakeholders had lined up behind the 
nonprofit organisations, the sector could count on considerable support from both 
the citizens and the domestic and international companies (Kákai, 2009b).
It is worth to examine the position these above-mentioned resources take up in 
the income structure of civil organizations, on a national and regional scale. 
If we compare the proportion of support made by citizens and different companies 
as part of the whole income, we can see that while the proportion of income coming 
from civil resources is the same, the proportion of company resources has changed 
considerably. 
At the same time, the picture is a good indication of the fact that that while the 
citizens' income increased with by a few measures between 2006-2007, (although it 
has already decreased with 0.6 per cent in 2008 by the economic crisis), on the other 
hand the business incomings decreased significantly with nearly 7 per cent between 
2006-2008.
The decrease can explain the fact that the first symptoms of the economic crisis 
were already seen in the data of 2007. Economists agree that the first effects ap-
peared in 2007. Probably this means that these first effects were felt by the Hungarian 
enterprise sector, although this period was not regarded as a crisis, and it started to 
rationalise its expenses. The rationalisation probably started with the cutting down 
of those expenses, which were not essential parts of the operation of a company, e.g. 
the support of civil organisations. This scenario seems likely because the pattern of 
changes does not look homogenous, i.e. it does not mean that companies in a general 
sense spent less on the support of civil organisations, but it means that companies of 
particular regions or those of a particular sector spent less on this purpose.
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Figure 15. The proportion of the civil and company incomes in the whole income 
of organizations (2000, 2006-2011)
Source: Kákai, 2011
If we want to examine the sources of business income according to settlement 
structure, the next figure looks good. Although it makes an influence practically in 
every settlement type, but the major decline is in the most frequent capital from the 
economic point of view, and it is striking in some other cities, where the business 
income rate dropped to one third compared to the 2006 year data.
If we examine the regional level, we will find the same trends. The proportion 
of income from civil sources between 2000 and 2006 remained the same in almost 
all regions. The only exception to this is the region of Northern Hungary, where the 
quota from this source dropped from 3.1 per cent to 2.4 per cent.
The proportion of enterprise income from different sources, however, increased 
significantly in almost all regions except for the region of Central Transdanubia and 
the region of the Northern Great (Hungarian) Plain. The quota of income coming from 
enterprises remained unchanged in these areas.
The quota of income, the source of which was different among companies, was 
considerably higher in 2000 in the Central Region and in the region of Central Trans-
danubia than the national average. By 2006, this changed a bit, the region of Central 
Transdanubia showed only average results, while in the region of the Southern Great 
(Hungarian) Plain they were above the average.
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Figure 16. The proportion of the company revenues in the whole revenues of organization 
(2000, 2007, 2008*, 2009, 2010. 2011)
* On the basis of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s sampling of 2008 year 
by estimated values!
Source: Kákai, 2009a
Figure 17. The proportion of the civil and company incomes in the whole income of organisations 
by regions (2000, 2007, 2010, 2011)
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The quota of income from companies, especially in the region of West Pannonia 
and in the region of the Southern Great Plain decreased in 2007, and this can be inter-
preted as a symptom of the economic crisis. It has been partly confirmed by analyses 
conducted since the beginning of the economic crisis according to which the greatest 
economic decline was observed in the regions that were prospering economically.
The economic and regional potential of the sector after the crisis
The impact of the economic crisis on Hungary in 2008 and then in 2010 had con-
siderably changed the triple structure described above, and by this time, as far as 
the relation between economic potential and civil activity is concerned, there were 
six different groups existing. The geographical situation of the new groups broke the 
former West-Middle-East division. 
It was still only the capital that could be characterised by high-level nonprofit 
activity and favourable economic conditions. Civil presence was moderate and the 
economic position was favourable in Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom and Győr-Moson-
Sopron counties. Exactly the opposite thing (moderate economic conditions and high 
nonprofit activity) could be observed in Veszprém county.
The largest group consisted of those counties where both civil activity and the 
economic potentials remained at a low level. These included Pest, Vas, Zala, Baranya, 
Tolna, Heves, Hajdú, Bács-Kiskun and Csongrád counties. 
Somogy, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Nógrád, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Békés coun-
ties faced weak economic conditions and a moderate level of civic power. In Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg county both the economic situation and the nonprofit activity was 
very poor.  
In most of the counties, no substantial change took place in the economic position 
(in terms of the national conditions) between 2006 and 2010, the counties remained 
in the same category. The only county making a negative shift was Fejér. Positive 
changes happened in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Somogy.
More significant changes occurred in the field of nonprofit activity. In 2008, civic 
presence improved in seven counties. These25 were all the counties in which the level 
of activity was low two years earlier. Six counties26 faced an opposite process: the 
former high level of activity decreased. This recession was accompanied by the wors-
ening of the economic conditions in Csongrád, Somogy, Vas and Zala counties.
25 Bács-Kiskun, Baranya, Békés, Fejér, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok, Pest and Tolna.
26 Csongrád, Győr-Moson-Sopron, Komárom-Esztergom, Somogy, Vas and Zala.
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Table 4. Change in nonprofit activity and economic potential between 2008 and 2010
County
2008 2010
Nonprofit 
activity
Economic 
potential 
Nonprofit 
activity 
Economic 
potential 
Bács-Kiskun moderate moderate moderate moderate
Baranya moderate moderate moderate moderate
Békés moderate weak moderate weak
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén moderate weak moderate moderate
Budapest high favourable high favourable
Csongrád moderate moderate moderate moderate
Fejér moderate favourable moderate moderate
Győr-Moson-Sopron moderate favourable moderate favourable
Hajdú-Bihar moderate moderate moderate moderate
Heves moderate moderate moderate moderate
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok moderate weak moderate weak
Komárom-Esztergom moderate favourable moderate weak
Nógrád moderate weak moderate weak
Pest moderate moderate moderate moderate
Somogy moderate weak moderate moderate
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg low weak moderate moderate
Tolna moderate moderate moderate moderate
Vas moderate moderate moderate moderate
Veszprém high moderate moderate moderate
Zala moderate moderate moderate moderate
Thus, in most of the counties with low civil activity in 2006, a considerable non-
profit expansion took place mainly amongst unchanged economic conditions.
In the same period, in many counties possessing a strong civil segment, the level 
of civic activity declined, the reason for which was – probably due to the impacts of 
the economic crisis – the decay in the economic environment of the civil organisa-
tions. However, there were two counties where nonprofit activity decreased while 
the economic potential remained at the same level.27 
To explain the cases of the counties showing a declining civic activity as a result of 
the decaying economic environment, I cannot draw one possible universal reason, on 
the basis of the data I cannot precisely tell which factor of the economy elicited this 
impact. As far as the framework of interpretation is concerned, I primarily thought of 
27 Győr-Moson-Sopron and Komárom-Esztergom counties.
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the revival of the “classical” civil world where the most important figures, the financ-
ers of the civil society are the citizens themselves. The citizens react to the world by 
embracing them through getting self-organised in order to achieve smaller or bigger 
community objectives. It is common sense in sociology that during crises the inner 
cohesion of the groups becomes stronger. This may be the reason why nonprofit 
activity strengthened in the less-developed regions between 2006 and 2008 while 
the economic potentials remained at the same level in most places. The revival of the 
“classical” civil view, however, is not only needed in the less-developed regions, but 
in the stronger Western counties as well, where the economic conditions declined 
considerably already in the first year of the crisis. As I see it, the withering of the 
formerly blooming nonprofit world started in these counties, as well. 
This is supported by the data on the economy of the civil organisations: the share 
of the company supports in the budget of the organisations dropped to nearly one 
third between 2006 and 2008, and actually stagnated at the same low level in 2009. 
Meanwhile, the resources gained from the public remained at an unchanged level. 
Figure 18. Relation between the change in the GDP and the nonprofit activity (2000-2010)
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In the early 2000s, in the period of economic boom, the GDP per capita increased. 
Between 2000 and 2008, in each of the three examined years (2000, 2006 and 2008), 
the value of the gross domestic product showed a growing tendency. By 2010, basi-
cally as a result of the world economic crisis, the value of this indicator fell to a much 
lower level. 
At the same time, the figure reflecting nonprofit activity rose until 2008. In the 
years of economic expansion, the civil sector flourished as well, manifesting con-
siderable growth in the period. From 2008 to 2010, this indicator did not follow the 
tendency in the GDP. Between these two years, the number of the nonprofit organisa-
tions per 10 thousand citizens practically stagnated.   
This is partly supported by the economic analyses made after the outburst of the 
economic crisis, according to which the winners of the boom suffered from the big-
gest economic recession. During the last 10-15 years, the export-oriented processing 
industry firms established in the Northwestern part of Transdanubia and their con-
tractors in 2009 were forced to retain their production, dismiss parts of their staff, 
or even terminate their operation. At the same time, the underdeveloped outer pe-
ripheries by the Northeastern and Southern borders and the disadvantaged regions 
of the Great Plains and Southern Transdanubia, lacking big cities, as well, seemed to 
have escaped.28 Basically, the data support the results of the economic geographical 
research which shows that the development of the domestic regions was periodic 
and, in terms of its pace, was continuously moving between wide extreme values. 
The essence of the process is that the regions exceeding the average in development 
(Central Hungary, Middle-Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia) had been devel-
oping faster than the average, while the regions below the average level of develop-
ment (Southern Transdanubia and Southern Great Plains) had shown improvement. 
However, the pace of this considerably lagged behind the average (KSH, 2012). The 
development of Northern Hungary and the Northern Great Plains had more or less 
met the national trends (Pitti, 2008). This trend changed, to the detriment of the de-
veloped regions, by the economic crisis.29 All this suggests that the crisis finally acts 
in the direction of the decrease in the regional inequalities of development, which is 
in itself desirable, but this unfortunately takes place by the degradation of the more 
developed regions, and not the catching up of the less developed areas. The only rela-
tion where the further growth and sharpening of the differences is expected is the 
capital-countryside relation (Lőcsei, 2009).
28 Since they had had no considerable industrial production capacities.
29 By 2010, despite the economic crisis, the gap between Middle-Hungary (as the most de-
veloped region) and Northern-Hungary, the least-developed region, deepened further as 
compared to 2007. The difference between the two regions in 2010 was 2.8 times as much 
(KSH, 2012: 86).
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What may be the reason of this phenomenon is that the social sector, the financing of 
which is very much dependent of the financial situation of the state and the economic 
organisations, reacts to the changes happening in the economy so inflexibly? 
The reason probably lies in the operational method of the civil organisations. Most 
of these organizations are small, with minimal costs of operation, so the reduction of 
the resources makes their operation more difficult, but does not make it impossible. 
And the bigger organisations with higher budgets probably find the possibilities to 
access resources amongst the more difficult economic conditions, as well. 
In addition, when evaluating this indicator, we also need to consider the fact that, 
in case of “bankruptcy”, the nonprofit organisations are not legally liquidated, unlike 
the economic corporations. Their legal existence is not affected by the fact that they 
have no money to reach their goals, so they keep existing statistically, although they 
do not operate. And the representatives of the concerned organisations (due to the 
lack of legal regulations and even more, the lack of sanctions) do not usually follow 
the legal paths of liquidation; they simply stop their everyday operation.   
Owing to all this, during the years of the crisis no clear patterns, similar to those 
found in the 1990s or the middle of 2000s, between nonprofit activity and economic 
development are shown (Kákai, 2009a; Kákai, 2009b; Kákai, 2011).
Due to the “faulty operation” of the nonprofit activity indicator, we cannot say 
that in the “poorer” counties the activity declined, and that it grew or stagnated in 
the “richer” counties. Between 2008 and 2010, it remained unchanged in Komárom-
Esztergom County, which suffered great losses in its GDP, while in Budapest, which 
had a growing tendency in GDP, the volume of civil organizations slightly decreased. 
All this does not mean that there is absolutely no sense in comparing these two 
indicators, and from now on it is not possible to conduct valid research of this system 
of relations. It only means that in order to understand the connections between the 
economic and the civil sector, we need more indicators and multi-variable analysis 
models, and that from searching for big, general tendencies we are required to move 
towards more complex, meso- or micro-level analyses.
Summary
To sum up, the legal and economic regulations have created a wide institutional 
framework and favourable (though not ideal) conditions for the development of civil 
initiatives and non-profit service provision since 1989 (Kuti, 2008). Due to all these 
reasons and circumstances, if we had to describe the Hungarian nonprofit sector in 
a single sentence, we could say that its number and membership may be significant, 
though it is particularly weak in terms of resources and its role to accumulate social 
capital and to get involved in national and local political decision support and articu-
lation of interests. 
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We could also say that the lack, weakness and decline of bourgeois and civilian 
traditions is the inheritance in Europe that makes positions of etatism easier after 
20 years.
The pictures we get from the structure and development of the nonprofit sector 
considerably differ depending on which indicator; the organisational number or the 
economic power we use to examine them. When we look at the developments and 
changes in the examined period of almost two decades, we can undoubtedly state 
that the weight of the nonprofit sector considerably increased both in absolute terms 
and within the framework of the national economy. At the same time, due to the het-
erogeneous composition of the sector, within the organisational heaps of very much 
differing nature, this process gained diverse emphasises, and the shift experienced 
and measured by certain dimensions were not only of differing dynamics, but in 
some cases of opposing directions, as well. Although we have no figures to prove our 
conclusion, the tendencies described above and other – not only empirical – informa-
tion we have about the sector’s activity, clearly demonstrate the fact that the weight 
of the nonprofit sector grew during the years examined.
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From the Green Movement to a Party. 
The Effect of the Crisis 
and Democratic Movements in Hungary
Viktor Glied1
Abstract
General political, economic and moral crises began in Hungary in 2006, after the 
prime minister’s speech about the real state of the Hungarian economy was delivered. 
Fidesz, the then largest opposition party refused any further cooperation with the 
government and started to attack the governing socialist-liberal coalition. After four 
years of permanent campaign against the socialists, Fidesz won the elections in 2010 
and started to rearrange the whole political and social system in Hungary. Parallel 
to that, the appearance of social movements in Hungary can clearly be understood 
as a reply to crisis phenomena, whether they are left-leaning organisations, green-
ecological, critical of globalisation (“globcrit”) or far-right, fascistoid groups and 
networks. One part of the green-ecologial movement was formed into a party and 
was named as Politics Can Be Different (LMP), but after 2010 other organizations ap-
peared such as Szolidaritás, an organisation established with reference to the Polish 
example, with a trade union background, Milla (One Million for Press Freedom), 4K 
(Movement for the Fourth Republic) and HaHa (Students’ Network), the Hungarian 
Two-tailed Dog Party (MKKP) and the Hungarian Pirate Party.
Introduction
Beginning from the 2000s, many “colour revolutions” have taken place all over the 
world. The multicolour movements demanding change organised themselves around 
several themes, but they had the common attitude of taking a commitment against 
the more and more visible crisis phenomena. The demands had common character-
istics, such as the increasingly harsh criticism of globalisation and the objectives of 
replacing governments with authoritarian/semi-authoritarian features and increas-
ing the transparency of political decisions. The protests following the Seattle WTO 
Summit of 1999 (Prague, Genoa, Davos, Madrid, Copenhagen) were embedded in 
1 PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Univer-
sity of Pécs. glied.viktor@pte.hu
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the process of the upheaval of globalisation criticism, and then the movements of 
groups protesting against corruption and authoritarian practices in post-socialist 
countries (Serbia, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan) projected the appearance 
of a new generation. An analysis of the Arab Spring that still invokes unpredictable 
consequences and extremely complex political relations showed the interactions of 
modernisation and globalisation appearing in the periphery, with religion and tradi-
tions. Internet (and especially Facebook) played a major role in the development of 
the continuously transforming movements and in the escalation of events. Members 
received information through social media sites, organised themselves and rapidly 
reacted to developments. Therefore, the movements involved virtual communities 
in which disputes continuously took place and the changes of the members’ positions 
could be measured.
The appearance of social movements in Hungary can clearly be understood as a 
response to crisis phenomena, whether they are left-leaning organisations, green-
ecological, critics of globalisation (“globcrit”) or far-right, fascistoid groups and net-
works. In this study, I concentrate on democratic, single-issue movements operating 
in a democratic manner, founded after the 2000s. The study focuses on the surge of 
the Hungarian green movement and its organisation into a party (Politics Can Be 
Different – Lehet Más a Politika – LMP), but is also affects the history of Szolidar-
itás, an organisation established with reference to the Polish example, with a trade 
union background, Milla (One Million for Press Freedom – Egymillióan a magyar 
sajtószabadságért), 4K (Movement for the Fourth Republic – Negyedik Köztársaság 
Mozgalom) and HaHa (Students’ Network – Hallgatói Hálózat), and the appearance of 
such organisations as the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party (Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya 
Párt – MKKP) and the Pirate Party (Kalózpárt). In my essay, I often refer to far-right/
radical movements but do not elaborate on them in detail because their complexity 
and depth could be the subject of a separate study.
Crises and movements – theoretical outlook
The ever more frequent and deeper changes (and the chains thereof) appearing 
simultaneously with the process of globalisation, political and economic crises, are 
often unpredictable, unexpected and cause uncertainty in both people in general, and 
decision-makers in particular. According to theories on change, it is primarily the act-
ing individuals (and not the groups) that have motivations, plans and interests that 
can be negotiated with other acting individuals for the purpose of enforcing interests 
of a group or the development of the group. However, the relationships of the actors 
and the consequences of actions are systems with multiple components, and they can 
swiftly disappear or reappear in case of a crisis situation. Dahrendorf emphasises2 
2 R. Dahrendorf, A modern társadalmi konfliktus, Budapest 1994, pp. 102-104.
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that this is exactly the reason why a group’s actions, social and political changes of 
structure have to be connected with persons and personal abilities to understand 
the system process and the factors causing changes. He considers the development of 
norms and values a change of structure, while according to him the change of roles 
and relations in an unchanged system of norms and values is adaptation. According 
to the theories of social changes3, social systems inevitably wish to provide resources 
for their survival – even at the expense of others, while economic interest has an 
interest in finding a place for their operation that offers a stable political system 
and legal background. If this is impossible or hindered by obstacles, the structure 
has to be changed, or certain elements of the structure have to be strengthened 
to enable a change in the future. The ability to innovate may provide an adequate 
answer thereto, by assisting in the solution of crisis situations. Social or political and 
economic innovation can be successful, where the adequate intellectual capital and 
human resources meet the will, initiative, capital and political support.
Currently, the neoliberal economic system ruling in a large part of the world is 
hindered by increasing and more extreme social contradictions, and its operation 
is limited by crises and ecological limitations. However, system malfunctions shall 
not be confused with efforts aiming to change it. Upon reviewing the history of the 
aforementioned movements in the 2000s, we shall agree to the statement that politi-
cal and economic crises are properties of the system, and they shall not be considered 
symptoms of its change. Thus, the battles for positions in the dominant economic-
political circles do not affect the framework of the system in the long run.4
Social changes are only partially instructible, controllable and measureable, as 
they stem from the aggregation of complex processes. They are rather predictable 
and spontaneous interlacements of processes. Therefore, the changes are cyclical; 
they consist of accelerating and decelerating phases, sometimes being open to in-
novation, sometimes expecting patience. It is also doubtful whether innovations 
and developments contribute positively to social development, and their effects and 
consequences are dubious. Multivariate processes almost exclude the possibility of 
unified reference frameworks; new paradigms are related to paradox phenomena 
and signs of a crisis.5 Bell also emphasised that it is not the central, top-down ini-
tiatives that are the most innovative, but the locally organised, grassroots actions, 
programmes, cooperations that ensure the presence of locality and civil courage, 
while being based on personal cooperation at the same time.6
3 W. Zapf, Modernizáció, jólét, átmenet, Budapest 2002, p. 21.
4 Artner, A., Globalizáció alulnézetben – Elnyomott csoportok – lázadó mozgalmak, Budapest 
2006, p. 103.
5 T. Kuosa, Towards the Dynamic Paradigm of Futures Research, 2009.
6 D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: a Venture in Social Forecasting, Budapest 1973, 
pp. 64-67.
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The reason for the creation of social movements is the inadequacy of organisa-
tional-institutional structures in the society to satisfy new types of social demands 
and to manage new social problems. Thus, the movement takes a stance for or against 
the existing system, rejecting, criticising, and channeling the current state.7 It is an 
elementary accessory for an operating democracy (and a good measurement to the 
degree thereof) to have a viable and effective non-governmental sector.
The major traditional social rifts, which were typical till the 1960s, partially lost 
their significance until the 1980s. Partially new, previously non-existing conflicts ap-
peared and transformed the party system and the non-governmental sector. Usually, 
these conflicts of the developed world were not absolute in their nature, they did 
not question the existing regime, but aimed to reduce injustice in the distribution of 
standards of living, to transform power structures and to fight for second and third 
generation rights or the protection of the private sphere. With the development of 
the welfare state, real class conflicts lost their meaning, while new kinds of eligibility 
problems arose. The romantic ideal of gaining rights did not invigorate certain social 
groups anymore, and the appearance of mass parties and collective parties rendered 
ideological clashes obsolete. However, new types of eligibility problems arose, such 
as the threats to natural environment, the decay of living standards (especially 
urban life), the dissolution of traditional communities, and the primacy of economic 
interests. As consequences of the slow dissolution of welfare institutions, the ap-
pearance of the new exclusion (new poverty), the increase of income disparities, the 
problems of redistribution, the sharp increase of utility prices affected everybody, 
and started to mobilise everyone to a certain extent, whether they were proponents 
of post-material values or members of globalization-sceptic groups. With the disap-
pearance of classes, interest groups, civil society organizations and movements have 
appeared to more profoundly represent partial interests, and they have participated 
in social-political life as a new mediating medium, and a sphere of social action.8
By the 1990s, the rapid development of information technology systems operating 
production systems created such knowledge-based information societies that can 
acquire enormous quantities of information via new communication channels, and 
may exchange and provide information at the same time. It enables people to join 
movements and networks virtually (not just materially) and to communicate their 
opinions in matters affecting them. New forms of participation and persuasion are 
discovered every day, and the media, political and business sectors work to cover 
these channels as much as possible.
The change the social movements wish to bring about aims at such a social 
structure that is displayed in the symbols and texts of the movement. Activists of 
7 Szabó, M., Társadalmi mozgalmak és politikai tiltakozás, Budapest 2001, p. 62.
8 R. Dahrendorf, A modern társadalmi konfliktus, Budapest 1994.
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the social movements are connected by their own movement identities that are usu-
ally very complex, having multiple elements and typically relate to one issue (single 
issue) or a group of similar cases. They are connected to the specific issue by their 
identities and common sets of values, and differentiate and isolate themselves from 
their enemies, neutral actors, and relate to their allies. The movement is a meeting 
of different identities, and therefore a conscious identity-building and community-
constructing process.9
Action is the individual’s freedom of choice, in which the goals, means and situa-
tions of action define the framework of the action. The utilitarian dilemma shows an 
important condition: the hierarchy and importance of partial goals may change, but 
the action continues until the reason creating the action is eliminated or the goal is 
realised (Habermas, 2011). Collective behaviour theory is based on the behaviourist 
understanding of social processes, applied to the examination of social phenomena 
that include some kind of collective action, like panic, mass hysteria, strike or the 
social movements themselves. According to the collective behaviour theory, these 
forms are only different in their appearances, their logic has a common origin, and 
therefore their analysis may also be conducted in a similar manner. However, these 
forms of collective behaviour show a confused operation of the social system, they 
are created as a result of some social tension or error, hindering the normal operation 
of society and creating an anomic state. The theory considers the discontent of the 
individuals to be the direct cause of collective behaviour.10 In case of collective action, 
the competent individuals interact with like-minded companions and align the prin-
ciples of their actions. During the course of the process, participants of the collective 
action articulate their suggestions not only for themselves, but also for others, and 
try to persuade them about the rightness of their way. If we accept that their decisions 
are guided by logic and possess rational bases together with arguments and general 
norms being accepted by the society or its subgroups, then the claim can be justi-
fied that social movements are communities acting for or against a certain change, 
with some kind of continuity. There are completely different examples regarding the 
sections, schedules, ideological background, goals and means of this change, ranging 
from revolutionary to conservative and the divisions are often unclear.
Social movements are less institutional organisations than parties, less stable in 
their ideologies and their philosophical system is not completely clear (or they lack 
a general ideology completely). Therefore, the theory of interpreting frameworks 
( frame analysis) is the ideal tool to study movements beyond their organisational 
properties. However, frame does not simply replace ideology, but its auxiliary prop-
9 A. Melucci, Challenging Codes. Collective Action in the Information Age, Budapest 1996, pp. 
135-139.
10 Mikecz, D., Az ellenállás kultúrája. Kultúra, identitás a mozgalomkutatás kultúrájában, Buda-
pest 2010, pp. 110-112.
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erty is very significant. The authors differentiate between three types of social 
movements: value-oriented, participation-oriented and power-oriented movements. 
During the development of a movement, it is a serious dilemma to decide which ac-
tions take place in the frame of the political system (inducing reforms) and which 
step over the framework, setting the demand to change the political system as their 
objective. This issue accompanies the development of the non-governmental sector 
(and, simultaneously, the ecological movement, for example), causing a crisis of val-
ues, division or dissolution in many cases. In case of value-oriented movements, it 
means reaching a certain social change. Members of the power-oriented movement 
aim to take over legitimate social institutions, without wanting to change them, so 
they intend to become relevant elements of the political system within the provided 
political framework. Participation-oriented movements wish to satisfy the needs of 
their members and do not articulate general programmes for the wider society. It 
is useful to study the arguments of Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall (2005) 
based on conflict analysis, about the circumstances of the birth and development of 
movements. According to this, new ideologies are created during socially tense con-
flicts and discontent, to provide a more acceptable justification to political changes. 
In the new approach to the system, previously existing social tensions and conflicts 
are articulated, whether they are social, political – or increasingly more often – en-
vironmental. The theory and action frameworks and concepts insisting on change, 
however, only develop gradually. In the beginning, they do not require complex ideol-
ogy, it is rather the vague theories, symbols and buzzwords that are acquired by the 
followers, and then they adapt to opportunities and open the way to new directions, 
simultaneously with developing and carrying on original ideas. The leaders of the 
movements have to find common elements, normative conceptual ranges that hold 
together and guide the heterogeneous groups. This differentiates them from spon-
taneous mass protests. The decision to challenge the system and generate a conflict 
triggers a reaction from governmental and non-governmental actors as well. The 
form of solving conflicts provides the degree of democratic quality of the specific 
political structure and culture.11
The reason for the creation of social movements is the crisis of the complete social 
system or certain elements thereof. The crisis leads to the questioning of the whole 
system responsible for the crisis and looking for opportunities to form alternative an-
swers. The introduction of alternatives (or the intentions thereof) can be performed 
in various ways, from violent revolutions to negotiated agreements. Since not every 
crisis leads to the creation of a movement, it is important to examine the mechanisms 
of articulating social interests and the so-called flip-over point, when certain social 
groups present and disclose the reasons of the crisis and provide alternative solu-
11 Ibid., pp. 115-121.
Civil Society – Political and Economic Transition – Crisis | 207 
St
u
d
ie
s
tions. After raising awareness, in case the social-political system lacks a problem-
solving reaction, the action to eliminate the reasons for the crisis is articulated.
The movements may be mobilised by opportunities or threats as well. However, 
their activity is reduced when these two circumstances are only slightly present. In a 
period when there is only a minor chance of a change (either a positive or a negative 
one), the willingness of groups to initiate protest actions is low.12 When the protest 
becomes public, it triggers response reactions from the international community on 
a global scale, and from the government and its bodies on a local level, and forces 
them to intervene. Depending on the level of the crisis, the depth of the interven-
tion, its direction and level of interaction with the movement activism, confrontation 
lead to the reaching of an agreement, or to the institutionalisation of the solution 
mechanisms of the crisis. The effect of the movement may increase with successful 
attempts and the modification of the level of crisis, or it may decrease, or fail utterly 
due to organisational and leadership problems. Nevertheless, if the crisis persists, 
the appearance of new and usually more radical movements can be expected. Many 
factors (the crisis and cynicism of the political system, dissolution of traditional 
social structures, a change in the economy or the environment or the knowledge of a 
future change, etc.) may result in the appearance of social activism, and the different 
forms of protests related to it. This is not universally caused by the legitimacy crisis 
of the government and the actors of the economy, but it is true in the case of Hungary, 
where doubts were raised regarding the legitimacy of the political elite. According 
to Habermas, when certain elements of life become interwoven with politics, social 
relations become bureaucratic, and there is an increased opportunity for increased 
citizen activity and the creation of alternative, new movements. According to him, 
the ultimate goal of the social movements is to end the colonisation of life, and the 
most important means to do so is protest. The reason for this is that crisis situa-
tions push the activities of citizens toward retreat or activism. On the activist side, 
the certain new social movements appear which are usually presented by feminist, 
green, pacifist, globalisation sceptic and student movements. Protest is their operat-
ing environment, means, source of identity and indicator of effectiveness.13
Dilemma
According to Ralph Dahrendorf (1994), the main risk of democratic processes is that 
the movement does not undertake continuing political activity, fearing that it would 
become an actor and “accomplice” of the political elite. Inertia freezes the movement. 
When resistance does not break legal boundaries, and when cooperation is defined 
by the corporative cooperation of the government and partial interests. This compli-
12 Szabó, M., Társadalmi mozgalmak és politikai tiltakozás, Budapest 2001, p. 23.
13 J. Habermas, Válogatott tanulmányok, 1994.
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cates changes and the entry of new actors to the field of democratic competition, and 
it may weaken the power of radical initiatives, but it may also the realisation of goals 
through cooperation and to the increase of chances of reaching an agreement.
Challenges to movements often (but not exclusively) arise inside the sphere of 
civil society, where the areas of resistance are formed somewhat independently from 
the state, but with the intention to influence it. Thus, civil society shall also be consid-
ered an area of struggle, public and political processes regarding the actions, where 
conflicts are also created among norms and identities.14 Movements not only direct 
attention to crisis phenomena, but they also intend to counter them. They perform 
some kind of permanent criticism of society, in which not only resistance, conflict 
and retreat are represented, but also the clash of interest and arguments based on 
institutionalised cooperation.15
Situation analysis
In Hungary, the crisis has already began in 2006 and it is practically still around 
today, in 2013. The election campaign in 2006 was all about promises. The then 
governing socialist/free democrat coalition communicated the temporary rise of 
living standards with success propaganda and successfully referred to the coun-
try’s accession to the European Union 2004, while the largest opposition party, the 
self-proclaimed right-wing Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Alliance of Young 
Democrats) used a depressive campaign (with the main slogan being: “we live worse 
than four years ago”) that utterly failed. However, some months after the elections, 
the re-elected governing parties practically shocked the public by introducing cer-
tain austerity measures. The public was also surprised to learn that the growth of the 
previous years was practically financed by loans, and repayment requires significant 
corrections in the budget. The already negative public perception exploded when a 
confidential speech of prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked, in which he ad-
mitted that the government lied to the voters about the country’s state and they only 
conducted “apparent governing” in the last years. The speech was disclosed on 17 
September 2006 and it lead to street riots. The protesters took over the headquarters 
of the Hungarian Television, set cars on fire and clashed with police in several areas of 
Budapest. The anti-government protests, organised mostly by the right-wing parties, 
continued all around the country until the elections in 2010. This time, policy issues 
were not discussed, the main question was whether early elections would take place, 
or the prime minister would be replaced by the governing parties. Taking advantage 
of the government’s sharp loss of popularity, Fidesz started a powerful campaign to 
present the prime minister as illegitimate and to reject all forms of cooperation with 
14 Mező, F., A társadalmi mozgalmak és az ellenállás területei, Budapest 1999, p. 1186.
15 Boda, Zs., Globális ökopolitika, Budapest 2004, pp. 180-181.
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Mr. Gyurcsány or the coalition parties. A lasting period of political crisis began that 
brought about a moral and ethical crisis. The socialists could not escape their network 
of interests and cases of corruption and their politics could only focus on remaining 
in power. The corruption scandals, and ambitious, but nevertheless futile attempts 
at reform were the main characteristics of the dead-end politics of the government. 
After losing a referendum, conducted regarding social questions in 2008, it could 
only keep its power, but lost the opportunity to perform any important government 
actions. The country was in such a state, when the credit crisis originating in the US 
reached its borders in 2008. It had an elementary impact on the otherwise weak and 
decreasing Hungarian economy. Unemployment raised sharply, the prices of utilities 
increased, and financial collapse was only avoided with the assistance of an IMF loan 
acquired in October of 2008. In spring the governing coalition was dissolved, the free 
democrats quit the alliance and the rapid collapse of the liberal party soon began. The 
popularity of the socialists did not decrease drastically, as it had already hit bottom 
in early 2008, stagnating between 18-22 percent. After all this, there was no doubt 
that Fidesz, the largest opposition party, was the main contender in the 2010 elec-
tions. The overwhelming majority of voters wanted changes; part of the votes could 
be considered protest votes, not primarily aimed to support Fidesz that participated 
in the politics of the twenty years after the transition to democracy.
Figure 1. The building of the Hungarian Television under “siege” in 2006
Source: http://www.indymedia.org/or/2006/09/847163.shtml
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The far-right, national radical Jobbik ( Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom – Move-
ment for a Better Hungary) also gained support. Although it was established as a 
party in 2003, it could only present itself after 2006, as the crisis deepened. As hope-
lessness and poverty increased, many became attracted to the party, which gave vent 
to antidemocratic, anti-EU, anti-Semitic and racist sentiments, invoking the attitude 
of Hungary in the 1930s, that was also supported by an intellectual group consisting 
of lawyers. Jobbik introduced the issues of the Roma minority and the fight against 
global capital into national politics, although these used to be taboo and it also gave 
expression to social concerns, gaining support especially in the poorer regions of 
Eastern Hungary. A new party also appeared in the centre and a little left to the cen-
tre, in the liberal-green-anarchist field, introducing fresh air and young dynamism, 
which immediately resulted in a 5% national support. Politics Can Be Different  – LMP 
was a party organised on a civil society base, registered in 2009, with followers in-
cluding greens, anarchists, liberals, supporters of the alterglob movement, conserva-
tives and new left sympathisers as well. The new force contributing to policy issues 
apparently came from nothing and gained ground swiftly, in not more than a year. 
Since neither the free democrats, nor the winners of the first democratic elections 
(Magyar Demokrata Fórum – MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum) could introduce a 
valid party-list in the elections, they did not win any seats in the national assembly. 
The winner of the election was Fidesz and its allies, the Christian Democrats, hav-
ing a two-third majority, followed by the MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt – Hungarian 
Socialist Party), Jobbik in the third place and LMP also winning seats in parliament. 
Although the results of the European Parliament elections in 2009 were similar, the 
election results of 2010 surprised many. The bipolar, two-party party system broke 
up, the so-called left-wing socialist-liberal block was beaten, and Fidesz could practi-
cally begin to transform economic and social subsystems without an opposition.
Green and globalisation-critical movement in Hungary
From the mid-1980s, new types of action-centric organisations started to appear in 
Hungary, making their voice heard primarily in environmental issues. In the second 
half of the decade the green movement became an important platform of expression 
of social discontent with the communist regime, and the case of the Gabčíkovo–
Nagymaros Dam was an excellent issue for them16. In 1984, the Danube Circle was 
founded, which hosted a lively discussion about environmental issues, and current 
social, political issues as well. When the policy of the government regarding the dam 
changed (the Hungarian party terminated the construction in 1989), the nature of 
the conflict changed; demonstrations and forums stopped when the general elec-
16 Due to protests from local environment activitsts and the crisis of the Hungarian economy, 
the government unilaterally shut down the contrcution of the barrage project with 
Czechoslovakia, and terminated the contract thereof in 1989.
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tions of 1990 were nearing. The opposition moved primarily from the relations of 
the state and the society to foreign relations. In the new institutional system and 
party structure formed after the transition to democracy, the green movement only 
had a marginal role, especially because it could not provide answers to social and 
economic issues directly affecting the people, partially because the formation of par-
ties assisted the organisation of “movements” with significant supporter base, as in 
the cases of SZDSZ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – Alliance of Free Democrats), MDF 
and Fidesz.17 Some of the most popular persons in the green movement entered poli-
tics in the newly formed parties, while others moved on to the academic sector. The 
main issues of the years following the transition to democracy were mitigating the 
damages of the polluting communist era and the rapid changes of the economy and 
the society, effectively marginalising the protection of the environment. Although 
the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dam was an important issue in the late 1980s, it failed 
to gain such importance after the fall of communism as the nuclear energy issues 
in Germany, that could unite the green, antiglob and pacifist movements, forming a 
movement-based, new left related network.18 The “glamour” of the swift transition 
to capitalist market economy and freedom diverted attention from the importance 
of the environment, and members of society were occupied by issues of consumption 
and growth. The majority of the people identified democratic transition with welfare, 
the appearance of basic rights was considered obvious, and wealth appeared in form 
of quantity rather than quality. The activities of ecological movements soon extended 
from being strictly environment-based: its thinkers recognised that based on the 
“everything is related to everything” principle, these problems cannot be solved in 
isolation from other tensions (consumer lifestyle, social justice, human rights, etc.) 
of the modern society.19 In the 1990s, several polls showed that society considers the 
protection of the environment important, but it cannot and it is not willing to spend 
money on it. It considers environmental organisations weak, but trusts them much 
more than other sectors. It is also very meaningful to see that 74% of respondents 
considered the government an actor that is able to solve environmental problems and 
shall be responsible for protecting the environment. This clearly shows the statist 
attitude of the average Hungarian citizen, the paternalist thinking and dependency 
attitude, which are the heritage of the political elitism institutionalised in the 19th 
century, the right-wing authoritarian system, socialism after 1948 and the transi-
tion to democracy. Citizens were originally divided in environmental issues, giving 
priority to economic growth, creation of jobs, material (consumption) security. The 
development of the green movement was also hindered by the lack of alternative 
17 Szabó, M., A zöld mozgalmak és polgári kezdeményezések Magyarországon: kutatási problé-
mák, módszertan, elmélet, Budapest 1999, p. 16.
18 Mikecz, D., Új pártok, változó mozgalmak, Budapest 2012, p. 72.
19 Móra, V., A zöldek (környezet-, természet- és állatvédő szervezetek), Budapest 2008, p. 120.
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methods of mobilising the masses (different from the principles of the economic-
political system) or protest forms limiting the market, and no general national 
organisation was formed for uniting experimental, alternative initiatives different 
from the mainstream. The reason for this was mainly the existence of a different set 
of values and motives of the representatives of the movement, and also the existing 
personal conflicts. In this period, the media presented the greens as obstacles to de-
velopment, spiritual idealists, parasites, etc. Also, members of the movement feared 
for their livelihood, and in many cases did not oppose polluting corporations and did 
not report those. If they did, they were likely to find themselves in slander and libel 
proceedings. In the 1990–2000 period, the enforcement of interests stagnated, even 
though the non-governmental sector rapidly extended,20 and the number of environ-
mental NGOs also increased.21 
In the late 1990s, the green movement became important again, when the case of 
the dam was put back on the agenda in 1997, after a meeting of prime ministers Gyula 
Horn and Vladimir Mečiar. The ongoing protests (Danube Charter) influenced the 
outcome of the elections in 1998 and played a role in the defeat in the socialist/free 
democrat coalition. With regard to this, after environmental conflicts caused by some 
major investments in Budapest and other cities, the green movements seemed to be 
able to build social support from their success in local issues that would provide an 
opportunity for integration and collective efforts. This did not materialise however, 
and the frequently mentioned “Saint Florian principle” remained valid. This means 
that green movements only focused on local ecological problems and did not have 
the power or the opportunity to influence national issues.22 Heterogeneity caused 
a fragmentation of the movement rather than prove a common identity, as it was 
clearly seen from the early 2000s. Mistrust did not only affect the government, but 
also the relations of each other as well, especially related to the opening of the EU 
tenders and the establishment of partnership agreements. 
The 2000s and networking
The 2000s brought about serious changes in the life of the green movement. Green-
peace, the organisation well-known for its radicalism and direct actions opened its 
office in Hungary, among other major transnational organisations that started inter-
national and European campaigns in the country.23 Globalisation and “Europeanisa-
tion” appeared in the life of the Hungarian non-governmental sector, the Hungarian 
organisations became members of networks and umbrella organisations. This caused 
20 Kákai, L., Önkormányzunk értetek, de nélkületek!, 2004.
21 Currently, there are 1400 ecological NGOs in Hungary (Móra, V., 2008, pp. 120-121.).
22 Szabó, M., A zöld mozgalmak és polgári kezdeményezések Magyarországon: kutatási prob-
lémák, módszertan, elmélet, Budapest 1999.
23 Such as the climate act campaign in 2009-2010. http://www.klimatorveny.hu/
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the adoption of certain patterns, and could increase resources temporarily (due to 
foreign foundations and other grants, cooperations - in a human and financial sense 
as well). In Hungary, the problem of global climate change entered scientific research 
and public discourse in the early 2000s. The greens thought that it is an issue that can 
connect global commitments with local actions.24 
The establishment of the regulations that opened the way to the participation 
and requesting of Phare-funds (and to spending them), opened new or informal 
partnership relations and cooperation opportunities to the NGOs. The civil sector 
recognised that in a collective effort they can influence decision-making more, ac-
tively participate in reviewing EU and national operative and action programmes, 
and in rationalising the allocation of EU funds later on. Therefore, more closely 
cooperating, formal and informal civil networks became much more important to 
prepare for the accession to the EU and to participate in creating development pro-
grammes as a new member country. From 2004, social participation became much 
more active than before, as earlier the NGOs had protests as the only means (against 
developments considered environmentally harmful), but in the social discussion of 
EU-programme preparations they could participate as actors of recommendation/
decision-making. The greens were among those actively supporting such coopera-
tions, and participated in the establishment and development of civil participation 
as catalysts. Participation beginning from 2004-2005 shall be considered a mutual 
learning process (although different for each region or town) that could turn the 
Hungarian NGOs to major pressure groups. It was a question whether actors of the 
Hungarian civil sector – based on their properties – could fill their traditional roles 
among society and decision-makers, and could be service providers ensuring profes-
sional knowledge that allows them to become actors and participants (and not just 
spectators) of the medium and long term processes affecting society and focusing on 
sustainable development.25 To answer this question, we could mention that the civil 
sector is clearly an actor of decision-making processes, but in different cases it is 
only moderately able to shape those and to enforce its interests. The commonly men-
tioned cooperation-learning process seems to restart from time to time, as actors 
often change and there is fluctuation in the public administration bodies. Contrary 
to several recommendations concerning participation, models and research detail-
ing the advantages of exemplary, progressive participation; participation is in most 
cases formal and can only be successful in so-called soft issues (such as strategy 
development, recommendations during planning, etc.). In hard issues, such as billion 
HUF value investments, participation is unwanted. I think that discussion on par-
24 Some prominent green leaders think this issue is overemphasised and defeats all other is-
sues.
25 Glied, V., Civil szervezetek szerepe a környezeti ügyekben a dél-dunántúli régióban, 2009, p. 70.
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ticipation is itself a soft issue, as it diverts attention from actually important issues. 
It serves as a valve to social issues and a decoy as well, providing a fighting arena to 
decision-makers and other political actors.  
After 2005, the structure of the green movement was established with its inner 
processes “fixed”: cooperation defined by formal and informal rules was stabilised, 
and became a routine in most cases. This ensures unified and somewhat rapid en-
forcement of interests – e.g. during common statements, press releases – that is the 
key to the organisation of the movement and probably its greatest strength. However, 
social embeddedness remained low, and the membership base of the movement was 
“overused” by the mid-2000s. The so-called second generation, with people in their 
twenties and thirties included the message of networking in themselves as a gen-
erational attitude, as the usage of the internet and other communication channels as 
well. According to Veronika Móra, although this increased their popularity, the role 
of the protection of the environment did not increase in society.26 This is on the one 
hand a consequence of post-environmentalism, as organisations newly created after 
the transformation of legal order, after the transition to democracy found that creat-
ing environmental regulations (and the systems thereof) was more important than 
increasing social embeddedness. On the other hand, the post-material set of values 
spreads much slower, the majority of the society considers consumption supported 
by multinationals to be of value, “casting their votes in supermarkets rather than in 
the public sphere”. As the majority of the public turned away from politics, they also 
turned away from public affairs. Indifference, a low level of individual responsibility, 
mistrust, turning away from the real to the virtual are all factors that hinder the 
spread of green ideology and values.
Figure 2. Cyanide pollution of River Tisza in 2000
Source: http://www.yubanet.com
26 Móra, V., A zöldek (környezet-, természet- és állatvédő szervezetek), Budapest 2008, pp. 122-123.
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Nevertheless, the cyanide pollution of the Tisza river, floods on the Danube and the 
Tisza, the problems of polders, problems related to the pollution and constructions on 
the beaches of the Balaton, the multiplication of weather anomalies, increasing urban 
smog, the foam pollution of the Rába and the red mud catastrophe are all warning 
signs to the public. “The single issue” remained valid in this period (with a few excep-
tions), but the space for permanent cooperation also appeared via different forums. 
The establishment of a negotiation structure was initiated by the government, and it 
is therefore a top-down process, even though the organisation of the forums and the 
works therein were performed by the participating organisations. The EU requires 
the member states to enforce the principles included in the 2001 “White Book” on 
European governance, issued by the European Commission (such as openness, inclu-
sion and highlight role of NGOs in consultation processes, accountability, efficiency 
and consistency).27 The White Book declares that there is no contradiction between 
the concepts of wide consultations and representative democracy. It is a requirement 
of good governance that effective communication is established with the affected 
parties, and NGOs have a major role in mediating the interests of the citizens. The 
culture of consultation with NGOs shall especially be assisted in new member states 
that show major weaknesses.28 
Non-governmental organisations were not absolutely positive about the accession 
to the European Union in 2004, although the volume of grants increased greatly. A 
significant part of the sector found itself in a financially adverse situation, as com-
munity sources are hard to acquire by civil organisations lacking resources (due 
to several administrative reasons), while national grants and sources from private 
foundations decrease due to the role of community sources. The European Union and 
other international funds (Norwegian, Swiss ones) created a special market of grants, 
where organisations compete with each other, yet appear as potential cooperating 
partners. The successful applications of NGOs required adequate capital for pre-
financing, and to finance their operation in cases of having to resolve discrepancies 
or other administrative errors.29 The NGOs with a stronger supporter base, human 
resources capacity, social base and good connections started to act in the market of 
grants as multinationals. They gathered the organisations operating in similar fields, 
and created networks. The reason for this is clearly to increase their capacity for 
pressure, while they also want to gather a wider source of information, increasing 
the action radius of their fields of interest. In the environmental sector, this clearly 
meant the extension of watchdog functions to the banking sector, monitoring seeds 
(breaching GMO-free regulations) and consumer protection.  
27 Pánovics, A., Régiós civil fejlesztési források felé – félúton, Pécs 2011, p. 12.
28 TEEN, 2006
29 Glied, V., Civil szervezetek szerepe a környezeti ügyekben a dél-dunántúli régióban, Budapest 
2009, p. 70.
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After the accession to the EU, the greens – such as the organisations in other fields 
of non-governmental sectors – switched to a project approach. The major support 
received from the community cannot be spent on operation and maintenance, but 
mostly on a specific development or programme. This factor caused many organisa-
tions to develop projects for a call, which they could not maintain after the project 
period, causing them to terminate. This approach dominates in the establishment 
of green networks and partnership initiatives, and it has thus become a new type of 
“single issue”.
The creation of LMP
After the water dam case in 1997-1998, the movement retreated to local levels. Many 
local and university green organisations were created. The organisation of greens at 
the national level gained momentum during the cyanide pollution of the Tisza in 2000, 
having been joined by semi-civil, semi-political organisations working along the Hun-
garian globalisation critic agenda, when Védegylet (Protect the Future) was founded. 
The Budapest-based organisation – although defined itself as a non-governmental 
organisation – soon started to operate as an ecological policy think tank and com-
municated policy issues. It gained popularity relatively quickly and its influence and 
lobbying capacity increased after László Sólyom was nominated and elected President 
of Hungary (during the Sólyom for President campaign) and it acted in events such as 
the “peace sign” demonstration to protest the Iraqi War or the NATO radar station pro-
posed on the Zengő Mountain. Among the “old” greens of the organisation, a number of 
members of the new generation also appeared, under the leadership of András Schiffer, 
Benedek Jávor, Gábor Scheiring, Bence Tordai and others.
Apart from discussing policy issues, Védegylet also gained attention by various 
actions that introduced a new range of participation and protest methods in the 
Hungarian public life. Its activists spread leaflets, issued publications, organised con-
ferences, or chained themselves to trees in Budapest’s Roosevelt Square to protest 
against the cutting of trees there. These actions strengthened the internal cohesion 
and connections of the organisation, and connected green ideology with new left, an-
archist and globcrit thinking.30 This variety made Védegylet interesting and accepted 
by many, but it also lead to serious political conflicts by the mid-2000s, regarding the 
time and image of a newly established party. Some opposed entering the political 
arena, others wished for a purely ecological party, while young members suggested 
a leftist collective party that could synthesise value of the political left, gathering 
disappointed socialists, liberals, conservatives and keeping the civil base it already 
had. The civil green organisation network refrained from supporting a party in the 
mid-2000s, as it would harm its positions in the non-governmental sector. Members 
30 Tóth, A., LMP: kísérlet a politikai tér újraalkotására, Budapest 2013, pp. 188-191.
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arguing for creating a party said it could win support from those that were tired of the 
bipartisan hysteria and the related political conflicts. They claimed that an increase 
of ecological policy conflicts will make it necessary to have a party that deals with 
environmental issues and can gather supporters by doing so. After internal conflicts 
and changes in basic values, András Lányi and his supporters left the organisation in 
2005 and founded the “Élőlánc Magyarországért Mozgalom” movement that is basi-
cally conservative and orthodox in green policies.31 
The young members, with Mr. Schiffer and his supporters spent three years with 
preparation and felt that the time has come to establish a party. With Lányi and his 
supporters, an older core of members that urged civil cooperation and considered 
politics a civic activity left Védegylet. But this did not break the group, and the or-
ganisation reached major political success in 2005 by nominating László Sólyom, a 
professor of law with strong green values to be President of Hungary. Internal con-
flicts of the governing parties and luck also contributed to having Mr. Sólyom elected 
President of Hungary, with the support of the then opposition Fidesz party. This step 
basically institutionalised ecological policy issues and brought them to the political 
arena, although it only contributed to political capital with other environmental-
social cases. 
Élőlánc did compete in the 2006 elections, but could not achieve any significant 
success. Mr. Schiffer and his supporters concluded that a campaign based on enthu-
siasm without money and an apolitical attitude is not enough to convince voters 
about voting on a green-liberal political force. After 2006, both external and internal 
conditions were provided for the appearance of a new ecological-globalisation critic 
formation. After the demise of MSZP and the loss of confidence with SZDSZ, there 
was an open space in the leftist-liberal area that András Schiffer and his support-
ers recognised. Citizens turned away from politics in large numbers, blaming not 
only the governing parties, but also the entire political elite for the crisis. Védegylet 
thought the crisis will not only result in negative processes, but will also provide 
an opportunity for ecology-based solutions instead of a neoliberal (gathering) eco-
nomic policy, for the change of consumption customs and persuading the politicians 
about a national minimum that would provide a basis for goals of multiple political 
terms. They also considered answers provided within traditional ideologies to be 
inadequate, and the ideological determination of political decisions to be obsolete, 
with parties of the transition period to be tired and having no confidence from the 
voters. They recognised a need for a third force as opposed to the technocrat/pseudo-
liberal/social democrat (so-called left-wing) and populist/namely socially sensitive 
(so-called right-wing) parties, that would not define itself according to the left/right 
31 Lányi, A., Porcelán az elefántboltban – Az ökológiai politika kezdetei Magyarországon, Buda-
pest 2009, pp. 186-188.
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distinction, and that would face conflicts by providing true solutions, and globalisa-
tion critic/ecological answers on a radical democratic basis. András Schiffer and his 
supporters developed the basic theses of the Hungarian ecological party based on the 
patterns of the German green party, synthesising ecological policy suggestions of the 
socialist, liberal and conservative ideologies, with the inclusion of alterglob/human 
rights/ecologist based recommendations.
To prepare for the establishment of the party, the organisers created the Ökopoli-
tikai Műhely Alapítvány (Ecological Policy Workshop Foundation) in the spring of 
2008 to form a civil environmentalist, human rights, anti-discrimination and liberal 
group. The organisation developed and corrected the future programme, structure 
and attitude of the party using an intranet application called Szimplakör. The party 
initiative was based on the ideas of participation and democracy. The intellectual 
background group participating in Szimplakör (Simpla Circle) concluded that Hunga-
ry needed a party based on post-modern values, democratic ideology and participa-
tory democracy that overcomes left/right division and can undertake a new regime 
change with limits to wild capitalism and autocratic populism. The party based on 
the foundation and members of Védegylet (especially their civic professional back-
ground) was founded in 2009 under the name Politics Can Be Different. The majority 
of green, alterglob, human rights and other alternative NGOs, with a research group 
of significant influence, soon started to support the party. The party was established 
at a right time, as part of voters (especially from the younger generation of thirty-
year-olds) showed interest in the new political organisation. LMP began campaigning 
for the 2009 European Parliament elections virtually without any money, fuelled 
by the enthusiasm of the organisers and the activists, reaching the result of 2.65%, 
collecting 75,000 votes. This indicated that a good campaign could allow them to be 
successful in the elections in 2010.32   
After the 1980s until the early 2000s, there was no national issue in Hungary 
that could help a movement build its identity and serve as a mobilising force. Until 
the foundation of LMP, there was no party that would provide a purely ecological 
programme (green economy, protests against nuclear power) as it happened in West 
Germany or Austria. Many issues formed a part of the agenda before the formation 
of green parties in Western Europe (such as nuclear energy, acid rains, air pollution) 
that divided society – although many understood their importance – that enabled 
forming political capital, and helped to integrate local groups into a large national 
organisation after achieving political success.33 The popularity of LMP could benefit 
from a large number of environment-related issues in the second half of the 2000s, 
32 Tóth, A., LMP: kísérlet a politikai tér újraalkotására, Budapest 2013, p. 206
33 Gergely, Gy., A hazai zöld civil szerveződések szerepe, lehetőségei a helyi környezeti konfliktu-
sok megoldásában – Stratégiai perek: szűkülő mozgástér?, Budapest 2009.
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after the shock of the cyanide pollution of the Tisza. Ecological policy topics were 
mentioned in the news every week, and the media was curious about the move-
ment and the party. In their first period of politics, the greens were very heavily 
attacked by the opponents, and many accused them of being successors of the failed 
liberal attempt at receiving funding from abroad and thus becoming servants of 
multinational corporations. Relations of the green movement, LMP and the business 
sector have been contradictory from the very beginning, even though goodwill and 
reaching win-win situations was the primary guidance in establishing partnership. 
One or more business actors (investors, constructors, etc.) and political actors are 
usually affected by environmental conflicts. There are many examples that prove 
that a business association’s ethical conduct and environmental efforts can be sup-
ported by the opinions and agreement of non-governmental organisations that may 
“legitimize” the activity of the company, political party or local government for the 
support they receive. Research literature frequently calls these “pseudo NGOs” or 
non-governmental organisations outside the civil sector.34 While many of the NGOs 
opposing political roles (a part of the green movement) left LMP, Fidesz used NGOs 
successfully to legitimise its goals and to put pressure on the government from 2002, 
when it started to organise the “civic circle” organisations. At the time of the elections 
in 2002, it called several hundred thousand supporters to the street to try to reverse 
the outcome of the elections, although it was unsuccessful then. After the lost elec-
tions, it successfully built a network of NGOs and advisers, but failed in 2006, partially 
due to the mistaken campaign and bad personal selections, and also because of the 
agility of the leader of the governing socialists, Ferenc Gyurcsány. The waves of pro-
tests in 2006 were advantageous for Fidesz, as it consciously constructed its tactics 
around the rejection of any compromise with the government, dividing the society to 
the extreme. It is still unclear what type of relationship existed after 2002 between 
far-right groups, the civic circles and Fidesz. According to Ervin Nagy, the former vice 
president of Jobbik, Fidesz and the far-right naturally had an informal relationship 
based on the distribution of work which the largest opposition party used skilfully, 
as it did not want to leave the democratic political stage, a thing which Jobbik and the 
far-right groups could do.35 Therefore, it is safe to say that during the riots in 2006, 
Fidesz and many of the related far-right, radical groups (civic circles, MIÉP, Jobbik, 
etc.) did not act as if they were participating in a pre-organised, professional coup 
d’état or “revolution”, but they seemed to be surprised by the course of events. This 
is probably how it happened, since an inspection has concluded that small groups of 
football hooligans, skinheads and other fascistoid/neo-nazi elements have entered 
34 Márkus, E., Civilek a sajtóban – közmegítélés, Budapest 2009, p. 163.
35 Huth, Gergely: A Jobbik már nem az a párt, aminek látszik. 12 March 2010:  http://www.
magyarhirlap.hu/belfold/a_jobbik_mar_nem_az_a_part_aminek_latszik.html 
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the protests during the riots of autumn 2006, with the leadership of unknown per-
sons. While the government and Fidesz pointed at and blamed each other for escalat-
ing the events, the speakers of the protests did not only blame Ferenc Gyurcsány and 
the socialists, but the whole political system, and called for the resignation of the 
whole political elite. This is what Fidesz understood well, and developed a so-called 
civil background that would not question the government’s decisions, even though 
they have a negative effect on them. This alliance had a somewhat religious nature, in 
which the personality of Viktor Orbán and the rejection of the pro-Gyurcsány/liberal 
elements played major roles. The leader of the opposition strengthened its own camp, 
pointed at the main enemy, and also collected most of the protest votes, thus reaching 
a two-third majority in the 2010 elections. 
LMP competed at the elections as the “least bad choice” that served as an advan-
tage in the campaign with a negative note and a lot of accusations. The 7.5% results 
and the 16 received seats in parliament showed that there is demand for an ecological 
party on the political stage (at least for a narrow base of voters). However, the eco-
party seemed to have used all its resources for the successful elections, and had to 
face a dilemma: should it target the large space on the political left wing, or should it 
continue on its own? This question let to the division of LMP within three years.  
New movements after 2010
The division of LMP
A new era of Hungarian politics has begun, labelled by the new government as a revo-
lutionary transformation and a new era (“revolution in the voting booth”). It soon 
became clear that the 2/3 majority in the parliament is not enough to conclude rapid 
reforms: the economy stalled and started to decline, the national debt has reached 
the level before the democratic transition, emigration was gaining momentum, the 
foreign currency interest rates of loans rose dramatically and caused tens of thou-
sands of families to find themselves in a hopeless situation. The systematic reforms 
affected personal livelihood, economic satellites and intellectual groups, and turned 
social groups, professions and generations against each other, causing further ten-
sions between Hungary and the European Union.  
LMP tried to solve this dilemma by ignoring the required discussions. Many of 
its supporters considered MSZP a party with a neoliberal economic agenda that 
sometimes performed social policy programmes to remain in power. A large share of 
its members was not willing to enter a political compromise aimed to create a united 
left-wing opposition. They tried to manoeuvre and keep an equal distance from the 
left and the right as well, and aimed to take sides with the people as a constructive 
opposition force. They initiated a referendum campaign in the spring of 2011, but 
due to disinterest from the public (and the National Election Committee’s failure 
to allow some of the more important referendum questions) they could not collect 
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the required number of signatures. The party prepared to communicate in policy 
matters, thus showing an example to the other parties. It quickly turned out that 
this type of politics cannot be successful. Fidesz started reforms in all social systems 
and began to restructure the country completely. The flat tax rate on income tax 
showed that the new government was favouring the richer middle classes. Cutting 
the funding of education and social services and simultaneusly increasing the vol-
ume of budget spent on the unsuccessful Hungarian football, retroactive legislation, 
amending the constitution, the destruction of checks and balances, total takeover 
of the state media, reform of the election system, controlling of the arts and cinema 
sectors angered many. And not just these phenomena angered the people, but also the 
arrogant, surreal, cynical and sniffy communication of the government and its politi-
cians, things that were far beyond the acceptable levels for many. LMP clearly thought 
that the election campaign was suitable to mobilise the masses, while it turned out 
that the party could only rely on a couple of hundred activists. Nevertheless, the Civil 
Unity Forum supporting Fidesz could mobilise several hundred thousand supporters 
for its “Peace March for Hungary” rally on 23 October 2012. It was also proved that 
although the newly popular movements and informal groups – such as Szolidaritás 
and Milla – could move masses of citizens, they had no political routine. LMP could 
not break through the wall of ignorance, and could not get rid of its intellectual style 
that may seem alien or “too professional” for many voters. It is also clear that a party 
may grow out of a movement, but it cannot expropriate the movement, as the two can 
only be effective simultaneously, such as in case of the German greens. While they 
thought that the citizens had had enough of divisive political clashes and a new, coop-
erative political culture may emerge for the common goals of the nation, the exactly 
opposite thing happened: the period after the crisis and the 2/3 majority of Fidesz 
increased hysteria in politics, poverty and social inequalities increased. LMP made 
same mistake as SZDSZ in 1990 and 1994, by having no single (charismatic) leader that 
the party could be identified with.  
During the autumn of 2011, LMP initiated talks with opposition groups about a 
possible cooperation, but these terminated when the new formation of Gordon 
Bajnai, an ex-socialist prime minister announced his new initiative during late 2012. 
Szolidaritás proposed the creation of a great opposition round table, but LMP still did 
not want to join MSZP and the new party of Ferenc Gyurcsány, Demokratikus Koalíció 
(Democratic Coalition – DK). The calls from the left divided the unity of the party, 
which could not be repaired by the “New Resistance” campaign in December 2012. On 
23 December 2012, LMP’s members of parliament protesting against an amendment 
of the national assembly’s internal regulations chained themselves to the parking 
place of the Parliament building, and they were only removed after an intervention 
from the police. The desperate action increased party support temporarily, but then 
it kept stagnating around 2-3%. Part of the parliamentary faction thought that this 
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meant that only a unified left will be able to defeat Fidesz in 2014. The new election 
act further supported this notion, as the elections are going to be held in a one-round 
system, making the opposition votes divided against the government candidate if no 
coalition is formed. 
During the autumn of 2012, after failed talks with trade unions, LMP found itself 
on its own. Szolidaritás and Milla announced to have entered into talks with Gordon 
Bajnai, thus closing another door for the ecological party. The new political force was 
established as Együtt 2014 (Together 2014) on 26 October 2012. This step divided LMP 
for good. The only remaining question was whether the members considered defeat-
ing the Orbán-government or the independence of the party to be more important. The 
green party rejected cooperation with Együtt 2014 at its congress held in November 
2012, then, the group led by Benedek Jávor announced to quit the parliamentary fac-
tion and LMP as well. Those who left founded a new party under the name Párbeszéd 
Magyarországért (Dialogue for Hungary – PM) and joined the Bajnai-initiative. The 
negotiations with MSZP during the summer of 2013 and the alliance agreement of the 
socialists with Együtt 2014 basically proved LMP right, as the leftist-liberal camp was 
unified again, with support from a green-globcrit group, Szolidaritás and Milla. The 
social democratic party was invited to joint Együtt 2013, and Ferenc Gyurcsány’s DK 
also applied for membership (although this is not concluded before the deadline of 
this paper). 
Before the 2014 national elections LMP had been expected to fight on its own, and 
it was doubtful if the voters were convinced that it was able to act as an individual 
force in the national assembly. However, reaching the 5% limit to enter parliament 
also seemed impossible in 2009, the green party could make it. In 2014 LMP was able 
to mobilise just its own voters and those having been tired of the conflicts of the 
left and the right, but just in a very small quantity. At last the party achieved the 5% 
threshold, which was just enough to send 5 representatives to the Hungarian Parlia-
ment, due to the new electoral law which was implemented in that year.
Szolidaritás, Milla, 4K, HaHa
Changes in 2012 created new, previously unknown movements and groups, which 
could rapidly bring masses on the streets and then be transformed into parties (or 
diminish entirely). The movements are based on several single issues, and the buzz-
words of the protests they organised are mixed with multiple levels of grievances 
and demands. These initiatives were created and fuelled by the divisive politics of 
Fidesz. At first, the communication of the government considered the employees 
of law enforcement agencies, media professionals, disability pensioners, students, 
artists-scapegoats who disagreed with the government’s reforms.36 
36 Vári, Gy., A Szolidaritás útja, Budapest 2013, p. 242.
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Magyar Szolidaritás Mozgalom (Hungarian Solidarity Movement) was created for a 
single reason, to protect the privileged pension schemes of law enforcement employees. 
This led to the creation of a general group of trade union leaders, organised according to 
the Polish example, to provide an initial impetus for anti-government protests. Shortly, 
several organisations protesting against the nationalisation of private pension funds 
and the punishment of homeless people joined. Szolidaritás has deeper roots than the 
other movements, as its dynamic is provided by people coming from a classic civil 
background that raised their voice for goals such as restoring legality, progressive tax 
systems and social security. The consistent agreement of the two leaders, the soldier 
Péter Kónya and fireman Kornél Árok was unquestionable, serious political challenges 
only affected the movement in early 2012. Regarding their ideological framework, all 
movements voiced their aim of overcoming the fighting and ideological war dividing 
the country, which would only be possible by strengthening social activity and partici-
pation. The fight against political passivity, the fear of the leaders being blackmailed by 
their livelihoods and the fear of freezing due to failure helped the movement overcome 
its apolitical attitude and guided it toward party politics. 
Figure 3. Clown Revolution in 2011, organised by the Hungarian Solidarity Movement
Source: www.nol.hu
Kónya, Árok and their supporters organised their protest titled “Clown Revolution” 
on 16 June 2011 to Alkotmány Street in Budapest, protesting against the government’s 
decision to retroactively raise the retirement age for law enforcement employees 
and introducing other regulations affecting employee rights. The organisers dressed 
as clowns intended to parody the government’s favourite term of “revolution in the 
voting booth”. After the initial success, Szolidaritás and several hundred joining or-
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ganisations announced organising the “D-Day” demonstrations on 29 September. The 
protest of 50-60 thousand participants was planned to take three days, started at the 
Kossuth Square of Budapest and ended with a sitdown strike in Clark Ádám Square via 
the Chain Bridge. A few hundred participants also went to the Sándor Palace, the seat 
of the President of Hungary. The group Egymillióan a Demokráciáért (One Million for 
Democracy) left Milla and joined the trade unions. Milla did not want to participate 
in the events of Szolidaritás, partially because it considered the activity of the trade 
union group a competitor, and it thought that Szolidaritás and law enforcement trade 
union organisations had connections to political parties, particularly MSZP and Job-
bik. From autumn 2011 to 23 October 2012, Szolidaritás and Milla implicitly shared the 
organisations of street demonstrations, and also held a joint opposition protest on 2 
January 2012 and opposed the ceremonial entry into force of the new Constitution. 
After the events of autumn 2011, leaders of Szolidaritás quit (or were expelled) 
from the trade unions on which the organisation was based. Szolidaritás intended to 
make up for the loss of its organised institutional background by joining the NGOs, 
but it turned out to be a complicated issue. The group committed the same mistakes 
as many other movements: it failed to maintain the enthusiasm and commitment 
to a common goal among its members, lacking definite political successes. The gov-
ernment proposed compromise solutions, but usually swept away the demands of 
Szolidaritás equipped with its 2/3 majority. Kornél Árok leaked his plans to establish 
his own party in early 2012, but his fellow leaders rejected the idea and believed 
in forming an opposition round table. While the movement worked to establish its 
organisational background, the original organisation practically dissolved. Árok 
considered the civil efforts to be futile, if there was no party in the background that 
could compete at the elections. The apolitical, uncompromising stance of Szolidaritás 
provided the movement with symbolic credit which has partially diminished after 
the dissolution. The movement could not elaborate upon its the important identity, 
and failed to show a third way of cooperation between the NGOs and the democratic 
opposition for the common good of the nation. On top of that, anti-establishment and 
anti-corruption buzzwords and problems of poverty were more successfully com-
municated by Jobbik. The success and subsequent “emptiness” of Szolidaritás is a 
good example of how effectively Fidesz could remove the checks and balances aimed 
to restrict the power of the government, and change important systems without any 
real opposition. The “stop-and-go” political games permanently applied by the gov-
ernment made it impossible for opposing organisations to adapt to the ever-changing 
central communication, and to increase or maintain the resistance of their members, 
which ultimately led to fatigue.
This is why it was a little surprising, but practically rational that the organisation 
of Mr. Bajnai and the “truncated” Szolidaritás decided to join forces. To Mr. Kónya and 
other leaders of the movement, Mr. Bajnai was an acceptable figure of the left, and 
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considered him a professional, not a reformer of the new left. The movement joined 
forces with the Bajnai-organisation on 23 October 2012, and created the party named 
Együtt 2014, with the accession of Milla as well.
One Million for Press Freedom (Milla)
Milla was the first movement that began to organise against the measures and reform 
plans of the Fidesz government. Milla was originally founded as a Facebook Group 
named One Million for Hungarian Press Freedom, on 21 December 2010, the day after 
the first protest for the freedom of the press. The group created by civil activist Péter 
Juhász rapidly gained supporters. Its members began their operation by showing 
how Fidesz started governing without a programme, with spontaneous ideas and 
provisions, and that the “National Cooperation System” created by the government 
was only a fake negotiation body that did not induce true discussions and expected 
reactions to centrally invented questions. On top of that, they were angered by the 
sense of absurdity, the success propaganda of the government and the enormous 
discrepancy of reality and government communications.37 
During the first half of 2011, Hungary held the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union for the first time, while the government and the prime minister kept 
talking about a freedom fight, explaining that Hungary will not allow the EU to inter-
fere with internal politics. While the 2/3 majority started to transform the political 
system, the opposition contemplated the changes as a lame duck, being unable to 
actively influence the processes. MSZP was healing its wounds, LMP could not over-
come having put on a course by the two major parties and organise an independent 
political pole. Jobbik acted as constructive opposition, dealing with taboo subjects 
defining the essence of politics. In this situation the non-governmental sector became 
more active and protested against the amendment of the media law, claiming that it 
threatened balanced and politics-free information services in the country. 
On 14 January 2011 the series of protests arrived to the Kossuth Square in Budapest, 
protests against limitations of press freedom. This was the first on-line organised 
demonstration in Hungarian history. A general concept package was elaborated for 
the national holiday on 15 March, which included the issue of the increasing emigra-
tion, the dangers of narrowing the rights of democratic institutions, an increase of 
social differences and the invasion of social subsystems by politics. Many intellec-
tuals and artists supported the protests, providing faces to the demands of Milla: 
dialogue, democracy, and an end to political infighting and fear. The rap song “I don’t 
like the system” was composed in autumn 2011 and rapidly spread on the Internet and 
provided the tone of the protests. This song represented a new generation complaint 
of several dozen thousand young people having a university degree, without a goal, 
37 Petőcz, Gy., Milla: őrkutya, vagy vadászkutya?, Budapest 2013, pp. 268-269.
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sensing poverty, hopelessness and dissolution of democracy around themselves. 
Milla also had to ask “where to go” for itself, just as Szolidaritás did. The initial buz-
zword of the Milla-organisers was: no politics please! Nevertheless, when they found 
themselves in the centre of protests and increasingly had to deal with politics, they 
felt that the major civil potential should be converted to votes in the election. This 
was a major issue in the history of Milla, as it was the only democratic proto-political 
force in the field between the left and the centre. 
After the protests of 15 March – which were joined by 40 thousand participants – 
they had to consider stepping forward toward creating a political group. Those not 
supporting this direction either left the movement, or went on to work in Milla’s NGO 
wing. They established their own media channel, and gathered interests with gags 
and street protests. This division basically meant that the movement had to develop 
and represent two different programmes. One aimed to defeat Fidesz, in cooperation 
with the opposition, both inside and outside the parliament, and another aimed to 
change the entire political system.38 Milla is a third-generation creation of new social 
movements, it was organised on the internet, conducting most of its discussions in 
the virtual space and identifying with pro-Europe, liberal, green and new left values. 
They reject populism, institutions established according to partisan logics, and all 
forms of corruption. Meetings of the activists concluded that the Third Republic 
founded in 1990 fell in such a great crisis that it cannot be overcome. The only solution 
could be to create a new pole and announce the idea of the Fourth Republic. Milla 
has not only been a movement, but also a framework, providing a platform to people 
and groups accepting a democratic minimum. The movement was created for a single 
issue (the amendment of the media law) and later went on the enforce some kind of 
a watchdog function that draws attention to anomalies in the Hungarian political 
system, the forced paths of economy and politics and discrepancies in understanding 
democracy, emphasising civil and opposition roles and the lack of political culture. 
The Fourth Republic (Negyedik Köztársaság – 4K) imagined grassroots reforms in a 
narrow, civil space, free from politics. It is clear that the power induced in civil roots 
and supported by discontent could not be turned to profit by Szolidaritás or Milla in 
public politics, for the facts listed herein. 
Fourth Republic (4K) and the Student’s Network (HaHa)
4K entered the political arena as a generation-based civil force, a group of young 
digital consumers. The organisation appeared with community street games and 
flash mobs in the autumn of 2010, it was active in the cooperation with students and 
those protesting against the new constitution, decided to transform into a party in 
2011, and held its first congress in 2012. It mainly expected the membership of those 
38 Ibid., p. 281.
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tired of political fights, pointless debates and anger. They demanded real political 
participation, real democracy and the reconquest of public life. They intend to act 
against a bleak future for the youth, by directing attention to uncertainties and the 
problem of emigration. 4K believes that the crisis is the consequence of a global proc-
ess, and the result of the rule of banks and political background deals not approved 
by the public. This includes the activity of Gyurcsány and the Orbán governments, 
which only provides answers on a forced path, which are merely reactions to the 
problems arising. They also understand – what LMP, Szolidaritás, Milla and other 
organisations failed to – that the love of freedom and enthusiasm in Eastern Europe 
and Hungary usually manifests in resistance and protests, not in the hope of unity 
and reaching common goals. In this environment, the sense of community is provided 
by acting against something or somebody, and dissension is the base of joint living, 
with paternalism and trust in the government is still defining most of the concepts 
of individual responsibility. However, politicians and the state are not able to solve 
certain problems, and it requires the choices of individual to get things right, if that 
is possible at all. There is no tradition of a collective formation of will in Hungary, it is 
mostly the individual enforcement strategies that prevail, in which the community is 
only a tool, while wealth and power are the goals.39 This leads to the conclusion that 
participation in public affairs is useless, the feeling and belief of the individual that “I 
cannot change anything” and “someone else can try to change things, I am not willing to 
risk anything” are going to define the thinking of the average citizen, with apathy and 
indifference becoming the prevailing view. This is what 4K intends to change, and as 
a self-defined leftist patriot party it wishes to emphasise the importance of participa-
tion, demanding a tax reform, the restoration of economic and legal stability, and the 
strengthening of workers’ rights. The major challenges for the 4K in the future are 
going to be the establishment of a real organisational structure and the mobilisation 
of its potential voters.
The history of the alternative university representation organisation, HaHa 
started much earlier than 2011. The organisers already appeared among the Occupy 
movement and the Anonymus group in the mid-2000s. In the 2011 they had several ac-
tions, occupying the office of Máté Kocsis, mayor of Budapest’s 8th district, protesting 
in front of the Bankcenter office building and raising awareness with other similar 
media hack events. The group initially consisted of 20-30 members and pronounced 
clear messages: as accomplices, the individual consumers, the corporations, the bank-
ers and the politicians are all responsible for the situation. The university and high 
school protests were fuelled in autumn 2011, when the government announced plans 
to reform higher education, introducing an obligatory student agreement, a radical 
decrease of state-financed university seats and great reductions in the education 
39 Mikecz, D., Köztér és köztársaság: 4K., Budapest 2013, p. 365.
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budget. HaHa also profited from the notion that the National Conference of Students’ 
Represents’ Councils (HÖOK) was not appropriately representing the students’ 
interests. HaHa chose a variety of methods for its protests. Its activists disrupted 
speeches of the state secretary responsible for the reform of higher education (who 
used to be an active member of the communist party before the transition to democ-
racy) and other ministry officials, they organised marches, student forums, talked at 
demonstrations organised by Milla, occupied university halls and auditoriums and 
held night vigils. They played a major role in the resignation of President Pál Schmitt, 
continuously organising campaigns, especially on the internet.40
Figure 4. March of the students, December, 2012
Source: eduline.hu
The organisation gained popularity during the winter of 2012/2013, when discon-
tent reached a new peak. On 12 December 2012, a group of students entered the Kos-
suth Square of Budapest with a march of several thousand protesters and reached 
the steps of the Parliament building, only to meet a wall of policemen. On 11 February 
2013, HaHa and high school activists held a demonstration in Budapest’s Deák Square, 
marched to the Faculty of Humanities building of the Eötvös Loránd University and 
“occupied” the main building. The “first Hungarian ‘occupy a university’ event” ended 
40 Gerő, M., El kéne foglalni valamit… Az Occupy Wall Street és a hallgatói mozgalom, Budapest 
2013, pp. 322-323.
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in 45 days, after the participants concluded an agreement with the leaders of the 
university. According to the agreement, the students were free to organise forums 
in the previously occupied auditorium and the university declared to “support self-
organisation of the students”. Moreover, the organisers negotiated with the govern-
ment, which again took a “stop and go” stance. While the students always compared 
the dismantling of higher education with the billions spent on building stadiums and 
spent on football, members of the far-right/neo-fascist football hooligan movement 
Ultras Liberi demonstrated at the student protests. After the initial protests, the gov-
ernment changed its original education policy reforms in many aspects. It revoked its 
proposal on quotas of admitted students, and provided almost 55,000 seats instead 
of the proposed 10,500 in higher education institutions. In February, they divided the 
ministry unit responsible for education into a state secretariat for elementary and 
secondary education and another one for higher education. The controversial state 
secretary Rózsa Hoffman remained head of the elementary and secondary educa-
tion unit, while the István Klinghammer was appointed state secretary for higher 
education. The stand-off was thus resolved, although no agreement was reached, and 
issues affecting the Hungarian youth were postponed and ignored.
Politics against politics
Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party (MKKP)
Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party) started as a joke 
in the city of Szeged in 2006. A group of friends had initially intended to use street 
campaigns, thought-provoking, cynical, symbolic messages to draw attention to 
anomalies of consumer society, the poor quality of the media and the flood of prom-
ises from politics and politicians. The formation, which was not registered as a party, 
was soon joined by a team of young creatives that started to operate in Budapest and 
major cities (university towns). Their declared aim was to make citizens think and to 
annoy politicians. They articulated intentionally impossible promises to voters, such 
as infinite life, free beer and a tax cut of 100%. They announced that these promises 
were no more impossible to keep than those promised by politicians.
The formation appeared in public in 2009, a year before the elections, when it 
organised a protest at the building of the National Statistics Bureau. The 200-300 
participants clearly stated to be tired of political fights, hysteria in the political arena 
and an unnecessary and hypocritical overuse of the patriotic themes. Leaders of the 
initiative announced that no election programme was necessary, as the other parties 
did not have plausible programmes either, or in case they did, those were completely 
unreal and intended to be forgotten after the elections. It is interesting to note that 
many impossible demands of MKKP turned into reality after 2010. Official govern-
ment communication entities and other government bodies committed errors that 
could have been announced in the programme of MKKP, or published on its fake news 
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website started after 2010, Hírcsárda. The joke party closely cooperates with the 
átlátszó.blog.hu portal that is a watchdog monitoring state investments, the effects 
of political decisions and the consequences thereof. The fact-finding and investiga-
tive series of articles on the blog try to disentangle and systematise operations of 
economic background organisations of the political elite.
In 2013, MKKP initiated official proceedings to become an officially registered 
party and requested the court for registration, also announcing that it was planning 
to run in the 2014 parliamentary elections. The intention to participate in politics did 
not change the image of the group, in a 2012 project they made promises to develop 
their performance in major Hungarian cities. They promised to build a mountain and 
a spaceport in Szeged; a gigantic church in Debrecen; a triple-size extension of the 
abandoned high tower building in Pécs; a sandy beach plaza, Mediterranean suburbs 
and a giant amusement park in Budapest. They also promised to construct an un-
derground railway connecting the eastern and western borders of the country, and 
a stadium covering the total area of the country, thus reacting to the government’s 
multi-billion stadium reconstruction programme. On 27 April 2013, activists of the 
joke party joined by the 4K protested on the streets against the serious harms against 
the political class and the billionaire oligarchs assisting them. They wanted to draw 
attention to the recent activities of the government providing major development 
orders to companies and corporate empires without a proper tender, and the govern-
ment labelling the opposition politicians or NGOs requesting data as supporters of 
multinational corporations and local representatives of foreign capitalists. Although 
the protest was ironic and cynical in its tone, it fitted into the series of movement or-
ganisations started in the year before, which named the oligarchs, corrupt corporate 
networks, banks, credit institution and offshore companies to be responsible for the 
crisis, not to mention the representatives of the political elite. They also started a 
“populist calculator” to convert the costs of corrupt and useless investments into the 
expenses spent on medicine and basic food.
MKKP – which is similar to the Icelandic Best Party in many ways – intends to 
take advantage of an increasingly anti-political sentiment and plans to compete in 
the parliamentary elections in 2014. Since the elections are only open to officially 
registered parties, this plan may fail due to administrative reasons, as the court 
rejects to register the joke party due to its deceptive name.
It did, however, register the Hungarian Kalózpárt (Pirate Party), founded in April 
2012 following Swedish and German examples. The group originally operating within 
LMP left the green party in 2011 and continued politics independently. Pirate parties 
all over the world are parties that include the freedom of online file exchange, the 
promotion of civil rights, direct participation, liquid democracy, a reform of copy-
right, a free flow of knowledge, freedom of information, more secure data safety, the 
protection of the private sphere, greater transparency in government and the public 
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sphere, democratic education and similar issues in their programmes. The Hungar-
ian party fights for similar goals, promoting the decision-making system established 
between representative democracy and participatory democracy, the so-called liquid 
democracy; and a basic income guarantee that would provide every citizen with a 
monthly income to provide a minimum level of livelihood. 
Conclusion  
Crisis had already arrived in Hungary in 2006, before the global crisis. It has not 
only been a financial-economic, but also a moral and ethical crisis which affected 
the governing coalition first, and then spread across society as a kind of judgement 
on the entire political system. Protests and street riots indicated that the majority 
of citizens had become tired of promises and party clashes in the political arena. 
The largest opposition force, Fidesz understood the public mood and continuously 
attached the government and its discredited prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány. This 
resulted in Fidesz winning a 2/3 majority in the 2010 elections. It began to transform 
the country completely. The crisis caused two formations to emerge. They entered 
the national assembly as new parties, and had strong movement networks in their 
background. Although it faced several scandals, Jobbik could remain united, while 
LMP dissolved and the quitting leftist, globcrit group joined Gordon Bajnai’s Együtt 
2014 formation, under the name PM. 
Protests against the reforms of Fidesz began as early as the first autumn after 
the elections. The originally single-issue movements grew to become groups and 
parties acting against the government and the entire political system by 2012. In the 
organisation of street protests, Szolidaritás and Milla emerged, while the opposi-
tion parties were shocked to see what was going on around them. The government 
continued to act without a compromise and repelled discontent forces according to 
the “divide and rule” principle. Therefore, democratic movements had to face the 
dilemma that most of the non-governmental organisations face when entering the 
political arena: without actual success the enthusiasm of the members vanishes, the 
movement freezes and diminishes. Their initially radical anti-politics attitude was 
misunderstood: Szolidaritás and Milla joined the Együtt 2014 organisation, the 4K 
is currently in talks with LMP, while MKKP and Kalózpárt also informally belong to 
the circle of the green party. Having no current single issues, HaHa and other student 
organisations are silent in policy issues. The bipolar character of politics in Hungary 
till 2010 extended by several additional poles by 2013. The governing party forms an 
enormous block in the centre and on the right, while Jobbik and the neo-nazi/arrow 
cross and national radical groups occupy the far-right. The democratic opposition is 
fragmented, continuously changing and consists of a mass of ideologically divided 
left/new left/globcrit/green/liberal movements and parties.
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The Economic Transformation in Hungary – 
Detour or Impasse?
Andrea Schmidt1
Abstract
The economic transition took place in the Central and Eastern European region 
almost at the same time. The reasons and the process of economic transition are 
similar. However, the Hungarian case had a special importance in the change of the 
regime, as it was followed by a political transformation. The New Economic Mecha-
nism from 1968 brought irreversible changes in macroeconomics and in the attitude 
towards entrepreneurship. The reforms were stopped because of several reasons. 
However, the spirit survived. While focusing on the transformation, it is also essential 
to examine the historical and political background of Hungary to answer the ques-
tion whether the socialist economy can be can be considered a ’detour’ or ’impasse’. 
Using the different statistical data about the Hungarian convergence towards the 
developed Western European region, it can be said that the relative backwardness 
is rooted in the historical past and apart from the fact that several efforts were car-
ried out in order to reduce or at least to stop the growing differences, these attempts 
failed partly because of several inappropriate political decisions.
“This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own 
social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be 
otherwise. If now there is not a communist government in Paris, the cause of this is Russia 
has no army that can reach Paris in 1945.” 
(Stalin’s speech from April, 1945).2
“When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist 
country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a 
common problem and concern of all socialist countries.” 
(Quotation from Breznev’s Doctrine, 1968)3
1 PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies and International Relations, Uni-
versity of Pécs. schmidt.andrea@pte.hu
2 It was called the ‘Stalin doctrine’ http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/01/22/the-
stalin-doctrine/
3 Quotation from the Brezhnev doctrine. Taranto, James: Brezhnev lives, in: The Wall Street 
Journal, 2012. 03. 30. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303404704577313
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The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 opened a new historical phase for Eastern Europe. 
But it also marked a turning point at the heart of neo-liberal globalisation 
and European construction. 
(Samary)4
Preface – The division of Europe
The aim of this paper is to describe the economic transition in Hungary within the 
Central and Eastern European region, its features, historical background, aims and 
consequences. After the Second World War, Hungary became the member of a bloc of 
states within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence called the socialist bloc, therefore 
it is reasonable to give an overview of the consequences of this group to focus to the 
Central and Eastern European region as a whole. According to Berend5, the transfor-
mation of Central and Eastern Europe after the half-century communist experiment 
is one of the most important historical events of turn-of-the-century Europe and the 
emerging new world order. The transformation is a complex phenomenon with far-
reaching political, social, cultural and economic aspects. 
When we examine the economic transformation, it is essential to concentrate on 
the geopolitical, historical, political and economic background as a whole. A huge 
amount of books and essays deals with the aspects and consequences of the divi-
sion of the European continent, the gap as an effect of the iron curtain. It would be 
a hopeless task to list the authors and their works; however it would be reasonable 
to introduce at least a part of the Hungarian works focusing on the economic transi-
tion and Hungary’s role within Europe and its convergence towards the developed 
Western European core region.
It is a part of historical legacy that the European continent cannot be considered a 
homogeneous entity; there are cleavages which are either cultural or economic. It is 
not surprising that these cleavages are located more or less at the same places.6 Among 
750705052134.html
4 Samary, Catherine: East Europe faced with the crises of the system, in: http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052702303404704577313750705052134.html
5 Berend T. Iván is a Hungarian historian who has been focusing on the economic history 
of the Central and Eastern European region in the 19th and 20th centuries. In many of his 
works, he explains the problems of convergence and divergence of the Central and Eastern 
European region to the more developed Western European states. His concise summary of 
the construction of the Soviet bloc can be read in: Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993; 
Detour from periphery to the periphery, Cambridge University press, New York, 1998
6 It is very popular to deal with the division of Europe. The core and periphery theory by 
Wallerstein is based on the same ideology that was also described by the Hungarian histori-
an Szűcs Jenő in his work: Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról in the early 1980s. Szűcs 
Jenő: Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról. In. Történelmi Szemle, 1981/3. 313–359 
The importance of this essay – apart from the intention to write a synthesis comparing the 
different regions of Europe – was its delicate timing. The essay was published in the early 
1980s and claimed that there was no homogeneous Eastern Europe. 
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others, the Wallerstein’s model7 that characterised the triple-divided construction 
was accepted by the Hungarian historians as well. His construction was extended by 
Jenő Szűts. According to their opinion, the gap between the more developed West and 
the periphery can be explained by several historical and economic factors. They both 
found a so-called semi-periphery which can be referred to as the Central and Eastern 
European region. 
If we keep in mind the regional differences as a reason and at the same time the 
consequence, the distinctions of the European continent are essential. According to 
Jacobs’s interpretation, Europe can be identified as a concept as well as a continent 
and the borders oscillate widely.8 Following this standpoint, ’Europe’ became virtu-
ally synonymous with Christendom in the Middle Ages. A relatively recent and gener-
ally unaccepted theory sees Europe spanning half the globe, from Iceland to Bering 
Strait, nearly touching Alaska. During the Cold War, however, the opposite tendency 
triumphed more often: All of the Soviet Union, including Vilnius, Riga and other cities 
that today lie within the European Union, were excluded from Europe entirely. At 
times even the Soviet satellite states in the Warsaw Pact were left out as well, so much 
had “Europe” come to be synonymous with “the West” and its associated political val-
ues. According to Jacobs, their Europeanness of the countries of the former Eastern 
Bloc was confirmed with the transition and the European integration. The change 
of the regime brought the remapping of the European continent as the post-socialist 
states also expressed their claim for acknowledgment as the full members of Europe. 
European integration was the final proof of the fact that the borders of Europe are 
not equal with the line of the iron curtain, however several doubts arose in connec-
tion this issue. 
The economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe
There can be several reasons of the collapse of socialism; of why it happened, whether 
there were external reasons or it was a consequence of several political and economic 
coincidences. It can be assumed that the agony of the socialist economy was a long-
lasting process. However, taking account the statistical data, we must not forget 
about the fact that in the first half of the 1950s, the Central and Eastern European 
region was the most dynamic region of the world reaching the greatest increase in 
the annual national product. There were times when the West did not feel totally 
assured about its superior economic and military force and  communist brush fire in 
poor parts of the world was feared. The whole region followed the same scenario as 
the Soviet view of communism was the prescribed model everywhere in the Soviet 
7 Wallerstein, I: A modern világgazdasági rendszer kialakulása: A tőkés mezőgazdaság és az 
európai világgazdaság eredete a XVI. században, Budapest, Gondolat, 1983
8 Jacobs, Frank: Where is Europe? http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/
where-is-europe/
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bloc and only a limited level of divergence was accepted. This perception underwent 
a remarkable change after the 1956 events in Poland and the collapse of revolution 
and war of independence in Hungary. Strict elements of Stalinism disappeared and 
never returned, however it did not mean a dynamic change in the socialist world, only 
moderate changes were recognisable. In case of Poland, farming largely remained in 
private hands and dissidents met with more tolerance than in other East European 
countries. Hungary was also allowed to embark on a more relaxed economic policy 
which included incentives for workers and greater freedom for middle management 
in agriculture and industry. Thanks to the higher level of consumption, it also be-
came the most individualist society of Europe. But when Czechoslovakia seemed to 
be heading towards the dismantling of single-party rule in 1968 and to the espousal 
of other ’bourgeois democratic’ heresies, Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops marched 
in and restored communist order. A month later, the so-called Brezhnev doctrine 
described precisely the limits of the divergence within the socialist world however it 
concentrated mostly on the political issue neglecting the economic issue. 
It was pointless to speak about the socialist region as politically homogeneous, but 
economic and social differences particularly emerged right in the late 1940s. Accord-
ing to several views, the reason of the collapse of communism can also be explained 
by this unequal heritage and development. Communism failed because it was based 
on a model, in some sense inappropriate, or the particular Soviet incarnation was at 
fault. The model served not too badly in special circumstances, such as the economic 
take-off in the terminology of Rostow, but it failed hopelessly in a mature economy. 
It was widely recognisable in the case of Czechoslovakia that, thanks to its historical 
and geographical background, it can be characterised as the most industrialised and 
most urbanised state within the Communist bloc. That is a special question whether 
enforced industrialisation had such painful consequences as  the decline of the stand-
ards of living, the fall of real wages, fall of consumption that could lead to the political 
opposition against Soviet Union after the death of Stalin. The features of communist 
rule were inherited from the tsarist Russia; the centralisation of power and the need 
for ideology, the key role of the military and the imperial aspirations.
When we examine the issue of the economic transformation, the road to the 
change of the regime from the perspective of the transformation of economy, the 
historical heritage also has to be kept in mind. This division survived for centuries. 
The historical heritage remained in Europe in a dual structure.9 The difference can 
discerned in the following issues: nation state versus global governance, representation of 
the local or global interests, federalism or strong nation state. The revival of the nation state 
after transition was very often accompanied by strong centralisation efforts which resulted 
9 If we look at the difference between the East and the West, semi-periphery can refer to the 
East as well. 
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in the total absence or a weakness of the decentralised institutional system and autonomies 
of the region. The judgement of the events of 1989, or the transition process itself differs 
according to the judges. It can be described as the ‘annus mirabilis’ when a great political 
and economic transformation appeared without violence.10
At the turn of millennium, more optimistic views became widespread according to the 
success or failure of the transition. The model created by Iván Szelényi11 distinguished 
three different types of transition models from which two “belong to” the post-Socialist 
European states. He estimated the outer-directed capitalism as the better scenario from 
the two European models with the limited possibility of transition crisis and a relatively 
short time frame. However, the crisis that reached Europe in late 2008 showed that the 
deeper a country is involved with foreign capital and foreign direct investment, the greater 
vulnerability it has to sustain.
Graph 1. Types of Transition by Szelényi
Source: Iván Szelényi edited by the author
10 This phenomenon appears in Kornai’s and Berend’s works. Berend describes 1989 as an 
‘annus mirabilis’ partly because of the speed of the events as almost every regime collapsed 
within a year, and on the other hand because of the peaceful nature of transformation. As it 
took part without greater violence. Kornai János, the famous Hungarian retired professor of 
Harvard University also uses this terminology to describe the chain of the events in 1989. 
11 Iván Szelényi (2004): Kapitalizmusok szocializmusok után. Egyenlítő 2004/4. pp. 2-11.
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According to Kornai, the transitions of the Central and Eastern European Region 
are unprecedented. In his 200512 essay, when he  compares the transition models he came 
to the conclusion that the CEE region transformations were realised according to the fol-
lowing criteria. The transition itself affected all spheres of the economy and the political 
institutions.
Table 1. Transition Models according to Kornai
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In the main 
direction of the 
development of the 
economic system?
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
In the main direc-
tion of the develop-
ment of the political 
system? 
Yes No No No Yes Yes
Parallel in all 
spheres? Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Without violence? Yes No No No No No 
Without foreign 
military occupation? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Source: Kornai, J. (2005): Közép-Európa nagy átalakulása – siker és csalódás, Közgazdasági 
Szemle, 52/12 edited by the author
By accepting Kornai’s statement, we can agree that the change was so rapid and 
covered all spheres so it can be rather described as a revolution. Kornai’s definition 
can be also disputable if it is compared with two types of perception which are also 
well known in this region. One of them relates to Habermas who writes about „re-
12 Kornai János: Közép-Európa nagy átalakulása – siker és csalódás In: Közgazdasági Szemle, 
2005/12
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pairing revolution” instead of regenerative revolution.13 However, there is a different 
phenomenon which is frequently used to characterise this region. In the assistance of 
the state, the government is determinative because the initiatives usually come from 
the above. The word is “refolution”, which is a composition of two words – reform 
and revolution blended together. This word refers to Ash and it referred at first to 
the role of the participants in the process of transition. Ash states that the initiators 
of the reforms were rather the Communists in late Socialism and the ideas of the 
“inhabitants”, the role of the newly-organised or reorganised civil society was not 
so decisive. As it is visible, the state, the “upper level” got an enormously great role 
inherited from previous centuries.14 
The relationship between the state and society, the question of the initiator is a 
consequence of the historical heritage. Examining the reasons of the economic back-
wardness or lag is a very complex issue. It cannot be declared that Eastern European 
backwardness is a mere consequence of the planned economy and state socialism. 
If this case, it would be enough “to return to normality” by introducing the Western 
type of market economy by bold and radical reforms. There is some kind of contradic-
tion between Berend and Kornai. When Berend describes the age of socialism as a 
‘detour’ in his book published in 199815, Kornai prefers to use the symbol of ‘impasse’ 
to get this model from the traffic signs.16 Both authors mention that socialism cannot 
be a natural consequence of the events and the features of the economy inherited 
from the inter-war period. However, there is a slight difference between the two ap-
proaches. If we use the word ’detour’, we accept a type of linear progression and this 
detour is just a moderate bending of the main direction. However the ‘impasse’ is 
13 Nachholende Revolution. It refers to the fact that the reason of these revolutions was the 
return to the democratic legal state and the norms of the developed capitalist Western Eu-
ropean region. According to Habermas’s theory, bureaucratic Socialism could not be identi-
fied as an alternative version of organised Capitalism. It is rather a backward formation of 
Capitalism. This is why the revolutions of 1989 can be called as „repairing revolutions”. This 
definition implies that this type of revolution does not have any importance or lesson for the 
developed Western world. 
14 It also has got a Hungarian version: “reforradalom” that is also the composition of the two 
words into one. There is another description, the so-called „velvet revolution” which also re-
fers the fact that the events took place mostly without violence. As Ash remarks, the symbol 
of the new type of revolution is the „round table” instead of guillotine that represents the 
possibility of agreement instead of terrorism. (Ash, T. G.: The Magic Lantern: the Revolution 
of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest and Prague, Random House, 1990, Schmidt,  Andrea: 
Törésvonalak és területfejlesztés Lengyelországban: adottságok, szereplők, intézmények, 
perspektívák, (Doctoral thesis) Pécs, 2010
15 Berend: Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993; Detour from periphery to the periphery, 
Cambridge University press, New York, 1998
16 He used this example first time in 2005 at his pubic lecture after receiving Doctor H.C. title 
at the University of Pécs. The lecture was published in Kornai, Op. cit. 
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rather a feeling of experience that we did not choose the right way, we have to go back 
to the starting point and to launch a new progress. 
Transition can be characterised by the collapse of state socialism. In most cases, 
the change of the regime was quite peaceful since the Soviet Union gave up the con-
trol of the area and the communist elite lost its self-confidence and hope to be able 
to solve the towering economic problems. A stormy and spectacular transformation 
began and characterised the entire period of the 1990s. The economic and political 
transition of the 1990s across the Central and Eastern Europe was simultaneous with 
the faster expansion of globalisation in Europe. The change of the regimes brought to 
life several scenarios in connection with economic transition. From the very begin-
ning, several hundreds of recommendations, studies and critical analyses became 
worked out by the newly appointed governments, scholars and experts of various 
international institutions. A broadly accepted set of criteria for a reform programme, 
the so-called Washington Consensus of 1989, originally applied to less developed, 
crisis-ridden Latin American countries, was offered as a blueprint for the process 
of Central and Eastern European economic transformation. The acceptance of the 
initiative of the Washington consensus concentrated mainly on macroeconomic 
stabilisation of the post- socialist states; it tried to help reduce the inflation and 
indebtedness. It rewrote, among others things, the role of the state, the share of the 
redistribution of resources, the liberalisation of trade, the monetary system and the 
importance of privatisation, the growing importance of the private sector focusing 
on the manufacturing industry. New institutions were to be built and the legalisation 
of the market economy was also essential. It also incorporated the price and trade 
liberalisation. This prescription was offered for former state socialist countries by 
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the American administration. As 
Jeffrey Sachs declared, “the economic reforms will set in motion a sustained proc-
ess of economic restructuring. […] Once market forces […] should be a strong pull of 
resources into the previously neglected service sectors.”17 On the other hand, such a 
great restructuring process was expected from the agricultural and industrial sec-
tors as well. As in the Socialist regime the importance of the energy-intensive heavy 
industry was unquestionable, with the transformation the labour-intensive and skill-
intensive industries became emphasised. Its role was to increase the competitiveness 
of this sector in order to make it an important factor on the world market. 
However, this tabula rasa process dominated by the Chicago school version of 
laissez-faire ideology, or market fundamentalism with disregard of social values and 
the seeking of supremacy of the market values was already in the scenarios of the 
17 Berend: The Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2006,  pp. 174-175
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Reagan’s and Thatcher’s governments and became the most important principles of 
the economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.18
During the economic transition, the following principles were kept in mind.
1. The transition to market economy was accompanied with the urgent demand of 
adaptation to a completely different environment of world economy
2. There was an inappropriate development trend of economy based on depressing 
structure of obsolete industry and stagnating service sector
3. There was a significant deficiency in domestic capital funds with high foreign 
debts19
The Hungarian transformation – 
its prelude and the reforms that were undertaken
The Hungarian economic and political transformation was based mostly on the prin-
ciples of the debt trap. However, it is worth to examine the reasons why the debt trap 
became so typical in the Soviet bloc and why it obtained such a determining influence 
and consequence in the Hungarian economy. Naturally, it can be explained by several 
ways. It was a consequence of the reaction of the Hungarian political elite after the 
revolution and war of independence. The representatives of the political elite tried to 
avoid any violence after the collapse of the 1956 revolution and war of independence. 
It was much easier to concentrate on consumption and if there was lack of inner re-
sources, it was the easiest way to ask for a loan from the banks. Based on the invisible 
compromise between the politicians and the inhabitants the so-called ‘Kadarism’ 
was not glorified by the society, as it was rather considered as an acceptable agree-
ment based on the attempt from the state to meet the needs of the nation and to limit 
the level of the dictatorship in political aspect and in the cultural sphere. If there was 
anything that could threaten the balance, the danger of losing legitimacy emerged.20
The troubles the Hungarian economy had to face were not the consequence of the 
oil crisis from 1973. The small adjustments became necessary much earlier. In the 
1960s, the world was still far enough from the oil crisis. In order to get a more precise 
outline of the history of the Hungarian economy we have to go to the turn of the 
19th and 20th centuries. Until the twilight of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Hungarian 
economy was functioning as a part of an economic integration and common currency 
18 Schmidt Andrea: The Consequence of the EU Enlargement – the New Borders of the Euro-
pean Union, In: Challenges for the European Union in the Next Decade, ed: Tarrósy – Milford, 
Publikon, Pécs, 2013, pp. 63-68
19 Gál and Rácz write about this in Gál, Z: Rácz, Sz: Socio- Economic Analysis of the Carpathian 
Area, Discussion Papers Special, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pécs, 2008, pp. 4-7
20 As Romsics explains it in his essay dealing with the threats of the Hungarian political le-
gitimacy. In: Romsics Ignác: A Kádár-rendszer legitimitásvesztése az 1980-as években, In: 
Rubicon, 2009/7-8 
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zone.21 Since 1920, as a consequence of the birth of the independent but truncated 
state, the Hungarian economy transformed from the status of a part of an empire into 
a small and internationally open economy that brought about a significant depend-
ency on the trade partners both in export and import activities. That was the reason 
why it was essential for the Hungarian economy to find adequate international trade 
partners, even if it meant the opening towards the fascist Italian economy or the 
sympathy towards the German Grossraumwirtschaft or later, after 1945, the thrust 
towards the Comecom. This latter sympathy resulted in an unilateral dependence on 
the Soviet Union that gradually became less and less tolerable. 
Although there are several views concerning the level of the development of the 
Hungarian economy and the roots and reasons of the relative backwardness, it is gen-
erally accepted that as the Hungarian state belonged to the so-called semi-peripheral 
region, its economic and social standards were far from the European core region. It 
was also generally assumed that if there was anything that could help in the process 
of modernisation, it definitely had to come from the outside, and thanks to the geo-
graphical and cultural position of Hungary, mostly either from Germany or, at least 
by German intermediation. As it was typical in the entire 20th century, the states 
of Central and Eastern European region were forced to adapt the Western type of 
modernisation and – apart from a short period from the early 1950s – no intention 
was noticeable to receive any results or influence of the Socialist Soviet Union. 
There is a lively discussion among historians about the level of convergence to-
wards the more developed Western region. The roots of this debate are based in the 
question whether the data represent more accurately the level of the productivity 
of the Hungarian economy versus the core region in past and present. It is generally 
accepted that in the past two hundred years Hungary was only hardly successful in 
catching up to the Western region. It is still close to the reality that the reasons of 
this disadvantageous position can be explained with historical, political and social 
problems as well. 
The idea of the viable market economy was a result of a set of slight reforms. It 
began with the policy of the „new course” announced by the prime minister, Imre 
Nagy in 1953. The revolution and the execution of the leaders of the revolution and 
war of independence prevented the continuation of the reforms, but from the mid-
1960s, a new phase of reforms emerged. The greatest obstacle was the question to 
what extent the Soviet Union would tolerate the divergence from the Soviet type of 
socialist economy. The Kádár regime was the exceptional one that finally chose the 
reconciliation with the enemy in several aspects. (Csaba, 2001) One of them was the 
21 However, there were several attempts to create the Hungarian monetary independence it 
became realistic only once, when the Hungarian prime minister and minister of finance, 
Sándor Wekerle hindered the attempt that would have led to the leaving of the common 
currency and economic zone. (Vígvári, 2008) 
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decision about amnesty in 1962/63, when a great part of the participants of the 1956 
October revolution were released. It also meant the official acceptance of the Kádár 
regime.22 
The other attempt was the involvement of the prominent actors of the coalition 
era with the political elite. There were several experts who did not show any attempt 
to accept the party membership, but their experience and knowledge seemed to be 
beneficial. Finally, a slight change in the Socialist economy was decided. The Hungar-
ian New Economic Mechanism23 (NEM) was a chain in the concatenation of the several 
reforms and patches made by the Hungarian government. In the 1960s, the Hungarian 
representatives were in negotiations with the IMF24, several representatives of the 
past coalition parties, or at least experts belonging to the sympathisers of the once-
existing parties were invited to different expert committees. These gradual reforms 
and facilitations did not have great influence on the macroeconomic level, but it made 
the inhabitants’ life enviable, especially comparing with the surrounding socialist 
states. It also questioned the policy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. In order 
to face the problems and to react for the traumas of the potential economic troubles, a 
new course  emerged in the programme of the state party as well. The initiative was 
borrowed from the Bible: “[…] who is not against us is for us”25.
The functioning of the Hungarian NEM can be summarised in the following chapters:
1. The five-year plans were rethought and did not appear at the level of the compa-
nies
2. Greater autonomy at company level
3. Limited influence of instructions from above 
4. Instead of free redistribution of the factors of production, the market became the 
key actor
5. Equality of company and cooperative properties, the acknowledgement of the 
private ownership (at a limited level)
6. Autonomy of the companies in decision making related to the profit and invest-
ment
7. Central planning system lost its priority, the Central Planning Office lost a great 
part of its units
22 The discussion on the 1956 events, the participation of the Soviet troops, the neglecting 
attitude of the Western powers was stopped. There was no longer debate on this issue at 
the sessions of General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. It was the end of the 
Hungarian isolation on the international stage.
23 It can be also written as New Economic Policy (NEP), but it is better to use the abbreviation 
NEM as NEP can also mean the new economic policy in Russia and in the Soviet Union in the 
interwar period. (Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Politika)
24 It resulted that in 1967 Hungary nearly became accepted as a member state, however it 
failed finally. 
25 Mark, 9:40
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8. Plans and markets are equal
9. Liberalisation of prices at 25% of consumer goods
10. Parallel appearance of USD and Rubels in foreign trade
When the efforts of the NEM are analysed, it is generally accepted that if there 
were some reforms that exceeded the frames of the socialist economy initiated in 
the Soviet Union, Hungary never thought about the breaking away from the Come-
com. The decision about the reforms was announced in 1964 at a session of the State 
Economic Committee and was finalised at the meeting of the Central Committee of 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. The introduction of the NEM was planned for 
the beginning of 1968. However, several unfortunate events preceded and continued 
the reforms. The six-day war in the Middle East in 1967 and the Prague spring in 1968 
forced the Socialist states to approach any changes and reforms carefully. According 
to the first experience, the reform seemed to be beneficial. The state budget obtained 
extra income. However, the proportion of the income jumped to 10 or 12 times in the 
management and the workers of the companies. This resulted an ’anti-management’ 
feeling in the representatives of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party itself, so the 
members of the conservative wing began their attack against the reforms, arguing 
that the initiative of the reform is the restoration of the ancient middle-class Hungary 
against the principles of the theory of socialism. When we summarise the effects of 
the NEM, we could say that the roots of the economic troubles couldn’t be solved. The 
reforms were stopped by 1973, the leaders of the programme were in a secret way 
removed from their positions. As it turned out from the example of the fate of the 
reforms initiated by Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it became generally 
accepted that the reforms had seemed to be viable without general changes in the en-
tire Hungarian economic policy. However, it would have required political reforms as 
well, which was hardly tolerable in the country and in the Soviet Union. The fears and 
arguments against the reforms concentrated on the question of criticising the state 
party in assistance of losing its power by giving greater autonomy of the companies 
and cooperatives. 
On the slope of indebtedness
The failure of the reforms stopped the entrepreneur spirit in the Hungarian economy 
and the oil crisis opened a new chapter as well. This had a double effect; the increas-
ing prices of the energy resources and the cheap ’oil dollars’. The cheap oil dollars 
postponed the reforms in most Socialist states. The Hungarian level of consumption 
was at an exceptional level in comparison with the other states from the bloc. How-
ever, by the late 1970s it became obvious that a new chain of reforms were needed 
to avoid insolvency. The Rubel-based accounting system became replaced by the 
dollar-based version that had painful consequences and more information about 
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the difficulties of the world economy. A new restructuring policy was needed in the 
Hungarian economy. There was an oversupply in the world market as far as those 
goods the Hungarian industry could export are concerned. In order to handle the 
fear of insolvency several scenarios were discussed, as it was generally accepted that 
the increase of the foreign loans could not be acceptable. Finally, a central decision 
was announced by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
in order to handle the economic crisis. However, there were several arguments in 
favour of the restructuring of the Hungarian economy and to stop the level of loans 
it took almost five years to work out and to introduce the inevitable reforms. It was 
not so easy even to convince the old generation of the party elite, but the appearance 
of the new technocratic experts and their increasing influence caused  the conserva-
tive socialist wing of the political elite to retreat. In 1984, the introduction of the 
self-governing system in the management of the (at that time still) state-owned 
companies was a great step towards the acceptance of the features of the market 
economies. Approximately two years earlier, as a consequence of the sustainability 
of the standards of living, the so-called second (invisible) economy became also ac-
ceptable. Apart from solving some increasing social and economic troubles, it had a 
great influence in the birth of the new entrepreneurs. Private ownership gradually 
entered in the Hungarian economy and, unexpectedly, people began to work hard 
without any force coming from outside or above. From the early 1980s there were 
no obstacles initiated by the state in order to let the so-called “second economy” to 
be strengthened. People were allowed to work even for 12-14 hours, and they did it. 
Founding their own interest they were fighting successfully against the decline of 
their standard of living even if it resulted their self exploitation. 
Troubles in the economy
Apart from the dissolution of the political sphere, the same problems appeared in the 
Hungarian economy as well. The Hungarian National Bank had to devaluate the forint 
by 8 percent in 1986 against most convertible ones which seemed to be an unprec-
edented step in the past six years. Based on the recently accepted Act on Bankruptcy, 
the first liquidation initiated by the state also took place in 1986. The first target 
firm was a construction company from Veszprém. With the increasing process of the 
liquidation of the loss-making state-owned companies the ideology of the socialist 
Hungary based on full employment devaluated. Thanks to this painful decision, the 
Hungarian government had to introduce the unemployment benefit in 1989, because 
approximately 50,000 to 100,000 unemployed appeared in three years. 
The government was not successful enough in economic and social reforms. Partly 
because of the already existing inner contradiction between the technocrats in the 
several institutions and ministries and partly because of the insufficiently delineated 
position of Hungary within the socialist world. It was difficult to calculate to what 
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extent Hungary could make its own decisions and when it became inevitable to get 
the consent of the already weakened Soviet Union, or when it was at least important 
to inform the “Big Brother”. Despite the economic troubles, the resourceful popula-
tion gathered significant amounts of illegal income and changed it – partly at the 
black market – into hard currency. The introduction of the passport valid all over 
the world made the position of the population even easier. Thanks to the travelling 
facilities, masses of Hungarians appeared in Yugoslavia and Austria to buy household 
appliances and electrical equipment.26 The most popular items to be bought were the 
Gorenje freezers, several pictures appeared in the newspapers all over Europe as 
Hungarian “Trabants” carried freezers on the roof racks. To sum up, the consuming 
activity of the Hungarian population reached more than 700 million USD spent from 
the Hungarian foreign exchange reserves. That resulted a negative balance in the 
currency reserve of the Hungarian state.27
Graph 2. 
Source: www.hir24.hu
26 The aim of the world passport was to ruin the political borders of Hungary and the Western 
world to let the people to travel to Western Europe and all over the world without any 
limitation that existed before 1987. Before that time, Hungary was among the few Socialist 
countries from where it was possible to travel to Western parts of Europe at least every 
second or third year. However, it was considered a political restriction not to let the people 
to travel to the West, but it also had practical meaning, too. It was hardly possible to sup-
ply the people intending to travel abroad with the appropriate amount of hard currency. 
(Lengyel László – Surányi György: Határátkelés, Kalligram, Pozsony, 2013)
27 Surányi, the formal president of the Hungarian National Bank argues that the liberalisation 
of travelling abroad resulted all together a negative balance on current account and the 
practice of private import resulted the lack of value-added tax the Hungarian economy 
had to experience. The final solution was a strict decision by the Hungarian National bank 
and the government that resulted the restricition of currency supply. The result of this 
restriction based on the annual 50 USD amount per capita that stopped the privagte import. 
(Lengyel – Surányi, op. cit.)
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The rapid growth of the previous decades came to a stop: in 1979 and 1980, Hungary’s 
growth rate declined to 1.6% and 0.0%, respectively. Poland, in 1981 and 1982, experienced 
a severe decline, -10% and -4.8% respectively. It became obvious that growth policy of the 
Soviet bloc had to be changed and the economy slowed significantly – from the annual 
3.9% increase of the GDP between 1950 and 1973 to 1.2% between 1973 and 1989.28 The 
economic crisis in the socialist world increased the necessity of transformation. It was 
strongly connected with the oil crisis which began in 1973. However, the real causes lay 
much deeper.29 The reserves of the extensive import-substituting industrialisation dried 
up around the late 1960s. As the economic policy of the Soviet bloc concentrated on the 
self-sufficiency within the Comecon member states, the foreign trade with the market 
economies were neglected until the 1960s. The socialist bloc could not get the benefits of 
the new technological revolution that emerged between the 1970s and 1980s. The appear-
ance of the PC in 1974 signed and symbolised the turning point. Unfortunately for the 
members of the Comecon, the symbols of the new technology were seldom used, partly 
because of political and security purposes – were used mainly in the military industry.30 
It also turned out that with the changes in the labour distribution and the developing 
globalisation, the old leading export branches of the world economy became obsolete. 
Sales of their products depended on major price reductions. Raw material prices, on the 
other hand, increased. In case of Hungary, it had a negative effect on the balance of trade 
between Hungary and the Soviet Union, because for the same amount of raw material, 
the state had to pay with 3 to 5 times more products. Sometimes raw materials had to 
be imported from the world market and that also brought the painful recognition of the 
difference between the competitive world market and the isolated world of Comecon 
member states. The roots of this issue are based on the insufficiency of modernisation.
There were two methods of industrialisation in the socialist bloc. One of them 
concentrated on import-substituting that helped in the modernisation of the semi-
peripheral region. This method was in practice mostly from the late 1940s. In case 
28 Here it is essential to make some remarks. As it is visible from the statistical data that both 
Berend (Berend Op. cit, 2006) and Janos (Janos, A. C.: haladás, hanyatlás hegemónia 2004), 
it turns out that the most dynamic region was the Soviet bloc from 1945 to 1973. Their 
annual growth of GDP exceeded the annual growth of the Western European region. The 
reason of this can be explained with the fact that thanks to the rapid industrialisation, an 
enormously great part of the national income was spent to investments that resulted a sig-
nificant economic growth. However, this policy concluded with harmful consequences; the 
development of heavy industry was in the centre of the investments and the light industry, 
the supplier of the consumption of the population was neglected such as life circumstances. 
On the other hand, the resources of the rapid growth concentrated in extensive elements 
that resulted in a slow process of the depletion of resources.
29 Berend (2006) Op. cit.
30 On the other hand, the existence of the so-called COCOM list (Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls) prevented the Socialist bloc from being acquainted with the 
tools of the newest technology.
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of Hungary (and the other Soviet bloc member states), this resulted in the dramatic 
decline in the standards of living of the population as the greater part of the invest-
ments concentrated on heavy industry and among others than the mining sector. 
This method brought a great increase of energy and mineral extraction, but had a 
limited concentration on efficiency and cost-savings. 
The countries of import-substituting industrialisation could not follow the 
technological revolution and experienced devastating trade deficits. The lack of 
adjustment in building new modern export sectors based on the achievements of the 
technological revolution exacerbated the crisis. According to Berend’s vision31 of the 
Schumpeterian structural crisis (the decline of the old and the rise of the new leading 
sectors as a consequence of technological revolution, which generated a 1-2 decade 
stagnation or slow growth) of the 1970s-1980s hit the socialist countries especially 
hard; they were unable to introduce competitive new technology and export sectors.
The necessity of restructuring the economies was obvious. In order to get new posi-
tions in the Western markets and to obtain hard currency for selling the competitive 
and exportable goods several reforms were needed. Until the mid 1970s, trade with free 
market countries was marginal. However, the socialist countries were forced to change 
their international economic environment and to search for new potential trade part-
ners. The effectiveness of opening the isolated markets was based upon the political 
openness of the given Socialist state and the necessity of importing several goods that 
were available on the world market. With reference to this, Hungary was among the 
more open states as the Hungarian export and import began to orientate to the West 
already in the late 1960s. That was the reason why the Hungarian trades had to realise 
that the quality of goods the Hungarian enterprises produced did not meet the quality 
requirements of the world market.32 Hungary was not alone in this reaction. An una-
voidable slowing down of production increased shortage and pushed countries onto the 
open, free trade world markets. Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia were among 
the countries which developed important trade relations with free market countries and 
reduced the trade with the Soviet-led Comecon countries to 50-60%. In order to increase 
the hard currency income, the Socialist states had to reorganise their economies. From 
the Hungarian point of view this brought the export-orientated version of production. 
There were several elements of the transformation that had to be worked out. Adjusting 
to world market prices and liberalising imports created competition for the heretofore 
protected and isolated Central and Eastern European economies, and this was also a 
prerequisite for market adjustments. On the other hand, it caused a decline in output. 
The opening of the economies brought the fear of inflation, and the ever-increasing 
trade deficit. It was functioning as a double-edged sword. The Kádár regime in Hun-
31 Berend (2006) Op. cit.
32 Honvári: Az új gazdasági mechanizmus, In: Rubicon, 2008/ 2-3 pp. 44-58
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gary and the acceptance, or at least tolerance of socialism was based on a moderate 
level of the standards of living. It was called socialist market economy, although, in 
fact, it obtained some elements of the market economy. However, it was still isolated 
and the requirements towards the Comecon membership obstructed the acceptance 
of the principles of the market economy. The system of rationing was over, most of the 
goods were available in shops.33 This was the basis of the calm and boring everyday life 
of the Hungarian population. Consumption was guaranteed at a moderate level, the 
possibility of extra work was also acceptable especially from the early 1980s, when the 
germs of the private sector were already widespread. People had the right to organise 
small enterprises, so-called communities of works and they could earn extra money. 
Table 2. This was the best in the Kádár regime.34 Kádár regime-related memories
of the Hungarian population (in percentage of the answers)
1. Safe workplace, no unemployment 35
2. Material safety, better life, sufficient salary 25
3. Predictability, safety, planability 11
4. Facility in gaining a flat, a house 5
5. “I was  young” 5
6. The possibility of travelling for holidays 4
7. Social security, equality of dignity 3
8. Everything was good in the Kádár regime 3
9. No inflation, strong forint (Hungarian currency) 2
10. Cohesive society35 2
11. The communist youth organisations, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party 2
12. Good future, safety in future 2
13. Nothing good 2
14. Good public safety 1
15. No answer 23
Source: Romsics Ignác. Magyarország története a XX. században36
33 Of course, this can be examined in two ways. If we compare the level of consumption in 
Hungary with the Western European standards, we can see how deep the Hungarian level 
was. But on the other hand, if the level of Hungarian consumption was compared with other 
Socialist states which still had the system of rationing, like e.g. Poland in case of meat or 
the Soviet Union where a lot of goods from sugar to washing powder could be bought only 
in limited amounts, Hungary found itself in a distinguished position. This is the reason why 
the Hungarian system was called ’fridge socialism’ together with ’goulash communism’.
34 The survey was made in 2007 and the results were published in September, 2007.
35 This is a very interesting comment as according to Körösényi the Hungarian society was 
among the most individualist ones at that time with a limited participation in any circles, 
movements, or other elements of the civil society. Körösényi explains this individualism 
by the relative high level of consumption. People were less vulnerable to the surrounding 
environment, social ties were less important (Körösényi, 2004)
36 Romsics Ignác: Magyarország története a XX. Században, Osiris, Budapest, 2001 p. 520.
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The faith towards the state was the basis of the socialist Hungary. It was assumed 
that the individual didn’t have the possibility (even didn’t have the reason) to involve 
himself or herself in decisions belonging to the political sphere. It was commonly 
accepted that the individual didn’t have the possibility to do anything against deci-
sions harmful for the inhabitants, furthermore, the paternalistic political system 
did everything to convince them that the state would make every effort to let the 
citizens to meet their needs and the only thing that was expected from them was not 
to argue against them.37 This behaviour towards the state survived and transformed 
at a moderate way. Because of the change of the regime, the convulsive behaviour 
of the inhabitants previously shown towards the policemen, tollers, or frontier-
guards almost disappeared, but on the other hand the fear of economic vulnerability 
increased. It is recognisable in the conviction that every entrepreneur was swindler 
and the price of their success was paid by the losing average inhabitant. These two 
decades of the political and economic transformation still couldn’t erase this type 
of conviction and the consequences of the economic crisis of 2008, the decline in the 
living conditions of a great part of the population amplified this feeling. 
Corrections in the socialist model – the twilight of socialism
Credits and debts were visible everywhere in the socialist world. As there were 
several attempts to reorganise the economy, it was obvious that because of several 
reasons the socialist economy could be functioning only with a limited efficiency. It 
was even a crucial question to what extent the intervention to the economy without 
political consequences was feasible. As it was one of the pillars of the Kádár regime 
and the faith towards the socialist regime tolerated no dramatic changes in living 
condition. As far as the consequences of the failure (or at least half-success) of the 
New Economic Mechanism are concerned, it was essential to look for alternative 
solutions in order to avoid the internal political conflicts and to calm the critics com-
ing from either the Hungarian conservative communist politicians or the worrying 
“friendly” Czechoslovakian, East German and Soviet politicians.
Because Comecon member countries followed the traditional fast-growth policy, 
they were faced with an ever-increasing trade deficit. The financial market was 
flooded with cheap ”oil dollars”, as a great portion of the tremendous extra income of 
the oil-exporting countries was exported. As it was easy to borrow, the governments 
of the region did not hesitate to bridge the deficit gap with loans. Between 1970 and 
1990, the net amount of debts in the region increased from $6 billion to $110 billion. 
Hungary’s $20 billion debt was two times greater than the value of the country’s 
export, but Poland’s $42 billion debt was five times higher than its export income. 
37 This is the opinion belonging to Elemér Hankiss and László Bruszt, the famous Hungarian 
sociologists quoted in Figyelő/ 2007/ September
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Debt servicing consumed up to 75% of the hard currency income, but in the case of 
Hungary, by the late 1980s it reached almost 100% that made the balance between 
foreign and internal trade extremely difficult. New credits were needed to repay the 
old ones and apart from this, only a limited part of the total income was devoted to 
investments. In Hungary, from the almost 20 million USD debt only a quarter of its 
had been invested, but in the case of other states of the socialist region even worse 
statistical data could be observed. 
Besides the economic slowdown, quite a few Central and Eastern European 
countries which had fixed prices under state Socialism started to lose control over 
inflation. Between 1989 and 1992, GDP and output across the region declined 25-30% 
and 30-40%, respectively. The unemployment rate jumped from zero to 15-20% in 
the CEE region. The economic crisis generated a political crisis and the regimes lost 
their temporary legitimacy. This led to a peaceful collapse of the state socialism in 
1989-91.38 
Table 3. The process of indebtedness in and the correlation of annual growth in Hungary
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Annual 
growth of 
GNP
1.5 0.1 2.9 2.8 0.7 2.7 - 0.3 1.5 3.4 0.1
Share of 
convert-
ible debt of 
the total
94.0 92.3 91.5 90.5 91.0 92.4 93.8 95.4 96.5 97.8
Gross debt 
in million 
USD
8,300 9,090 8,699 10,216 10,745 10,983 13,955 16,914 19,592 19,328
Share of 
the total 
debt in 
the annual 
export in 
%
159 159 139 151 163 182 198 234 242 247
Source: Vigvári, András: Reform and transition in Hungary 
(Reform és rendszerváltás Magyarországon) In: Rubicon, 2008/2-3
Although according to the socialist methods, the Hungarian politicians tried 
to hide the actual situation of the balance of the state budget, in the November of 
1989 the actual prime minister, Miklós Németh had to confess that the experts of the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party had tried to dissemble the almost 3 billion dollar 
debt. The reason of this attempt was easy to be understood; they were afraid of the 
38 Berend (2006) Op. cit.
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lenders and of the reaction of their inhabitants. After this incident, the IMF revoked 
the agreement, and a year later, in 1990, some months before the first democratic 
elections, a new contract had to be accepted with the retiring government. As the 
criteria of the new contract were much stricter, the margins of the new coalition 
government were much more limited. 
As a result of the inevitable decisions, a two-tier banking system was also intro-
duced in 1987 that was followed by a series of reforms and acts that could lay the 
economic ground for the transformation. 
The state found itself in debt trap by the beginning of the 1980s. As it was already 
mentioned, the greatest problem was the way how the ”oil dollars” were used in 
practice. As it was essential to keep the standards of living and to avoid any kind 
of demonstration or uprising a relatively great part (around 75%) was transferred 
to consumption. On the other hand, the reasons of the unbalanced economy and the 
consequences of the collapsed 1956 revolution and war of independence also had to 
take into account.39 The Hungarian attitude towards the repayment of loans was also 
remarkable. In 1989, Hungary decided to pay back all the loans. The reasons of this 
relatively good outcome can be examined as a consequence of the openness of the 
Hungarian economy towards the foreign direct investments.
The traumatic news about the level of the Hungarian economic crisis resulted with 
shock among the members of the parliament and the public opinion. Until the official 
declaration, the statistical data were state secrets. Even the experts of the National 
Bank or the Ministry of Finance had limited information about the real amounts. In 
the early 1980s, a quiet struggle took part causing a cleavage between the deputy 
prime minister (József Marjai) and the president of the Hungarian National Bank 
(Fekete János).40 Seeing the risk of insolvency, the Central Committee of the Hungar-
ian Socialist Workers Party informed the Soviet Union about the hopeless financial 
situation and asked for a loan already in 1978. The Soviet Union, however, refused to 
pay 1 billion dollars, as they were interested in the arms race that required a great 
amount of financial resources. Apart from this, the Soviet Union had to concentrate 
both on the arms race and the occupation of Afghanistan. Hungary had to look for 
financial aid in the world financial market. After the fiasco in the late 1960s, the 
39 As Lengyel and Surányi commented in their book, the reasons of the debt trap can be 
summarised in the following terms: the lost revolution and war of independence with the 
economic consequences, as most of the events took place in Budapest, the administrative 
and economic centre of Hungary, plus the loss of the labour force. Most of them was in prison 
because of their participation in the events, or the younger and skilled workers simply chose 
the emigration to the West causing enormous damage to the labour force. The other reason 
of this economic situation can be explained with the relatively high standards of living 
compared to the neighbouring socialist countries. In: Lengyel László – Surányi György: 
Határátkelés, Kalligram, 2013, pp. 116-117
40  In: Csaba László: Hadigazdaságtól a piacgazdaságig, 1945-1990, Rubicon, 2001/3 pp. 24-29
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Hungarian negotiation was successful and in 1982 Hungary joined the IMF.41 After 
Hungary became the member of the IMF in 1982, 475 million, and another 72 million 
and in 1984 another 425 million USD were transferred to the state. Despite the help 
coming from the international sources, the balance of current accounts was still 
instable. From 1988 the annual basis of the balance on current accounts reached 8-9 
% of the Hungarian GDP that was difficult to keep in control. A new decision about 
the introduction of the passport that was valid all over the world increased the dif-
ficulties in monetary policy. The share of the private import grew to an uncontrolled 
level and the monthly amount of the outflow reached 150 million dollars. The foreign 
exchange reserves of the Hungarian National Bank decreased to a critical level. This 
condition required a quick and strict decision that was made in the summer of 1989. 
First of all, the amount of the hard currency to one person was limited to 50 dollars 
and new negotiations were begun in the background about new financial aid coming 
from several sources. Fortunately, according to Lengyel and Surányi42 the 95 % of the 
loans belonged to the long-term ones that gave a limited margin to the Hungarian 
state and, on the other hand, the Hungarian practice based on the controlled exchange 
policy. However, the difficulties with the foreign exchange reserves persisted. From 
the spring of 1990 to the summer of 1991 summer, its amount multiplied, but the fear 
of inflation and the troubles of economy connected with the transformation did not 
disappear at once.43 Actually there were several arguments concerning the question 
of the rescheduling of the loans, or even the releasing of the loans. As it was generally 
assumed among some politicians it was the sin of the previous regime, so the new 
democratic government had nothing to do with this amount of money. Some politi-
cians were even expecting a new Marshall Plan focusing on the financial aid of the 
transitional economies, but there was no such a solution in the international agenda. 
Political contexts led to different outcomes across transition countries. Although 
the principles of Washington Consensus were at least discussed in transition coun-
tries, the acceptance of the recommendations of WC were not accepted everywhere. 
In Hungary, there was a high level of international debt but also a strong community 
of economists with international standing and good contacts with economic thinkers 
from outside the old Soviet bloc. They had the confidence to question policy ideas 
41 As a matter of fact, the Hungarian timing was partly successful as the application arrived a 
day before the state of emergency (martial law) was declared in Poland. 
42 Lengyel – Surányi Op. cit
43 In 1990, the lack of hard currency reached a critical level. The total amount of hard currency 
was equal with the value of one month’s import and a year later it reached the 5 month level. 
The former minister of finance, Lázló Békesi confessed in an interview in 2010 that the 
foreign exchanges level was at such a critical level that the price of the exported goods that 
was paid by dollars or any kind of hard currency was simply taken to the briefcase into he 
Ministry of Commerce and taken to the Hungarian National Bank and this situation lasted 
for several months. In: Figyelő, 2009/51-52
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from outside.44 There were also pragmatic reasons for ignoring the WC strategy, as 
reform in Hungary had already taken the country long way from traditional central 
planning.45 A single package, delivered as a shock, was therefore irrelevant in eco-
nomic terms. It was a political demonstration of a change of direction. It was also 
considered a political danger in the government circles to undertake a rapid transi-
tion that would leave part of the population ”abandoned along the way”. When the 
minister of finance was asked why Hungary would want to proceed more slowly than 
Poland, he responded: “We cannot risk the social tensions that would put everything 
in question.”46
The reforms that were accepted and introduced between 1985 and 1988 led Hungary 
from the socialist economy to a special type of ‘socialist market economy’. As Berend and 
Lengyel László argue,47 the reforms accepted in socialist Hungary were the next steps 
towards the economic transformation nevertheless without any attempt to make any 
modification in the political structure. 
1. One of the most important changes appeared in the life of the state-owned com-
panies as decentralisation appeared at the management level. The responsibility 
was divided between newly-elected managers and the state having the state party 
and the organs of the central governments had less opportunity to interfere. This 
new type of management with the symbolic right of the state as the owner to 
intervene led gradually to the spontaneous privatisation. 
2. The price and wage system was also modified as the 90% of the goods belonged to 
the free price system. That had double consequences: the goods didn’t disappear 
from the shops and there was no necessity to introduce any kind of shock therapy 
44 Myant – Drahokoupil: Transition economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, Wiley, 2011 pp. 99-100
45 With the introduction of the New Economic Programme valid from 1968 January, Hungary 
formally left the central planning system leaving more freedom for the (state-owned) en-
terprises. The reforms were stopped at a moment because of several reasons, so the second 
wave was not functioning. In practice, the old strategy of socialist economy didn’t return. As 
it is generally accepted, the real importance of the reforms is based on the fact that the spirit 
of reforms survived and had an enormous importance in the following years.
46 Myan – Drahokoupil: ibid. The Hungarian government’s attitude after the political change 
simply followed the principles of the attitude of the old regime. The success and popularity 
of the Kádár regime was based on the slow, and calm everyday life without greater shocks 
in order to avoid any kind of mass demonstrations. As it turned out from Kádár’s last speech 
in 1988 in front of the representatives of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party (quoted by Góralczyk) he still couldn’t break with the question of the col-
lapse of the 1956 revolution and war of independence and his personal responsibility in 
the execution of the popular prime minister of the revolution, Imre Nagy. Apart from his 
role, the fear of the repeating of the revolution was present in his political decisions as well. 
Góralczyk, Bogdan: Magyar törésvonalak, Helikon, Budapest, 2002, pp. 49-52
47 Berend T. Iván: Törésvonalak, 2009 and Csaba László: A hadigazdaságtól a piacgazdaságig, 
In: Rubicon, 2001/3
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to handle the problem caused by the so-called monetary overhang. That made 
the economic transition less expensive as compared with the Russian or Polish 
versions. 
Table 4. Hungary’s position versus Western Europe according to Hungarian people’s opinion in 
percentage (It was better in Hungary than in Western Europe)
1981 1986 1988
1. Right to work 98 87 42
2. Protection of the workers’ interest 96 93 80
3. Level of the medical health care 90 66 47
4. The well-balanced life of families 86 73 36
5. The resale value of the currency 66 41 6
6. Possibility to get/ buy a flat 63 39 16
7. Material elements of well-being 46 29 10
8. Large selection of goods 44 34 18
9. Well-dressed people 42 33 28
10. Possibilities of travelling abroad 29 27 33
11. Amount of free time 58 46 27
12. Equal opportunities 78 69 38
Source: Romsics, I: Magyarország története a XX. században, p. 521 
Final remarks
The transition, however, had another aspect. The major part of the new economy was 
necessarily built on foreign investment-based or restructured economic organisa-
tions. The expansion of multinational firms yielding their profits from their absolute 
price advantages (cheap products) in the first period of transition served as a basis 
for this new economy.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 opened a new historical chapter for Eastern 
Europe. But it also marked a turning point in neo-liberal globalisation and European 
construction. The economic crisis in the early 2000’s brought to the surface a lot of 
questions originated in the process of ambiguous transformation. If we combine these 
elements to the generally accepted components of the successful transformation of 
backward or semi-peripheral regions in case of the so-called small open economies48 
the following elements can guarantee the success:
1. According to the economists, the level of the openness of the given economy is 
essential for the future. It can help to substitute the insufficient internal market. It 
is generally accepted that the speed and level of development of a given economy 
is based and linked with the size of the internal market. In this regard, Hungary’s 
48 As Romsics writes about it in: Romsics, I.: Félperifériától a félperifériáig, a magyar gazdaság 
20. századi teljesítmánye In: Rubicon, 2008/2-3 pp. 4-18
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internal market belonged to the small size ones that could cause an impedimental 
effect.
2. The level of the R&D and its support can also determine the effectiveness of the 
development of the economies. They can substitute the geographical position as 
well. If a state affords to support the places of scientific research, whether they 
are universities or research centres, it can also determine the speed of catching 
up. 
3. Stability of the favourable business environment can also be an important factor of 
the increase. It has to be in accordance with the supporting legal and institutional 
background. Apart from those, these are the factors that can also move forward 
the economic development: reliability, predictability and equality in the competi-
tion. If there are no big cultural, language problems and social differences, they 
can also help. 
To conclude our investigation. it is reasonable to think over the following ques-
tions: Can we talk about a successful economic transition in Hungary compared with 
the surrounding states of the post-Soviet bloc? Was it successful from the perspec-
tive of the convergence towards the more developed West? How can we evaluate the 
transition, can we speak about the return to the original path or did Hungary have to 
make a return from a detour, or impasse? From these factors the Hungarian economy 
and society were not a good example. Looking at the events of the past decades, it 
is obvious that social disparities and ethnic conflicts hampered the uninterrupted 
economic growth. The devastation caused by the world wars, the territorial loss 
after the First World War and the communist  diversion also hurted the Hungarian 
economy as well as the society. The ethnic and religious purges caused the emigration 
of the intelligentsia, in particular the Jewish scientists, artists left Hungary and set-
tled down abroad. The persecution of the Jews in the interwar Hungary also belonged 
to the painful moments of the Hungarian history. The consequences, the lost war and 
the inclusion to the Soviet bloc and the changes forced outside and initiated by the 
Soviet Union were among the consequences of the economic and social troubles. 
The destiny of Hungarian economy and political system was decided in Yalta and 
Potsdam at the end of the Word War II for subsequent decades. The 1956 revolution 
and war of independence failed and lasted for a fortnight without great influence 
in economy. The NEM, however, opened a new perspective for catching up with the 
West. The previously mentioned facts explain the reason why it was only a partly suc-
cessful attempt. The year 1989, however, brought a new chance. The scenarios were 
different, however the task to be solved was almost the same. The old-fashioned party 
members and the reformist technocrats were forced to collaborate in the reconstruc-
tion of the Hungarian economy struggling with several new troubles. Sometimes the 
chosen methods were not the most successful, as Samary points out. She accuses the 
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Hungarian communist leaders that they were the only ones to decide to respond to 
the crisis of external debt by selling the country’s best enterprises to foreign capital. 
According to her opinion, this made Hungary in the first year of transition the prin-
cipal host country for foreign direct investment, but the Hungarians were among the 
first who – following on the new European relations established by Gorbachev, to 
help bring down the Berlin Wall.49
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Gender in the European Union. 
Achievements and Problems to be Solved
Judit Bagi1
Abstract
Gender as a notion became an important part of everyday life in the second half of 
the 20th century. The European Union (EU) regards the establishment of equality 
between women and men as one of its major priorities, which is part of basic human 
rights. The EU aims to increase gender mainstreaming, the process to enforce aspects 
of gender in different areas by plans, policies, laws initiated by different institutions, 
and establishing relevant committees and institutes. The road from the emergence 
of the notion of gender to introducing regulations concerning gender issues was not 
without difficulties. Women and men now have the same rights according to the 
constitution of EU member states. Thus there is no de jure discrimination anymore. 
It is a fact though that many women cannot enforce their rights up to this day so there 
is no positive freedom hence huge inequalities are present in certain fields. Thus 
the glass ceiling phenomenon is still visible, which refers to obstacles and barriers, 
which hinder the advancement on women’s social ladder or as far as women’s political 
representation in national parliaments of the member states is concerned.
Some significant steps regarding the intention of the EU to enhance equality 
between women and men are worth mentioning. Equal payment for men and women 
already appeared in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The Amsterdam Treaty considers the 
equality between genders a basic community principle. Furthermore, the Treaty of 
Lisbon highlights the principle of gender equality as a value and a goal of the EU.
The European Union makes several efforts even nowadays in order to fully elimi-
nate all kinds of gender inequalities. The European Institute for Gender Equality, 
founded in 2007, a community programme for employment and solidarity and the Eu-
ropean Pact for Gender Equality are both examples of this. The work of the Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality also helps the enforcement of gender aspects.
1 PhD Student, Interdisciplinary Doctoral School, Political Science Programme, University of 
Pécs. Judit Bagi’s research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, 
co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-
0001 ‘National Excellence Program’. bagi.judit@pte.hu
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This paper firstly aims at giving an overview about the history of gender equality 
regulations in the European Union. In the second part the article shortly introduces 
the ratio of women’s political representation in the national parliaments of the EU 
member states, focusing on Hungary.
The History of Gender Equality in the Regulation of the European Union2
The first milestone on the way to gender equality was Article 119 of the Treaty of 
Rome (1957) which promoted equal pay for equal work between men and women – so 
its scope was limited to the field of employment. Although this legislative measure 
can be considered progressive, it was not the result of concerns about gender equal-
ity, but that of the intention to evade differences between the Member States of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). In the 1970s the Treaty also proved signifi-
cant and helped the Commission and the European Court of Justice support equal pay 
for men and women with regard to social security and benefits for the unemployed 
and the labour market in general. This Community law was further developed in 
1975 as a series of Directives: The Equal Pay Directive was accepted and later the 
Equal Treatment Directive as well. The latter declared that men and women have to 
have equal opportunities to receive professional training, promotion, or any benefits 
in connection with employment. This resulted in the introduction of the measure to 
promote equal treatment in terms of social security in the 1980s. 
The above initial treaties caused growing activity in the field of gender equality in 
the 1980s: the Equal Opportunities Unit, the Equal Opportunities Action Programme 
(1982), and the Committee on Women’s Rights of the European Parliament (1980) 
were established. The Maastricht Treaty continued the tradition to promote gender 
equality by supporting actions on the national level, which protect the rights of the 
two genders in the labour market. Later, the legislative actions of the EU were also 
expanded by Directives linked to pregnancy, maternity and paternal leave just as 
well as part-time employment – thus the fields of work and social security became 
connected. Although the new policies affected more and more areas, there were no 
equal opportunities for the different genders in science; women’s chances were re-
stricted due to the isolated and sporadic nature of research institutes. This changed 
in the 1990s, when concerns about gender were put in focus and systematic solutions 
were looked for to make science and research work more accessible.
The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997 and ratified in 1999, became noted as an 
outstanding development in gender equality. While earlier measures only regarded 
social policy – employment and social security – the Amsterdam Treaty broadened 
its scope by presenting the concept of gender mainstreaming. The central idea of 
2 This part of the essay was written by the use of the following resources: www.genderkom-
petenz.info; www.gender-equality.webinfo
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gender mainstreaming is to include the aspect of gender in any measures or policies. 
Gender mainstreaming has its origins in feminist and political theories and activism, 
which intended to point out the unequal nature of state policies in order to call for 
amendment.
It is important to note that Article 141 Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity (TEC) revised the initiative of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) about equal 
payment in the Directive on Equal Pay in order to guarantee the application of this 
principle. A crucial part of the Amsterdam Treaty is Article 13, which prohibits any 
discrimination in the labour market on the ground of sex, race, disability, or age. Two 
other directives were established which are linked to Article 13: the Race Directive 
and the Council Directive, influenced by the Equal Treatment Directive, to grant 
equal treatment in occupation, but these are not directly related to gender issues. 
In 2002 the Equal Treatment Directive was revised with the intention to determine 
direct and indirect discrimination and work place harassment linked to men and 
women. The Commission proposed to strengthen the legislation of gender equality by 
expanding its legislative power to new fields. Besides the main legislative power such 
as the Commission, the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) also aims at pressuring the 
Commission and supporting equality by issuing so-called “Shadow Directives” which 
expand to various fields such as services, goods, women in media, social exclusion, 
raising awareness. (Arribas and Carrasco, 2003: 23-24)
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, introduced in December 2000, is also a 
document, which covers political matters without having legal status. Although it re-
inforces Article 12 of the EC by the prohibition of discrimination, it does acknowledge 
the necessity of positive measures in support of the marginalised sex. This Charter 
is only of symbolic value, however, it is widely debated and might become part of the 
Treaties as a preamble.
As it was mentioned, earlier measures such as the Treaty of Rome or the Equal Pay 
Directive only affected certain areas of legislation, employment and social security. 
This limited scope is what gender mainstreaming can change since it includes the 
aspect of gender in all fields of social issues when it comes to decision-making. Ac-
cording to the 1996 Communication on Mainstreaming of the Commission, gender 
mainstreaming mobilises general initiatives in the process of establishing new poli-
cies in order to support equality between men and women. As part of an international 
text it was first included in the United Nations Third World Conference on Women in 
1985. Gender mainstreaming was first undertaken as a policy by the Beijing Platform 
for Action was formal after 1995, which urged legal bodies to consider the effects of 
all policies on women.
From the early 1990s on, the Council of Europe similarly took part in putting 
gender mainstreaming forward in the Third (1991-1995) and the Fourth (1996-2000) 
Equal Opportunities Action Programmes by the reorganisation and development of 
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EU policies for the sake of gender equality. The Fourth Equal Opportunities Action 
Programme, influenced by the UN Beijing Conference, already advocated equal op-
portunities for both genders but the was the abovementioned Amsterdam Treaty, 
which brought about fundamental changes by introducing gender mainstreaming. 
The United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA) aimed for 
“women’s empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all 
spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access 
to power, [which] are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and 
peace”. (BDPA 2005, Annex I. 13.) This resulted in the Community incorporating this 
new aspect of encouraging equality into its tasks.
Equality became key feature in science as well. In 1999 the Commission passed a 
Communication and Action Plan in this field: Women and Science: Mobilising women to 
enrich European research was to incorporate the aspect of gender equality in scientific 
world, too. Additionally, in 2000 women researchers founded the European Technol-
ogy Assessment Network (ETAN) to the inspiration of the DG Research organisation 
to make surveys about women’s position in European science. This report, Science 
policies in the EU – promoting excellence through mainstreaming gender equality, 
published in 2000, initiated political discussions regarding the European knowledge 
economy3.
In 2000 the Commission even established the Framework Strategy on Gender 
Equality, an action plan for the following five years (2001-2005) to improve equality 
and implement the aspect of gender in the fields of economics, social issues, decision-
making, and civil life including gender roles and stereotypes. As part of the plan, the 
different Commission units had to make reports on how they achieved to comprise 
gender equality in their decisions. There were five central points the departments 
had to adhere to: “equality in economic, social, and civil life; equal representation 
and participation in decision-making; and changing gender roles and overcoming 
stereotypes”. This action plan also inspired the first Annual Working Programme 
for Gender Equality, which was adopted in 2001 and described the tasks of the Com-
munity for the mentioned year in all fields. It put forward “specific actions addressed 
to women” and the “integration of a gender perspective in policy initiatives”. (Ar-
ribas and Carrasco, 2003: 25) Thus the Work Programme proved comprehensive and 
contributed to the effective supervision and assessment of the development achieved 
throughout the years. This method was similarly applied in the Commission’s Work 
Programme in 2002 with some additional priorities.
3 Source: European Commission (2000): Science policies in the European Union. Promoting 
excellence through mainstreaming gender equality. A Report from the ETAN Expert 
Working Group on Women and Science. ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/improving/
docs/g_wo_etan_en_200101.pdf
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From 1997 on the European Council had a growing importance in advocating gen-
der mainstreaming, which was integrated into the programmes of Educational, the 
Market, Science, Research, and Developmental Councils. The European Parliament 
also committed itself to mainstreaming and had a great importance in supporting 
gender equality by funding programmes promoting equality regarding payment, de-
cision-making, part-time employment. But this commitment brought about internal 
changes as well; in 1984 the Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities 
was established. This committee passed an evaluation on gender mainstreaming, 
which contains recommendations just as well as reports about gender mainstream-
ing on the political and administrational levels to call for equal participation.
After the Santer Commission founded the Group of Commissioners on Equal Op-
portunities, their tasks were redefined in 1999 in order to ensure the consistency of 
their programmes regarding equal opportunities and the inclusion of mainstreaming 
either in the framework of the Commission or outside of it. Since gender mainstream-
ing came to have an outstanding importance throughout the decades, by the mid-
1999s most directorates and organisations already had a person assigned to keep 
track of the gender perspective. From the beginning of the 2000s the Commission 
also started to concentrate on the internal balancing in connection with the propor-
tion of men and women. Their set target – which was to have 40 per cent of female 
representatives – was almost achieved in their cabinet of 120 members. (Arribas and 
Carrasco, 2003: 26)
More than a decade passed since the EU first integrated the concept of gender 
mainstreaming but its effect has been limited regarding organisational practices. 
Some even argue that gender mainstreaming as a programme has been greatly un-
successful because the gap between men’s and women’s payments still persists 
despite doing the same amount of work. Even applying quotas could not contribute 
to balanced representation in EU boardrooms; men are still in majority. As for the 
field of employment, after 1998 women were still considered less dedicated to their 
job and often discriminated against by employers due to pregnancy or motherhood, 
according to Rittenhofer and Gartell (2012: 205). Women tend to have the same is-
sues in connection with employment as men but they often receive less support from 
organisations. 
The political representation of women is still low in the EU member states. In 
most of the national parliaments women are still in minority.
It is important to note that literature on gender mainstreaming tends to describe 
problems affecting women different from those affecting men, this suggests the 
necessity of “positive actions” to take issues regarding women into consideration. 
But Gatrell and Rittenhofer argue that gender mainstreaming theories and policies, 
but most importantly, their practical application, are hindered by the ambiguous 
definitions of gender mainstreaming in connection with how women’s issues have 
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to be talked about. Moreover, mainstreaming linked to management and organisa-
tion studies is much less discussed than mainstreaming in sociology or feminism. 
Gender mainstreaming in the field of employment has remained somewhat under-
represented – this is why there is a considerable demand for research work. Thus, 
although the EU made progressive propositions throughout the 1990s, which had the 
potential to transform the contemporary state of gender equality, development has 
remained slow (Gatrell and Rittenhofer, 2012: 202-203).
Political Representation of Women in EU Member States. Focus on Hungary
Besides the number of gender equality programmes and regulations, the average political 
representation of women in EU national parliaments is still low, only 25.6 per cent. But it 
is higher than the world average (21.4 per cent). The number of female parliamentarians 
shows a little increase compared to 2008 (23.6 per cent) (IPU Word Classification 2014). In 
order to reach rapid increase in women’s political representation some countries use gender 
quotas. As the chart shows, Sweden has the highest number of women representatives 
among the national parliaments of the EU member states. Unfortunately, Hungary has the 
lowest rate of women representatives among the EU member states.
It is important to note that raising the number of female politicians does not 
necessarily come together with taking aspects into consideration, which are impor-
tant for women. This is why achieving a so-called critical mass would be desirable. 
According to literature on gender, at least 30 per cent of MPs have to be women in 
order to bring about significant changes in connection with issues regarding women, 
such as family policy, aid systems, maternity leave, healthcare, matters of school 
systems and education, social inequalities, etc. 98 countries already apply quotas 
to increase women’s representation. There are three types of quotas for women in 
use: “The first one is called reserved seats (constitutional and/or legislative). This 
gender quota type regulates the number of women elected. The other two types: the 
legal candidate quotas and the political party quotas set a minimum for the share of 
women on the candidate lists, either as a legal requirement (legal candidate quotas) 
or a measure written into the statutes of individual political parties (political party 
quotas).”4
4 Global Database of Quotas for Women: http://www.quotaproject.org/aboutQuotas.cfm
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Table 1. Women’s Political Representation in National Assemblies in the EU member states
Source: Women in Parliaments: 
World Classification – Inter-Parliamentary Union. www.ipu.org
From a different aspect there are two parliamentary quotas. In case of the gender-
neutral quota 40 per cent has to be the minimum amount of the representatives from 
either of the genders. The aim of the positive discriminative quota is to put unprivileged 
groups into a more advanced position; this minimum rate of participation only affects 
them. It is important to bear in mind that introducing quota system often happens due 
to the pressure of international organisations advocating equality instead of national 
regulations. The EU or the UN also played an important role in this process.
Country Women’s representation Type of quota
Sweden 45% party quotas
Finland 42.5% no quotas
Denmark 39.1% no quotas
Netherlands 38.7% party quotas
Belgium 38% legislated quotas
Germany 36.5% party quotas
Spain 36% legislated quotas
Austria 33.3% party quotas
Slovenia 32.2% legislated quotas
Italy 31.4% party quotas
Portugal 31.3% legislated quotas
Luxembourg 28.3% party quotas
France 26.9% legislated quotas
Bulgaria 24.6% no quotas
Lithuania 24.1% party quotas
Croatia 23.8%  party quotas
Poland 23.7% legislated quotas
Latvia 23% no quotas
United Kingdom 22.5% party quotas
Greece 21% legislated quotas
Estonia 20.8% no quotas
Czech Republic 19.5% party quotas
Slovakia 18.7% party quotas
Ireland 15.7% legislated quotas
Malta 14.3% party quotas
Romania 13.3% party quotas
Cyprus 10.7% party quotas
Hungary 8.8% party quotas
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There indeed are women MPs in the Hungarian parliament but their rarity is a 
thought-provoking fact. It takes effort to notice them. Only 8.8 per cent of the current 
386 representatives are women, which is not much. One could say it is a matter of 
perspective, but in this case the situation seems even worse: Hungary occupies the 
116th place globally (IPU Word Classification, 2014).
Hungary has not reached the mentioned proportion, 30 per cent of female MPs. 
It is also discouraging to see that the situation is better not only Scandinavian and 
Western European countries, which are famous for their democratic traditions, but 
all member states of the EU have a higher percentage of female representatives in 
parliaments than Hungary.
It is interesting that neither constitutional, nor legislative quotas were introduced 
in Sweden, in the country, which holds the record in Europe with 45 per cent of fe-
male MPs (IPU World Classification). Thus, in this case positive political traditions, 
movements organised by women (the majority of significant activities took place in 
the 1970s), economic and social advancement, and an advanced political culture all 
contributed to the success of female representatives.
There is a lack of successful activities linked to women’s political representation, 
legislative and constitutional quotas in Hungary. There were some initiatives to 
encourage women’s political participation after the regime change but all of them 
turned out to be unsuccessful due to various reasons.
During the Socialist era there was a relatively high number of female MPs, their 
political representation amounted to 17–30 per cent. This percentage did not mean 
real representation of women’s interest since establishing equality between the two 
genders was not necessarily important for the communist dictatorship. Women’s 
political participation was not much dealt with during the regime change either. Fol-
lowing the first democratic elections the percentage of female MPs was always very 
low, around 10 per cent in Hungary and other post-socialist countries as well. But 
the problem lies in the fact that by now all Central Eastern European countries have 
managed to reach a higher percentage than Hungary. While in the former socialist 
countries the average amount of female representatives is around 20 per cent, this 
number is less than 9 per cent in Hungary.
As for the attempts to encourage women’s political participation in Hungary, it 
is important to mention the initiative to introduce parliamentary quota for women 
made by former liberal SZDSZ (Alliance of Liberal Democrats) MPs, Bálint Magyar 
and Klára Sándor. The two representatives proposed a bill to modify the constitution 
by establishing actual equal opportunities for the different genders (Papp, 2007: 1). 
They wanted to achieve equality by the so-called “zipping” which means that an equal 
number of men and women would be on the party list. In their bill they also wanted 
to modify the process of appointing under-secretaries and ministers by establish-
ing that at least one third of the appointee has to be from either of the genders. The 
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parliament voted down both law proposals. It is interesting to mention a civil initia-
tive from 2010 named “Referendum for Women” when signatures were collected to 
introduce parliamentary quota for women. But the referendum was never held since 
only 65 thousand signatures could be collected instead of the required 100 thousand.
The party with the highest amount of female MPs, Politics Can Be Different (Lehet 
Más a Politika – LMP) entered parliament in 2010. LMP used a quota for women on their 
electoral list during the elections of 2010. This resulted in having 31.2 per cent female 
representatives within the party, which meant five women MPs. The parliamentary 
faction of LMP disbanded in the beginning of 2013 but later reunited in September. 
Following the reunion, there were four female and three male representatives in LMP 
thus the first party with female majority was formed.
Conclusion
Based on the new electoral law of Hungary the number of MPs is decreasing but the 
importance of constituencies is rising. Both policies are disadvantageous for female 
politicians. Since the number of parliamentary representatives is being cut back, 
many politicians are afraid to lose their position hence there is almost no chance for 
introducing a quota that would support women in such a situation. Furthermore, the 
growing significance of constituencies is also unfavourable for women because here 
they usually gain fewer votes than men. Thus there is a risk that without a quota 
measure the number of women MPs would fall instead of stagnating. Achieving 30 
per cent female representatives is still to come. Reaching the critical mass is still just 
a dream in Hungary, but hopefully the kind of dream that will come true one day.
No doubt that in the last decades the European Union made a great leap forward 
in the case of gender equality, but there are plenty of areas, which are still waiting 
for a change. As it was shown the number of female representatives in most of the 
EU member states are low, less than 30 per cent. It is clearly a question whether or 
not the growth of political representation of women is important enough for the EU 
to pass stricter regulations connected with it, such as the implementation of gender 
quotas. 
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The Foreign Policy of ‘Global Opening’ 
and Hungarian Positions in an Interpolar World
István Tarrósy1 – Zoltán Vörös2
Abstract 
This study wishes to contribute to the relatively limited circle of academic publica-
tions on Hungary’s foreign policy – in particular, in the second decade of the twenty-
first century. First, it looks at major foreign policy priorities since the change of the 
political system in 1989 and their maintenance in the country’s external affairs policy 
agenda, together with the omnipresent desire to get re-positioned ‘rightly’, ‘back’ 
into the international community. The intention of the authors is to investigate the 
validity and possible execution of a ‘global opening’ in an increasingly ‘interpolar glo-
bality’, and therefore, to provide a detailed analysis of the Hungarian ‘turn towards 
to East’. The new foreign policy document of the country contains a re-positioning of 
Hungarian presence in five priority regions of the world, among which emphasis has 
obviously been laid on Central Europe and the Visegrád Group. The paper offers a 
critical analysis of both the potentials and challenges of the global opening.
Introduction
After the change of the political system which took place towards the end of the 
1980s, it was obvious for countries of the former Soviet Bloc that major (re)orienta-
tion in their foreign policies will be directed towards the European Union, with the 
aspiration to gain membership as soon as possible, but preferably in the early 2000s. 
In the case of Hungary, three pillars of the foreign affairs strategy signaled a firm 
alignment with the community of values she had always wanted to share – not only 
the official political rhetoric, but also what the society at large thought were centered 
on the move ‘back to Europe’. The three pillars covered European accession (as top 
number-one priority for the country), joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO), therefore, strengthening the trans-Atlantic alliance, and neighborhood 
policy with a heavy focus on Hungarian communities across the Carpathian basin 
(and beyond). Developing relations with Moscow and the ‘East’ was put aside at a 
1 PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Univer-
sity of Pécs. tarrosy.istvan@pte.hu
2 PhD Student, Interdisciplinary Doctoral School, Political Science Programme, University of 
Pécs. voros.zoltan@pte.hu
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fast pace, which may be explained as part of the strategy of keeping distance from 
‘Soviet ties’, and demonstrating that the country was ready to rejoin the European 
community. However, “cordial relations” with the Russian Federation and the other 
states that came into being after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were established 
and also “immediate and strong support was given to Yeltsin in the days of the August 
1991 coup.”3
In the course of the first fifteen years of the democratic republic, until Hungary 
gained membership in the European Union in 2004, the country was heavily engaged 
in building links with Western European countries, the United States of America and 
the leading international institutions of the gradually globalizing world. In the mean-
time, all Hungarian governments had a fundamental task – also as the constitution 
of that time obliged them to do – to “take responsibility for the Hungarians living in 
the diaspora in the neighboring states”, and to contribute to the creation of a “united, 
secure and stable Europe” by helping the Western Balkans integrate “as fully and 
quickly as possible into the Euro-Atlantic community”.4 
A determined step toward the implementation of a ‘global opening’ to the rapidly 
changing world came with the government taking office in 2010. A new position of 
‘Deputy State Secretary for Global Affairs’ was established in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, underscoring the strong intention to bring about changes in foreign policy, 
and thus to reposition Hungary on the world map. Although the ‘global opening’ con-
cept “gained momentum only after the [second] Orbán-government came to power”, 
already under the Gyurcsány-government the Hungarian External Relations Strategy 
of 2008 “realised that Hungary needs to intensify its global presence, and the country 
needs to address issues of global importance with an increasing visibility.”5
A strategic document got the green light after the Hungarian Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union was handed over to the forthcoming Troika-member 
Poland for the second half of 2011. In one of the most important foreign policy strate-
gies since the political regime change, the Hungarian state clearly argued for a policy 
of ‘opening’ to the increasingly global and transnational world. Our paper will offer 
an overview of this strategic decision and provide details in particular about Hun-
gary’s redefined stance on the ‘East’, including China, Russia and Central Asia, as well 
as the Middle East, but also on sub-Saharan Africa. In light of both a progressively 
3 G. Jeszenszky, “Hungary’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas after Regaining Sovereignty”, Society 
and Economy, vol. 29, no. 1 (2007), p. 47.
4 T. Magyarics, “Hungary and Southeast Europe – Preface”, International Relations Quarterly, 
vol. 1, no. 1 (2010), p. 1. 
5 A. Rácz, “An Unintended Consequence: Is the Hungarian Commitment to the EU’s Enlarge-
ment and Neighbourhood Policy Weakening? Hungarian Engagement in Eastern Europe”, 
Draft paper (2012), http://www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1201/racz.pdf, 9 July 2013. 
p. 6.
Near Abroad – Global Actorness – Governance | 275 
St
u
d
ie
s
evolving global ‘actorness’ of the EU on the supranational level and reaffirmed coop-
eration with the Visegrád countries, pursuing a stronger representation of regional 
interests, Hungarian foreign policy will be critically analyzed.
The study seeks first to look at major foreign policy priorities since the estab-
lishment of the first democratically elected government after the collapse of the 
Soviet-satellite system and their maintenance on the country’s external affairs 
policy agenda, together with the omnipresent desire to get positioned ‘rightly’ in the 
international community. Second, the validity and potential execution of a ‘global 
opening’ in an increasingly ‘interpolar globality’ will be investigated, which will then 
be followed by the detailed analysis of the Hungarian ‘turn towards to East’, which 
– in its ‘global’ framework – also contains a re-positioning of Hungarian presence 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Third, some major considerations will be summarized with 
regard to Hungary’s Central European policy, in particular, as the country declared 
the year 2013 as its “Central European Year” because of the rotating presidencies of 
the Visegrád Group and the Central European Initiative (CEI) it holds. Finally, a set of 
concluding thoughts will encapsulate the paper’s most important points.
Hungary’s foreign policy priorities since 1989
There has been a consistency in prioritizing Hungarian foreign policy since the 
change of the political system as for all the governments of the country until 2010, 
when the Euro-Atlantic integration and good neighbourhood policy in the Carpathian 
Basin provided the key elements for long-term strategic thinking. Right after the 
first free elections in the spring of 1990, the main objective of József Antall’s govern-
ment – backed by all the six parties in parliament – was “the re-orientation of [the 
country’s] foreign policy”6. Signing the first bilateral agreement with the new Russia 
in December 1991, gaining membership in the Council of Europe a month earlier, and 
launching the Visegrád cooperation together with Poland and Czechoslovakia on 
15 February 19917 – Antall’s own initiative – were all significant steps on the new 
(democratic) road of statehood. The encouragement and strengthening of peaceful 
cooperation with the neighboring countries seemed evident for Hungary in any 
geopolitical sense. The country needed to face the increasing number of states in its 
vicinity, as well as the fragmentation of the region with all the political, diplomatic 
and security-related consequences of the escalating crisis in the Balkans.8 As Dunay 
clearly points out, “regional cooperation in Central Europe had no roots that could 
6 G. Jeszenszky, “Hungary’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas after Regaining Sovereignty”, Society 
and Economy, vol. 29, no. 1 (2007), p. 45.
7 Ibid. pp. 47-48.
8 L. Kiss J., “Magyarország szomszédsági kapcsolatainak jövője” [The future of Hungary’s 
neighborly relations], Grotius (2007), http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/FJFDTM/kiss_j_
lászló_magyarorszag_szomszédsági_kapcsolatok.pdf, 4 August 2013. p. 3.
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serve as a point of reference. East-Central Europe seemed doomed to fall back to frag-
mentation and eventual national rivalries”9, which basically cried out for a change: to 
foster a new era of regional ties in a newly defined, enlarging Europe, into which most 
of the countries of the former Soviet bloc felt to “return”10.
Tamás Magyarics rightly claims that “the external framework of Hungarian for-
eign relations changed drastically on May 1, 2004 when the country […] joined the 
EU.”11 Accession to the desired international institutions – the European Union and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – succeeded, paving the way to the process 
of ‘Europeanization’, which, according to Rácz, “has [since] significantly changed 
domestic political landscapes and also the norms and institutions of policy-making, 
including foreign policy”12.
From a number of angles for some years, in the context of its new international 
socialization, which basically meant a kind of “acclimatization to the new policy-
making setting”,13 Hungary was also expected to meet, among other things, the chal-
lenges to “existing identities and interests of national officials, their conceptions of 
statehood, and relationships between national and supranational.”14 Working along 
the lines of the European community of values never meant for the country to loosen 
its position on the assertion of Hungarian identity and interests, just the opposite: 
to “effectively advance national interests in all aspects that go beyond Hungary’s 
borders”, executing a “value-based foreign policy”15 as a Member State of the Euro-
pean Union. The main aim of the policy of the Orbán-government since 2010 has been 
declared to “be friendly in all directions”, with the Visegrád group as the “core”16. As 
9 P. Dunay, “Subregional Cooperation in East-Central Europe: the Visegrád Group and the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement”, ÖZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, 
no. 1 (2003), p. 46.
10 A number of scholarly articles dealt with how former Soviet satellite countries communicated 
their aspirations for EU and NATO memberships. See, for example, K. Henderson (ed.), Back 
to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union. London 1999.
11 T. Magyarics, “From semi-periphery to semi-periphery: Hungary’s foreign relations un-
der the socialist-free democrat governments (2002-2010)”, in M. Majer, R. Ondrejcsák, V. 
Tarasovič, and T. Valášek (eds.), Panorama of Global Security Environment, Bratislava 2010, 
p. 67.
12 A. Rácz, “A Limited Priority: Hungary and the Eastern Neighbourhood”, Perspectives, vol. 19, 
no. 2 (2011), p. 143.
13 S. S. Denca, “Europeanization of Foreign Policy: Empirical Findings From Hungary, Romania 
and Slovakia”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 5, no. 3 (2009), p. 402.
14 Ibid. p. 391.
15 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Un-
ion”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/
cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 3.
16 “How the world looks from Hungary: Hungary’s foreign policy”, The Economist, 13 August 
2010, at http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/08/hungarys_for-
eign_policy, 9 July 2013.
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for priorities, according to many scholars and experts of international relations, the 
so-called “Eastern opening doctrine” has become Hungary’s fourth major diplomatic 
objective in addition to the remaining three of the policy of the nation, regional policy 
in Central Europe and active involvement in Euro-Atlantic integration. “Global open-
ing”, also accommodating the concept of the East, “is meant in a geographical sense, 
such as new links with the Middle East, North Africa, Asia and Latin America”, but 
also including that “Hungary must find areas beyond traditional foreign policy and 
security policy where it can strengthen its role; [for example, areas covering] climate 
policy, sustainable development and water policy”17. 
In order to enable the reader to understand the scope and main considerations of 
such policy, the next section will elaborate upon the dominant streams in the interna-
tional arena, which it is supposed to take into account, along with the most relevant 
set of aspirations, sufficiently realistic for the country.
The idea of “Global Opening” in an age of interpolar relations
When a country like Hungary – a middle-sized European state – makes attempts to 
become more open to the global world, she recognizes that it is the only valid and 
plausible behavior in the long run, keeping in mind that she wants to keep fostering its 
national interests first and foremost. This attitude is easy to validate as interpolarity 
expects that countries behave in such a way; in fact, the changing “post-American” 
international context, the fading away of the “unipolar moment” and the evolution of 
the multipolar set of relations have an impact on Europe and the foreign and neigh-
borhood policy of Hungary.18 Although multipolarity and the debate whose interpre-
tations have stirred in scholarly communities – also offering the ground for Grevi’s 
theory – “does not necessarily presuppose the existence of three or more states of 
basically equal power capabilities,” according to Smith (2012). “It does, however, 
suggest a widespread acceptance and inculcation of the belief that there is essential 
equivalence amongst several states”19. William Wohlforth (2007) warns us to remain 
cautious enough with “today’s multipolar mania”,20 so that we can profoundly relate 
the position of the emerging actors to that of the US and foresee the potential redis-
17 Quoting Szabolcs Takács in “Hungary in good position to strengthen ties with Asia, says 
Foreign Ministry secretary”, Hungarian News Agency (MTI), 18 July 2012, at http://www.
politics.hu/20120718/hungary-in-good-position-to-strengthen-ties-with-asia-says-
foreign-ministry-secretary/, 9 July 2013.
18 See L. Kiss J., “Magyarország szomszédsági kapcsolatainak jövője” [The future of Hun-
gary’s neighbourly relations], Grotius (2007), at http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/FJFDTM/
kiss_j_lászló_magyarorszag_szomszédsági_kapcsolatok.pdf, 4 August 2013. p. 18.
19 M. A. Smith, Power in the Changing Global Order. The US, Russia and China. Cambridge 2012, 
p. 54.
20 W. Wohlforth, „Unipolar Stability. The Rules of Power Analysis”, Harvard International 
Review, vol 29, no 1 (2007) Spring, p. 46.
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tribution of power in the international system in an increasingly multipolar environ-
ment. One of the most decisive arguments of Fareed Zakaria about a ‘post-American 
world’ draws our attention to the “rise of the rest”, meaning the growing influence of 
emerging powers coming from the Global South. We can agree with him that this rise 
is “at heart an economic phenomenon, but it has consequences for nearly every other 
sphere of life.” His ‘post-American world’ is not “an anti-American world,” but “one 
defined and directed from many places and by many people”21. A world increasingly 
possessing more centers of gravity, one that is better referred to as ‘interpolar’, as the 
context embraces the concept of a transnational setting with more ‘poles’ or powers 
interwoven in deepening interdependence, in an interest-driven, problem-oriented 
and pragmatic way.22
In 1999, Huntington introduced the notion of a ‘uni-multipolar’ hybrid system, 
“with one superpower and several major powers […] that are preeminent in areas of 
the world without being able [yet] to extend their interests and capabilities as globally 
as the United States”23. This can be taken as fair observation with the reservation that 
by 2013 even more changes have occurred in the system into the direction of rather 
more than less multipolarity.24
Although in recent years international media have been engaged with the “rise 
of the dragon” from the Far East, Zakaria is again right when he claims that “it is not 
[only] China that is rising. Emerging powers on every continent have achieved politi-
cal stability and economic growth and are becoming active on the global stage”25. In 
our case, looking at such a Central European country and its redefined foreign policy 
about the global world, we can unanimously pose the questions: What are Hungary’s 
relations with these entities? How can Hungary get engaged with processes gener-
ated by these emerging forces? How can Hungary envisage its place and role in an 
interpolar order? 
There is no doubt that every country of the ‘Global North’ – and as long as Hungary 
is a member of the European Union it is considered to belong to the more developed 
part of the world – it needs to have an idea how to position the emerging powers in 
their foreign policy priorities, or, to look at it from the opposite direction, how to 
position themselves with regard to the dynamics generated by these actors.
Foreign Minister János Martonyi believes that in the global, multipolar world 
Hungary tries to enhance its weight in international politics – and the country could 
21 F. Zakaria, The Post-American World. Release 2.0. New York 2012, p. 4.
22 See: G. Grevi, “The interpolar world: a new scenario”, ISS Occasional Papers, no. 79 (2009), 
http://www.iss.europa.eu, 18 March 2013.
23 S. P. Huntington, “The lonely superpower”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2 (1999), p. 35.
24 See more of this issue: I. Tarrósy, “‘Chimerican’ Interests, Africa Policies and Changing 
US–China Relations”, Security Policy Affairs, vol. 1, no 1 (2013), forthcoming
25 F. Zakaria, The Post-American World. Release 2.0. New York 2012, p. xii.
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do this during its rotating presidency when, for example, “it was the embassy of Hun-
gary in Tripoli which served as the diplomatic mission of the EU since the Union itself 
had no representation there”26 – pursuing “Hungary’s economic interests just like the 
Americans, German, French, Italians, Poles and others do”27 in terms of their own. 
From this perspective, the new policy is sufficiently pragmatic to attempt to position 
Hungary in the global arena, and more importantly, to push the country’s crisis-
ridden economy and society back on the right track of development. Parallel with the 
policy of global opening, however, “another new element has appeared in the foreign 
policy discourse of Hungary, and in particular in Prime Minister Orbán’s discourse, 
namely the ‘Eastern opening’ (keleti nyitás).”28 This – in our opinion – is easy to get 
accommodated into the overarching approach emphasizing ‘global opening’ for the 
first sight, but obviously, with the help of proper terminology, coherent arguments 
and the leading political figures (prime minister and ministers) confirming each 
other’s thoughts from time to time. As Rácz (2011) underlines, “in Hungarian foreign 
policy thinking, the general term ‘East’ (Kelet in Hungarian) lacks a widely agreed 
upon meaning”, and as long as “there is not a single interpretation of the ‘Eastern’,”29 
it presents a challenge to talk about the same things in the same direction. In the next 
section, we provide a detailed analysis of the “Eastern doctrine”.
Turn towards the East
Hungary’s turn towards the East is not quite a coherent policy, but rather a collection 
of steps and gestures towards Eastern states which possess the capacity to invest in 
the country or to finance its debt. The ultimate interest in them has been growing, 
but becomes really intensive when criticism comes from European or Western finan-
cial institutions. On the following pages we are going to look into this ‘Eastern turn’, 
and present projects and events which have already had or will have substantial and 
lasting effects for Hungary’s development.
The system change in 1989–1990 and the end of the Cold War were followed by 
an immediate replacement of the former Eastern connections by Western relations, 
causing a dramatic change first of all in export markets: as shown earlier, the step 
26 E. N. Rózsa, “Libya and the Hungarian EU Presidency”, HIIA Policy Brief, no. 14 (2011), at 
http://www.hiia.hu/pub/displ_eng.asp?id=TVYBGH, 9 July 2013.
27 Interview with János Martonyi, “Global Opening in Hungarian Foreign Politics”, 9 Septem-
ber 2011, at http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulugyminiszterium/a-miniszter/beszedek-
publikaciok-interjuk/global-opening-in-hungarian-foreign-politics, 9 July 2013.
28 A. Rácz, “An Unintended Consequence: Is the Hungarian Commitment to the EU’s Enlarge-
ment and Neighbourhood Policy Weakening? Hungarian Engagement in Eastern Europe”, 
Draft paper (2012), at http://www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1201/racz.pdf, 9 July 
2013. p. 1.
29 A. Rácz, “A Limited Priority: Hungary and the Eastern Neighbourhood”, Perspectives, vol. 19, 
no. 2 (2011), p. 145.
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was imminent, lacked any organic evolution and left Hungary without Eastern 
export markets and cooperation. The only remaining tie was the ‘new Russia’, but 
only because of energy imports, and therefore, Moscow continued to be an important 
partner for Hungary in this sense. 
At that time, and by the early 2000s, “Western European financial experts were 
praising Hungary, labeling it is as the economic front-runner of Central Europe, for its 
huge efforts to comply with EU regulations and difficult economic tasks.”30 Its route 
was paved to the European Community and even if the process itself proved to be 
successful, in a bit more than a decade Hungary lost its advantageous position in the 
region. The economic difficulties of the country are clear since the first years of the 
new Millennium, and the EU membership has been unable to solve the problems – or 
better to say, it has generated even new ones, for example, in the sector of agriculture, 
where traditional Hungarian actors met fierce competing Western counterparts, and 
lost. The socialist–free democrat coalition government agreed a package deal with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2008 – a rescue credit line of 20 billion 
Euros – although its effect was predicted to be miserable: the government was unable 
to react upon the challenges the deal presented. The turning point arrived in 2010, 
after Fidesz gained power after the so-called revolutionary election, turned its back 
to the IMF and began to encourage foreign interests in the country from the East.
Disappointment in the EU
The turn towards Eastern partners seems to have been boosted by several factors, 
mainly connected to the unsuccessful European steps aiming at the recovery of 
the economy and the criticism arriving from other EU countries because of Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán’s national reforms. The economic difficulties of Hungary are 
undoubtedly serious; the huge amount of foreign-currency debt is a big concern, and 
Western financial organizations and several credit-rating agencies have considered 
Budapest as one of the most vulnerable members of the Community. During the first 
year of his government, Orbán wanted to let budget deficit reach 7-8% of the GDP, and 
to boost the economy, but the Community was against these moves because under cur-
rent rules, present and potential future Euro-zone members must keep their budget 
deficits below 3% of the GDP. Since then, Hungarian foreign policy met with massive 
EU-criticism and the country’s new foreign connections manifest a determined turn 
towards Eastern countries. This turn, together with the internal political reforms 
(aiming at power centralization with occasional anti-democratic touches) are in 
the focus of EU critiques, which, among other things, led to the endorsement of the 
so-called Tavares Report by the European Parliament. MEP Rapporteur Rui Tavares 
30 A. A. Nemeth, “The country where growth stopped”, The European Strategist, 24 June 2011, 
at http://www.europeanstrategist.eu/2011/06/the-country-where-growth-stopped/, 20 
August 2013.
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constructed a report about Hungary’s ‘constitutional revolution’ which described 
the situation of fundamental rights, democracy, freedom, the rule of law etc.31 Viktor 
Orbán commented the adoption during a press conference after the meeting: “Draw-
ing conclusions from the past, Hungarians do not want a Europe where successful 
countries are punished and placed under guardianship, large countries abuse their 
power, double standards are applied and only small countries have to respect the 
larger ones and not the other way round,” he said, adding that “the Tavares report […] 
applies double standards, poses a serious danger to Europe, violates the Treaty on the 
European Union and arbitrarily defines criteria.”32 The tone of his speech was similar 
to general governmental communication trends about the EU, which suggest that the 
Union was blamed from time to time for the unsuccessful economic outcomes. In an 
interview with The Economist in 2011, Viktor Orbán agreed with the “suggestion 
that success in macro-economic stabilization has not been matched by progress on 
the micro-economic agenda: debureaucratization, labor-market reform and particu-
larly the black economy.” He put “some of the blame on the European Union, both for 
low growth and for failing to disburse structural funds more quickly.”33 The reporter 
quickly noted that “other countries are growing a lot faster than Hungary”34 with 
the same conditions, under the same circumstances. But blaming an entity, blam-
ing the bureaucracy far from our borders, the well-known “Brussels wants us to” 
phrase just fits perfectly in this foreign policy, where everything has been shaken 
up. Former supporters of the Free Tibet Movement decided to silence these activists 
in themselves,35 who were once critics of Moscow and Vladimir Putin’s embarrass-
ingly anti-democratic use of power now seems to follow the ‘Russian way’. Time has 
changed, says Orbán, and criticizes the way Western democracies work, bringing 
Eastern countries such as China or Russia as an example. “To stay competitive”, he 
argues, “democracies have to adapt. They have to be less debt-dependent: debt cre-
ates weaknesses and hampers decision-making. They have to pay more attention to 
manufacturing, and to providing decent jobs for manual workers. […] That led on to 
31 See the report here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=
A7-2013-0229&language=EN
32 “Tavares report called unjust in a European Parliament debate today in Strasbourg”, Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2 July 2013, at http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/
news/tavares-report-called-unjust-in-a-european-parliament-debate-today-in-strasbourg, 
2 August 2013.
33 “Orbán and the wind from the east”, The Economist, 14 November 2011, at http://www.
economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/hungarys-politics, 2 August 2013.
34 Ibid.
35 Young democratic activist Orbán organised  a public protest against the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989. In 2000, during his first term as primes minister, he even had a meeting 
with the Dalai Lama in Budapest. See more: D. Kałan, “Relationship of a Special Significance? 
A Chinese Direction in Hungary’s Foreign Policy under Viktor Orbán”, Croatian International 
Relations Review, vol. 17, no. 66 (2012), p. 63.
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the question of whether something is fundamentally wrong with the way that west-
ern democracies make decisions. Mr Orbán has no truck with that, Russian, Chinese 
and Brazilian decision-making is slow too. It is just that they are doing better than the 
old West right now,”36 Orbán thinks.
Hopes in the Chinese economy
Diplomatic and economic relations are evolving and becoming more intensive from 
year to year between European countries and Beijing, and the financial crisis of the 
Community just accelerated these events. All member states try to secure an out-
standing place in the framework of cooperation with Beijing, so does Budapest as 
well. And even if Europeans have become much more critical of China according to 
some surveys37 and the EU has serious concerns about the human rights situation 
in Beijing, the race for China and for Chinese investments has started.38 As a new 
trend, China seeks bilateral connections with each country in the community and the 
European countries seek connections on their own – naturally based upon their na-
tional interests – instead of forming a single EU strategy for international relations.39 
Beijing appears not only as an investor, but also as a lender and savior, an economic 
partner that could help find a way out of the crisis.
It is useless to compare Budapest to the Western countries of the Community, but 
in its closer vicinity, Hungary is competitive. If we focus specifically on investments 
or trade relations, Hungary plays a prominent role in the region’s relations with 
China. The country plays a particularly important role in China’s foreign policy, as 
it is not only the most popular regional destination for Chinese immigrants, but also 
Hungary is the only country that has a Bank of China branch in the region. What is 
more, there is a Hungarian–Chinese bilingual elementary school since the fall of 2004. 
36 “Orbán and the wind from the east”, The Economist, 14 November 2011, at http://www.
economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/hungarys-politics, 2 August 2013.
37 See, for instance: http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/chapter-3-views-of-china-and-
its-increasing-influence/
38 The Asian giant “has now overtaken the United States as the greatest perceived threat 
to global stability in the eyes of Europeans, according to the opinion poll commissioned 
by the Financial Times. The poll, carried out by the Harris agency [in 2008] found that 35 
percent of respondents in the five largest EU states see China as a bigger threat to world 
stability than any other state.”  See in: J. Wolf, “Europeans View China as Biggest Threat to 
Global Security”, Atlantic Review, 16 April 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1058-
Europeans-View-China-as-Biggest-Threat-to-Global-Security.html, 4 August 2013.
39 I. Tarrósy and Z. Vörös, “An Overview of EU-China Relations: From the Race for Energy 
Security to the Development of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy”, in Sz. Pudruzsik and S. 
Kerekes (eds.), China – EU Cooperation for a Sustainable Economy, Budapest 2012, pp. 201-
218. and A. Inotai, Kína világgazdasági szerepének erősödése. Az exportorientált „modell” 
jövője, Budapest 2010, p. 206.
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Hungary has been establishing itself as a regional partner of China for years now 
and the second Orbán government’s foreign policy openly declared its turn towards 
China – continuing and obviously extending bilateral relations “previously enacted 
by the left-wing governments headed by Péter Medgyessy (2002-04), Ferenc Gyurc-
sány (2004-09), and Gordon Bajnai (2009-10).”40 The visit of Wen Jiabao in the summer 
of 2011 seemed to mean an advantage for Hungary, compared to other countries in 
the region. The Chinese Prime Minister and Viktor Orbán signed twelve agreements, 
including a one-billion-euro extra credit or potential infrastructure investments. 
During this visit there was a shocking step of the Hungarian government against the 
protesters of Free Tibet movement: although Orbán stated that they “did not lock 
up anybody”, the demonstrations were banned and local Tibetans summoned to at-
tend the government immigration offices on that day.41 As Orbán noted in another 
interview in The Economist, “the government has the right to stop demonstrations 
that disrupt diplomatic relations. The Hungarian state has the right to pursue foreign 
policy in the national interest”. Additionally, the reporter added: “Perhaps, but other 
countries do allow protests within sight of visiting foreign delegations, including 
those such as the Chinese whose feelings are famously prone to injury. His didn’t.”42
But Hungary’s so-called leadership in the region is very fragile, and many coun-
tries are willing to offer the Asian country immediate and full partnership; for ex-
ample, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland or Romania – all of them are ready to act 
in this way. Clearly, “China sees the Central European countries as a gateway to the 
European Union. […] Hungary would [definitely] like to become a hub for the Chinese 
economic presence in the region.”43 
All in all, economic connections with China could be beneficial for Hungary, but 
praising the ‘Chinese way of democracy’ over that of what the European Union fosters 
is dangerous, together with the emphasis put on manufacturing based on Chinese 
labour market produces illogical outcomes, especially when the education sector 
gets less and less attention and money in Hungary from year to year. 
Russian way of democracy – The power of energy
One of the major tasks of Hungarian diplomacy is “to support projects leading to 
increased security of [energy] supply.”44 In general terms, energy security is “the 
40 D. Kałan, “Relationship of a Special Significance? A Chinese Direction in Hungary’s Foreign 
Policy under Viktor Orbán”, Croatian International Relations Review, vol. 17, no. 66 (2012), 
p. 61.
41 “Orbán and the wind from the east”, The Economist, 14 November 2011, at http://www.
economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/hungarys-politics, 2 August 2013.
42 Ibid.
43 T. Matura, “Sino-Hungarian Relations in 2010”, HIIA Papers no. 8 (2011) April 12, p. 7.
44 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), at http://www.kormany.hu/
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issue that has lately produced the most spectacular flicker of revival of Visegrád 
cooperation as a consequence of the gas crises in 2006 and 2009.”45 This is certainly 
in line with the efforts of the European Union, which has a strong interest to bring 
security in the entire European Energy System. From this perspective, the EU “is 
seeking a balanced energy partnership with Russia and is pushing for the renewal of 
a wide-ranging Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.”46
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia remained an important partner 
for Hungary mainly because of energy trade – although Moscow has always played a 
decisive role in Hungarian politics. As a ‘shadow’ of the former socialist era and the at-
titude of the actual government towards Russia and deeper energy-cooperation with 
them could always easily generate arguments among the political actors, and thus set 
the agenda several times. The actual energy needs of Europe have a major influence 
on Hungary as well, and because the Union was unable to conceive a single strategy, 
Budapest decided – as a right choice – to join both pipeline projects, the Nabucco, 
supported by the EU, and the South Stream, designed by Russia. While in opposition, 
Fidesz argued against the Russian project47, but since they are in government, they 
have strongly stood for the South Stream.48 Based on this, it is clear how Moscow can 
influence the foreign policy of Budapest, and the substantial change of the previously 
anti-Russian Fidesz is clearly visible and shows the obvious adjustment of the party’s 
foreign strategy. As the Economist noted, “in opposition, the party was a stern critic 
of the ex-KGB regime in Moscow, berating it for neo-imperialism and shenanigans on 
energy security, and complaining about Western weak-kneedness towards the threat 
from the east. Now the tone is rather different.”49 Although some analysts noted that 
the relationship is not the best between the two sides50, the agreements that have 
download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 12.
45 A. Sobják, “Rethinking the Future of the Visegrad Group at a Time of Heated Debate on the 
Future of the EU”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 4 (2012), p. 130.
46 S. Boneva, “Enhancing energy efficiency in the European Union: A challenge for the next 
decade”, in I. Tarrósy and S. Milford (eds.), Challenges for the European Union in the Next 
Decade. A View from the Danube Region. Pécs 2013, p. 89.
47 “Függesszék fel a Déli Áramlat munkálatainak előkészítését”, 13 July 2009, at http://www.
fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=136262, 30 July 2013.
48 “A Fidesz határozottan a Déli áramlat mellett”, 16 September 2011, at http://nol.hu/
gazdasag/a_fidesz_hatarozottan_a_deli_aramlat_mellett?ref=sso, 30 July 2013.
49 “Orbán and the wind from the east”, The Economist, 14 November 2011, http://www.econo-
mist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/hungarys-politics, 2 August 2013.
50 See: “An analysis of Russian-Hungarian relations in perspective”, Hungarian Spectrum, 2 
February 2013, http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2013/02/02/an-analysis-of-
russian-hungarian-relations-in-perspective/, 8 August 2013. It is worth quoting a longer 
passage from the original text: “Viktor Orbán is in a difficult position when it comes to 
friendly relations with Russia because of the heavy political baggage he carries from his 
days in opposition. In those days he made irresponsible comments about Russia. Despite 
Vladimir Putin’s warm welcome, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Orbán 
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been signed in Moscow are enormous – but the details are still undisclosed. As the 
government website informs us, “it is in Hungary’s fundamental interest to pursue 
good relations and close cooperation with Russia, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said 
when he met President Vladimir Putin […]. The Prime Minister stressed Russia’s im-
portance and apart from its economic power, he also praised the richness of Russian 
culture. He pointed out that Hungary has always regarded Russia as a great nation 
with a great future. Therefore, Hungary would like to encourage Russian investments 
as well as maintain bilateral cooperation on energy, and it relies on Russia’s ‘excellent 
professional credentials and world-ranking technology.’”51 The business weekly HVG 
had an insider information that Russia could subscribe 4.6 billion dollars of Hungar-
ian government bonds at an interest rate of 2.25 percent.52 The government quickly 
denied this information but the growing reality of the enlargement of the Nuclear 
Power Plant in the town of Paks, and Russia as the investor – even in the form of lend-
ing to the Hungarian government up to 10 billion euros to build the two new reactors 
(again with Russia as partner) as a result of the bilateral deal signed by President 
Putin and Prime Minister Orbán on 14 January 201453 – in the project certainly proves 
deepening connections. 
To sum up, Russia is one of the strategically important key countries of the so-
called ‘opening towards the East’ policy. The Hungarian government has the definite 
aim to intensify bilateral cooperation, and as the Foreign Minister of Hungary János 
Martonyi pointed out, “the Government intended to settle all outstanding economic 
issues at the earliest opportunity. The most important tasks include the drafting of 
a new version of the long-term gas supply agreement that is to expire in 2015 and to 
settle the outstanding claims on both sides following the bankruptcy of Malév to the 
satisfaction of both parties. He added that it is also important to settle the case of 
government’s Russia policy. Putin’s Russia doesn’t hide its true feelings toward Viktor 
Orbán, which in this case translated into a short audience, no scheduled press conference, 
and no lunch or dinner after the official appointment. In November 2010 when Viktor Orbán 
first visited Russia as prime minister these niceties were planned, but in the end they were 
dispensed with. By contrast, each time Péter Medgyessy or Ferenc Gyurcsány paid a visit to 
Moscow there was always a press conference and a dinner meeting. Russia has reason to be 
dissatisfied with trade relations and mutual investments between the two countries. In the 
last three years the rate of investment has slowed. To quote from Putin’s welcoming speech: 
‘Until recently, the level of investment between the two countries was well balanced. How-
ever, for the last three years it hasn’t grown or has grown very slowly.’”
51 “Agreement on energy cooperation”, Prime Minister’s Office, 31 January 2013, at http://
www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/agreement-on-energy-cooperation, 8 
August 2013.
52 “Orbán 4,6 milliárd dollárért cserélte Moszkvára az IMF-et”, HVG, 6 February 2013, at http://
hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130206_HVG_Orban_46_milliard_dollarert_cserelte, 8 August 2013.
53 “Russia to increase Hungary’s nuclear power”, Reuters, 14 January 2014, at http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/2014/01/14/russia-hungary-idUSL6N0KO28L20140114, 13 March 2014.
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Dunaferr in a satisfactory manner.”54 As far as the flights between the two countries 
are considered, Hungary-based Wizz Air, the biggest low-cost airline in the region 
launched a Budapest–Moscow flight 5 times a week in August 2013 and also started 
to analyse the possibility of the Saint Petersburg destination. As undersecretary 
Péter Szijjártó noted, this is the success of the new policy of the government.55 After 
periods of changing relations – to use Póti’s typology (2006) – between 1990 and 2004 
of “divorce with the Soviet Union (1990-1991); peaceful co-existence (1992-1994); nor-
malisation (1994-1998); distancing (1998-2002); normalisation again (2002-2004)”56 – a 
potential new rapprochement can be hoped for following the very logical steps of 
recent times. For both actors a well-functioning bilateral set of collaborative projects 
is of mutual interest.
The Middle East connection
Another priority region of Hungary’s global opening covers the countries of the 
Middle East, especially those with abundant financial resources to invest, as both 
potential short-term and long-term partners for Hungary. Viktor Orbán travelled to 
Saudi Arabia in 2011 to discuss political and economic cooperation between the two 
countries. Apart from the Prime Minister’s delegation, since the beginning of the new 
Fidesz-led era several other missions have visited the Arab World, either on behalf of 
the government or the City of Budapest, and tried to negotiate economic investment 
projects in Hungary. 
Among the first (seemingly) successful projects one can list the new “national” 
airline company, the so-called Sólyom [Falcon] Company – the investors of the com-
pany are from the Arab world, still unknown, but information about them is scarce. 
One source about them indicated that they were the owners of the Emirates Airlines, 
one of the biggest airline companies of the world. Although this was announced, the 
confidence of the management is pointing into such direction.57 As for their expecta-
tions, the Sólyom planned to launch a deal with a leasing company for six aircrafts, 
the first Boeing 737-500 to be delivered on 18 August. That is when the airline started 
its operation. “The carrier expects to run a fleet of 50 aircrafts by 2017, 20 of which 
54 “János Martonyi: Russia is one of the key countries in ‘Eastern opening’ policy”, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1 March 2013, at http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/
news/janos-martonyi-russia-is-one-of-the-key-countries-in-eastern-opening-policy, 8 
August 2013.
55 “Moszkvai járatot indít a Wizz Air”, index.hu, 19 July 2013, http://index.hu/gaz-
dasag/2013/07/19/moszvai_jaratot_indit_a_wizz_air/, 8 August 2013.
56 L. Póti, “Hungarian Foreign Policy and ENP in the East: Energy- (and) Nationality-based 
Policy”, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3-4 (2006), p. 66.
57 “Az Emirates állhat a Sólyom mögött”, Gazdasági Rádió, 31 July 2013, at http://gazdasagiradio.
hu/cikk/94158/, 8 August 2013.
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should be regional, 20 narrow-body and 10 wide-body aircraft.”58 The plans are gran-
diose, but with a big investor in the background, it might work – if the previous news 
is true. However, the weekly HVG refuted the info based on the spokesman of the 
Emirates. The website noted that they are not interested in the region.59 As of May 
2014, the official website of Sólyom Hungarian Airways (see: http://www.solyom.
org) informs its potential customers that routes are still not scheduled, just “most 
likely” will be flown.
The Caucasus in brief
The countries in the Caucasus, especially Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are also in the 
focus of the new policy, in particular, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
with their “significant gas and oil deposits even by international comparison.”60 So 
far, however, the only thing Budapest could achieve was an international scandal, 
the Ramil Safarov-case. In brief, Ramil Safarov killed an Armenian man with an axe 
in Hungary during a NATO program in 2004 and was imprisoned in Budapest until 
August 2012.61 Then, he got extradited to Azerbaijan. He was expected to serve the 
rest of his life sentence in Azerbaijan, but well before his arrival, it was obvious that 
he would be promoted instead, and that is exactly what finally happened. Armenia 
formally suspended ties with Hungary and accused the country of a secret deal with 
Azerbaijan. 
Since then, the ties between Baku and Budapest have become warmer; the 
Hungarian Post even designed a commemorative stamp. It was a tribute to Heydar 
Aliyev’s 90th birth anniversary. Moreover, an Azerbaijan Park is in the planning phase 
to be built in Budapest. 
Besides energy-focused relations, Hungary emphasizes in its strategic document 
on foreign policy that she is “ready to share with the states of [Central Asia] its ex-
periences, gained in the course of democratic transformation, in promoting human 
rights and cultural diversity”, especially due to the fact that “Hungary enjoys a good 
58 “Emirates Airlines tipped as mysterious investor behind Hungary’s new carrier Sólyom”, 
portfolio.hu, 31 July 2013, at http://www.portfolio.hu/en/economy/emirates_airlines_
tipped_as_mysterious_investor_behind_hungarys_new_carrier_solyom.26430.html, 20 
August 2013.
59 “Az Emirates biztosan nem áll a Sólyom mögött”, HVG, 31 July 2013, at http://hvg.hu/gaz-
dasag/20130731_Az_Emirates_biztos_nem_all_a_Solyom_mogot#rss, 20 August 2013.
60 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), at http://www.kormany.hu/
download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 41.
61 Background of the conflict: Azerbaijan and Armenia are in a bloody conflict over the dis-
puted border territory of Nagorno-Karabakh for more than two decades. See more of the 
case: “Azeri killer Ramil Safarov: Nato chief ‘concerned’”, BBC News Europe, 6 September 
2012, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19499151, 22 August 2013.
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reputation and a certain degree of social capital through personal contacts dating 
back to the Soviet times, while a special element of [the] relationship is an awareness 
of common origins,”62 the argumentation reads.
Africa is not that distant, is it?63
It may feel surprising, but Hungary also wishes to formulate its “own” Africa policy 
– as one can be assured when reading the policy document of global opening.64 Good 
reputation and a wide network of personal contacts in many countries of Africa 
can certainly contribute to successful implementation, if the approach goes further 
beyond official government rhetoric. Hundreds of young Africans arrived in Hungary 
during the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s with scholarships from the Hungarian state, who 
represent “an unbreakable link between our country and the continent,”65 according 
to the introductory text of the Budapest Africa Forum held between 6 and 7 June 
2013, celebrating the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity (OAU), predecessor of the African Union (AU). These individuals – who, as 
Hungarian graduates with partial Hungarian identities, or at least with the feeling 
of attachment to their former alma maters and Hungarian culture, also bearing the 
knowledge of the local language – can function as “ambassadors” to foster bilateral 
ties. ‘There is much to be done’, however, as the academic and NGO circles have been 
advocating for many years so that such potential commitments are channeled into 
concrete achievements for the benefit of both sides.
In addition to aspiring for “stronger interstate relations with the Sub-Saharan 
and Sahel regions,”66 connecting to Africa via the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and through its own new policy, Hungary’s priority for Africa is “to 
closely follow humanitarian issues, including food aid, along with agricultural, envi-
ronmental, water-management and health issues, and to assess the needs for sharing 
our experiences related to democratic transition.”67
62 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), at http://www.kormany.hu/
download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 41.
63 This section is based upon: I. Tarrósy and P. Morenth, “Global Opening for Hungary – New 
Beginning for Hungarian Africa Policy”, African Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1-2 (2013), pp. 
77-96.
64 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union”, The chapter on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel runs pp. 47-49.
65 See: http://budapestafricaforum.kormany.hu/hungary-and-africa
66 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), at http://www.kormany.hu/
download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 48.
67  Ibid. pp. 48-49.
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Taking a closer look at the “Africa-content” of different development, aid, or 
business-related policies, we feel that Africa is still in a marginal position. How Hun-
garian aspirations can be achieved better and with more success depends on whether 
or not the “African thread” can become a real foreign policy goal, which is sufficiently 
represented both in the government and abroad. A quick multi-country comparison 
in Hungary’s closest neighbourhood can show, however, that the present setting can-
not support the new policy: Poland maintains five embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, the Republic of South Africa), the Czech Republic 
seven (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, the democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the 
republic of South Africa, Zimbabwe), Slovakia four (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, the 
Republic of South Africa), and Hungary only three (in Kenya and the Republic of 
South Africa, together with the one in Nigeria, which was first closed in 2010, then 
reopened in 2013).68 On their own, diplomatic missions are not enough for a success-
ful policy implementation, but they are undoubtedly vital to build trust across local 
societies, business circles, or decision-makers. The policy of global opening has a 
definite answer to this by admitting that “Hungary needs to review how to address 
the problems arising from the short-comings of our network of representations in 
Sub-Saharan countries,” and underlining that “it would be pertinent to consider the 
(re)opening of at least two embassies, one in West Africa and the other one at the 
headquarters of the African Union, in Addis Ababa.”69
Hungary has a positive image in numerous African countries from two angles: 
first, it did not take part in Africa’s exploitation as a colonial power, second, with 
many of its former products, such as the Ikarus buses or Hajdu washing machines, and 
even the Elzett locks and the streamlined Diesel rail cars of the Ganz company can 
hold extra credits for refining and redefining relations. A good combination of utiliz-
ing ‘nostalgic’ feelings of both university studies and products, the resident African 
diaspora in Hungary representing many nations, together with a strengthened and 
extended network of diplomatic representations as part of a coherent and consistent 
government policy contributes to success in the long run. All these, however, need 
to be coupled with direct and immediate commitments (as in the case of the Libyan 
crisis) as a EU and NATO member state.
Hungary has several direct serious security policy and geopolitical concerns and 
interests, as far as migration, peacekeeping or NATO duties are taken into account. 
68 See: D. Kopinski, “Visegrád Countries’ Development Aid to Africa: Beyond the Rhetoric”, 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol 13, no 1 (2012), pp. 33-49., and “Hun-
gary reopened its embassy in Abuja”, http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/
news/hungary-reopened-its-embassy-in-abuja, 14 April 2014.
69 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), at http://www.kormany.hu/
download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 48.
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In the spring of 2013 the Hungarian government took part in the French-led military 
operation ‘Serval’ in Mali with experts from the Hungarian Armed Forces.70 For the 
economic and political refugees of Sub-Saharan Africa, Hungary is a potential target-
country. Organized crime, international terrorism, AIDS and tropical diseases can all 
reach Hungary, too. Therefore, to contribute effectively to the stability of the region 
and to reduce poverty in the long run is Hungary’s best interest, while at the same 
time, presents a crucial moral obligation for the country.
Hungary’s global opening on the African continent fosters the extension of coop-
eration in Southern Africa, which is a logical step as the Republic of South Africa is the 
country’s most important commercial partner in the entire continent. After Europe 
and the USA, China and the United Arab Emirates, it is South Africa that has increased 
its exports and has become Hungary’s fourth largest market, intensified its business 
activities, and strengthened its cultural and diplomatic presence in Hungary. South 
Africa defined a regional approach in its foreign policy toward Central Europe, and 
has been encouraging South African businesses to invest in more countries of the 
Visegrád area, for example. In this respect, SABMiller can present a success story 
with investments in the beer industry all across Central Europe.71 Is there any sense 
to foster cooperation among the Visegrád states, therefore, or competing for better 
business and investment deals is more important for individual national interests? 
Our final section will look at how Hungary thinks about Central Europe and its Viseg-
rád allies in its new policy of global opening.
Changing Visegrád relations – A more coherent regional community?
József Antall, the initiator of the Visegrád Group Cooperation, Hungary’s first prime 
minister after the change of the political system, was determined about his country’s 
place and ultimate role in its region. On 22 May 1990, in an address to the National As-
sembly in Budapest he presented a straightforward plan on behalf of his government, 
underlining that “pan-European cooperation is accompanied by intensive regional 
cooperation”, and he assured the parliament that Hungary “will seek to foster it with 
all its neighbors.”72 This thesis has been a cornerstone of Hungary’s foreign policy 
ever since, and therefore it is not surprising that the country’s “primary intention is 
to further strengthen the regional policy”, and “to enhance a global opening.”73
70 See: “Magyarok Maliban: megjelent a kormányhatározat”, HVG, 8 March 2013, at http://hvg.
hu/itthon/20130308_Magyarok_Maliban_megjelent_a_kormanyhatar, 22 August 2013.
71 See more of the company’s European presence at: http://www.sabmiller.com/index.
asp?pageid=833
72 J. Antall, Parlamenti beszéd, 5. ülésnap [5th day of the newly elected parliament in session], 
22 May 1990, http://www.antalljozsef.hu/hu/5__ulesnap, 23 August 2013.
73 Interview with János Martonyi, “Global Opening in Hungarian Foreign Politics”, 9 September 
2011, at http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulugyminiszterium/a-miniszter/beszedek-publika-
ciok-interjuk/global-opening-in-hungarian-foreign-politics, 9 July 2013.
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As the official foreign policy document states, the Visegrád countries “boast simi-
lar living conditions, thanks to which economic ties between these countries – espe-
cially since our joint accession to the EU – have started to develop dynamically, and 
now feature prominently in each other’s external economic ties.”74 It also admits that 
major developments are crucial in the sectors of transport and energy infrastructure 
to serve further expansion in economic cooperation. As for the political dimension, 
in addition to the management of the minority issue (in particular, the Hungarian 
communities all across the region), to be able to enhance “common positions at the 
European negotiating table,”75 alliance-building and frequent consultations are nec-
essary for all the members of the group. At the same time, it is vital to understand 
the different roles the Visegrád countries can imagine for themselves – as long as 
this may influence the facility of formulating common positions, or just the opposite, 
the difficulty of representing a common aim. Péter Marton (2012) neatly elaborates 
on the “sources of Visegrád conduct” in foreign policy-making, and in his compara-
tive analysis draws our attention to the “similarities [that] may be discovered in the 
uncertainty and fluidity of their role conceptions,”76 which for the coming years need 
careful attention on the level of each government.
The future of group dynamics depends on the interest of the participating states, 
whether or not all of them want to establish closer cooperation as an intra-regional 
formation within the European Union. They have “a natural overlap of their immedi-
ate foreign policy interest zones: the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership 
states,” and they are also “vulnerable to internal divisions as a result of divergent 
positions towards the most significant players in the international arena, that is, 
the US, China, and [Russia].”77 Although there are unanimous success stories for the 
members, for instance, in the field of civil society, cultural and academic projects 
funded by the International Visegrád Fund (IVF), as Anita Sobják (2012) notes, “divi-
sions are deep” as far as “positions in shaping the future of the European Union” are 
concerned, therefore, “expectations from the Visegrád Group should not be too high, 
but rather remain within the horizons of what can be deemed realistic.”78 The IVF has 
been a commitment, which is taken seriously by all the members of the group, and can 
provide a good ground for further ‘expansion of thought’ to support regional cohe-
74 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), at http://www.kormany.hu/
download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 21.
75 A. Sobják, “Rethinking the Future of the Visegrad Group at a Time of Heated Debate on the 
Future of the EU”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 4 (2012), p. 122.
76 P. Marton, “The Sources of Visegrád Conduct: A Comparative Analysis of V4 Foreign Policy-
making”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 4 (2012), p. 12.
77 A. Sobják, “Rethinking the Future of the Visegrád Group at a Time of Heated Debate on the 
Future of the EU”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 4 (2012), p. 124.
78 Ibid. pp. 138-139.
292 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
sion. The numerous grass-roots initiatives can reach out to the public at large, as well 
as include key decision-makers, together with lobby groups, think tanks, academics 
who all can contribute to ‘more Visegrád’ within the Community. This can then re-
flect Foreign Minister Martonyi’s thinking about the interest of Central Europe, “that 
the countries of the region do not compete with each other but that their interests 
are jointly represented towards the other regions.”79 However, before noticing the 
promising steps of Hungary towards a deeper and more committed regional coopera-
tion, we have to add that despite the grandiose comments and official documents, 
the participants of the Visegrád Cooperation have let each other down, or had been 
played out against each other by Western states several times, not to mention the 
Agricultural Agreements of the EU accession negotiations or as it happened in the 
case of the Climate Quotas. For a healthy cooperation, each of the members needs to 
recognize the fundamental importance of such a forum, especially in an ever-forming 
Community, where such a regional platform could be more successful in supporting 
of several common interests. In a “multi-speed” EU such cooperation can really find 
its momentum.
As for the recent situation, right after his oath of his second government80 in 2010, 
Prime Minister Orbán Viktor’s first official visit was paid to Warsaw. The gesture 
was exceptionally special, as this was the first time for a Hungarian Prime Minister 
to launch his foreign diplomatic routes in a regional country (not counting Austria in 
this context), also symbolizing the new connections between Poland and Hungary, 
emerging from the ideological bases of the governing parties and from the connec-
tions of the past.
2013 was a special year for Hungary with the opportune moment to enhance 
Central European cooperation. The country served as president of both the V4 Coop-
eration and the Central European Initiative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed 
commitment to curve the main focus of the year along the lines of “eliminating the 
possible obstacles to Central European cooperation, representing the region’s com-
mon goal within the European Union and to further the Central European participa-
tion of countries outside Europe,” therefore, emphasis was laid on “enhancing the 
international organizations’ transparency, as well as aiding economic development 
and facilitating mobility.”81 The Hungarian government supported the concept of a 
79 Interview with János Martonyi, “Global Opening in Hungarian Foreign Politics”, 9 September 
2011, at http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulugyminiszterium/a-miniszter/beszedek-publika-
ciok-interjuk/global-opening-in-hungarian-foreign-politics, 9 July 2013.
80 On 6 April 2014, the Fidesz–Christian Democrats (KDNP) coalition led by Viktor Orbán won 
the national elections and could form yet another government again with a two-thirds ma-
jority backing in the parliament. See more, for instance: “Hungary election: PM Viktor Orban 
declares victory”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26908404, 7 April 2014.
81 “2013 Central European year in Hungarian diplomacy”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 
December 2012, at http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/news/2013-
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“stronger Europe” with a “vision of a stronger Central Europe within the EU” to be 
able to improve “regional accessibility and the development of physical and human 
infrastructure […] in order to increase the region’s competitiveness.”82
Conclusion
“To adapt our foreign policy to the new realities across the world”83 is now the new 
mantra for Hungarian foreign-policy makers. There is an apparent change and adap-
tation in governmental communication which manifest that Hungary feels she has 
duties, but at the same time opportunities in different parts of the interconnected 
world, even in seemingly faraway regions of Asia, Latin America or sub-Saharan Af-
rica. Hungary’s declared “value-based foreign policy” wants to fulfill its central aims 
from two angles: to pursue the strategic goals of the European Union as one of its 
members states, and to advance its national interests “in all aspects that go beyond 
Hungary’s borders.”84 
Our paper has shown that the future of Hungary is still a future with an EU-
membership status – but recent tendencies are showing a growing interest towards 
the East, towards Eastern investments. This government policy, however, has an-
other side as well: to secure new export markets for Hungarian companies and their 
trademarks which can become new actors in other competing spheres beyond the 
European realm. In this context, this policy is more of a ‘turning back’ to the foreign 
policy of the socialist era with its peculiar ‘turning towards Eastern countries’ objec-
tive, building upon the memories of products of the country still familiar to the public 
at large. We can easily notice the government’s unique step to refinance its huge debt: 
Hungary offers 5-year-long residence permits for those foreigners who buy 250,000-
euro government bonds. Naturally, with this permit a given foreigner is allowed to 
enter the EU without any proper control – not the most proper step toward building 
trust among EU countries, and hardly the best tool to foster investments.
Strategic planning, however, is welcome in the administration and in civil society, 
as long as resources are also made available in a coherent manner. This is to be done 
systematically in the forthcoming years, with the enhanced involvement of differ-
ent stakeholders interested in the implementation of what the government aspires 
central-european-year-in-hungarian-diplomacy, 25 August 2013.
82 P. Rada, “The ‘Central European’ Year of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, CED Articles, 2 April 
2013, http://www.cepa.org/content/“central-european”-year-hungarian-foreign-policy, 20 
August 2013.
83 Quoting Szabolcs Takács in “Strategic Cooperation and Diverse Relationship”, Diplomacy & 
Trade, 31 January 2013, at http://www.dteurope.com/diplomacy/news/strategic-coopera-
tion-and-diverse-relationship.html, 9 July 2013.
84 “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011), at http://www.kormany.hu/
download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf, 20 July 2013. p. 3.
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for in terms of increased cooperation with different parts of the world. Recent 
developments in the affairs of the western Mediterranean region, for example, may 
also underline how timely Poland’s initiative is, seeking “to create a vision for the 
European Commission and the European Parliament and for coordinating the foreign 
policies of the EU member states.”85 The ‘European Global Strategy’ can strengthen 
the “outstanding role of the Visegrád Four in bridging the widening gap between the 
European Union and its neighboring countries.”86 Therefore, Hungary’s policy to-
wards the East can make even more sense, supposing that in the closer geographical 
vicinity of the country, together with its V4 allies, she can truly redefine and enhance 
Central European cooperation. Hungary’s attempts to re-position itself in an interpo-
lar world, and thus to re-orientate its foreign policy according to the new dynamics 
and opportunities to seek for more financial stability back at home at the same time 
are certainly formulated at the right time. By the end of the second decade of the 
twenty-first century we will be able to examine how successful this policy of global 
opening will have been, and whether or not Hungary will have joined forces with its 
regional allies in the most relevant way to “assume a more prominent position” with 
the Visegrád Group “at the European negotiating table.”87  
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The Vilnius Summit – 
A Milestone in the Eastern Partnership?
Teodor Lucian Moga1 – Gabriela Carmen Pascariu2
Abstract
The enlargement towards the Central and Eastern countries has created a rift be-
tween the new EU member states and the former post-Soviet space now under huge 
scrutiny taking into account the latest political developments. The EU strengthens 
cooperation with the six Eastern European partners – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – encourages reforms and aims at bringing them 
closer to its core values. Such is the case of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) which 
has recently sparked widespread debates about the future of these countries in the 
EU’s future configuration. Brussels has always sought to have strong political and 
economic ties with the post-Soviet region following the principle that a safer EU 
able to grow inside but also to assume in a responsible manner the role of a regional 
and international player is firstly obliged to put its near abroad in order. However, 
Russia’s recent diplomatic overtures have effectively reduced or even hampered the 
activity of the EU’s towards its vicinity – as the case of Ukraine best points out. This 
article seeks, on the one hand, to unpack the regional turmoil ignited by the EU’s 
attempt to include the aforementioned states into enhanced models of integration 
and cooperation (i.e. Association Agreements) and, on the other, to touch upon the 
challenges to the EU transformative power raised by the other competing actor in the 
post-Soviet area, Russia.
Introduction
Since its fifth enlargement wave (the 2004 big bang enlargement which saw the 
accession of ten new states), the European Union (EU) has engaged itself into the 
promotion of its acquis communautaire to third countries, most actively from its 
neighbourhood. In the near abroad the EU has designed alternative forms of inte-
1 Lecturer, Centre for European Studies, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi.
teodor.moga@uaic.ro
2 Professor, Centre for European Studies, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi.
gcpas@uaic.ro. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors.
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gration below the threshold of membership and above simple partnership.3 Such is 
the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), which aimed at concretis-
ing the Brussels’ aspirations for deeper integration with the surrounding states, the 
immediate backyard of the EU. For the near future, Brussels envisages the creation 
of an economic area similar to the European Economic Space with its neighbours. 
This statement has been initially raised by Romano Prodi, former president of the 
European Commission (1999–2004), who suggested that “it is worth seeing what we 
could learn from the way the European Economic Area was set up and then using this 
experience as a model for integrated relations with our neighbours” (Prodi, 2002: 7). 
However, the path towards full-fledged economic integration following the European 
Economic Area (EEA) example is still strewed with difficulties. This long-term pros-
pect is currently tempered: on the neighbours’ side, by some of the countries’ (i.e. 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) desire to be offered an accession perspective (consid-
ered to be the main incentive for domestic reform; currently not on the negotiation 
table) which adds up to the already Russian pressure to relinquish any institutional 
arrangements with the EU and join instead the Moscow-led projects (i.e. the Customs 
Union). On Brussels’ side, the EU still lacks the necessary transformative power to 
engage countries without a membership perspective. Instead of being a reliable force 
for good, the EU still finds it difficult to deploy efficient institutional models capable 
of managing tensions between exclusion and inclusion. 
Engaging the eastern neighbours – from the ENP to the EaP
Since the dissolution of the USSR the EU has radically changed its approach towards 
Eastern Europe. Whereas throughout the Cold War period Europe practiced a policy 
of exclusion, protecting itself from the Soviet threat, after the disintegration of the 
USSR, the EU shifted towards a policy of inclusion (Smith, 1996), whose centrepiece 
focused on the transfer of European values (democracy, rule of the law, respect for 
human and minority rights, liberal market economy etc.) to its immediate vicin-
ity. However, since the enlargement solution to the pan-European integration has 
reached an obvious fatigue (nearly to exhaustion),4 Brussels has devoted its support 
to developing alternative cooperative arrangements. As such, the EU has crafted a 
new strategy modelled on enlargement, a strategy, which the Union is now apply-
ing to its neighbourhood (Kelley, 2006). The ENP aimed at forging a new way of 
approaching the immediate neighborhood, but upholding its fundamental identity 
narrative as a peace project; it meant the creation of a stable area, a ring of friends 
3 In the current phraseology the ENP offers “more than partnership and less than member-
ship” (Prodi, 2002).
4 Despite Croatia’s accession to the EU on 1 July 2013.
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at the EU’s borders which in turn would ensure prosperity and regional security.5 
Since 2010, the main principle which underpins the EU’s approach has been more 
for more: the EU aims at developing stronger ties and offer greater incentives only 
to those neighbours which make more progress towards embracing European core 
values: open-up their economies and genuine democratic reform, free and fair elec-
tions, freedom of expression, of assembly and of association, judicial independence, 
fight against corruption, etc.
In the post-Soviet area, the ENP’s additional multilateral frameworks – Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) and Black Sea Synergy (BSS) – reiterate Brussels’ interest in the 
eastern proximity of the EU, by providing the premises for pushing the states in-
volved a step closer to the EU. Particularly the EaP, which emerged as a consequence 
of a joint Swedish-Polish initiative in May 2008, has been developed as an answer to 
the declining ENP’s appeal. It was meant to accelerate political association and fur-
ther economic integration between the EU and its partners. Thus, it added up to the 
existing ENP by embracing all EU’s Eastern European partners – Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, including Belarus, currently not covered by the ENP 
Action Plans – and by laying stronger emphasis on regionalism to supplement the 
relatively modest bilateral relations established under the ENP. Furthermore, the 
EaP has been an answer to draw a clear distinction within the heterogeneous ENP 
between the neighbours of Europe (the Mediterranean states) and the neighbours of 
the European Union (the post-Soviet states whose European sense of belonging confers 
them – at least from a geographic perspective – a future integration prospect6). 
The pivotal innovation of the EaP has been the development of new ambitious 
legal frameworks – the Association Agreements (AAs) – which provides the partner 
states specific blueprints for deeper economic and political integration with the EU 
(currently three out six EaP countries have ratified the AAs, namely Ukraine, Moldova 
and Georgia). 
In addition, both the ENP/EaP institutional arrangements and the envisaged AAs 
undergird the Europeanization process in the eastern neighbourhood and the EU 
external governance through the transfer of the legislative, structural, institutional, 
and economic policies – parts of the acquis communautaire – and the diffusion of 
European norms, values and principles.
5 The ENP is distinct from the enlargement policy. The ENP states have not yet been identified 
as future EU candidates. Belonging to Europe and being associated with Europe are two distinct 
phrases which draw a blurred line between the EU states and their neighbours. “The blurring 
of a boundary, however, does not then mean its elimination but that interactions across the 
line take on an increased intensity and complexity. This amounts, in short, to a growing inter-
dependence between the EU and its neighbours, and requires deliberate efforts by both sides 
to manage effectively that interdependence.” (Smith and Weber, 2008: 74)
6 A state wishing to apply for EU membership first and foremost must be a European state 
(Art. 49, TEU).
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The role of Europeanization in the EU’s external governance. Approaching the 
EaP states
The process of transferring values to the vicinity is mainly analysed from Europe-
anization mechanism perspective and the EU’s external governance. According to 
S. Joseph, the Europeanization process looks at “the reform of domestic structures, 
institutions and policies in order to meet the requirements of the systematic 
logic, political dynamics and administrative mechanisms of European integration” 
(Joseph, 2006: 2), whereas Ladrech perceives Europeanization as an “incremental 
process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that European 
Community political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic 
of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994: 69). 
EU scholars recently have paid increasing attention to the external effects of 
Europeanization which has expanded its focus exclusively from the members states 
to include the countries situated beyond the geographical borders of the EU. Despite 
having a weaker impact on the neighbouring states, due to the lack of EU membership 
promise, the EU conditionality still has a considerable influence from a twofold per-
spective: firstly, the broadening and the strength of the single market carries enough 
leverage to shape the domestic policies of the neighbours (having trade agreements 
with the EU implies the adoption of a set of European principles and rules by the part-
ner countries); secondly, by applying its external arrangements (the ENP, EaP), rules 
and practices, Brussels seeks to persuade the outsiders to emulate its policies and 
mechanisms and gradually adopt the acquis communautaire. (Börzel, 2010; Gstöhl, 
2007; Lavenex, 2004).
In the ENP/EaP region the neighbourhood Europeanization underpins and is in-
tertwined with the EU’s external governance, which “seeks to capture the expanding 
scope of EU rules beyond EU borders” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 791). Ac-
cording to Michael Emerson’s concentric circle model (Emerson, 2004), the EaP foresaw 
a number of new and important measures and initiatives to steer the neighbours’ 
direction towards European integration. As such, four main commitments – political, 
economic, security and intense contact with the civil society – have been employed, 
which have taken the shape of cross-border cooperation programmes, support for 
energy diversification, good environmental governance, incentives for small and 
medium-size enterprises, building response to the natural and man-made disasters, 
etc. All these initiatives emphasise the purpose of the EU, namely, forming a platform 
of political and economic cooperation with its neighbours that may provide security 
and stability. This platform offers concrete advantages for the initiator: a geostrategic 
position in the area, control over establishing the partnership frame and conditions, 
setting the cooperation agenda, etc. As highlighted in major EU policy documents, ulti-
mately the Union’s security interests within its own territory cannot be disentangled 
from its interests in its neighbourhood. (European Commission, 2003: 3) Thus, despite 
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the stated economic interests (the extension of the internal market and regulatory 
structures, preferential trade relations and market opening envisaged in the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements7), the EU’s goal of deeper integrating the EaP 
countries also carries a geopolitical reasoning.8 “Clearly, the DCFTAs follow a similar 
logic: greater prosperity resulting from trade is seen as crucial to increasing stability 
and security at the EU’s borders.” (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2013: 4) 
However, this has generated an ongoing competion between the EU and Rus-
sia, which considers the post-Soviet space as belonging to its traditional sphere of 
influence. The emergence of the Customs Union (2010), the Common Economic Space 
(2012) and planned Eurasian Union (2015) has raised additional challenges both for 
the EU’s transformative power and for the six countries which are currently caught 
into two different integration regimes. This makes them look for strategies to hold 
sway over the much more powerful centres. Surprisingly, even the weak position of 
being situated between two competing centres of power could constitute a key asset. 
The common strategies range from (1) gaining loyalty rewards (for not moving to an-
other centre), (2) intermediary rewards (the states could either stand as a bridge or a 
boundary between two centers) to (3) playing one centre off another, (4) manifesting 
empathy and/or emulation vis-à-vis a centre (depending one the chosen moment) or 
(5) exhibiting a bold plan (i.e. a clear rejection of one centre at a given moment).9 Such 
is the case of Ukraine whose Rada refused to ratify before the Vilnius Summit (28-29 
November 2013) an already-negotiated AA with the EU in a last attempt to persuade 
Brussels to increase its financial assistance, which would avoid – according to Kiev – 
Ukraine’s default. Thus, multivectoralism has been a usual trait, which steered these 
countries’ course of action (Parker 2008: 12), however, complicating their external 
policy choices. Even the most pro-European ones (Georgia, Moldova and, particularly, 
Ukraine) have been marred by domestic instability and lack of consensus. 
The EU-Russia rivalry in light of the Vilnius Summit. Yanukovych’s Janus face
This multi-faceted judgement has exhausted itself in the eve of the EaP Vilnius 
Summit when the neighbouring states were faced with difficult decisions to define 
their position in the future European configuration. The event hosted under the 
7 The DCFTA is a substantial FTA, which apart from abolishing customs tarrifs, includes 
non-technical norms for institutional harmonization, good governance, human rights and 
democracy (Moga and Fotea, 2012: 80).
8 Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, subject to DCFTAs are modest trade partners for 
the EU. According to the EU DG Trade data Moldova, Armenia and Georgia each account less 
0.1% of the EU’s exports, while Ukraine, EaP largest member,  represents only 1.4% of EU 
exports. (DG Trade 2013)
9 In his 2008 book, The geopolitics of Europe’s identity: Centers, boundaries and margins, Noel 
Parker thoroughly assesses the relationship between central, hegemonic states and mar-
ginal ones.
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Lithuanian Presidency of the EU demonstrated that Brussels has found additional 
tailored-made solutions to increase engagement with the region far greater than it 
was before 2009. In the past Brussels was often criticised for constantly overlooking 
partner countries’ specific needs and regional ties and for acting most of the time 
from a hierarchical position (Korosteleva, 2012). 
The most positive outcome of the Summit has been the initialisation of the AAs – 
including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) – with Moldova 
and Georgia. The most positive outcome of the Summit has been the initialisation of 
the AAs – including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) – 
with Moldova and Georgia, subsequently ratified in July 2014. However, the two AAs 
still need to be fully ratified in 2014 by their respective parliaments. The Summit has 
also brought some tangible results in the area of visa facilitation and liberalization 
(the EaP states have or soon have Visa Facilitation Agreements, whereas Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia has been given clear Action Plans), whilst cooperation in 
other domains such as agriculture, environment and common security and defence 
policy has been enhanced. Moreover, the EU has sought to be proactive by bringing 
countries in the region into international energy and aviation systems, encouraging 
public-sector reform, deepening research and educational exchanges and trying to 
integrate the region’s transport infrastructure into the backbone of the European 
transport system. 
However, achieving all the aforementioned goals seems still remote taking into 
account Russia’s diplomatic overtures to counter EU’s initiatives. Since the creation 
of the EaP, Russia has been one of the main stumbling blocks to the EU declared in-
tegration project and its transformative power. Moscow perceived the ENP/EaP and 
the very concept of shared neighbourhood as posing a threat to what Russia considers 
to be its traditional sphere of influence (Gower and Timmins 2009, 1685). As such, the 
Summit often regarded as a historic cornerstone in the relations between the EU and 
its eastern proximity has not managed to meet all the expectations, which proves the 
EU had overrated its ability to change East European neighbours. Whereas Azerbai-
jan expressed from the very beginning its lack of desire to negotiate an AA with the 
EU – thus keeping neutral towards both Brussels and Moscow –, Belarus and Armenia 
conceded to Russian pressure. Belarus has already taken a different path and decided 
to found in 2010 the Eurasian Customs Union together with Russia and Kazakhstan. 
Security, economic and energy implications has made Armenia to follow suit and join 
the Customs Union, after the announcement made in September 2013 by President 
Serzh Sargsyan (Euroactiv, 2013). 
Since the desintegration of the USSR in 1991 and gaining independence, Ukrainian 
leadership has vacillated between the EU and Russia for economic and political co-
operation playing off either Brussels’ efforts to deeper integration against Moscow’s 
attempts to include Ukraine into a Russian-led bloc or vice versa. Ukraine concluded 
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negotiations on a comprehensive DCFTA with the European Union in late 2011 and 
the Association Agreement in March 2012 which included 28 policy areas, inter alia, 
security and foreign issues, tailored reforms to improve the judiciary system and 
rule of law. Despite edging closer to signing trade and political agreements and 
being at some point the forefront of the EaP, Ukraine withdrew in the last moment 
its bid to sign the AA with the EU, instead insisting on deepening ties with Russia. 
This decision was motivated by domestic political calculations (the EU has repeatedly 
called for the release of the then imprisoned opposition leader, Yulia Tymoshenko, 
one of Yanukovich’s fieriest political rivals, move blocked by Kiev) and also by Russia’s 
increased pressure (particularly in the economic and energy fields) meant to demon-
strate the cost of Ukraine turning westwards. Moscow suddenly banned agricultural, 
diary and chocolate imports from Ukraine (the so-called “chocolate war”) on alleged 
sanitary flaws – a move in clear violation of its World Trade Organisation obligations – 
and threatened to raise gas prices.10 Thus, Russia has sought to discourage Kiev’s at-
tempts to sign the AA and push Ukraine to join its Customs Union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. According to Kremlin, Russia’s domestic market would be endangered 
by being “flooded” with more competitive European products, provided that Ukraine 
completely abolishes trade barriers with the EU.11 (Reuters 2013).
Conclusions. The post-Vilnius ‘era’: looking ahead?
Having the ongoing geostrategic competition between the EU and Russia and their 
respective institutional arrangements (the EaP versus the Customs Union), could the 
Vilnius Summit be regarded as a milestone for the EaP? To a large extent, the future of 
the post-Soviet countries is still bleak as much as the configuration of the neighbour-
hood is still uncertain. 
On the one hand, the partial failure of the EaP project and its November Summit 
has been a direct consequence of Brussels’ miscalculations. Since the launch of the 
EaP, the EU has developed and intensified ties with most of its eastern neighbours. 
However, it has hardly brought about structural change or significantly altered the 
course of their development. Whereas there is a growing need to enhance political 
freedom and civil liberties, the era of authoritarian (Belarus’s Lukashenko and Az-
erbaijan’s Aliyev) and hybrid regimes (defined as neither democratic nor authoritar-
10 The tensions between Russia and Ukraine over the price of natural gas and over gas transit 
to Europe via Ukrainian territory started in 2006 (and again in 2009) when Gazprom cut 
gas deliveries to Ukraine and, subsequently, to other parts of the EU.
11 Moscow has had a bilateral free trade agreement with Ukraine as legal basis fore their trade 
partnership since 1994 (enhanced in 2011 through the Commonwealth of Independent 
States’ framework). However, this relationship was rather rocky, since neither has been a 
member of the WTO until recently (Ukraine joined the WTO in 2008 and Russia in 2012). 
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ian; i.e. Ukraine under ex-President Yanukovich)12 has not completely passed. At the 
time being it seems the EU has not managed to coalesce its normative mechanisms 
(soft power) with a similar realist approach – capable of perceiving the essence of 
power relations between Russia and Ukraine – into a clear and coherent strategy. As 
such, the EU’s soft external governance model is at complicated crossroads, which 
does not allow the EU to deploy much transformative power. Obviously, unless a clear 
goal-oriented strategy is employed, the stake in the EU market looks insufficient in 
carrying enough leverage to steer the post-Soviet countries towards Europe. Whereas 
the Central Eastern European countries which joined the EU in the three consecutive 
enlargement waves – 2004, 2007 and 2013 – had a clear motivation to reform (the 
membership prospective), the EaP ones lack this kind of incentive. Europeanization 
in the post-Soviet region is mainly driven by internal dynamics which are not able to 
produce change, provided they do not have enough outside stimuli. Thus, following 
the same pattern the EU’s propensity to be a regional leader is still hampered from 
being successful in the near future.
On the other hand, ENP/EaP project has come under strain because of Russia’s 
counter-strategy. The mixed results from the Summit demonstrated the effective-
ness of Russia’s (hard) tactic. This corresponds with the Russian understanding of 
a zero-sum game with the West according to the realist behaviour based on power 
politics often employed during the Cold War. At least for the time Moscow managed to 
achieve its geopolitical aim of preventing Ukraine from drifting from its orbit. Many 
observers underlined the similarities between the current Ukrainian debacle which 
culminated with the annexation of Crimea and the backing up of the pro-Russian 
rebels in Eastern Ukraine with 2008, when Russia used the same tactics and managed 
to block Georgia from initiating Membership Action Plans with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization at its 2008 Summit in Bucharest (the months following the Sum-
mit saw the Russian-Georgian war and Moscow’s official recognition of both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia). 
All in all, unless a clear commitment between the two players – EU and Russia – to 
shift the paradigm from geopolitical competition to consolidated partnership, the 
struggle to beef up their respective institutional arrangements (EaP vs. Customs Un-
ion) is likely to continue, thus facing the neighbouring states with difficult decisions 
to make, as the case of Ukraine best reflected.
12 The placement in these categories of regimes has been undertaken in line with the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2012.
Near Abroad – Global Actorness – Governance | 305 
St
u
d
ie
s
Bibliography
BBC News (2013). “Russia deal saved Ukraine from bankruptcy - PM Azarov”, Retrieved 
December 19, 2013 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25427706. 
Börzel, T. (2010). “The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded. The Limits of Ex-
ternal Europeanization”, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 11, Kolleg-Forschergruppe 
(KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe“, Freie Universität Berlin.
Democracy Index (2012). Economist Intelligence Unit, Retrieved November 30, 2013 
from http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download
&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12.
Emerson, M. (2004). The wider Europe Matrix, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, Retrieved November 18, 2013 from http://www.ceps.eu/book/wider-
europe-matrix. 
Euroactiv (2013). “EU loses Armenia to Russia’s Customs Union”, Retrieved October 
20, 2013 from http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-loses-armenia-russia-
customs-news-530224. 
European Commission (2003). Wider Europe Neighbourhood: a new framework for 
relations with our eastern and southern neighbours, Communication to the Council 
and to the European Parliament COM (2003) 104 final, 11 March.
European Commission (2013). DG Trade, Retrieved November 30, 2013 from http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/. 
Delcour, L. and Wolczuk, K. (2013). “Beyond the Vilnius Summit: challenges for 
deeper EU integration with Eastern Europe”, Policy Brief, European Policy Cen-
tre, Retrieved November 1, 2013 from http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/
pub_3889_beyond_the_vilnius_summit.pdf.
Gower, J. and Timmins, G. (2009). “Introduction: The European Union, Russia and the 
Shared Neighbourhood”, Europe-Asia Studies, 61(10), pp. 1685–1687.
Gstöhl, S. (2007). “Political Dimensions of an Externalization of the EU’s Internal 
Market”, EU Diplomacy Papers, 3, Retrieved November 30, 2013 from http://aei.
pitt.edu/9593/.
Joseph, S. (2006). “Introduction: Turkey at the threshold of the EU”. In: Joseph S. Joseph 
(ed.), Turkey and the EU: internal dynamics and external challenges, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-15.
Kelley, J. (2006). “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through 
the New European Neighbourhood Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 
(1), pp. 29–55.
Korosteleva, E. (2012). The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: towards a 
more ambitious partnership?, London: BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and 
East European Studies.
Ladrech, R. (1994). “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case 
of France”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32 (1), pp. 69-88.
306 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
Lavenex, S. (2004). “EU external governance in wider Europe”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 11 (4), pp. 680–700.
Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). “EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing 
external governance in European politics”, Journal of European Public Policy, 16 
(6), pp. 791-812.
Moga, T. and Fotea A. (2012). “Enhancing regional integration through commercial 
ties in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU”, Centre of European Studies Working 
Papers, 4 (1), Retrieved December 12, 2013 from http://www.cse.uaic.ro/Work-
ingPapers/articles/CESWP2012_IV1_MOG.pdf, pp. 76-87.
Parker, N. (2008). “A theoretical introduction: spaces, centers, and margins”. In: 
Parker, N. (ed.). The geopolitics of Europe’s identity: Centers, boundaries and mar-
gins, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, pp. 3-23.
Prodi, R.  (2002).  “A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability, peace, 
security and stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”, Sixth ECSA-
World Conference-Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, Retrieved 
November 12, 2013 from http://Europe.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer
ence=SPEECH/02/619&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
Reuters (2013). “Putin says EU should not criticize Russia over Ukraine”, Retrieved 
December 18, 2013 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/us-
ukraine-eu-putin-idUSBRE9AP0TJ20131126. 
Smith, M. (1996). “The European Union and a changing Europe: establishing the 
boundaries of order”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1), pp. 5-28.
Smith, M. and Weber, M. (2008). “Political Dialogue and Security in the European 
Neighbourhood: The Virtues and Limits of ‘New Partnership Perspectives’”, Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review, 13, pp. 73–95.
St
u
d
ie
s
The EU–Turkey Relationship in the Past Few Decades
Esztella Varga1
Abstract
Accession is a very important question for both the European Union – we may ask 
if it is it a relevant question in time of the euro crisis – and Turkey. Both participants 
have a long history together and possess a very hectic relationship. Ups and downs 
have always been transparent, but the recent studies regarding Turkish view of EU 
membership indicate a serious decrease of faith. 
What are the core problems in this relation and how has the Turkish and EU 
strategy changed in the last few decades? This study is looking for answers for the 
questions above.
Short historical overview
Between Europe and Asia Turkey was always hard to identify as a national actor. In 
the Ottoman era she acted as an empire, but with the Ottoman decline there was a 
challenge ahead of the newborn republic. With the lead of Kemal Atatürk the Turk-
ish Republic laid its future with Europe struggling to abandon the eastern heritage. 
Although the state was shaped as a secular one, it should not be overlooked that the 
population is deeply Islamic and Turkey should be considered as part of the modern 
Islamic world. 
But who can be considered as a Turk? During the Ottoman era national identity 
was never a problem since the Ottoman rulers did not suppress the right of most 
minorities (Arabs, Christians lived peacefully together). After the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, however, the question of nationalism has been raised. With the 
many minorities living behind the borders of the Ottoman Empire nationalism soon 
became a highly important issue. The ‘Young Turks’, a nationalist party in the early 
20th century in Turkey seemed to have found the solution in spreading Ottoman (later 
Turk) identity. 
The drastic change began when Atatürk became the leader of modern Turkey. 
His vision included a secular, modern Turkish Republic, which is part of Europe. 
Driven by the examples of the western countries that have defeated the Ottoman 
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Empire in the First World War, Atatürk decided to reshape Turkey in the way of the 
countries of the West. He believed that by implementing their strength Turkey can 
regain its place amongst the great powers. Therefore, he adopted the western dress 
code, Latin alphabet as well as the secular state which are still the most important 
characteristics of the state. In the meantime, in its foreign policy the Arab states were 
kept in the background in favour of the European powers. It is a hard process for a 
deeply religious, eastern population to adopt the values of the West. The main pillars 
of their – or rather, Atatürk’s – ideology are: republicanism, populism, nationalism, 
secularism, statism and reformism. These fundamental ideals have a great impact on 
the Turkish state from the declaration of the republic (29 October 1923).
The wish to join the West, to be part of Europe remained the main priority in the 
Cold War era as well. In 1952 Turkey became a member state of NATO (established 
in 1949) emphasizing her Western alignment. According to the North Atlantic Treaty 
(Washington D.C. 4 April 1949), Turkey is considered as a Western, more importantly 
European country. “Article 10: The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any 
other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contrib-
ute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”
However, as long as the Turkish state does not accept the European values, practices 
and patterns of though she cannot be considered as European state, at least in the 
opinion the population of the European Union. 
European point of view
In fact the EU is far from being united regarding Turkey. Due to the lack of common 
foreign policy the Turks have to debate each member country over their right to be a 
full member state. France and Germany are the strongest opponents of the Turkish 
accession. The Hungarian–Turkish relation goes back several hundred years. These 
two nations always respected each other even as foes during our history. A sign of 
this mutual respect was the fact that Turkey supported Hungary’s acceptance to the 
NATO, which was a great step for Hungary: with this we joined the western side of the 
world instead of the old Soviet one. As Turkey once supported Hungary, now Hungary 
has to support Turkey to achieve her goal: to become a member of the European Union.
The main concerns regarding the Turkish accession can be divided into several 
groups: cultural, economic, geopolitical, social, etc. Some of these features Turkey can-
not change or improve. A brief summary of the most important issues (Ferguson, 2006):
• The population of Turkey is approximately 81.6 million (estimated July 2014, 
CIA The World Factbook), therefore, a significant change would happen in the 
decision-making process of the EU if Turkey becomes a member state. To the larg-
est member, Germany this issue can be considered as one the main problems as 
far as the Turkish accession is concerned. 
Near Abroad – Global Actorness – Governance | 309 
St
u
d
ie
s
• The implementing of the acquis of the EU in the agriculture and industrial sectors 
of the Turkish economy. However, Turkey has to show determination, capacity and 
willingness yet to adopt the EU’s acquis.
• There is a serious deficit in the Turkish democracy: the protection of human 
rights. There are some efforts on the Turkish part to make amendments, but they 
are neither enthusiastic nor effective enough. There is still a long way ahead of the 
country in this matter.
In addition to the above-mentioned there is the cultural difference, one of the main 
arguments of those who are against the accession. Mostly the Christian Democrats of 
Europe argue that the Islamic character of Turkey cannot be inserted into the EU; they 
simply do not belong ‘here’. It is a traditional way to look at Turkey; she has always been 
an outsider as long as Europe’s history is considered. True, she was always there, but in 
a marginal yet influential position, but never as one of the European powers.
One of the most problematic aspects of the accession is Turkey’s conflict with EU 
member states like Greece and Cyprus. Both of the conflicts are of historic origin and 
related to each other. The issue with Greece is of Ottoman origin, but nowadays is as 
crucial as ever. Greece – as a member state – could veto Turkey’s accession, and Greece 
strongly supports (Greek) Cyprus. The issue with Cyprus cannot be separated from the 
Greek problem, since the divided island is one of the main conflicts between Turkey and 
Greece. Only the Greek part was allowed to join the EU, the Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus is both economically and diplomatically embargoed ever since. Turkey as 
a response closed all her harbours to Greek ships. The solution of the Cyprus problem 
seems hard to find, given the Greek part of the island voted with ‘no’ to a 2004 proposal 
of union. As long as there is an open conflict between Turkey and some member states 
of the EU, Turkey cannot dream of membership. (www.news.bbc.com)
The European Neighbourhood Policy also has to change due to the Turkey’s future 
membership. The main focus of the EU’s policy is the swift and efficient conflict 
solving, using the elements of soft power. But being neighbours to Iran, Iraq and the 
conflict zone of the Middle East is a prospect the EU is not prepared for. The EU’s 
influence in this region would grow, but could the union handle such responsibility? 
Does it have the necessary tools to create a comprehensive strategy for the region? It 
should not be overlooked that another, more powerful actor is to be reckoned with: 
the USA (Rada, 2007). Since the USA plays an important role in the Middle East the 
clash of interests could lead to a growing tension between the EU and the USA.
With Turkey as a member the EU could have Iran, Iraq, Syria as neighbouring 
countries, but these states count as a potential danger to international security. Iran 
with her atom programme, Iraq, the state which could not be stabilized after 2003, 
and Syria with its raging civil war would be dangerous to the EU’s security. 
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Turkish point of view
The EU is the grandest peace-project in the history of Europe: there has never been 
such an integration to keep the peace as the EU. The Turks often emphasize how 
patient the Turkish nation is. It is true: the Turks are trying to become a member 
of the European integration process since 1959, although they have a strong public 
support behind them. The Ankara Treaty, a milestone in the relation was signed in 
1963. To the opposition of this statement are some polls, events of nowadays, it seems 
the Turks are beginning to lose their fate in the EU and the Turkish integration.
The Kurdish problem is also an often-discussed issue in connection with the ques-
tion of human rights. According to the official statements of the Turkish government 
this ethnic group living in the Eastern part of the country is guaranteed their human 
rights. They say that ten years ago it was restricted to even talk about this ethnic 
group, but today they have a television channel broadcasting 24 hours a day.
The economic matter is always important: Turkey is the 16th largest economy in 
the world and the 6th largest in Europe. It is also a member of the G20, therefore, she 
cannot be ignored as an important factor of the economic stability of Europe. Turkey 
has not only a large economy; its economic growth is quite dynamic as well: in the 
first half of 2010 the growth was 9% (www.economist.com). This percentage is im-
pressing considering that Turkey could afford such a change in the time of economic 
crisis all around the rest of the world. Not only the economy, but also the population 
is impressive: the average age is 28, while in the EU 42. It means huge refreshment in 
the European population in case of the common future.
Energy security is becoming a burning issue for the EU so it has to be dealt with. 
There should be a diversification in the energy sector in which Turkey could have an 
important role. The dependence on Russian energy is a fact, but there are other ways 
to the European consumers to secure their need of energy. There are pipelines in 
which Turkey is interested as a transit country. It could improve her status, impor-
tance for the EU as well as restoring the EU’s fate in Turkey.
The current energy situation can be described – at least from a Turkish point of 
view – as an oxymoron. While Turkey is planning to become a key factor in the Eu-
ropean energy security problem, she cannot open the energy chapter in this matter 
with the EU causing a big delay in the accession process. There are 35 chapters but 
20 are sealed and yet not discussed. 17 are politically sealed; one of them concerns 
Cyprus, which blocks the process. However, the Turks hope to open one additional 
chapter soon.
Why could the Turkish accession be beneficial for Europe? A few examples from 
the Turkish perspective: the EU could have an excellent mediator position. Turkey 
is the most Western part of the East and the most Eastern part of the West, so with 
the EU they can be a credible mediator between countries such as Iran and Iraq, the 
US and Iran, Israel and Syria. On top of that her military strength is significant in the 
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area: Turkey has the largest army in Europe and the second largest in the NATO. It 
could be a key to establish common European military actions. The fact that Turkey 
is such a strong and devoted NATO member could help achieve this goal.
Critics often say that Turkey is rather a part of Asia than Europe. A historical 
phrase is often cited in connection with this issue: Turkey was always “the sick man 
of Europe”, not Asia. The EU is not a “Christian Club” anymore. There are several 
million Muslim people living in the EU’s countries already. To these people Turkey 
could be a leader in connection with their integration to the nations they are living in. 
Regarding this matter the strongest opposing opinions can be identified: especially 
the two most important countries in the EU (Germany and France) have doubts. They 
are supporting a special partnership with Turkey instead of full membership. On the 
other hand, Turkey is only accepting full membership; any form of special partner-
ship is insufficient for her. 
10 September 2010 was a very important day for the Turkish people: there was 
a referendum about the amendment of the constitution. The reformers won, but it 
was also a victory for the governing force too, granting them with more power. The 
Turkish government as well as the EU greeted the referendum’s results considering 
it as a step towards the EU. The achievements of the referendum can be summed up 
as: the establishment of the institution of the ombudsman, the members of the army 
can now be prosecuted before civil judgment (Baran, 2009), the wider guarantee of 
human rights. The military had always had a great influence in Turkey. Its origin can 
be traced back to the Ottoman era, when the military was the root of reformism, 
therefore, a vital actor in the country. Atatürk – being part of this military himself 
– placed a great emphasis on their role as defenders of the republic. As Turkey more 
and more aligned herself with Europe, in the process of Europeanization the military 
became more and more a burden, an obstacle in the way of modernization. Nowadays 
the role the military has in Turkey is a disadvantage, therefore, the governments 
are trying to minimalize it in the policy making of Turkey. Time has come when the 
military became an obstacle to the republic instead of its defender.
The opposition, however – mostly in the Western part of the country – was against 
the changes introduced by the 2010 referendum. Their most important fear was that 
the government could become too powerful. And even a moderate Islamic government 
could shake the secular basis of the republic. Although the AKP government has always 
laid great emphasis on avoiding the Muslim references in connection to the party. The 
party simply describes itself as ‘conservative’ and not ‘Islamic’ (Kuzman, 2010).
Five main issues can be summed up between Turkey and the EU (rather in a Turk-
ish perspective):
1. The Turks have the feeling they are facing unreasonable excuses when it comes to 
the matter of accession. They do not request any favours during the process, just 
what other countries went through but without any needless delay.
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2. In the fight against terrorism the EU should cooperate with Turkey at a higher 
level. As a significant and devoted member of the NATO Turkey misses the intense 
cooperation with EU members in this important matter.
3. The issue of visa is also an important problem to Turkey: while the people of Ser-
bia, Montenegro do not need visa to access the EU, Turks do. Turkey officially is a 
future member state of the EU and yet has fewer privileges than other countries.
4. The matter of Cyprus is also a serious problem and a significant block in the way 
of accession. In the Turkish point of view the two issues (accession and Cyprus) 
are two strictly different matters and they should not influence each other. The 
conflict is between Turkey and Cyprus not the whole EU.
5. On the EU Council summits Turkey should be a member just like Romania, Bul-
garia as well as Croatia was before their accession.
There are a few interesting processes going on in Turkey now influencing the is-
sue of accession: not only the people lost their fate in the EU, but it also seems that 
Turkey has other priorities in the international arena than the accession. It looks like 
the country is struggling to find its own way in the world. But this process does not 
mean that Turkey lost all her interest in the EU, it is rather a natural process. There is 
a shift in the economic area towards the Eastern part of the world; Turkey (like any 
other country) is simply following this process.
As a conclusion, some of the Turkish leaders say: neither the EU nor Turkey can 
afford to lose each other as partners. It should be decided whether the cost of having 
Turkey out or having her in is higher to the EU. If this is decided the matter of acces-
sion could be solved in a consensual way. Nowadays Turkish international issues are 
hardly known to the West and this should be changed. Having Turkey as a member 
could open many possibilities for the EU: having new regions as neighbours, strength-
ening its economic position in the world, having stronger Atlantic connections.
The Turkish economy has a great potential, but the whole country is two-faced 
which threatens this great economic opportunity: the Western part is highly devel-
oped and represents a significant economic power while the Eastern part is very poor. 
The cultural issue was not a topic of the conference but it should not be neglected. 
Turkey is a Muslim country even when the secular state is achieved. After German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the failure of the multicultural society (www.
news.bbc.com) it is hard to imagine a Europe having the culturally distinct Turkey 
and its massive population successfully integrated.
Challenges of accession
The European Union has to face a completely different Turkey as it did in the 1980s. At 
the time of 1987, when Turkey officially asked for membership Turgut Özal, the Prime 
Minister focused mostly on economic growth. Human rights, the freedom of speech, 
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the freedom of press were only marginal questions. Therefore, human rights remained 
serious obstacles in the way of accession. In light of this, it is understandable why the 
Copenhagen criteria – adopted by the EU in 1993 – were such a challenge for Turkey. 
Instead of granting a formal accession status to Turkey, the European Union de-
cided against it. However, in the year of 1997 eleven other countries – including ten 
former communist states – have been offered the accession status. The most prob-
lematic issue from Turkish point of view is the status of Cyprus. Cyprus’ accession 
has been sped up by the decision in Luxemburg, and the country was able to join the 
European Union is 2004. Turkey on the other hand had been kept waiting, although 
her candidate status has never been questioned. 
A customs union was signed with Turkey in 1995, an agreement the EU signed only 
with Turkey. Neither the old, nor the new member states had to sign such a treaty 
with the EU in order to become a member state.
The significant change in the EU happened in 1999, when it officially recognized 
Turkey as a candidate to membership. The Turks were satisfied and happy with this 
decision; they considered this as a sign of the changing attitude of the EU. The change 
had its reasons, which are the following (Christensen, 2009):
• The war in Kosovo: In 1999 the EU failed to solve the international crisis due 
to its lack of common foreign policy as well as its flawed neighbourhood policy. 
Therefore, the EU adopted a more open neighbourhood policy to avoid such crises 
in the future.
• Social democratic wave: Chancellor Gerhard Schröder adopted a more multi-
cultural, inclusive way of thinking in connection with Turkey. His predecessor, 
Helmut Kohl considered the EU more like a ‘Christian Club’.
• Due to the change of German leading politicians economic ties were strengthened 
between Germany and Turkey. The Turkish minorities and the issue of their inte-
gration played a significant role in this matter.
• The European Council’s positive progress report in 1999: the Council showed that 
they have a positive attitude regarding Turkey’s accession. There has not been any 
significant change in Turkey’s progress considering human rights, etc., but the 
report suggested the EU’s trust towards Turkey.
The importance of the change in 1999 could not be minimalized: the Turkish 
people were joyous; they felt the positive atmosphere and were optimistic when they 
were asked about their country’s candidacy. The Turkish government reflected the 
people’s feelings: they took several steps to accelerate the membership process. Only 
foreign minister Cem could be counted as a voice of caution: he emphasized the dif-
ficulty of accession due to Turkey’s Eastern legacy, the lack of European values (e.g. 
human rights) and cultural differences. Prime Minister Ecevit stated, on the contrary, 
that Turkey would be a member state before the estimated time (Park, 2012).
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Due to the 1999 change Turkey introduced a reform process, which was laid 
down in a thousand-page-long national programme. The most significant aim of the 
programme was to implement the acquis of the EU, but the programme faced strong 
opposition. The importance of the programme can be summarized, however, as the 
sign of Turkey’s willingness and determination to align herself with the EU in an 
administrative, economic and legal way (Park, 2012). The reform process was not 
decelerated by the victory of the AKP in 2002; instead, it intensified. Many important 
steps were taken in order to move the ‘Europeanization’ of the country forward: 
packages of harmonization were passed in the parliament, together with legal pack-
ages (including the freedom of speech, religion, press), and the death penalty was 
abolished. 
However, the reforms slowed once again when the actual EU accession negotia-
tions began in October 2005. Of the 35 chapters of the negotiation there are only 12 
open, and only one (Science and Research) could be successfully closed in the past 
eight years! The rest of the chapters could not even be opened, nor negotiated. These 
are chapters including the issue with Cyprus, etc.
One of the remaining features of the progress report made of Turkey is the 
backwardness in such important issues as human rights, political and legal reforms. 
Turkey has made a considerable effort to shape herself to a form the EU is ready to 
accept, but she has not reached her goal yet. 
One of the new elements of the EU–Turkish relation is certainly the financial cri-
sis. Ever since 2008 the EU has not been able to defeat the instability of the Eurozone. 
With a weakened, struggling EU as partner the Turks seem to have lost interest in the 
accession. Would the growingly emerging Turkish economy want to be part of a union 
in such a difficult time? The future is dark – even if the EU defeats the current crisis 
the Eurozone would still be left weakened, and there would be more member states, 
which will not want to accept the common currency. (Eralp, 2012)
Despite all the difficulties the candidacy and the future membership are not off 
the agenda: with the accession of Croatia and the prospect of membership regarding 
Montenegro, Turkey is still a key factor to the EU. The vast amount of her popula-
tion as well as her territory makes her not easy to adopt. However, the population 
of Turkey grows impatient in the meantime. According to a poll made by GALLUP in 
2004, the Turks are mostly supportive towards the issue of EU accession and they 
see the EU as Turkey’s future. In 2012 only 17 per cent of the Turks are still supportive 
towards the EU. A significant decline (9%) can be noted even compared to the data of 
the previous year. (Sadikoglu, 2009)
Conclusion
The AKP party reigns in Turkey since 2002, and it is determined to reshape the 
Turkish Republic on a new base. This base would be the new constitution that would 
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strengthen the Turkish democracy in questions of the military (and its important 
role to protect the republic), the Kurdish issue, human rights, etc. The current consti-
tution – amended several times – came into force in 1982, following a military coup. 
Ever since the birth of the republic the constitution was shaped in the same way: 
always following a military coup. Therefore, the military’s influence has always been 
transparent in the previous as well as in the current constitution.
Instead of constantly rewriting the current one, writing a new constitution would 
give the opportunity to the Turkish government to implement the changes that have 
happened since the end of the Cold War. In the process of the modernization of the 
republic there is a point where the past should be closed in order to move forward. 
The constitution would try to achieve this goal – at least in the rhetoric of the Turkish 
government.
Despite the many changes in Turkish politics, the EU is still a key factor of the 
future of Turkey. The negotiation may have slowed down but the economic relation is 
still vital for both participants. Turkey’s main export partner is still the EU, and for 
the EU Turkey is also substantial. However, due to the lack of encouragement coming 
from the EU, Turkey adopted a new model of foreign policy: they are focusing now 
on their region, trying to be a moderator in the Middle East. This foreign policy has 
its flaws, but the impact of refocusing Turkey’s interest could be noted in the state’s 
relation with the EU. 
The long wait, the opposition of some EU members and the refocused foreign 
policy led to a loss of interest in the EU. The Turks are not only disappointed in the 
EU, but also are opposing the accession in an increasing number. Still, the EU can be 
considered as Turkey’s main objective and the future prospect of the country based 
on Atatürk’s legacy.
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La Unión Europea y América Latina: 
las cuestiones de una alianza estratégica birregional 
István Szilágyi1
En torno a la política exterior de la Unión Europea 
Como un sistema político sui generis y una formación multicolor, la Unión Europea 
es una macroregión que a través del concepto Europa aglutina a diferentes regiones, 
zonas, sistemas y países dentro de la cual se trazan importantes líneas de fractura 
que se manifiestan en tradiciones y prioridades políticas, económicas, sociales, cul-
turales, lingüísticas y de política exterior. Las relaciones exteriores y de seguridad 
de la UE, sus relaciones con otras regiones así como la solución de conflictos inter-
nacionales tiene carácter intergubernamental. La creación de presidencia de la UE y 
de la Comisaría de Exteriores, la Política de Defensa y Seguridad Común constituida 
en 1999, las cumbres de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno así como el Acuerdo de Lisboa 
entrado en vigor el 1 de diciembre de 2009 indican la necesidad de un sistema de 
prioridades de una política exterior común.
La amplición al Este2, el Proceso de Barcelona iniciado en noviembre de 19953, la 
Política de Vecindad Europea anunciada en el 20044, así como las relaciones de la Unión 
con los países del Mediterráneo, especialmente España y Portugal, y con los países 
del Tercer Mundo, especialmente América Latina y el Maghreb, cuyas relaciones se 
remontan a más de medio milenio, han determinado este sistema de prioridades de 
política exterior. Durante el análisis de las relaciones entre la UE y los países de Amé-
rica Latina y el Caribe (ALC) y a partir de 2013 como Comunidad de Estados Latinoa-
mericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) hay que prestar atención a los cambios tenidos lugar 
1 Professor, Department of Political Geography, Development and Regional Studies, Universi-
ty of Pécs. szortega@freemail.hu
2 Véase Szilágyi, István.(2004). La política hacia el „Tercer Mundo”de la Unión Europea la am-
pliación al Este.(en húngaro) Comitatus. 7-8, 7-22.; Szilágyi, István. (2007). Política exterior 
y la ampliación de la Unión Europea. Las enseñanzas mediterráneas y húngaras. Veszprémi 
Humán Tudományokért Alapítvány, Veszprém,
3 Véase El proceso de Barcelona y Europa Central y del Este.(en húngaro). Szeged. Szegedi 
Tudományegyetem, 2001.; István Szilágyi,István.(2008). The Barcelona Process Revisited 
in the SBH Presidency. In: New Perspectives for the Team Presidencies: New members, 
New candidates and New Neighbours. Budapest, ”Together for Europe Research Center”.
Budapest. 423-443.
4 Véase Communication from the Commission. A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Brussels,05/12/2007.COM(2007) 774. final.
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tras la desaparición del mundo bipolar, la rivalidad y competencia entre los centros 
de poder que representan un nuevo tipo de regionalismo institucionalizado. Durante 
las últimas tres décadas del siglo XX y el inicio del siglo XXI la política exterior y 
el espacio de acción de los países, de las organizaciones gubernamentales y de las 
integraciones regionales se determinan cada vez más por nuevas relaciones estatales 
y por las asociaciones estratégicas de nuevo tipo entre las integraciones regionales. 
La cooperación estratégica entre la UE y ALC-CELAC merecen una atención especial y 
un papel destacado en este proceso.
La Unión Europea – América Latina: los fundamentos de la asociación estratégica
Las relaciones entre ambas regiones – la Comunidad Europea (CE) y ALC-CELAC – 
se han hecho intensivas durante las últimas tres décadas aunque el diálogo entre 
el Parlamento Latinoamericano, Parlatino, que aglutina a los representantes de los 
países latinoamericanos y la Asamblea de Europa, desde 1986 Parlamento Europeo, 
se iniciaran ya en la década de los sesenta del siglo XX.  En los años ochenta del pasado 
siglo, el Parlamento Europeo declaró de importancia estratégica sus relaciones con 
el Tercer  Mundo, especialmente con Sudamérica. Tras el ingreso de España y Por-
tugal a la Comunidad Europea, esta dimensión hacia América Latina se dirigió a un 
acercamiento económico, político y cultural, principalmente con la intermediación de 
España, hacia la creación de un status particular de asociación.
Desde su creación en 1957, la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) entró en 
contacto con las organizaciones económicas latinoamericanas, firmándose en la dé-
cada de los setenta los llamados acuerdos comerciales de primera generación. Estos 
conllevaron a los Acuerdos de Lomé I y Lomé II en 1974 y 1979 entre la CEE y los países 
de Asia, el Caribe y el Pacífico (ACP). Durante los años ochenta y noventa nacieron 
acuerdos de segunda generación en parte en los acuerdos de Lomé III (1984), Lomé 
IV (1990) y Lomé V (1995), así como en el Acuerdo de Cotonú, firmado en el 2000. Sin 
embargo, otra parte se relaciona ya directamente con los países latinoamericanos 
(Brasil), así como con organizaciones de integración (Comunidad Andina, Mercosur)5. 
Una tercera generación de acuerdos tiene lugar en la década de los noventa tras la 
desaparición del mundo bipolar. La primera Cumbre Birregional de Rio de Janeiro 
de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de junio de 1999 determina el nuevo tipo abierto de 
regionalismo, y la alianza estratégica se materializa en forma de acuerdos bilaterales 
y de asociación. El encuentro y las consiguientes cumbres al más alto nivel entre la 
UE y ALC, las conferencias y consejos de especialistas significaron una respuesta de 
estos actores a los retos integratorios de las nuevas relaciones internacionales.6
5 Se tratará de las organizaciones de procesos integratorios.
6 Véase Colomer Viadel, António. (coord): (2007). La integración política en Europa y en 
América Latina. Instituto de Iberoamerica y el Mediterráneo. Valencia,
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La época de grandes transformaciones geopolíticas en Europa terminó en la víspe-
ra del nuevo siglo. La UE, ocupada con la ampliación y las tareas de la profundización 
de la integración, ha iniciado con la puesta en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa profundas 
y por el momento inseguras reformas institucionales. Entre ellas, la prioridad de la 
política exterior de la Unión, la determinación del círculo de alianza, la ampliación 
del área de acción internacional de la Unión y el afianzamiento institucional de sus 
posiciones estratégicas.
Entre 1990 y 2013, América Latina atravesó cambios políticos y económicos de gran 
importancia histórica también. Durante las décadas de los ochenta y los noventa tuvo 
lugar la caída de los regímenes dictatórico-autoritarios que representaban el poder 
de los militares y que habían surgido durante los años sesenta y setenta mediante 
golpes de Estado.7 Tras el nacimiento de los regímenes democráticos vino el periodo 
de reforzamiento de, por una parte, de integraciones continentales que ya existían 
(Comunidad Andina – CA),  por otra, la formación de nuevos procesos integratorios 
(Mercosur, 1991; Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, 2007), o de la Comunidad Ibero-
americana de Naciones (CIN, 1991)8 ligada a España y Portugal. Además de la coopera-
ción intrarregional, América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) como actor independiente de las 
relaciones internacionales intenta ampliar su espacio de acción, eliminar su relación 
de dependencia y determinar su modelo de integración interregional. La constitución 
de la CIN es un ejemplo de manifestación de estos intentos.
Al inicio del siglo XXI y desde el punto de vista latinoamericano, parece ser que se 
cristalizan tres guiones. Además de la opción de relaciones más estrechas con los EE 
UU, la tendencia del hemisferio sur a una unión continental va ejerciendo una seria 
influencia. Y desde la mitad de la década de los noventa del siglo pasado emergió 
la idea de la creación de una estrategia de alianza y asociación entre la UE y ALC, 
la cual se ha convertido en práctica de política exterior y paradigma de integración 
para ambas partes. Esto, lo que el documento de la Comisión Europea de primavera 
de  2008 titulado  La asociación estratégica entre la Unión Europea, América Latina y 
el Caribe: un compromiso común acentúa en su introducción, tiene una raíz común 
histórica, lingüística, de valores, política y de civilización: “La Unión Europea (EU), 
y América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) son aliados naturales unidos por fuertes vínculos 
históricos, culturales y económicos, así como por una convergencia cada vez mayor 
de valores básicos y principios. Comparten un compromiso común respecto a los 
derechos humanos, la democracia, la buena gobernanza, el multilateralismo y la co-
7 Véase Szilágyi, István.(1991). Autoritarismo, Estado de Excepción, abertura, transición. En: 
Introducción a la política comparada. Aula Kiadó, Budapest.145-160.(en húngaro); Szilágyi, 
István.(1996).Transición y consolidación democrática en España.(en húngaro).Napvilág 
Kiadó, Budapest.11-24.
8 Véase Szilágyi, István. (2006).La Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones en la política 
mundial. Revista de Historia Actual. 4, 155-165;
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hesión social, y cooperan para lograr estos objetivos. Todo esto hace que sean socios 
bien adaptados para abordar juntos los retos globales”(The Strategic Partnership 
between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: a joint commitment, 
2008: 5). El documento considera de actualidad el análisis elaborado por la Comisión 
Europea en el 2005 sobre el reforzamiento de la asociación UE-ALC.9
Como medida para la contribución al desarrollo de la cooperación, para el periodo 
2007-2013 la UE creó el llamado Instrumento de Cooperación al Desarrollo (ICD). El ICD 
abarca cinco regiones geográficas – América Latina, Asia, Asia Central, Oriente Medio 
y Sudáfrica – asimismo como cinco programas temáticos. Estos últimos, la inversión 
en los ciudadanos, la gestión sostenible de los recursos naturales y la energía, apoyo 
a las autoridades locales y no gubernamentales, seguridad alimentaria y migración y 
asilo fueron los capítulos destacados. La UE estableció asignaciones financieras para 
estos programas y regiones. Para América Latina la cantidad para el periodo 2007-
2013 es de 2,690 millones de euro. Las prioridades establecidas en el programa están 
en conjunción con las prioridades del Programa de la ONU Objetivos de Desarrollo del 
Milenio10 adoptado en el 2000 y a realizarse hasta el 2015. La UE tampoco se olvida de la 
región del Caribe. Entre 2008-2013 aportará un apoyo de 760 millones de euro. 
Las relaciones comerciales entre AL y la UE se han ampliado de forma muy im-
portante durante las dos últimas décadas. La UE se convirtió también en el mayor 
inversor en la región. En gran parte esto se debe a las estrechas y tradicionales rela-
ciones del subcontinente con el Gobierno de Madrid. Para finales de la década de los 
noventa del siglo pasado el 52% de las inversiones extranjeras directas en la región 
eran españolas, logrando así que numerosas grandes empresas españolas (Telefóni-
ca, YBERDROLA, Repsol YFP, Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Banco Central 
Hispano, Banco Popular Español, Iberia, Sol Meliá y Tryp, la Compañía Valencia de 
Cementos, etc.) ocuparan los primeros puestos en los sectores determinantes de los 
países del continente – sector bancario, hostelería y turismo, energía, telefonía y 
comunicación.11 Sin embargo, el volumen del intercambio de mercancías entre ambos 
“continentes” no refleja las medidas esperadas de la estrategia de asociación. “…si 
América Latina fuera un solo país, – podemos leer en un informe – … sería el sexto 
9 Vease: A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America. Euro-
pean Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.
(COM2005.636.final.) Luxembourg, 2006.
10 El documento puede leerse en la página 321 del libro Barbé,Esther.(2003)Relaciones Inter-
nacionales. Editorial Tecnos, Madrid.
11 Véase Szilágyi, István.(2005). Identidad nacional y política exterior de la España democrá-
tica.En: Identidad nacional y política exterior en la area euroatlantica. (en húngaro). Teleki 
László Alapítvány, Budapest. 255-289..; Szilágyi, István.(2006). Nosotros somos un mundo. 
La política „imperial” de las democracias nuevas de Portugal y de España. En: István Szilá-
gyi: Portugal y España. Historia y política en el siglo veinte.(en húngaro). Veszprémi Humán 
Tudományokért Alapítvány. Veszprém, 210-243.
Near Abroad – Global Actorness – Governance | 321 
St
u
d
ie
s
socio comercial de la UE, con flujos cercanos a los que existen con Japón, aunque 
representa apenas  el 5,2% de los intercambios de la UE. Y a pesar de las críticas 
latinoamericanas al proteccionismo europeo, el hecho es que esta región provee más 
de la cuarta parte de los bienes agrícolas que compra la UE en el exterior.”(Freres y 
Sanajua ,2006:25-26)
Analizando la otra cara de la misma cuestión podemos afirmar que: “Si la UE fuera 
un solo país – y desde el punto de vista comercial no cabe duda de que ya es un actor 
unitario – sería el segundo socio de América Latina, su segunda fuente más impor-
tante de inversiones directas extranjeras y el principal donante de ayuda.”(Freres y 
Sanajua , 2006:25)
Es un hecho que las relaciones económicas entre la UE y AL han tenido un gran 
desarrollo en el último cuarto de siglo. El intercambio comercial tuvo un crecimiento 
de un 15% por promedio anual, pero a un ritmo desigual y a un ritmo más acelerado 
que su capacidad económica. La información que aparecen en el libro editado por 
Juan José Martín Arribas coincide con las conclusiones de las fuentes ya citadas. En 
el 2003, la participación de América Latina en la exportación mundial era de un 5%, 
mientras que en las importaciones era de un 4,7%. En el caso de la UE15 estos valores 
alcanzaron el 38,7%. Si a éste le agregamos el el promedio de 2,6% y de 2,9% de la 
Europa Centro-Oriental, obtendremos que el volumen de exportación mundial de la 
UE es de 41,3%, mientras que el de las importaciones es de 41,6%. Su gran rival, los EE 
UU muestran unos datos estadísticos de 13,3% y 19,9% respectivamente. Sin embargo, 
no olvidemos tampoco los intereses de Japón y de China hacia América Latina. Japón 
aporta un 6,3% a las exportaciones mundiales y un 4,9% a las importaciones. En el 
caso de China, los datos son 5,8% para las exportaciones y 5,3% para las importacio-
nes.(Martín Arribas,2006:240)
Antes de iniciar el análisis de las relaciones económicas UE-ALC quisiera llamar la 
atención al siguiente dato: la UE de 500 millones de habitantes aporta con un 23,4% al 
PIB mundial. La América Latina de 530 millones de habitantes, sólo un 7,5%. De esta 
forma, y tomando en cuenta la estrategia de asociación, las dos regiones representan 
una tercera del PIB mundial. En caso de una cooperación efectiva esta situación otorga-
ría un peso importante a la integración en el sistema de las relaciones internacionales.
Al mismo tiempo, las relaciones UE-ALC se caracterizan por asimetría y desbalan-
ce económico. Los países del Nuevo Mundo y sus asociaciones de integración expor-
tan, principalmente, alimentos, bebidas, tabacos y productos tradicionales, así como 
un 37,3% de materias primas. Tienen que luchar contra el proteccionismo de la UE; 
más de la mitad de las importaciones provenientes de la UE son productos técnicos 
y manufactura.(Martín Arribas,2006:240-245).La ampliación de la UE al Este no se 
considera de hecho relevante e influyente desde este aspecto. La UE y ALC no son 
sólo socios estratégicos, sino también rivales desde el punto de vista de las relaciones 
comerciales
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Resumiendo podemos decir que una gran parte de la economía latinoamericana 
se atrasó en la competencia con la UE. Esta desventaja se manifiesta de manera dife-
rente en las relaciones de los Estados latinoamericanos de desarrollo económico he-
terogéneo (Chile, Mexikó) y sus integraciones interregionales (Comunidad Andina de 
Naciones, CARICOM, Mercado Común Centroamericano, Mercosur), con la UE.(Martín 
Arribas, 2006: 260)
“La globalización no es un proceso tan global como su nombre parece indicar – 
podemos leer en la conclusión de la obra de Martín Arribas. – En este escenario, 
la UE es uno de los protagonistas económicos frente al papel residual de América 
Latina y el Caribe. Desde la perspectiva latinoamericana, el comercio con Europa es 
importante. Aunque si bien Estados Unidos es el primer socio comercial de ALC en su 
conjunto, para Chile, el MERCOSUR y la CAN, la Unión Europea se convierte en destino 
principal de sus productos. Sin embargo, Europa está perdiendo peso en el mercado 
latinoamericano debido a que su comercio se centra en productos no dinámicos en el 
comercio internacional. En este “terreno” está siendo ganado por los EEU. En sentido 
opuesto, ALC es solo una región marginal en el comercio de la UE”(Martín Arribas, 
2006:261)-  concluye el análisis.
La colaboración birregional UE-ALC descansa en cinco pilares que son la soli-
daridad, la autonomía, los interes, los valores comunes y la asociación. Estos cinco 
pilares se encuentran en el cruce de tres tendencias. En ellos influyen las tendencias 
regionales que caracterizan a la UE y a ALC, asimismo las de corte global. 
En el proceso de la creación de una asociación estratégica birregional de la formu-
lación e institucionalización de objetivos y prioridades comunes, durante el esbozo 
de los posibles guiones es imprescindible tomar en consideración estas tendencias.
Igual posición tuvo la sesión de diciembre de 2007 de la EuroLat, la Asamblea 
Parlamentaria Euro-Latina que une a los representantes parlamentarios de la UE y 
América Latina. En la Resolución aceptada el 20 de diciembre por uno de los foros 
más importante de la alianza estratégica birregional acentuó que “la Asociación 
Estratégica no habrá alcanzado plenamente su objetivo hasta haber propiciado un 
mayor acercamiento entre sus sociedades, impulsado sus niveles de desarrollo so-
cial, y haber contribuido de forma decisiva a una reducción drástica de la pobreza y 
desigualdad social en América Latina, a la que debe contribuir tanto el continuado 
crecimiento económico que se viene sucediendo en la región en los últimos daños, 
como los intercambios y la ayuda de todo tipo y el transvase de experiencias en mate-
ria de cohesión social que puede aportar la Unión Europea…
América Latina tiene una riqueza propia en recursos humanos y materias primas 
y que además constituye un mercado muy importante para la Unión; y que ésta, a 
pesar de la actual asimetría de las relaciones comerciales, es un socio clave para el 
desarrollo económico, industrial, científico y tecnológico de América Latina y puede 
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contribuir a la diversificación de la región, tradicionalmente muy vinculada con 
Norteamérica, y con vínculos crecientes con
Asia (y en particular China)”(Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly. 
EuroLat. Text Adopted at the session of Thursday, 20 December, 2007: 4)
Según el EuroLat, hay que profundizar también la dimensión política y de seguri-
dad de las relaciones entre ambas regiones. De acuerdo al documento aprobado por la 
Asamblea, para 2013 hay que superar las soluciones ad hoc de los apoyos comunes a las 
acciones y proposiciones aisladas en el escenario internacional. La Asamblea apoya 
la creación de un Espacio de Asociación Interregional Global Euro-Latinoamericana 
(Euro-Latin American Global Interregional Partnership Area- ELAGIPA) que abarque los 
terrenos político, económico, social y cultural. Para el eficaz funcionamiento de la co-
operación propuesta es necesaria la creación de un sistema institucional adecuado.Y 
como un fundamento institucional de la alianza birregional sirven las Cumbres de los 
Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE y ALC. 
La alianza estratégica en el camino de la institucionalización: las Cumbres 
Bajo el signo de la delimitada idea e intención en junio de 1999 se organizó en Rio de 
Janeiro la I Cumbre UE-ALC con la participación de 48 Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de 
ambas regiones.12 El Preámbulo de la Declaración del encuentro acentuó lo siguien-
te: “Nosotros los jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unión Europea y  de América 
Latina y el Caribe hemos decidido promover y desarrollar nuestras relaciones hacia 
una Asociación Estratégica Birregional, basada en la profunda herencia cultural que 
nos une y en la riqueza y diversidad de nuestras respectivas expresiones culturales. 
Las mismas nos han conferido acentuadas identidades multifacéticas, así como la 
voluntad de contribuir para la creación de un ambiente internacional que nos per-
mita elevar el bienestar de nuestras sociedades y cumpliendo con el principio del 
desarrollo sostenible, aprovechando las oportunidades  que ofrece un mundo cada 
vez más globalizado, en un espíritu de igualdad, respeto, alianza y cooperación entre 
nuestras regiones.”13 “ Esta primera e histórica Cumbre fue convocada en virtud de la 
voluntad política de fortalecer las ya excelentes relaciones birregionales, basadas en 
valores compartidos y heredados de una historia común. El objetivo de esta Cumbre 
es fortalecer los vínculos de entendimiento político, económico y cultural entre las 
dos regiones, a fin de desarrollar una Asociación Estratégica entre ambas.”(Martín 
Arribas, 2006: 314.)
El documento esbozó un programa de cooperación basado en 55 prioridades para 
un periodo de 25 años, determinando también el contenido de 55 objetivos a corto 
plazo que formarían la base de acciones conjuntas directas. El elemento más impor-
12 E inglés http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/9906/p000448.htm. En español en la obra editada 
por Juan José Martín Arribas, 2006: 314-332.
13 http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/9906/p000448.htm, En español Martin Arribas, 2006: 315.
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tante de esto último es la conclusión de un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre ambas 
regiones de acuerdo con las disposiciones de la Organización Mundial del Comercio. 
Para la UE, el punto más difícil de cumplir es el capítulo que haría posible la libre 
entrada de los productos agropecuarios latinoamericanos en el mercado de la UE. No 
es casual que en esta cuestión la UE siga una táctica de pasos cortos.
Dar los pasos prácticos que hagan posible el libre ingreso de productos agropecua-
rios latinoamericanos representa el punto más neurálgico, el menos posible y el más 
difícil de cumplir desde el punto de vista de la Unión. El programa de acción dispone 
de inversiones financieras comunes a través del Banco Europeo de Inversiones, así 
como la introducción del euro en las relaciones comunes. Es de destacar las acciones 
comunes de los parlamentos en los diferentes foros e instituciones internacionales, 
así como los programas que refuerzan la cooperación en el área de la salud, cultura 
y ciencia. 
La mayor finalidad común de la asociación estratégica es la realización de una 
democracia participativa y representativa, los Derechos Humanos, el imperio del 
Derecho, el buen gobierno, el pluralismo, la paz y la seguridad internacional, la es-
tabilidad política y la confianza entre las naciones. En el aspecto político acentúa el 
diálogo institucional UE-ALC, la democracia y el respeto de los derechos fundamenta-
les. En la esfera económica se compromete a la construcción de un sistema comercial 
internacional multilateral, un eficaz funcionamiento de las relaciones económicas 
birregionales basado en un regionalismo abierto, la liberalización comercial, estímu-
lo a la prosperidad, la lucha contra los procesos financieros inconstantes y de efecto 
desestabilizador, apoyo a las inversiones que contribuyen a fortalecer la producción y 
a los pequeños países. En el área cultural y científico, social y humanitario basados en 
la enorme herencia cultural que une a ambas regiones, considera entre sus principa-
les valores mantener los conocimientos desarrollados durante el proceso histórico, 
el renacer, contribuir a la educación general, defender y mantener las diferencias 
culturales. 
La Cumbre enumera numeros programas a largo plazo: @Lis, la creación de la 
sociedad de la información, ALFA y Erasmus Mundus para la educación superior, 
URB-AL, desarrollo de las ciudades y comunidades locales, AL-Invest, para inversión 
y comercio, ECIP, cofinanciamiento de los llamados programas horizontales. A estos 
se unió el programa Alßan  de apoyo a estudios de posgrado y doctorales y aceptado 
en la Cumbre de Madrid de 2002.
La Segunda Cumbre de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE y América Latina 
tuvo lugar en mayo de 2002 en Madrid. En este encuentro las cuestiones de coopera-
ción cultural jugaron el papel principal, sin embargo, figuraron también en la agenda 
temas referentes a las ayudas materiales y de cooperación concreta en áreas econó-
micas, así como las posibilidades de éstas y la creación de sus mecanismos. En honor 
a la verdad histórica tenemos que añadir que los cinco (entonces) países miembros 
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del Pacto Andino (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Perú y Venezuela), así como los países 
centroamericanos quedaron extraordinariamente descontentos con los resultados 
económicos de la Cumbre. Según palabras del entonces presidente de la Comisión 
Europea, Romano Prodi (1999-2004), con la ampliación al Este la UE no se encontraba 
en la situación de firmar acuerdos de asociación con los países latinoamericanos. Las 
dos excepciones son Chile, con el cual se firmó un acuerdo de asociación el 18 de mayo 
de 2002 y México, con el cual se había concluido un acuerdo similar en el 2000.
El Compromiso de Madrid,14 firmado el 17 de mayo de 2002, adopta los aspectos 
formales de la Declaración de Rio de Janeiro. Al capítulo de política le siguen los 
capítulos dedicados a la cooperación económica, cultural, educación y ciencia. Sin 
embargo, el número de prioridades se redujo de 55 a 33, concretizándose estos pro-
gramas en mayor medida. Además de las acciones políticas es preciso resaltar punto 
17 del capítulo dedicado a la cuestión de cooperación económica, que trata del inicio 
en septiembre de 2002 de las negociaciones del Acuerdo de Asociación Económica con 
la Unión Europea, en el marco del Acuerdo de Cotonú. Los demás puntos del capítulo 
coinciden considerablemente con los Objetivos del Milenio. El Compromiso de Madrid 
se complementa con el Documento de Trabajo sobre los valores y posiciones comunes y 
el Informe de evaluación de los avances realizados.15
La Tercera Cumbre de la UE de los 25 y los 33 países de América Latina y el Caribe 
tuvo lugar en la ciudad mexicana de Guadalajara los días 28-29 de mayo de 2004. En 
las negociaciones con la participación de los representantes de 58 naciones al más 
alto nivel las cuestiones referentes a la cooperación económica y comercial recibieron 
el mayor acento. La conclusión de un acuerdo de asociación que contuviese el libre 
comercio representaba la finalidad común. Sin embargo, ésto se realizó por el nuevo 
Parlamento Europeo elegido en junio de 2004, así como por la Comisión Europea con 
José Manuel Durão Barroso como presidente. De todas maneras, se declaró que entre 
la UE de 485 millones de habitantes y con una participación del 23,4% del PIB mundial 
y América Latina de 530 millones de habitantes y con un 7,5% del PIB mundial, con 
varias organizaciones económicas subregionales – Mercosur, Pacto Andino, Comuni-
dad del Caribe (CARICOM) –, las negociaciones de orden político se habían concluído. 
La Declaración de la Cumbre de Guadalajara del 28-29 de mayo de 200416 consta de 
104 puntos y en comparación con las anteriores Cumbres de Jefes de Estado y Gobier-
no incluyó numerosos elementos nuevos, recibiendo los elementos tradicionales un 
nuevo énfasis. La Cumbre tomó firme posición respecto a la creación de un sistema 
internacional multilateral y el cumplimiento consecuente del principio y la práctica 
de la cohesión social en las relaciones birregionales, compatibles con los Objetivos 
14 Vease: Martín Arribas, 2006: 332-337.
15 Vease: Martín Arribas, 2006:337-363.
16 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/vienna/index_en.htm - página consultada 26 
de octubre de 2013
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del Milenio. Acentúa la importancia del Acuerdo de Asociación Económica entre la 
UE y el Caribe (Economic Partnership Agreement- EPA). En cuanto al desarrollo eco-
nómico de América Latina destaca la importancia de la inversión productiva basada 
en la cooperación entre el Banco Europeo de Inversiones, el Banco Interamericano 
de Desarrollo, el Banco de Desarrollo del Caribe, la Corporación Andina de Fomento, 
el Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica. Apoyó la continuación de los 
programas de desarrollo iniciados en Rio de Janeiro y Madrid y la creación de un 
Espacio Común de Educación Superior y la consolidación y el futuro reforzamiento de 
la asociación estratégica.
La Cuarta Cumbre de la UE y de América Latina tuvo lugar en la ciudad de Viena los 
días 11 y 12 de mayo de 2006. Aquí apareció en la escena un bloque alternativo liderado 
por los presidentes de Bolivia, Evo Morales, y el de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, y el re-
presentante de la delegación cubana. Ellos criticaron duramente el comportamiento 
económico de la UE y exigieron una mayor prioridad de Sudamérica en la política 
económica de la Unión Europea.  
La Declaración17 titulada Fortaleciendo la Asociación Estratégica Birregional contie-
ne 59 puntos y examina los 16 principales aspectos de la situación de la asociación es-
tratégica. Se declaró a favor de la garantía de la democracia y los Derechos Humanos. 
Destacó su especial interés en la realización de la propuesta de la XVII Conferencia 
Interparlamentaria UE-ALC (Lima, Perú 14 a 17 de junio 2005) de crear una Asamblea 
Euro-Latinoamericana.18 Celebró la actividad del III Foro Euro-Latinoamericano-
Caribeño de la Sociedad Civil, atribuyendo gran importancia al Foro en la profundiza-
ción de esta asociación estratégica. Repitió el compromiso de las Cumbres anteriores 
respecto al desarrollo de un sistema internacional multilateral, la importancia de la 
paz y la seguridad y el respeto al Derecho Internacional. Se ocupó de las cuestiones del 
terrorismo, del crimen organizado y narcotráfico, del medio ambiente y de la energía. 
Destacó la importancia de los acuerdos de asociación concluidos por la UE con algu-
nos países de América Latina (Chile, México), y con las integraciones (Mercosur, CAN, 
CARIFORUM, Mercado Común Centroamericano, CARICOM), y saludó la actividad del 
Banco Europeo de Inversiones en la región del Caribe. Declaró la lucha contra la po-
breza, la desigualdad y la exclusión social. Apoyó la realización del objetivo de cohesión 
social a través del desarrollo económico de América Latina. Se ocupó de los programas 
y medidas respecto a la educación superior, la investigación y el desarrollo cintífico 
y tecnológico. Como mencionamos anteriormente, en la Cumbre hizo su aparición el 
grupo de países descontento con la política económica de la UE hacia América Latina, 
17 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/vienna/index_en.htm
18 La Declaración aprobada el 20 de diciembre de 2007 analizamos en la primera parte de 
nuestro ensayo.
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la denominada “Alternativa Bolivariana”. Su aparición indica que la construcción de 
la asociación estratégica birregional no transita por camino real.
La Quinta Cumbre de los Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de la Unión Europea y América 
Latina19 se organizó en Lima, capital de Perú, los días 16 y 17 de mayo de 2008. El títu-
lo de la Declaración adoptada y firmada fue “Respondiendo juntos a las prioridades 
de nuestros pueblos” (Adressing our Peoples’ Priorities together).20 A pesar de que en 
el Preámbulo del documento se trate de la nueva etapa de las relaciones entre las 
dos regiones, la Cumbre pudo disminuir y desatar sólo en parte las contradicciones 
anteriores. Los representantes de América Latina esperaban respuestas, propues-
tas, medidas e iniciativas de la UE capaces de abolir eficazmente las relaciones 
asimétricas entre las dos partes. Entre los temas centrales del encuentro formaban 
parte las cuestiones del futuro reforzamiento de la alianza estratégica, el desarrollo 
sostenible, la cohesión social y el cumplimiento de los Objetivos del Milenio. A pesar 
de que los participantes estaban de acuerdo en las prioridades, los puntos de vista y 
enfoques diferenciaron el contenido de los problemas discutidos. La Unión Europea 
estaba interesada en los aspectos climáticos y de protección del medio ambiente, del 
desarrollo sostenible y de los problemas de energía. Las partes latinoamericanas en 
cambio consideraron de tareas más importantes aquellas cuestiones del desarrollo 
sostenible vinculadas y relacionadas a la cohesión social, a la abolición de la pobreza, 
la desigualdad, y la exclusión social. Estaban de acuerdo en que el reforzamiento de 
la alianza estratégica y la cooperación entre las dos regiones requiere de nuevos 
métodos, acciones y esfuerzos. Las partes consideraron de instrumentos principales 
y eficaces para la realización de los objetivos enumerados el establecimiento de un 
sistema de acuerdos de asociación bilaterales y multilaterales, así como los Acuerdos 
Económicos de Asociaciones con los países de África, del Caribe y de Asia. En la Cum-
bre decidieron sobre la creación de una Fundación de UE-AL dedicada a custiones 
teóricas y prácticas de la alianza estratégica. Felicitaron y apoyaron la Resolusión 
de la Asamblea de Eurolat y aprobaron el establecimiento del mecanismo institucio-
nal propuesto por la Asamblea. Decidieron que la próxima cumbre se celebrara en 
España en la primera mitad de 2010, durante la presidencia española de la UE. Los 
participantes en la Cumbre de Lima aprobaron como método el diálogo estructurado 
entre los países y las organizaciones de integración de la UE y de América Latina y en 
las relaciones interregionales. Los jefes de Estado y de Gobierno apoyaron el método 
de la evaluación individual, quedando claro que ni siquiera entre los países del sur 
del hemisferio hay unidad y concordancia en el papel jugado y desempeñado por las 
19 Véase Günther Maihold: La Cumbre de Lima: un encuentro de la asímetria euro-
latinoamericana(ARI). http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org.9081/wps/portal/rielcano/
Imprimir?WCM_GLOB
20 Véase V. Latin America and Caribbean-Euroean Union Summit. Lima, May 16, 2008. Lima 
Declaration. „Addressing our Peoples’ Priorities together”
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organizaciones de nuevos tipos de integración (Mercosur, UNASUR, Banco del Sur, 
PetroAmérica, CAN, etc.) en el reforzamiento de la alianza estratégica.  
La Sexta Cumbre de los Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de la Unión Europea y América 
Latina se organizó en Madrid los días de 17-18 de mayo de 2010. La Declaración titulada 
„Hacia una nueva etapa en la asociación birregional:la  innovación y la tecnología en 
favor del desarrollo sostenible y de la inclusión social”Los participantes reiteraron 
su compromiso de continuar promoviendo y reforzando la asociación estratégica 
birregional basando los principios,valores e intereses comunes que han definido 
conjuntamente en las cinco cumbres anteriores.
Las altas partes contratantes aprobaron Plan de Acción de Madrid, lo que contiene 
diversas iniciativas conformas a las prioridades establecidas en la VI. Cumbre UE-
ALC y recogida en su Declaración final.
La Séptima Cumbre de los Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de la Unión Europea y América 
Latina y Caribe se organizó en Santiago de Chile los días de 26 y 27 de enero de 2013. Se 
reunieron en la capital de Chile  los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los 60 países que 
forman parte de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) y de 
la Unión Europea (UE), más los Presidentes del Consejo Europeo y la Comisión Europea.
El tema central era: “Alianza para un Desarrollo Sustentable: Promoviendo Inversio-
nes de Calidad Social y Ambiental”.
Aunque la cita continuaba el próspero diálogo de seis cumbres anteriores entre 
los Estados de América Latina y Caribe con la Unión Europea, los primeros se presen-
taban por primera vez bajo un alero común, la CELAC.
También de manera inédita, la reunión de líderes en Santiago incorporaron a su 
diálogo las conclusiones del trabajo de los múltiples foros de la Sociedad Civil y se 
realizaró una Cumbre de Poderes Judiciales de ambas regiones, con lo que los tres 
poderes del Estado estaban incorporados en la alianza birregional.
La Declaración Final contenía 48 puntos y examinaba los 4 principales aspectos 
de la situación de la asociación estratégica. En la primera parte definia y reforzaba 
el contenido del nuevo diálogo de  CELAC-UE acentuando que „1.Los Jefes de Estado 
y de Gobierno de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) 
y de la Unión Europea (UE), y los presidentes del Consejo Europeo y de la Comisión 
Europea, nos hemos reunido en Santiago de Chile el 26 y 27 de enero de 2013 para 
renovar y profundizar nuestra Asociación Estratégica en torno al tema “Alianza para 
el Desarrollo Sustentable: Promoción de Inversiones de Calidad Social y Ambiental.” 
2. Por primera vez América Latina y el Caribe se reúnen hoy para sostener el diálogo 
birregional de más alto nivel en el marco de la CELAC, el mecanismo representativo de 
esta región que promoverá sus intereses y objetivos de integración y desarrollo.”21La 
21 http://eeas.europa.eu/la/summits/docs/2013_santiago_summit_declaration_en.pdf. – pá-
gina consultada 28 de octubrebre de 2013
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segunda parte de la Declaración se dedicaba a los valores y posiciones comunes en 
el ámbito internacional y multilateral. Las altas partes firmantes subrayaron que „4. 
Ratificamos el consenso alcanzado en nuestras anteriores cumbres que han reforza-
do nuestras posiciones en el ámbito internacional y multilateral, y en este sentido, 
reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con el multilateralismo. 5. Reafirmamos nuestro 
compromiso con todos los propósitos y principios consagrados en la carta de las 
Naciones Unidas.”22 Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de CELAC y de la UE se decla-
raban su preocupación por la crisis económica mundial. Adoptaban una actitud para 
trabajar juntos a superar las dificultades económicas y financieras internacionales 
creando un nuevo sistema económica mundial Los representantes da CELAC y de la 
UE destacaban su especial interés en  alcanzar el desarrollo sustentable también. „12- 
También expresamos nuestra preocupación por la actual crisis económica y porque 
la recuperación sigue siendo muy lenta. – podemos leer- En este sentido, reiteramos 
nuestro compromiso de seguir trabajando juntos hacia una nueva arquitectura 
financiera internacional, según lo acordado en la Cumbre de Madrid de 2010. Esto in-
cluye las reformas ya acordadas. También seguimos comprometidos con la aplicación 
completa, oportuna y consistente de la agenda internacional de regulación financiera 
para fortalecer la resiliencia del sistema financiero y reducir los riesgos sistémicos 
que son clave para una reforma integral del sistema financiero global. 13. Expresamos 
nuestro compromiso de alcanzar un desarrollo sustentable en sus tres dimensiones: 
económica, social y ambiental, en forma integrada y equilibrada.”23 Los Jefes de Es-
tado y de Gobierno de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños y de 
la Unión Europea en la tercera parte de la Declaración Final reconocen los avances 
logrados en la  Aplicación de Plan de Acción birregional, elaborado y adoptado en 
la Cumbre de Madrid de mayo de 2010. A pesar de eso El Plan de Acción CELAC-UE 
2013-2015 aprobado en Santiago de Chile, lo amplió. El séptimo capítulo del nuevo Plan 
de Acción revisitado se ocupa de las cuestiones de Género. El documento acentua 
„7. Género; El objetivo principal es darle prioridad al tema de género en el contexto 
de las relaciones birregionales y resaltar la voluntad política de ambas regiones de 
garantizar la igualdad de género y la protección, ejercicio y promoción de los dere-
chos de la mujer, entre ellos i) participación política de las mujeres; ii) eliminación 
de todas las formas de violencia contra mujeres y niñas, incluida la violencia sexual; 
y iii) empoderamiento económico de las mujeres y su participación en el mundo del 
trabajo y en todos los procesos de toma de decisiones.”24  Y el capítulo octavo llama 
22 http://eeas.europa.eu/la/summits/docs/2013_santiago_summit_declaration_en.pdf – pá-
gina consultada 1 de noviembre de 2013
23 http://eeas.europa.eu/la/summits/docs/2013_santiago_summit_declaration_en.pdf – pá-
gina consultada 1 de noviembre de 2013
24 http://www.consilium. europa. eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135043. 
pdf  – página consultada 1 de noviembre de 2013
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la atención a la importancia de las inversiones y emprendimiento para el desarrollo 
sustentable. De todos modos la tercera parte de la Declaración dice que: „ 19. Recono-
cemos los avances logrados en la aplicación de nuestro Plan de Acción birregional y 
acogemos su profundización a través de la incorporación de nuevos capítulos sobre 
género e inversión en el Plan de Acción 2013- 2015 de la UE-CELAC aprobado hoy aquí 
en Santiago.”25 La cuarta parte se trata de las cuestiones de la alianza para el desarro-
llo sustentable  y de la promoción de inversiones de calidad social y ambiental. Y por 
fin en la Cumbre de Santiago de Chile decidieron en celebrar la próxima Cumbre de la 
CELAC-UE en Bruselas en el año 2015.
Conclusión
Las relaciones entre la UE y ALC y a partir de 2013 entre UE y CELAC se han intensi-
ficado más en el último cuarto de siglo. Ya en la década de los ochenta del siglo XX el 
Parlamento Europeo calificó de importancia estratégica la cooperación con el Tercer 
Mundo, especialmente con América Latina. Tras el ingreso de España y Portugal a la 
CEE, y principalmente gracias a la mediación de España, esa dimensión se dirigía a la 
cooperación económica, política y cultural entre América Latina y la Unión Europea, 
a la creación de un status de asociación. Las cada vez más fuertes y profundas relacio-
nes conllevó a la organización en Rio en Janeiro en 1999 de la Cumbre Birregional de 
Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno. Los encuentros al más alto nivel, las sesiones conjuntas 
de los parlamentos latinoamericanos y el Parlamento Europeo, la cooperación de 
las diferentes asociaciones subregionales de integración (CAN, Mercosur, UNASUR) 
así como los actores interregionales (Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones), los 
programas de desarrollo conjuntos condujeron a una institucionalización de una 
asociación estratégica UE-ALC-CELAC. La base de esta asociación la constituye el 
común origen histórico, los valores y la cultura, la defensa de la democracia, el interés 
de constituir un sistema internacional multilateral, la similitud de las finalidades 
políticas. Los intentos de eliminar la asimetría de las relaciones económicas entre 
ambas partes y que aún son muy notables, juegan un gran papel en la creación de la 
asociación estratégica. El fortalecimiento de la alianza entre ambas regiones influye 
también en gran medida en constitución de las relaciones internacionales.  
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Cuba, the Delicate Question 
 
Foreign Policy Roller Coaster in 
Cuba–European Union Relations
Evelin Szarka1
Abstract
Until September 1988, relations between the European Communities and Cuba were 
limited almost exclusively to trade, but after a series of negotiations the European 
Union has become one of the most important investment partners of the island. 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 authorized the EU as a legal entity to communicate 
with Cuba and to represent common preferences and interests. As the community 
has 27 member states of many different sizes and various traditions, it still lacks 
a confident Cuba policy. Its declarations condemning the American embargo are 
mostly ineffective without legal actions or sanctions, so the European Union is taking 
one step forward and one step back not to offend its Atlantic ally but to satisfy once 
the pro-Cuba Mediterranean voices and then the hardliners of the Eastern post-
communist countries. The objective of the EU is to encourage the process of transi-
tion to a pluralist democracy. However, forcing its own core values and models is not 
always beneficial to the recipient; what is more, best practices of Western European 
or post-communist states may not work in Cuba.
Due to the absence of consensus, constructive engagement and political condi-
tionality were based on the Common Position adopted in 1996; then, after a turbulent 
period and the so-called cocktail wars, they resumed political dialogue by the Coun-
try Strategy Paper of 2010.
This short interdisciplinary paper aims to evaluate the role of the European Union 
as an independent actor during the integration of the island of Raúl Castro into the 
global economy and international politics. It not only identifies and criticises the ele-
ments of EU policy from the soft, declarative and ineffective Common Position to the 
1 PhD Student, Interdisciplinary Doctoral School, Political Science Programme, University 
of Pécs. This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, 
co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-
0001 ‘National Excellence Program’. evelin.szarka@gmail.com
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first Country Strategy Paper for the Republic of Cuba, but also underlines the fact that 
the mostly US-dependent European policy has chosen the path of getting closer by 
working up a coordinated new approach with few distractions.
Cuba through the eyes of a changing community
Undoubtedly, due to the nature of integration, Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) was not a priority in founding treaties; besides, the European Political Coop-
eration (EPC) introduced in 1970 was not an effective way of joint actions, so member 
states coordinated their foreign policies separately. In consequence, each European 
country presented a unique framework for its bilateral relations with Cuba.
Having been a former Spanish colony, the Caribbean island has closer ties with 
Spain as they share a common history dominated by similar cultural roots and speak 
the same language. Western European countries, however, have always had to take 
the American Cuba policy and US interests into account because of their NATO mem-
bership and their dependence on transatlantic cooperation, but secure and stable 
investment conditions in Cuba attracted European funds despite the Cuban regime 
lacking market economy. Although the Eastern Bloc signed many treaties establish-
ing a strong economic cooperation between the states aligned with the Soviet Union 
and Cuba according to the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 
they could not overcome ideological clashes like Fidel Castro condemning the Prague 
Spring of 1968.
European countries found themselves in a new political and economic milieu after 
the dissolution of the USSR, which meant the loss of ideological support and subsi-
dies for Cuba; and, in the meantime, the possibility for further deepening relations 
with the EEC. While French, German and British corporations at least doubled their 
investments in the communist state after the official establishment of the relations 
in 1988, many Central and Eastern European post-communist countries put an end 
to their friendly cooperation, which led to a dramatic decline in bilateral trade to 
15 per cent. The main reason why they cut their ties with Cuba was that these small 
states saw a great reconciliation project, a key of modernisation, and a guarantor of 
stable democracies and favourable market conditions in the European Communities. 
(Balázs, 2011) Besides, they considered “instant freedom” to be the supreme value, 
and gave top priority to European integration in their foreign policy. Thus, they were 
obliged to meet a series of special requirements, namely the Copenhagen criteria2, of 
which ideas confronted courteous interactions with a communist regime. Emerging 
2 Conditions set out by the relevant articles of the Treaty on European Union. New member 
states must meet three criteria: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and the protection of minorities (political); having a functioning market 
economy that can cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU (eco-
nomic); acceptance of the Community acquis. (europa.eu, 2013)
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Balkan nation-states were not able to cope with the traumatic shock of the Yugoslav 
Wars: they made efforts to elaborate effective domestic policies and reshape their 
identity.
At first, funds sent to Cuba meant humanitarian aid, which should have been 
gradually reduced thanks to future economic cooperation and development pro-
grammes depending on Cuban reforms. (Erisman and Kirk, 2002) After 1993, when 
the Maastricht Treaty established the Union, member states had the possibility to 
detail joint actions toward third countries, but different views of developed Western 
and still struggling post-communist states prevented pursuing a common Cuba 
policy. Though German Gerard Henze, leader of UN representatives of EU members, 
explained that solely the Cuban leadership was responsible for the deterioration of 
political and economic performance of the Caribbean state, and condemned human 
rights violations on the island, the official statement of the community criticised the 
American Torricelli Act of 19923, as well. This legal act not only strengthened the US 
embargo, but also plagued citizens of other nations by violating international law and 
thus the sovereignty of independent states. However, EU rhetoric remained ineffec-
tive without sanctions.  
The European Union was a great maneuverer between isolation and dialogue 
that time as it allowed American influence into the community regarding Cuba 
policy, which was a delicate but “not so important” question to risk cordial bilateral 
relations with the United States. Even the implementation of the American Helms-
Burton Act of 1996 could not cause as much friction as one would have thought. The 
abovementioned legislation prohibited companies outside the US from trading with 
the communist Cuba; otherwise these firms had to face serious consequences in com-
merce. Not surprisingly, after initial hesitation, the EU did not denounce America at 
the WTO in order to protect the relationship with its Atlantic ally. (Haass, 1998: 21-39)
The EU Common Position on Cuba
However, unexpected events led to the EU accepting a major document on Cuba policy. 
In March 1996, José María Aznar and the People’s Party of Spain defeated the pro-
Cuba Socialist Workers Party governing for 13 years; besides, Cuban air force shot 
down two civilian aircrafts of the Miami-based NGO Brothers to the Rescue in Feb-
ruary 1996. So the community postponed the dialogue on a cooperation agreement 
and conditioned it to a remarkable progress in the political situation. On 2 December 
1996, the European Council adopted the Common Position4 on Cuba (96/697/CFSP) 
in Brussels, which aimed to fill the gap caused by the lack of special agreements. As 
3 Cuban Democracy Act by Robert Torricelli, member of the United States House of 
Representatives. It prevented food and medicine from being shipped to Cuba
4 Pre-agreement showing how far governments have come towards agreeing the terms of a 
particularly complex piece of legislation.
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Cuba was the only state that did not have such documents signed with the EU, this 
was a significant and particularly important step toward mutual understanding. 
Nevertheless, the Common Position fell behind the expectations of members pro-
moting the strengthening of ties with Cuba and also those of post-communist Eastern 
countries. The focus of improving relations was on interdependency: economic 
relations could be strengthened in case of implementing reforms toward a pluralist 
democracy, and interaction depended on the recognition of human rights in Cuba. 
(Common Position, 1996) The Union distanced itself from measures complicating and 
deteriorating the economic situation of the island, but it emphasised the importance 
of constructive dialogue with the government of the Comandante, and the exchange of 
ideas with organisations of the local civil society. (Cameron, 2000: 1-2)
Critics of the Common Position say that this is neither a common policy, nor an 
innovative and positive document. However, many recognize that, though it was 
established by the pressure of Aznar, it set a different political direction from that of 
the government of the United States; as the constructive dialogue seeks to promote 
peaceful transition initiated by local actors, while the US encourages any kind of 
(even violent) transformation on the island. (Morley and McGillion, 2003)
The Commission analyses and evaluates internal and external developments in 
half-year and annual reports, which are sent also to the European Council.
Antagonistic relationship leading to cocktail wars
Cuba remains the only Latin American country that does not have a bilateral coopera-
tion agreement with the European Union. Additionally, it could not benefit from the 
preference system of the Lomé Convention of 1975, nor during the 20-year period 
after 2000 when the Cotonou Agreement5 was signed. As Cuba has had a symbolic 
status among Latin American states, the EU realized that the community had to open 
toward the regime of Fidel Castro. The Caribbean state was admitted to the ACP as 
an observer in 1998 and became a member in 2000 (Haass, 1998: 40). However, Cuba 
refused to sign the Cotonou Agreement as some European countries criticised the 
government for its human rights record, and demanded the unconditional release of 
political prisoners and the abolition of death penalty.  
The question of human rights has always been a priority of the European Cuba 
policy. This explains why member states have signed the Common Position repeat-
edly without notable changes. Although European NGOs condemned the United 
States for the embargo against Cuba, they also requested more transparency over 
the allocation of international funds on the island. As the EU distributes aid through 
5 A treaty between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, 
it entered into force in 2003. The agreement preserves peace, aims at eradicating poverty, 
and promotes sustainable development. Thanks to an enhanced political dialogue, new non-
state actors and local authorities are involved in the joint strategies beside governments.
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non-governmental channels, the position of these organisations is of uttermost 
importance for the Cuban government. Actually, statistics underpin its significance: 
16% of the population of the island has profited from 145 million euros of EU aid since 
1993. (europa.eu, 2012) 
While the EU was still committed to the integration of Cuba into the global 
economy, the expansion of trade relations continued to be carried out by individual 
member states and bilateral agreements. Under the aegis of the CARITAG (Caribbean 
Trade Advisory Group) a British delegation visited the island in 1999 to reschedule 
the debts of the Caribbean nation; France was the largest grain supplier of the com-
munist state, and they offered the Havana police Peugeot cars; and by the end of 
1999, Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorel-Zeul visited the Cuban capital to 
announce a German humanitarian aid designed to fight desertification. (Pax Christi 
International, 2000: 1-11)
After Cuban reforms in the nineties, the European Union published a compre-
hensive evaluation paper in 2000, which stated that Cuba was no longer a country in 
emergency. However, an additional 8 million euros were distributed through ECHO 
(European Commission–Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection) after the damage 
caused by Hurricane Michelle on 4 November 2001, and new programmes boosting 
living standards were started during the Belgian presidency as Cuba had to face a se-
rious loss of revenue, especially in the field of tourism due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in the US, while the shutdown of the Russian Lourdes Signals Intelligence deprived 
the island of 200 million USD annually (Erisman and Kirk, 2002: 104-105).  
Cuban leadership hoped that the case of the Caribbean state would receive a more 
significant role during the Spanish, the Danish and the Greek Presidency, but Europe 
was busy with integration, immigration problems, and the strengthening of right-
wing parties. What is more, the review of the Common Position in 2002 noted that 
Cuba had still not succeeded in taking steps toward democracy and economic pros-
perity, which disappointed the Castros, who did not attend the EU–Latin America and 
Caribbean Summit in Madrid. As the document extended the six-month monitoring 
cycles to one-year periods and welcomed some positive changes like the free exercise 
of religion, the downward trend of the imprisonment of political opponents, and ac-
cepting the principles of UN human rights resolutions (XII Evaluation of the EU Com-
mon Position on Cuba, 2002), Cuban leaders allowed Oswaldo Payá to travel to Europe 
to receive the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought6. As a sign of rapprochement, 
the EU opened a representation office in Havana in March 2003.
Regrettably, bilateral relations took an unexpected turn due to unforeseen events. 
Seventy-five journalists and human rights activists were accused of anti-regime ac-
6 The prize was established in 1988 by the European Parliament to honour individuals or 
organisations who combat intolerance, fanaticism and oppression.
338 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
tion and were arrested in Havana in 2003. They asked for help from the community 
who demanded the immediate release of the political prisoners. Cuban Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Felipe Pérez Roque accused Europeans of having superficial knowl-
edge of the island, he said that the EU was unable to make autonomous decisions and 
let the US dictate the terms of talks. The sharpest criticism was that of Fidel Castro 
calling the Union “the Trojan horse of the US” before rejecting all kinds of European 
aid7. (Chadwick, 2004) As a consequence, several European states withdrew their 
participation in Cuban cooperation programmes; they did not attend intergovern-
mental meetings, and exile leaders were invited to ceremonies held at the embassies; 
moreover, Silvio Berlusconi urged for a European embargo. The so-called cocktail 
wars began. (Klepal, 2006: 4)
The Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs did not meet Italian, Greek and Spanish EU 
delegations, government officials were not present at events organized by European 
embassies, and the Castros held demonstrations in front of these buildings. The Co-
mandante called the Prime Minister of Italy “Benito Berlusconi” and that of Spain, José 
María Aznar, a “little Führer” (Gortázar et al., 2004: 91-92); furthermore, he refused 
to help to establish a Spanish Cultural Centre in Cuba (Amnesty International, 2003).
For 2004 Fidel Castro realised that Cuba needed international partners, and tried 
to normalise relations with most of the European countries, so the government freed 
fourteen political prisoners (excarcelación). A group of member states argued that the 
sanctions introduced in 2003 did not have any visible results; therefore, they had to 
take a different approach regarding the Caribbean state. Diplomatic relations were 
re-established with Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Austria, Hungary, 
Greece, Portugal and Sweden, while the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia did not want to participate in the detente. (Havel, 2005) These latter 
provided the exile communities with financial support and committed themselves to 
contribute to a democratic transition on the island. 
The EU suspended the 2003 sanctions for two years in 2005 in spite of the fact that 
the Common Position remained in effect. Furthermore, the Parliament awarded the 
Sakharov Prize to the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco)8 in 2005, and adopted its first 
decision regarding Cuba on 2 February 2006, which mainly criticised the intimidating 
measures (actos de repudio) of the Cuban government.
A major breakthrough – or not? The first country strategy paper 
But why gave the EU up its ineffective but easily correctable Cuba policy? The visit 
of Pope John Paul II in 1998 and the release of almost 200 political prisoners are of 
7 Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, refused to 
freeze aid shipments.
8 Cuban opposition movement consisting of wives and other female relatives of political 
prisoners.
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historical importance – said Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spanish Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, so new guidelines of the EU–Cuba relations should be delineated. Certainly, this 
was an excellent opportunity for the Union to act as an independent entity outside the 
US articulating a new policy, which had symbolic meaning but little weight in global 
politics.
Thus, as a result of Spanish influence, the European Commission adopted the 
first country strategy paper on 12 May 2010 promoting sustainable economic and 
social development, which contributed with 20 million euros between 2011 and 2013 
to regional, thematic and collaborative programmes of the community through its 
project, namely the EU Development Cooperation Instrument. Priority sectors are 
food security, environment and the challenges of climate change, and the exchange of 
experts and their further education and training. 
This document analyses strategy developing factors and indexes in detail; be-
sides, it underlines the fact that according to Human Development Index Cuba is the 
51st country in the international competition, which is a relatively good position for a 
communist country. The paper mentions that more than half of the FDI comes from 
European investors, so it is not surprising that the EU–Cuba trade accounted for 40 
% of the total exchange of goods of the island. The largest foreign investors are: Italy 
in the field of telecommunications, Canada in oil drilling and nickel mining, and Spain 
regarding tourism. Most tourists come from overseas; that is why service is the first 
sector in Cuba with its 75 per cent share of the GDP. (Tzivelis, 2006: 1-25) Humanitarian 
collaboration was launched again in 2008: nearly 50 million euros were distributed 
mainly through the assistance programs of the Commission to eliminate damage 
caused by hurricanes, and to ensure food security, rehabilitation and environmental 
goals. Spain, Belgium, Austria, Cyprus, Italy and Portugal have signed economic 
agreements, but also other European countries cooperate with Cuba along a common 
interest, such as the fight against drug trafficking, the protection of their citizens9, 
and the organisation of cultural events10. 
Although this document is similar to the Common Position as it highlights human 
rights and democracy, it goes further by emphasising the freedom of expression and the 
release of political prisoners as an additional condition of developing diplomatic relations. 
Its advantage is that the programme supports Cuban food security objectives with 
10 million euros as a part of the fight against poverty, while another area of coopera-
tion is economic sustainability and the promotion of the decentralised management 
of local production. In addition, it gives aid to the rationalisation of the supply chain, 
the accession of farmers to innovative technologies, the exchange of experiences, and 
the implementation of unique market mechanisms. 
9 France and Great Britain.
10 Chiefly France and Poland.
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Measures taken to protect the environment are sound and highly effective, too. 
However, broadening the use of diesel instead of heavy fuel oil may cause other types 
of risks and should be reconsidered in the case of Cuba; as the Brazilian model of 
recycling and producing ethanol from sugarcane can be a viable way.  The reopening 
of sugar factories and mills not only creates new jobs, but also grows revenue thanks 
to relatively high world market prices11. Taking action to reduce global warming is a 
key goal of the EU, but it is not clear why it was set as one of the three main areas of 
support since the Caribbean state has had a significant track record in environmen-
tal security individually. It was probably chosen as a priority to avoid international 
political tensions, as it is a problem that preoccupied most developed countries of the 
world, and both Europe and Cuba fight against it at community and national levels, 
as well. What is more, they can mutually help each other with their best practices in 
improving soil quality, water management, and conserving biodiversity; therefore, 
having experienced the success of these initiatives, the Cuban government is more 
committed to the protection of mangrove swamps, bogs and beaches. The European 
Union contributes to the development of alternative solar, wind and hydro power, and 
the modernisation of power plants. It makes efforts to prepare farmers for natural 
disasters by strengthening dilapidated buildings to resist damage or collapse, and to 
maintain infrastructure in order to avoid energy shortages or severe crises. 
Regarding the training of professionals, the EU provides short-term technical 
and financial assistance to help implement sector-specific legislation. Furthermore, 
mutual visits in the form of seminars and workshops have taken place in the past 
few years, which are inspired by the positive results of the exchange programmes 
of Spain, Belgium, France and Great Britain. The main areas are business, the bank-
ing system and stock market, industrial policy, decentralisation and the role of local 
authorities in development, access to credit, local tourism, and different aspects 
of environment protection. The community allocates 3 million euros for this third 
objective. (Republic of Cuba – European Union. Country Strategy Paper and National 
Indicative Programme for the period 2011-2013, 2010: 1-74)
As signs of desire to pursue a policy of detente, for the first time since 2001, the 
EU participated again in the Havana International Fair in 2009. It also organised the 
first EU–CELAC and the seventh EU–LAC Summit that brought together European, 
Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Government in Santiago on 26-27 
January 2013, to promote investments of social and environmental quality in both 
regions. (europa.eu, 2013) Ministerial meetings between Cuban Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Bruno Rodríguez and his Spanish counterpart, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, were 
held after the adoption of the programme; however, no concrete steps followed these 
negotiations due to the firm opposition of a group of member states led by Sweden, 
11 China and India would be partners in sugar trade.
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Hungary and the Czech Republic, who stated that Cuba would obtain “unnecessary 
and undeserved” preferences. Clearly, these countries pressed the committee to 
award the Sakharov Prize in 2010 to Cuban dissident and opposition activist, Guill-
ermo Fariñas, which caused friction again in the relationship between the EU and 
Cuba.
Furthermore, the Union entrusted Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to explore further cooperation op-
portunities (Solti, 2010), which is considered a diplomatic gesture, but shows lack of 
commitment to make clear policy choices.
The future of Cuba–EU relations
Currently, the European Union is the second most important trading partner of Cuba 
(19.4%) after Venezuela (25%); moreover, nearly one-third of the tourists visiting the 
island come from Europe (europe.eu, 2013), so nowadays a definite plan of action is 
more important than ever. 
High-oscillation Cuba policy has been causing great concern for the European 
Union: the community loses legitimacy as member states cannot coordinate various 
interests, and they are not able to find a compromise solution and form a unified 
image on the international scene. 
European Cuba policy is a reactive policy. Small positive and negative fluctuations 
can be observed, but the overall picture has been the same for years. Mostly ineffec-
tive declarations make up the core of the policy beside the success of trade relations 
and humanitarian assistance, so new means of interactions are needed for the com-
munity to be considered as an independent actor regarding the case of the Caribbean 
state. Let us see what kinds of opportunities exist in the future.
One is the destabilisation and the international isolation of the Cuban govern-
ment. This means unconditional cooperation with the exile community (even radical 
elements), and political and economic pressure to help overthrow the regime. Ad-
mittedly, this scenario ignores the principles of the country strategy paper and acts 
against the priorities of the traditional Cuba policy, so it is very unlikely to happen.
Returning to and insisting on the immobility of the Common Position requires 
less consensus, but the EU is already accused of lacking strength and capacity to act 
independently. So it is not desirable to pursue a stagnant policy.
In fact, deepening dialogue and increasing cooperation with Cuban officials would 
mean intense negotiations with the government of Raúl Castro and the potential 
interruption of talks with a significant part of the exile community in the US, which 
may provoke international condemnation. This would challenge the reason of the 
struggle for democracy and human rights on the island, question the efforts of the 
internal opposition, and demoralise civil society engagement in a peaceful transition.
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In conclusion, the EU will probably maintain the basic principles and continues to 
oscillate between Cuban leaders and the exile community. This policy is characterized 
by regular humanitarian aid, ongoing dialogue with NGOs, a permanent monitoring 
and evaluation process of internal reforms, and limited austerity measures on the 
Cuban regime. 
After the initial breakthrough of the country strategy program, analysts and 
pro-Cuba voices have criticised the EU of being still engaged in a soft Cuba policy. 
Although the future vision satisfied both sides, the community seemed to call a 
halt to the articulation of an independent and progressive Cuba policy. The setback, 
however, is not due to the steps taken by the government of the Caribbean state, as re-
forms concerning the communist party and the economy are obviously encouraging 
and have earned recognition from the international community. The European Union 
indeed is responsible for the pause, but it has powerful reasons to do so. Reasons that 
are beyond the control of the two actors and their bilateral relations. Since the EU is 
looking for answers to its internal challenges and has been managing community cri-
ses, it will not have the potential to put delicate issues on its agenda until it stabilises 
its own system.
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10 Years of EU Membership: 
The Place, Role and Opportunities 
in the Agriculture Sector of the New Member States1
Attila Jámbor2 – Júlia Siróné Váradi3
Abstract
10 years have passed since the 2004 accession round to the European Union. The 
tenth anniversary provides a good opportunity for stocktaking and assessing the 
developments of the New Member States in light of the latest data available. The aim 
of this paper is to assess the place and role of the agriculture sector in the countries 
acceded in 2004 as well as to identify future opportunities on the basis of their 
overall performance. Results suggest that the New Member States show significant 
differences in their agricultural performance during the previous decade based on 
agricultural production, trade and income indicators. It seems that they have used 
the possibilities given by the common European market to a different extent due to 
initial conditions as well as pre- and post-accession policies. Opportunities for the fu-
ture are numerous, though a consistent agricultural and rural development strategy 
is highly needed to realise them.    
Introduction
10 New Member States (NMS) joined the European Union in 2004. The tenth anniver-
sary provides a good opportunity for stocktaking and analysing the lessons learned 
in agriculture during the previous decade. Despite the apparent importance of the 
topic, there is a limited number of research dealing with impacts of EU accession on 
NMS agriculture. Therefore, the aim of this article is to assess the place and role of 
agriculture in New Member States in the previous decade as well as to identify the 
opportunities for the future. In order to achieve these goals, the paper is structured 
as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review on the topic, while Section 3 
analyses changes in agricultural performance. Section 4 identifies the opportunities 
from the policy perspective, while Section 5 concludes.  
1 The research for this paper was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Research Excellence Award of the Corvinus 
University of Budapest.
2 PhD, Assistant Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest. attila.jambor@uni-corvinus.hu
3 PhD Student, Corvinus University of Budapest. julia.varadi@gmail.com
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Literature review
A large amount of literature is dedicated to the analysis of the impacts of EU accession 
on New Member States’ agriculture. Many books around the millennium have quan-
titatively estimated the impact of EU enlargement in agriculture on EU expenditures, 
on agricultural protection levels, on commodity markets and trade (see e.g. Banse 
et al. 2000, Münch 2002, Tangermann and Banse 2000, Hartell and Swinnen 2000).
Hertel et al. (1997) were among the first to conduct a sectoral and economy-wide 
analysis of integrating NMS into the EU by using the GTAP4 model and found that 
accession would result in very substantial increases of both crop and livestock pro-
duction in the NMS, while net budgetary consequences of integration for agricultural 
expenditure would be quite modest. Bchir et al. (2003) investigated the impact of EU 
enlargement on Member States with a CGE5 approach and provisioned that EU ac-
cession would provoke huge swings on relative prices and big fluctuation in the real 
exchange rate, raising serious concerns for agriculture. They also forecasted that the 
impact of accession on EU15 members would be negligible, whereas NMS would face 
huge and not always beneficial consequences.
A few years after accession, Gorton et al. (2006) analysed the international com-
petitiveness of Hungarian agriculture by calculating domestic resource cost (DRC) 
ratios and making estimations for 2007 and 2013. They projected that EU enlargement 
will have a negative impact on the international competitiveness of Hungarian agri-
culture by increasing land and labour prices. Similar estimations were conducted by 
Erjavec (2006), forecasting that the newly accessed countries will gain from higher 
prices and budgetary support, indicating real improvements in most agricultural sec-
tors on recent production levels. Ivanova et al. (2007) analysed Bulgarian agriculture 
following EU accession by the AGMEMOD6 model and found that accession would have 
a very positive effect on the crop sector in Bulgaria, whereas the effect is the opposite 
on the livestock sector. Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) analysed how transaction costs 
and imperfect competition in the land market affect the welfare effects of agricul-
tural subsidies in the NMS. Their results show that the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) might have an ambiguous effect on NMS agriculture as decoupling of payments 
shifts policy rents to farmers, but constrains productivity-enhancing restructuring. 
Bojnec and Fertő (2008) analysed the agri-food trade competitiveness with the 
EU15 of the newly accessed Member States and concluded that trade has increased 
as a result of enlargement, though there have been ‘catching-up’ difficulties for some 
countries in terms of price and quality competition, more so in higher value-added 
processed products. Artan and Lubos (2011) analysed the agrarian trade transfor-
4 Global Trade Analysis Project
5 Computable General Equilibrium
6 Agricultural Member States Modelling
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mation in the Visegrad countries and found that the value and volume of export 
and import operations increased significantly. Ambroziak (2012) investigated the 
relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and intra-industry trade (IIT) 
in the Visegrad countries and found that FDI stimulated not only vertical IIT in the 
region but also horizontal IIT. He found that differences in country size and income 
were positively related to IIT as is FDI, while distance and IIT showed a negative 
relationship.
Policy-oriented analysis of the impacts of accession can be found in Möllers et al. 
(2011) who investigated the changes in agricultural structures and rural livelihoods 
in the NMS and reached several agricultural policy conclusions, especially regarding 
the ongoing debate of the CAP. Gorton et al. (2009) analysed why the CAP does not 
fully fit the region and identified several reasons valid for the NMS. Csáki and Jámbor 
(2009) analysed the impacts of the first five years of EU accession on NMS agriculture 
and concluded that EU accession has had an overall positive impact, although mem-
ber states capitalised their possibilities in a different manner. 
On the whole, pre-accession literature suggests huge changes in NMS agriculture 
after 2004 with production growth, price hikes and serious budgetary concerns. 
However, post-accession literature emphasizes that impacts of EU accession on NMS 
agriculture are ambiguous: farmers are relatively better off, though agri-food trade 
balance decreased and competitiveness deteriorated. 
The place and role of agriculture
The article aims to analyse the place and role of the agriculture sector of the NMS 
in ten years’ time. In order to do so, the paper uses Eurostat, FAO and World Bank 
data for the period 2001–2012 and provides descriptive statistics and analyses. The 
period is divided into four sub-periods in order to better assess the developments. 
Note that the article focuses on the 2004 accession round and therefore, Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania are excluded from the analyses despite that they are also new 
EU members.
One of the most widely used indicators defining the role of agriculture is the 
share of agriculture in GDP. As evident from Table 1, the share of agriculture in GDP 
was decreasing in all countries analysed from 2001–2003 to 2010–2012 and reached 
around 2-4%. The highest role of agriculture in GDP can be observed in Lithuania 
(5%) before accession, whereas Latvia had the highest share in 2010-2012. However, 
it is important to note that the decreasing share of agriculture was not due to EU 
accession – this is a tendency observable all over the world. 
The role and place of agriculture in a country can also be assessed by analysing 
the developments in agricultural output. It can be seen from Table 2 that there are 
very significant differences regarding the index of real agricultural output among 
NMS. On the one hand, the Baltic countries and Poland increased its gross agricul-
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tural output in real terms by 30-50% from 2000 to 2010–2012, while on the other hand, 
all other NMS were not able to reach their agricultural production levels of 2000. Note 
that real agricultural output growth was higher in new members than in the old ones 
in each and every period analysed.    
Table 1. The share of agriculture in GDP in the NMS (%)
Country 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012
Cyprus 3.63 2.73 2.15 n.a.
Czech Republic 3.31 2.84 2.33 2.31
Estonia 4.27 3.51 2.82 3.54
Hungary 4.75 4.35 3.89 3.53
Latvia 4.41 3.96 3.31 4.14
Lithuania 5.32 4.59 3.67 3.51
Malta 2.81 2.68 2.09 1.92
Poland 4.67 4.64 3.90 3.54
Slovakia 4.75 3.77 4.07 3.86
Slovenia 2.94 2.59 2.49 2.46
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2013) data  
Table 2. Index of agricultural output in real terms in the NMS (2000=100)
Output index 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012
Cyprus* 100 99 89 92
Czech Republic 93 91 92 92
Estonia 104 108 107 127
Hungary 96 91 89 93
Latvia 120 147 141 151
Lithuania 98 112 123 137
Malta 98 86 85 76
Poland 101 112 125 137
Slovakia 105 94 86 81
Slovenia 96 98 93 94
NMS10 average 100 105 110 118
EU15 average 97 90 90 94
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data  
However, analysing agricultural productivity (proxied by real agricultural output 
per hectare) shows different results (Table 3). On a hectare basis, Malta and Cyprus 
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had by far the most productive agriculture among the NMS, while Latvia had the low-
est. The biggest increase in agricultural productivity can be seen in Cyprus, while 
actually a decrease is observable for Slovakia. Note the gap between the productivity 
of new and old members which remained twofold in each period analysed.   
Table 3. Agricultural output per hectare in real terms in the NMS (euro/ha)*
Country 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012
Cyprus 1329 3867 4326 4925
Czech Republic 833 819 826 834
Estonia 578 567 519 595
Hungary 1113 1059 1047 1183
Latvia 337 377 343 372
Lithuania 468 539 605 644
Malta 13127 12447 12666 10176
Poland 822 964 1068 1289
Slovakia 830 863 794 742
Slovenia 2079 2158 2088 2216
NMS10 average 844 921 963 1086
EU15 average 2178 2026 2050 2147
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data  
Another traditional way of analysing agricultural productivity is related to cereal 
yields. Evidence shows that Slovenia had the highest yields of cereals in the NMS 
after accession, almost equal to EU15 levels. Hungary was the second, while the Czech 
Republic was the third in this regard – the lowest productivity pertained to Estonia. 
Cereal yields were increasing in the vast majority of cases after accession, though 
still remained low compared to EU15 levels.
One of the most significant effects of EU accession can be observed in the agricul-
tural trade performance of the NMS. It is quite evident that agri-food trade balance 
shows a diverse picture in the region (Figure 2). On the one hand, Poland, Hungary 
and Lithuania remained net agricultural exporters after EU accession as they could 
reach a positive trade balance in each period analysed, while all the other countries 
experienced a decrease in this regard after accession. The sharpest decline is observ-
able for the Czech Republic where a billion euro surplus was converted to a billion 
euro deficit in 10 years’ time. Such evidence suggests that EU accession had adverse 
effects on agri-food trade performance in the majority of cases.
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Figure 1. Yields of cereals in the NMS (tonnes/ha)
Source: Own calculations based on FAO (2013) data
Figure 2. Agri-food trade balance in the NMS (million euro)
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data  
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Despite a country’s trade performance, EU accession has brought a significant 
increase in farmers’ income in the NMS (Figure 3). The index of real farm income per 
annual work unit increased in the NMS but Cyprus and Malta. From 2000 to 2010–2012, 
the highest increase can be seen in Estonia, while the lowest was in Slovenia. It seems 
that agricultural income remained constant in the EU15 after 2004 compared to 2000 
levels, suggesting that income gap has been decreasing between the two sides of 
Europe.  
Figure 3. Index of real farm income per annual work unit in the NMS (2000=100)
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data
The reasons behind
Reasons behind the different post-accession performance of the NMS are numerous – 
our aim here is to identify the most important ones.
First of all, differences in agricultural output and productivity can partly be ex-
plained by the difference in initial conditions. One the one hand, endowment of land, 
labour and capital as factors of production definitely plays a crucial role in explain-
ing country-to-country differences. Those countries with relatively high levels of 
factor endowment (e.g. Poland, Slovenia) usually perform better. On the other hand, 
countries with initially low rates of output can provide higher growth rates, partly 
explaining the difference between old and new member states in this regard.  
As to the overall negative impact of EU accession on NMS agri-food trade, rea-
sons behind lie in the increased competition NMS are faced with. We believe that 
one of the most important causes behind the increased trade deficit is the change 
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in trade policy and the opening of national agri-food markets to EU competition. 
In practice, this has meant a marked increase in imports of high value-added and 
price-competitive processed products, while exports continue to be the more easily 
substitutable bulk agri-food products. Processed products from the EU15 are much 
more price-competitive in the national market than are national raw materials 
in EU15 markets. Another important factor has been the tough adjustment to new 
market conditions. EU membership has made all the NMS part of a much larger and 
very competitive market. Whilst this offers tremendous opportunities, the NMS 
are faced with significantly increased competition in their domestic markets. This 
situation reflects the rapid emergence of vertically coordinated food chains, creating 
very strong price competition. Although consumers are generally the beneficiaries of 
these changes, producers are not always able to adjust, or to cope with the business 
practices employed by the large chains. 
Last but not least, the overall increase in agricultural income was mainly due to the 
increased world market prices as well as the growth in EU subsidies. The hike in inter-
national commodity prices was in favour of the development of NMS farmers’ income, 
traditionally focusing on raw materials. As international commodity prices soared in 
2008 and 2011, farming became more profitable. Moreover, the subsidy policy of the 
CAP has definitely played a role in increasing farmers’ income. The traditionally high 
agricultural subsidies of the EU15, especially direct payments, have gradually become 
available to new members, providing a fixed income for regional farmers. 
As an external factor, the pre- and post-accession agricultural policy framework 
also had an impact on individual country performances. As to the pre-accession 
period, especially in 1998-2004, the candidate countries implemented quite different 
policies some with positive, others with negative impacts after accession. Measures 
in favour of competitiveness enhancement have definitely proven to be beneficial. On 
the one hand, those countries where agricultural subsidies to farmers remained at 
a low level (e.g. Poland) have gained with the accession which has provided visible 
incentives for production and led to the increase of agri-food trade balance. On the 
other hand, those countries providing initially high and uneven price and market sup-
port (e.g. Hungary) are considered to lose with accession as it has brought hardly any 
price increase. Differently implemented land and farm consolidation policies have 
also had diverse effects on post-accession country performance. Restrictive pre-
accession land policies and the lack of land and farm consolidation (e.g. in Hungary) 
has negatively influenced the capacity to take advantage of the enlarged markets by 
constraining significantly the flow of outside capital to the agricultural sector. Con-
versely, liberal land policies (e.g. in Baltic countries) helped the agricultural sector to 
obtain more resources and utilise better the possibilities created by the accession. 
The ways in which the countries used EU-funded pre-accession programmes such as 
SAPARD, ISPA and PHARE was also important. Those who focused on competitive-
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ness enhancement and production improvement were better placed to realise the 
benefits after accession. On the contrary, delays in creating the required institutions 
as well as the initial disturbances of implementation resulted in the loss of some EU 
funds in a number of countries.   
Individual country performances were also largely dependent on the post-acces-
sion national policies. An existing agricultural and rural development strategy with 
long term visions, goals and properly set priorities largely contributed to the success 
of some countries (e.g. Poland). However, the lack of strategic thinking and short-term 
political interests usually ended up in fire-brigade policy making in many NMS (e.g. 
Hungary, Slovakia). The post-accession performance of NMS was also dependent on 
the existence of institutional capacities and bureaucracy responsible for administer-
ing EU funds. The number of well-educated staff was crucial in this regard.   
Opportunities for the future
It is evident from above the NMS have used the opportunities given by the European 
Union to a different extent after accession due to various reasons. If member states 
aim to better use their inherent agricultural capacities in the future, they have many 
opportunities doing so. 
Regarding agricultural output and production, NMS definitely hold a large agri-
cultural production potential, which should be used by focusing on policy measures 
enhancing competitiveness. First of all, support is needed for the modernization and 
restructuring of farms, including the introduction of new technologies. Competitive-
ness enhancement is recommended through the more efficient use of resources for 
which capital investment is crucial. Climate change mitigation and environmentally 
friendly production practices hold a high potential for productivity increase. Second, 
land consolidation in the region also holds opportunities for future growth. Adequate 
policies for the consolidation of agri-land structures are needed in order to convert 
dual and fragmented land structures to efficient ones in terms of resource and 
land use. Third, cooperation should be enhanced between agri-food producers and 
agri-business (wholesalers, retailers) to increase income opportunities and provide 
access of NMS agri-food products to international markets. Fourth, access to capi-
tal, input and output markets for farmers are also important, taking the regionally 
typical ‘dual’ structure of farms into consideration. One of the most important fac-
tors contributing to competitiveness growth is farmers’ access to input and output 
markets. Fifth, the improvement of the educational, research and extension services 
in NMS also holds an opportunity for farmers to increase their competitiveness. The 
modernisation of the education and research base is highly needed in many countries 
(e.g. Hungary, Slovakia) together with the creation of an efficiently working exten-
sion service system. Synergies among education, research and extension should be 
used as much as possible.
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Regarding the agri-food trade performance, the biggest potential for the future 
lies in higher value added products. One of the major factors contributing to the 
increased agri-food trade deficit is the low value added of NMS food products. Given 
its geographical location and historical traditions, the majority of NMS is focusing 
on the export of low value added, substitutable bulk commodities with relatively 
low prices, while at the same time importing high value added, processed products. 
Such a competitive disadvantage should be changed in the future by investing in 
food processing capacities in which nationally grown agricultural commodities can 
be transformed to high value added products. One of the most important pillars of 
long-term competitiveness is a viable food processing industry, selling high value 
products at competitive prices. 
As to income from agriculture, competitiveness enhancement is crucial. Invest-
ments for the modernisation of farms mentioned above would lead to competitive 
and profitable farms. The appropriate use of the respective measures provided by 
the Common Agricultural Policy will play a crucial role in the future performance of 
NMS farms.   
On the whole, probably the most important opportunity for the future lies in the 
creation of national agricultural and rural development strategies for the long run. 
Besides the obligatory elements required by the European Union, NMS should pro-
vide a decent analysis of their agricultural potentials with realistic goals and targets 
for the future. A tough implementation of such a strategy, regardless of short-term 
political interests, would guarantee the realisation of the opportunities lying in dif-
ferent member countries. It seems that the new Common Agricultural Policy would 
facilitate this process by giving enhanced powers to nations deciding on their own 
agricultural futures.    
Conclusions
The paper analysed the place, role and opportunities of the agricultural sector of the 
New Member States after 10 years of accession and has reached a number of results.
First of all, by analysing the place and role of the sector, it becomes evident that 
the role of agriculture has been decreasing in the NMS during the previous decade in 
line with international trends. Second, regarding their post-accession agricultural 
performance, two groups of countries can be identified: the first group with increas-
ing output and productivity in real terms (the Baltic Countries, Poland and Slovenia) 
and a second with the rest of the countries, showing decreasing performance in most 
cases. Third, as to agri-food trade performance, Poland, Hungary and Lithuania could 
retain their net exporter positions, while the vast majority of countries experienced 
deterioration in their agri-food trade balance after accession. Fourth, data show that 
agricultural incomes have increased in the majority of the NMS, compared to 2000 
levels. Fifth, the paper identified three main reasons (initial conditions, pre- and 
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post-accession policies) contributing to the different post-accession performance of 
the NMS. Based on all the above, various opportunities for the future are outlined in 
the paper, though a consistent agricultural and rural development strategy is highly 
needed to realise them. 
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Les modèles de gouvernance à multi-niveaux, 
à deux-niveaux et multipolaire 
dans l’Union européenne1
Ágnes Tuka2
L’évolution de plus d’un demi-siècle de l’intégration européenne a donné naissance 
à une structure particulière qui reste unique jusqu’à nos jours3. L’appréciation et 
l’évaluation de cette organisation internationale qui, malgré sa transformation 
continue, les ralentissements de son évolution, ses débats et tensions internes, 
prône l’approfondissement des coopérations, constituent un défi permanent pour 
les chercheurs de l’intégration européenne. Bien que les modèles de l’intégration 
économique se prêtaient adéquatement à l’analyse de la mise en place des Communautés 
européennes, de nos jours les structures politiques sont aussi déterminantes que les 
structures économiques.4 Dans les deux dernières décennies, les élargissements de 
l’Union européenne ont mis l’accent sur les problèmes des procédures décisionnelles. 
La crise financière éclatée en 2008, qui est d’ailleurs la crise la plus profonde et la 
plus longue de l’histoire de l’Union, accentue davantage les contradictions de la 
gouvernance économique et politique et approfondit les nouveaux débats sur l’avenir 
de l’intégration européenne.
Le premier chapitre de cette étude est consacré aux cadres théoriques de 
l’interprétation des modèles de gouvernance à multi-niveaux. Le deuxième chapitre 
porte sur la position des organisations supranationales, tandis que le troisième 
chapitre traite les phénomènes liés aux modèles de gouvernance à deux-niveaux et/ou 
multipolaire et cherche à identifier les différentes formes possibles du fonctionnement 
de l’Union dans la situation actuelle.    
1 Cette étude a été élaborée dans le cadre du projet no 81571 d’OTKA (programmes de base 
scientifiques nationaux), intitulé « Pécs a többszintű kormányzás csapdájában » (« Pécs 
piégée dans la gouvernance à multi-niveaux »).
2 PhD habil, Associate Professor, Director, Department of Political Science and International 
Studies, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, University of Pécs. tuka.agnes@pte.hu
3 L’expression « jusqu’à nos jours » réfère au fait que plusieurs organisations internationales 
(p. ex. l’Union africaine) cherchent à mettre en place une structure analogue à celle de 
l’Union européenne. 
4 Bien que l’intégration européenne soit avant tout décrite en tant que construction 
économique et juridique, à notre avis, les décisions politiques ont été dominantes dès le 
début de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne . Il suffit de citer la crise de la « chaise vide » 
ou le renforcement du rôle du Conseil européen. 
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La théorie de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux
Selon une définition notoire et de plus en plus reconnue de l’intégration européenne, 
l’Union européenne est un espace politique basé sur la symbiose des niveaux 
supranational, intergouvernemental et subnational et dans lequel les groupes de 
pressions économiques transnationaux et les ONG cherchent à faire entendre leur 
voix, mais la prise de décision y est déterminée par la contrainte de la recherche d’un 
compromis. 
L’interprétation de ce mécanisme décisionnel est un défi particulièrement 
important pour la science politique. Il est évident que les catégories actuelles de la 
science politique et les méthodes de recherche classiques ne puissent pas décrire 
adéquatement le fonctionnement de l’Union. En fait, les trois branches de la science 
politique, le ‘polity’, le ‘politics’ et le ‘policy’ se focalisent avant tout sur un pays / 
un État donné, tandis que les théories des relations internationales analysent les 
rapports traditionnels des États. Je suis convaincue que c’est la raison pour laquelle 
de nombreuses théories cherchent à décrire la coopération en se fondant sur un 
phénomène. Les analyses peuvent actuellement être regroupées comme suit: 
• analyses orientées sur l’objectif : même de nos jours, les positions fédérative et 
intergouvernementale comptent plusieurs représentants : il suffit de penser aux 
débats suscités par la conférence de  Joschka Fischer à Humboldt, par l’intervention 
de José Manuel Barroso en septembre 2012 devant le Parlement européen ou bien 
par le discours prononcé en janvier 2013 par le premier ministre britannique, 
David Cameron.
• analyses orientées sur les institutions : les institutionnalistes qui considèrent 
l’intégration comme une coopération institutionnalisée, basée sur 
l’interdépendance. (Kaiser, 2003: 18-25) 
• analyses orientées sur les fonctions : les représentants du néo-fonctionnalisme 
et de la théorie du régime qui considèrent procédures décisionnelles comme 
significatives. (Kende, 2002)
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, certains chercheurs ont proposé de 
nouvelles approches. Dans le cadre de cette étude, nous voudrions citer trois de ces 
approches qui sont les suivantes :
• l’interprétation de l’Empire européen : d’après les auteurs de cette théorie, celle-
ci est le résultat de la deuxième modernité dans le cadre de laquelle les entités 
nationales et supranationales évoluent en s’influençant mutuellement. (Beck, 
2007.)  
• l’intégration différenciée : c’est la théorie sui generis de l’Union à plusieurs vitesses 
dont la base juridique a été constituée par la codification de la coopération 
renforcée. (Koller, 2012)
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• la gouvernance à multi-niveaux (multi-level governance, MLG) : d’après cette 
théorie, la gouvernance sans gouvernement a déjà été mise en œuvre. (Dieringer, 
2011:109.; Ágh, 2011)
Nous sommes convaincus que cette dernière théorie, la théorie de la gouvernance 
à multi-niveaux, est la plus adéquate à décrire le réseau institutionnel qui pourra 
désormais être interprété en tant qu’une structure de la politique intérieure 
européenne.
La gouvernance à multi-niveaux a été définie par Jürgen Dieringer de la façon 
suivante : « Depuis un certain temps, il n’est plus possible de séparer la politique 
intérieure de la politique extérieure (européenne). Il vaut mieux de parler d’une 
politique européenne ou d’une gouvernance dans un système à multi-niveaux. Dans 
ce cadre, les États-nations et les institutions européennes « se fondent » en une seule 
entité. L’État-nation, qui a accepté d’exercer, au niveau européen, une partie de sa 
souveraineté nationale conjointement avec les autres États membres, doit fonctionner 
efficacement dans le cadre de cette coopération. Il convient de représenter et de 
valoriser les intérêts au niveau communautaire, tandis que les décisions doivent être 
mises en en œuvre au niveau des États membres. » (Dieringer, 2011, 109.).
Il est évident que l’Union européenne ne dispose que des pouvoirs législatifs qui 
lui ont été délégués par les États membres. Compte tenu du fait que les traités sont des 
soi-disant traités-cadres, leur interprétation ainsi que les processus décisionnels qui 
en sont déduits sont adaptés en permanence. Cette adaptation permanente peut être 
interprétée par l’intermédiaire de la théorie de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux qui 
reflète parfaitement ce caractère provisoire. En même temps, elle permet également 
d’intégrer les résultats positifs des autres théories dans le cours de l’analyse, en 
relativisant leurs constatations. 
Premièrement, cette théorie, qui ne met pas en cause les compétences des 
gouvernements des États membres, permet d’interpréter la dominance actuelle du 
système des États-nations. Elle permet également de décrire la transformation du 
rôle des États : l’interdépendance des autres acteurs du monde mondialisé ainsi que 
des organes subnationaux et non-gouvernementaux.
Deuxièmement, l’intégration est le résultat des espaces décisionnels non 
hiérarchique, caractérisés par la coopération et impliquant plusieurs acteurs.
Troisièmement, c’est une forme de coopération qui oblige les acteurs à trouver 
un compromis. Elle nécessite une nouvelle culture politique. A notre avis, c’est 
principalement pour les citoyens et l’élite politique des pays de l’Europa centrale et 
orientale que l’intégration pose des difficultés considérables, compte tenu du caractère 
plutôt conflictuel du mécanisme de socialisation qui détermine ces sociétés5.           
5 N’oublions pas que, d’après les sondages d’opinion, les habitants de cette région ont toujours 
tendance à interpréter les compromis en tant que « capitulation ».
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Quatrièmement, le rôle des institutions supranationales continue nécessairement 
à augmenter : l’effet « spillover » agissant effectivement au niveau des politiques 
communautaires ainsi que les défis de la mondialisation, notamment les réponses 
possibles aux phénomènes du 21e siècle de la sécurité qui acquièrent une signification 
tout à fait inédite, rendent nécessaire la continuation de l’élargissement de la décision 
communautaire à de nouveaux domaines politiques6.
Cinquièmement, cette théorie permet d’interpréter les raisons de la forte 
augmentation du nombre des réseaux verticaux et horizontaux, formels et informels 
ainsi que des groupes de pression en Europe et surtout à Bruxelles. 
Sixièmement, elle permet également de suivre les changements au niveau de 
l’élaboration et la prise de décisions. (Tuka, 2009) 
Les organisations supranationales et les défis de la gouvernance de l’Union
La naissance de l’Union européenne a contribué au renforcement du niveau 
supranational. En même temps, le principe de la subsidiarité a fortement gagné 
du terrain et un débat a surgi sur les possibilités d’interprétation de la démocratie 
dans cette organisation internationale. Ces processus ont contribué à l’acceptation 
de la catégorie de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux, élaborée par les spécialistes de 
la théorie des questions européennes, dans les documents officiels des institutions 
supranationales. Parmi ceux-ci, il semble nécessaire de mettre l’accent sur le document 
de la Commission européenne, intitulé « Gouvernance européenne – un Livre blanc » 
qui a été élaboré en 2001. Dans ce document, la Commission européenne, en se fondant 
sur l’analyse du polycentrisme et du système à multi-niveaux, a cherché à ébaucher une 
conception cohérente. Selon cette conception l’Union européenne manque toujours 
de pouvoir souverain : elle ne dispose pas d’un gouvernement proprement dit, mais 
a réussi à mettre en œuvre une gouvernance sui generis. D’après le document: «  La 
notion de ‘gouvernance’ désigne les règles, les processus et les comportements qui 
influencent sur l’exercice des pouvoirs au niveau européen, particulièrement du point 
de vue de l’ouverture, de la participation, de la responsabilité, de l’efficacité et de la 
cohérence. » Le document souligne que la gouvernance doit se fonder sur cinq piliers 
étant donné que la gouvernance est interprétée comme « l’éthique des pouvoirs » et 
« l’art de la gouvernance ». (Livre blanc, 2001)
Les Traités – y compris le Traité de Lisbonne – ne peuvent pas fixer adéquatement les 
pouvoirs des différents niveaux. D’autant moins que la réglementation des différents 
politiques sectorielles n’est pas identique. Cela ne facilite pas la compréhension 
des processus. En plus, de nombreuses fois, dans le cadre d’un domaine politique il 
existe des questions qui relèvent de la compétence commune ou bien uniquement de 
6 Cette constatation est, d’ailleurs, parfaitement soutenue par la modification des traités 
fondateurs: la politique étrangère et de sécurité, la coopération en matière des affaires 
intérieures et la protection de l’environnement sont devenus politiques communautaires.  
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la compétence communautaire7. En analysant les raisons de ce phénomène, on peut 
voir que ce sont surtout les États membres qui pourront ne pas avoir la motivation 
de réglementer d’une façon tout à fait claire la prise de décisions dans les politiques 
sectorielles. En effet, les gouvernements cherchent à interpréter et à thématiser la 
politique intérieure européenne en fonction de leurs intérêts. Il existe de nombreux 
exemples pour illustrer que dans leur communication, ils tentent de présenter les 
résultats positifs de l’intégration en tant que leur succès dans la représentation et la 
valorisation des intérêts nationaux, tandis qu’en cas d’une décision défavorable pour 
leur nation, ils cherchent à attribuer la responsabilité à Bruxelles8. (Middelaar, 2011; 
Balázs, 2011)
C’est lors de l’analyse du rôle des niveaux subnationaux que le Parlement européen 
traite les questions de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux. La résolution du Parlement 
européen « sur la gouvernance et le partenariat aux niveaux national et régional, et 
une base pour des projets dans le domaine de la politique régionale », adoptée en 2008 
(Résolution, 2008) souligne que « l’Union européenne a fait considérablement évoluer 
la gouvernance au sein des différents États membres. Les politiques européennes, 
et plus particulièrement la politique de cohésion, ont déclenché un processus de 
transformation de la gouvernance : d’un système souvent centralisé et caractérisé 
par le cloisonnement (à la fois géographique et sectoriel), la gouvernance a évolué 
vers un système à plusieurs niveaux de plus en plus intégré […] La gouvernance multi-
niveaux implique que chaque échelle politique – communautaire, nationale, régionale 
ou locale – dispose des compétences et capacités pour contribuer à la mise en œuvre 
de la politique de cohésion. » Les députés européens encouragent principalement 
la gouvernance fonctionnant selon une logique ascendante, c’est-à-dire de bas vers 
le haut. À notre avis, d’ailleurs, cela n’est pas adéquat aux processus en cours. Nous 
soutenons que, à l’exception de quelques pays à caractère fédéral, les processus de 
7 Dans notre étude, la notion des politiques exclusives ou communes désigne les domaines qui 
relèvent de la compétence exclusive de l’Union, comme p. ex. : la politique de concurrence, la 
politique monétaire, la politique de la pêche, ainsi que – partiellement – la politique agricole 
et la politique commerciale. Dans le cas de la politique communautaire, la compétence est 
divisée et concurrente; c’est-à-dire les objectifs de la politique sectorielle donnée sont fixés 
par l’intermédiaire des directives, mais la prise de décision concrète relève de la compétence 
des États membres (p. ex. la politique des transports, la politique de l’environnement). 
La compétence des États membres reste toujours significative dans le cas des politiques 
sectorielles (p. ex. la politique éducative, la politique fiscale). Dans ces cas, le rôle de l’Union 
se limite à un rôle annexe ou de support. 
8 Quelques exemples hongrois des dernières années : les hommes politiques ont tendances 
à présenter les restrictions budgétaires dues à la politique de convergence en tant que 
conséquence négative de l’adhésion à l’UE, tandis que l’augmentation des subventions 
versées à partir des Fonds structurels est souvent attribuée à la bonne capacité du 
gouvernement à exercer une pression sur les institutions européennes en vue de valoriser 
les intérêts nationaux.   
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l’Union sont plutôt caractérisés par une gouvernance descendante (c’est-à-dire du 
haut en bas) dont le centre se trouve au niveau des États membres.
La gouvernance à deux-niveaux et la gouvernance multipolaire
Dans son état actuel, l’intégration européenne est caractérisée par la perte 
d’importance, peut-être provisoire, des niveaux régionaux.
À la suite de l’élargissement en 2004, à l’exception de la Pologne, ce sont 
principalement des États sans traditions régionales et avec des administrations bien 
centralisées qui sont devenus membres de l’Union européenne. Les régions des onze 
nouveaux États membres adhérées à l’Union européenne à la suite du  « big-bang » ne 
sont pas en mesure de participer efficacement à l’élaboration des décisions. En fait, 
ou bien il s’agit de pays qui sont trop petits pour la régionalisation ou ils ne disposent 
pas de régions économiquement viables et disposant de mandat politique. Nous 
supposons que c’est aussi la raison pour laquelle l’influence des niveaux subnationaux 
a diminué et l’Union européenne est principalement devenue l’arène des États-nations 
et des institutions supranationales.
C’est ainsi que la théorie de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux a été replacée par la 
catégorie de la gouvernance à deux-niveaux. Selon cette nouvelle catégorie, la prise 
de décision de l’Union est dominée par la coopération des niveaux supranational et 
intergouvernemental. (Balázs, 2011.) 
La crise financière, puis économique éclatée à l’automne 2008 a quasiment contesté 
les fondements de l’économie de marché libérale de l’Union. La crise a renforcé 
les sentiments d’anti-mondialisation de la population. Les citoyens de l’Union ne 
pouvaient pas bénéficier du socle de protection sociale de l’Union, un « instrument » 
qui leur aura, peut-être, facilité de supporter la crise. Les gouvernements des États 
membres ont réagi à ce défi extraordinaire par la mise en œuvre de la conception de 
l’État fort et paternel. En 2009, en vue d’éviter l’effondrement du système monétaire, 
les États membres ont été amenés à faire valoir des instruments dont l’application 
était exclu avant la crise en raison de la menace que lesdits instruments ont exercé 
sur le droit de la concurrence9. 
Le taux de participation particulièrement faible aux élections du Parlement 
européen de 2009, le renforcement spectaculaire des partis eurosceptiques, les 
grèves et manifestations en raison des restrictions budgétaires ont démontré que 
les effort de l’UE en vue d’augmenter son acceptabilité n’ont pas été couronnées 
de succès : l’élargissement et l’approfondissement de l’Union européenne n’ont pas 
contribué au renforcement de l’identité européenne des citoyens. Dans de nombreux 
cas, la population n’aperçoit que le renforcement de la concurrence entre le niveau 
9 Ces mesures étaient, par exemple, les opérations de « renflouements » des banques 
commerciales, le support des campagnes de l’échange des voitures en vue de maintenir la 
production du secteur de l’automobile.
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supranational et intergouvernemental à Bruxelles. Dans l’Europe des 28, la recherche 
des compromis est également devenue plus difficile, il y a plus d’intérêts qui divisent 
l’Union et par conséquent la prise de décision requiert encore plus de temps. Le 
rôle des gouvernements, leur capacité de marchandage et leur aptitude à trouver 
des compromis sont devenus des facteurs encore plus importants. Il incombe aux 
institutions supranationales de définir les instruments de motivation, les perspectifs 
ainsi que les valeurs communes qui permettent de sortir de la crise et d’augmenter 
les opportunités de l’Europe. 
À notre avis, le Traité de Lisbonne (et plus particulièrement son protocole no 2), 
qui augmentait le rôle des parlements nationaux en disposant que tout document de 
l’Union doit être communiqué à ceux-ci avant la prise de décision, constituait une 
opportunité spéciale au niveau intergouvernemental pour la représentation et la 
valorisation des intérêts. Dans cas où la moitié des parlements nationaux estiment 
que la proposition soit contraire au principe de subsidiarité, le document peut être 
retiré de l’ordre du jour. Ce processus peut cependant favoriser l’acceptation et le 
renforcement des valeurs communautaires car les parlement nationaux ne peuvent 
pas invoquer le manque d’informations préalables et approfondi concernant les 
nouveaux projets législatifs. C’est seulement dans l’avenir que l’on pourra apprécier 
les résultats de cette modification, tout particulièrement si elle permet de rapprocher 
les décisions de l’Union au niveau national ainsi que si elle favorise la coopération 
entre le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux.
Les documents de l’Union témoignent du fait que la gouvernance à multi-niveaux a 
également rendu nécessaire de faire appel à d’autres acteurs, comme les organisations 
civiles et les acteurs économiques. La résolution du Parlement européen sur la mise 
en œuvre de la législation de l’Union européenne relative à l’eau illustre parfaitement 
cette nécessité. Ladite résolution souligne que le Parlement européen : « 44. exhorte 
la Commission, les États membres et les autorités régionales à stimuler le dialogue 
intersectoriel ainsi que le dialogue entre les divers acteurs économiques et les citoyens 
sur les questions liées à l’eau […]; met en évidence l’importance d’une gouvernance 
efficace à plusieurs niveaux… » (Résolution, 2011)
L’Union a l’intention d’ouvrir ces canaux davantage étant donné que 2013 était 
l’« Année européen des citoyens ». Dans ce cadre, conformément à la déclaration de 
Berlin, les objectifs principaux étaient de donner des informations aux citoyens ainsi 
que de les associer à la préparation des procédures décisionnels. En mars 2007, la 
déclaration citée ci-dessus s’est engagée à la division verticale des responsabilités 
ainsi qu’à la coopération des différents niveaux de gouvernements.       
En guise de conclusion
Bien que la gouvernance à multi-niveaux soit une catégorie couramment pratiquée en 
sciences politiques, elle ne peut pas être acceptée en tant que la seule explication du 
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processus de l’intégration européenne. L’histoire de l’Union montre jusqu’à présent, 
que l’intégration européenne n’est caractérisé que par un seul élément constant : la 
mutation. À la lumière de la préparation des élections européennes qui auront lieu 
cette année pour l’huitième fois, il est possible de constater que la concurrence entre 
le niveau supranational et les gouvernements des États membres n’est toujours pas 
en mesure de mobiliser les citoyens européens.
Quelles sont les perspectives d’évolution possibles pour l’Union européenne ? Le 
Groupe Spinelli, regroupant des députés européens, hommes politiques et chercheurs 
engagés à la mise en œuvre d’une fédération européenne, a organisé le 12 décembre 
2010 une conférence dans le bâtiment du Parlement européen intitulée « Les États-
Unis d’Europe – vers une société transnationale ». Les deux intervenants de la session 
plénière de la conférence, Joschka Fischer et Jean M. Ferry ont mis en évidence que, 
une fois la crise économique et financière terminée, le rétablissement de l’importance 
de l’Europe passerait par l’unification des intérêts des États membres et par l’exercice 
conjointe de leur souveraineté. Le 12 septembre 2012 lors de la session plénière du 
Parlement européen, le président de la Commission européenne, José Manuel Barroso 
a souligné la nécessité du renforcement de l’espace politique européen et a évoqué 
dans son discours une Union européenne fonctionnant en tant que fédération des 
États-nations.  
Quels changements seront introduits par la « gouvernance économique » ? 
N’oublions pas que depuis 2010, de nombreuses décisions importantes, qui ont 
d’ailleurs diminué la souveraineté  des États membres dans les questions budgétaires, 
ont été prises en vue de surmonter la crise et de remédier l’imperfection de l’union 
monétaire10. Ces décisions, toutefois, en raison de leur mise en œuvre progressive, 
n’exercent pas encore une influence directe sur la gouvernance politique. 
Est-ce que le principe de équilibre institutionnel, considéré par ailleurs par 
le Comité des Régions comme la garantie de la démocratie, peut être effectif ? Ce 
principe implique un système concernant le partage des pouvoirs entre les différentes 
institutions européennes, en leur conférant un rôle spécifique dans la structure de 
l’Union et dans l’exécution des tâches déléguées à l’UE.  
Les citoyens de l’Union pourront-ils profiter de la nouvelle opportunité qui leur 
a été offerte en vue de la modification ultérieure des politiques sectorielles de l’UE ?  
Les institutions européennes seront-elles en mesure de mettre en œuvre la « bonne 
gouvernance » ? Dans ce sens, les organisations supranationales sont obligées de tenir 
un dialogue régulier avec les différents groupes d’intérêts et la société civile. Elles 
doivent également établir des relations spéciales avec les Églises, les communautés 
religieuses et les organisations non confessionnelles. 
10 La présentation de ces décisions dépasse le cadre de notre étude.
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Quel sera l’avenir de la représentation et la valorisation des intérêts au niveau de 
l’Union ? Le député européen hongrois, Csaba Tabajdi est d’avis que celle-ci est basée 
sur un système à plusieurs institutions, à plusieurs piliers et à plusieurs acteurs et, 
par conséquent, implique l’exercice d’influence formel et informel, voire également 
les instruments de la manipulation. (Tabajdi, 2008. 6. o.)
Un certain nombre de questions restent à résoudre au cours des années à venir.
Bibliographie
Ágh Attila (2011): A közpolitika változó paradigmái: az érdekcsoportoktól a 
többszintű kormányzásig. Politikatudományi Szemle Vol. XX. No. 1.  
Balázs Péter (2001): Európai egyesülés és modernizáció. Budapest, Osiris.
Balázs Péter (2011): Magyarország és Európa. Budapest, Napvilág. 
Beck Ulrich, Grande Edgar (2007): A kozmopolita Európa. Társadalom és politika a 
második modernitás korszakában. Szeged, Belveder.
Dieringer Jürgen: Németország európaizálódása. In: Közpolitika, Európai Unió, 
reformok. Ágh Attila 70. Budapest, Kossuth. 
Delcourt Barbara (2007): La gouvernance contre représentation politique? In: Didier-
Lasalle (eds) La „nouvelle gouvernance européenne”. Strabourg. 
Kaiser Tamás (2003): Europanizáció és regionalizmus. PhD disszertáció.
Koller Boglárka (2012): „Klubtagságok az EU-ban”. Politikatudományi Szemle, Vol. 
XXI. No. 1. pp. 32-57.
Laczkóné Tuka Ágnes (2004): Európai Parlament. A meg-megújuló intézmény. Pécs-
Budapest, Dialóg-Campus. 
Middelear van Luuk (2011): Valahogy Európába. Örökös átkelés. Budapest, Typotex. 
Palánkai Tibor (2002): „Az integráció gazdasági mozgatórugói”. In: Kende-Szűcs 
(szerk.) Európai közjog és politika. Budapest, Osiris. 
Palánkai Tibor (2004): Az európai integráció gazdaságtana. Budapest, Aula.
Robert Schuman (2004): Európáért. Pécs, Pannónia. 
Tabajdi Csaba – Kenessey Tamás (eds.) (2008): Megtalált Európa. Budapest. 
Tuka Ágnes (2009): Az Európai Uniónk színe és fonákja. Pécs, Publikon K. 
Wallace Helen – Wallace William (1999): Politikák születése az Európai Unióban. Studia 
europaea, Pécs.
Internet
Rapport (2008): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/plenary/reports/sidesSearch.do
Livre blanc (2001): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/fr/com/2001/com2001_ 
0428fr01.pdf  
PE, (2009):  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+ 
CRE+20090324+ITEM-003+DOC+XML+V0//HU&language=HU
366 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
Jelentés (2010): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT& 
reference=A7-2010-0280&language=HU
PE (2011): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=
20110623&secondRef=ITEM-005&language=HU&ring=A7-2011-0222
Eurobaromètre (2009): Numéro spécial 307 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/ebs/ebs_307_fr.pdf
CdR (2009): „A Régiók Bizottsága többszintű kormányzásról szóló fehér könyve” 
(Livre blanc du Comité des régions sur la gouvernance à multi-niveaux) CdR 
89/2009_FIN_AC_HU-1
PE (17.12.2009): Procès-verbal des séances plénières du PE: http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20091217+ITEM-
003+DOC+XML+V0//HU&language=HU
Fiche (2010): Fiche CdR 8733/2010 EN-PMF/cc
CdR (2012): https://toad.cor.europa.eu/CORWorkInProgress.aspx
CdR (2012): CDR2244-2012_00_00_TRA_PAC http://www.toad.cor.europa.eu/
AgendaDocuments.aspx?pmi=
ha5jDW%2bOWSFzHkMDjny1iiXc1s9d/kFDDtmFpjfwh5s%3d&ViewDoc=true 
Résolution (2011): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?
lang=en&reference=2011/2297%28INI%29
St
u
d
ie
s
La protection des droits des minorités françaises 
sur l’ordre du jour de l’Intergroupe des Minorités 
du Parlement européen (2004–20091)
Balázs Brucker2
Les intergroupes sont des groupements de députés européens appartenant à de 
différents groupes politiques ayant pour but de traiter un objectif commun. Parmi 
ces objectifs, il convient de mentionner la protection des droits des minorités vivant 
sur le continent européen et en dehors de l’Europe ainsi que la représentation des 
leurs intérêts, questions qui relèvent de la compétence de l’Intergroupe du Parlement 
Européen des Minorités nationales historiques, régions constitutionnelles et langages 
régionaux (ci-après: « Intergroupe des Minorités »).
La « nouvelle génération » de l’Intergroupe des Minorités a été mise en place en 
2004 pour répondre au défi de l’adhésion des pays d’Europe centrale et orientale 
(PECO) qui sont des pays particulièrement imprégnés par des conflits ethniques. 
Toutefois, l’activité de l’Intergroupe des Minorités ne s’est pas limitée à la seule 
région d’Europe centrale et orientale, et ce groupement de députés a également traité 
les questions ethniques de l’Europe de l’Ouest. L’un des sujets les plus importants 
concernant cette région était la question des minorités vivant en France.
L’objectif de cette étude est de présenter le rôle de l’Intergroupe des Minorités 
dans la protection des droits des minorités vivant en France. Le premier chapitre est 
consacré à la présentation du cadre théorique (notions de base, caractéristiques de la 
politique française envers les minorités). Le deuxième chapitre définit la notion des 
« intergroupes » en général, en présentant leur organisation et leurs activités, ainsi qu’il 
présente également l’organisation et les activités de l’Intergroupe des Minorités. Le 
dernier chapitre de cette étude est consacré à l’activité de l’Intergroupe des Minorités 
déployée pour la protection des minorités vivant sur le territoire de la France.
Cadre théorique
Avant d’esquisser la situation des minorités en France, il semble important de définir 
les notions de base utilisées dans cette étude.
1 L’étude se limite à l’analyse de la question pendant le premier cycle parlementaire de la 
« nouvelle génération » de l’Intergroupe des Minorités, car les synthèses des réunions de 
l’Intergroupe concernant la législature entre 2009 et 2014 n’ont pas encore été rendues 
publiques.
2 PhD Student, Interdisciplinary Doctoral School, Political Science Programme, University of 
Pécs. brucker.balazs@gmail.com
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Notions de base
Selon la définition de Francesco Capotorti, professeur italien du droit international, 
l’expression « minorité nationale » désigne un groupe de personnes dans un État qui 
(1) résident sur le territoire de cet État et en sont citoyens; (2) entretiennent des liens 
durables avec cet État; (3) présentent des caractéristiques ethniques, culturelles, 
religieuses ou linguistiques spécifiques; (4) sont suffisamment représentatives, mais 
moins nombreuses que le  reste de la population de cet État; (5) sont animés de la 
volonté de préserver ensemble ce qui fait leur identité commune, notamment leur 
culture, leurs traditions, leur religion ou leur langue (Recommandation 1201, 1993). 
Comme la définition de Capotorti illustre, l’un des composants les plus décisifs de 
l’appartenance à la catégorie de « minorité nationale » est la langue.
Au sens de la Chartre européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires, par 
expression « langues régionales ou minoritaires » on entend les langues « pratiquées 
traditionnellement sur le territoire d’un État par des ressortissants de cet État qui 
constituent un groupe numériquement inférieur au reste de la population de l’État; et 
différentes de la (des) langue(s) officielle(s) de cet État ». La Chartre précise également 
que la définition n’inclut ni les dialectes de la (des) langue(s) officielle(s) de l’État, 
ni les langues des migrants (Chartre, 1992.). Compte tenu des explications données 
par la Chartre, on entend par langues régionales les langues parlées dans une partie 
limitée du territoire d’un État, dans laquelle elles peuvent, par ailleurs, être parlées 
par la majorité des citoyens. Les langues minoritaires sont des langues parlées par 
les ressortissants de l’État et sont différentes de la (des) langue(s) officielle(s) de 
l’État, mais qui, « bien que traditionnellement pratiquées sur le territoire de l’État, ne 
peuvent pas être rattachées à une aire géographique particulière de celui-ci » (Chartre 
européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaire, 1992.). Ne sont pas considérées 
comme langues minoritaires les langues parlées par des immigrés ou les dialectes de 
la langue majoritaire.
Malgré cette distinction au niveau de la définition, les sciences politiques et 
linguistiques françaises privilégie l’utilisation de l’expression « langue régionale ». 
La raison en est que la France reconnaît les régions, non les minorités. 
La situation des groupes ethniques vivant en France3
En France, les langues régionales sont les langues des minorités historiques de France. 
Historiquement, avant l’unification linguistique effectuée sous la IIIe République, les 
langues régionales étaient parlées par une majorité de la population vivant sur le 
territoire de la France. La volonté d’assimilation de la France a marqué l’histoire de la 
3 Ce sous-chapitre est principalement basé sur l’article suivant: La politiques des langues 
régionales et minoritaires (2013): http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/europe/france-3politik_
minorites.htm.
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politique linguistique et culturelle de la France envers les minorités régionales tout 
au long du 20e siècle.
La République française ne considère pas les locuteurs des langues régionales 
comme des « minorités », mais comme des Français bénéficiant des mêmes droits que 
les personnes appartenant à la population majoritaire4. Étant donné que « la France 
est une et indivisible, il n’y aurait que des citoyens libres et égaux en droit et en devoir, 
donc pas de minorités » (La politique des langues régionales ou minoritaires, 2013). En 
plus, Henri Guaino, conseiller spécial du président Nicolas Sarkozy déclarait en avril 
2012 qu’ « il n’existait pas de minorités en France et que les reconnaître serait mettre fin 
à plus de deux cents ans de construction de la France, d’où la nécessité de l’assimilation » 
(La politique des langues régionales ou minoritaires, 2013).
L’article 2 de la Constitution française de 1958 stipule, depuis sa modification par 
la loi constitutionnelle du 25 juin 1992, que « La langue de la République est le français » 
(Constitution de la République Française, 2008). Par cet acte, la Constitution a fait 
du français la seule langue officielle de la République. La révision de la Constitution 
a ajouté l’article 75-1 de la Constitution (« Les langues régionales appartiennent au 
patrimoine de la France. »). Selon la proposition initiale, cette modification aurait dû 
être ajoutée à l’article 2 de la Constitution. Toutefois, cette proposition a suscité une 
crainte chez les sénateurs5: ils avaient peur que cette reconnaissance n’ouvre la voie à 
toutes sortes de revendications d’autonomie, voire aux mouvements séparatistes. En 
tout cas, il est à voir que cette disposition n’introduit aucun droit nouveau puisqu’elle 
n’assure pas du tout la protection juridique des langues régionales. 
Le débat autour de la signature et la ratification de la Chartre européennes des 
langues régionales ou minoritaires atteste parfaitement l’attitude de la France envers 
les langues régionales. La Chartre a été adoptée en 1992 sous les auspices du Conseil 
de l’Europe pour protéger et promouvoir les langues historiques régionales et les 
langues des minorités en Europe. Le 7 mai 1999, au nom de la France le ministre 
délégué aux Affaires européennes a signé la Chartre en souscrivant 39 engagements 
parmi les 98 proposés. Toutefois, la France ne l’a pas encore ratifiée jusqu’à 
aujourd’hui6. Le motif principal de la non-ratification est que le Préambule confère 
des droits spécifiques aux locuteurs de langues régionales ou minoritaires. En outre, 
la Chartre est contraire au premier alinéa de l’article 2 de la Constitution en ce qu’elle 
reconnaît un droit de pratiquer une langue autre que le français dans la vie publique. 
En somme, certains hommes politiques craignent que la ratification de la Chartre 
4 Par conséquent, cette étude cherche à éviter l’utilisation des expressions « minorités » et 
« langues minoritaires », et, conformément aux discours des politiciens français essaie de 
privilégier les expressions « groupes ethniques » et « langues régionales ».
5 Le Sénat constitue la chambre haute du Parlement français selon le système du bicamérisme.
6 La ratification lie juridiquement l’État contractant, la signature est une simple 
reconnaissance des objectifs de la Chartre.
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pourrait apporter une reconnaissance légale des langues régionales et leur usage en 
tant que langues officielles dans les textes administratifs, notamment les lois, décrets 
et jugements de tribunaux. En tout cas, il faut savoir que ce n’est pas la Chartre qui est 
inconstitutionnelle, mais la Constitution française en vigueur ne correspond pas aux 
exigences des normes européennes. 
Dans la pratique, la France ne mène officiellement aucune politique contre les 
langues et cultures régionales parlées sur le territoire de la France, ni aucune en 
leur faveur. Elle refuse simplement de les reconnaître et de leur donner un statut 
officiel. En tout cas, malgré cette reconnaissance officielle, la France n’interdit pas 
explicitement l’enseignement des langues régionales, même si les conditions imposées 
par les autorités françaises cherchent à limiter les possibilités de l’apprentissage de 
ces langues.
La législation linguistique concernant les langues régionales est relativement 
récente dans l’histoire de l’Hexagone. Pour la période d’après-guerre, il convient 
de citer deux lois qui, au moins en partie, contribuent à la réglementation de 
l’enseignement de ces langues: la loi Deixonne en 1951 et la loi Haby en 1975.
La loi Deixonne de 1951 relative à l’enseignement des langues et des dialectes locaux 
(abrogée), avait deux objectifs: (1) défendre la langue française et (2) protéger les 
langues régionales. Cette loi a rendu possible l’apprentissage facultatif de certaines 
langues régionales dans des écoles primaires et maternelles, sous condition que 
l’instituteur en fasse demande. La loi précisait également que les maîtres pouvaient 
recourir aux parlers locaux « chaque fois qu’ils pourront en tirer profit pour […] l’étude 
de la langue française » (La politique des langues régionales ou minoritaires, 2013). 
Cette loi se limitait à l’enseignement du breton, du basque, du catalan et de l’occitan. 
Des décrets successifs rendront possible l’enseignement du corse (1974), du tahitien 
(1981) et des langues mélanésiennes (1992).
La loi Haby de 1975 relative à l’éducation dans son article 12 stipule qu’« un 
enseignement des langues et des cultures régionales peut être dispensé tout au long 
de la scolarité » (La politique des langues régionales ou minoritaires, 2013). Ce texte 
juridique oblige les administrateurs scolaires à organier l’enseignement des langues 
et des cultures régionales pour toutes les minorités régionales qui en font la demande. 
Par cette loi, la France a reconnu officiellement une place modeste et limitée aux 
langues régionales dans l’enseignement.
Or, ces lois n’avaient qu’une valeur purement symbolique et il fallait attendre 
jusqu’à l’avènement au pouvoir de François Mitterrand (1981) pour que l’attitude 
des autorités gouvernementales soit moins hostile envers les langues régionales. 
Il est également à savoir que ces lois n’ont pas assuré une protection juridique aux 
langues régionales mais ont rendu possible l’enseignement de ces langues sous 
certaines conditions. L’enseignement des langues régionales n’est devenu possible 
au niveau universitaire qu’à partir de 1981 et l’obtention d’un diplôme universitaire 
Near Abroad – Global Actorness – Governance | 371 
St
u
d
ie
s
générale (DEUG) a été rendue possible seulement à partir de 19897. À l’heure actuelle, 
l’enseignement d’aucune langue régionale n’est obligatoire. Il est fondé sur le principe 
du volontariat aussi bien pour les élèves que les professeurs.
En 2001, l’OCDE publiait en anglais sous le titre de What Makes School Systems 
Perform? (« Qu’est-ce qui rend les systèmes scolaires performants ? ») une étude 
comparative sur le système éducatif de cinq pays européens (Royaume-Uni, Finlande, 
Suède, France et Pays-Bas) et sur celui du Canada. Cette étude révélait l’attitude 
négative des autorités françaises à reconnaître le rôle des langues maternelles « non 
officielles » (langues régionales) dans l’intégration scolaire et l’enseignement. L’étude 
a critiqué que « [t]ous les pays, sauf la France, [reconnaissait] l’appui d’une langue 
maternelle comme élément important pour l’intégration et l’éducation. […] La France, 
par ailleurs, [soutenait] l’acquisition du français comme la condition préalable pour la 
réussite scolaire » (La politique des langues régionales ou minoritaires, 2013).
En matière de justice, la langue française est obligatoire, en règle générale, dans 
le déroulement de la procédure aussi bien administrative que judiciaire. Toutefois 
le basque, le corse et l’alsacien peuvent être parfois utilisés dans les tribunaux à 
condition que le juge connaisse la langue régionale en question. Cependant, dans les 
faits, le français reste presque exclusivement employé dans les tribunaux.
Quant aux services administratifs, l’utilisation du français est obligatoire pour tous 
les documents écrits. En ce qui concerne la communication orale, les fonctionnaires 
peuvent utiliser une langue régionale, s’ils la connaissent.
Quant aux services audiovisuels, depuis la loi du 29 juillet 1982 relative à la 
communication audiovisuelle, l’expression en langue régionale est devenue libre. 
Par conséquent, Radio France diffuse des émissions en langue régionale dans chaque 
région où il existe une langue minoritaire particulière. La régionalisation de la 
radiotélévision a privilégié certaines langues régionales (breton, occitan, basque, 
catalan, corse, alsacien) qui disposent désormais de quelques heures hebdomadaires 
à la radio et à la télévision. (La politique des langues régionales ou minoritaires, 2013)
7 En France, avant l’introduction du processus de Bologne du système d’éducation et de 
formation à trois niveaux, le système d’enseignement universitaire a suivi le schéma 
suivant: à la fin de la 2e année d’études: obtention du DEUG (diplôme d’études universitaires 
générales), au bout de la 3e année: obtention de la licence, au bout de la 4e année: obtention 
du maîtrise. Ces quatre ans de formation correspondaient au niveau complet d’études. 
Toutefois, il était possible aux étudiants de continuer leurs études pour obtenir un DEA 
(diplôme d’études approfondies) ou un DESS (diplôme d’études supérieures spécialisées). 
C’est seulement après ce cycle que la thèse (3 ans) pouvait être entamée.
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La carte des langues régionales en France
Source: http://www.gipuzkoaeuskara.net/albisteak/1332097834
L’Intergroupe du Parlement Européen des Minorités nationales historiques, 
régions constitutionnelles et langages régionaux8
En dépit du fait que l’Intergroupe du Parlement Européen des Minorités nationales 
historiques, régions constitutionnelles et langages régionaux joue un rôle non 
négligeable dans la représentation des intérêts des minorités, la littérature scientifique 
européenne (hongroise comprise) a tendance d’oublier ce forum important.
C’est pourquoi il me semble particulièrement important de présenter brièvement 
les plus importantes caractéristiques ainsi que le fonctionnement des intergroupes.
Les intergroupes du Parlement européen
Comme il a déjà été cité dans l’introduction de cette étude, les intergroupes sont des 
groupements de députés européens appartenant à de différents groupes politiques 
ayant pour but de traiter un objectif commun. L’objectif principal de ces groupes 
est de permettre l’échange informel de points de vue sur un sujet particulier et de 
promouvoir le contact entre les membres de la société civile. (Navracsics, 1998: 116.)
Les activités des intergroupes font l’objet d’une réglementation interne adoptée par la 
8 Ce chapitre est basé sur l’article suivant: Brucker Balázs: Alternative Platforms of the 
European Parliament for the Representation of Interests in Minority Questions. In: Pálné, 
Kovács Ilona – Kákai, László (eds.): Ten Public Policy Studies. Political Studies of Pécs VIII., 
Pécs, 2013, Publikon, pp. 29-50.
Near Abroad – Global Actorness – Governance | 373 
St
u
d
ie
s
Conférence des Présidents le 16 décembre 1999 (et modifiée le 14 février 2008) qui fixe les 
conditions de la constitution des intergroupes ainsi que les règles de fonctionnement.
Pour assurer la transparence de l’activité des intergroupes, les présidents de 
l’intergroupe sont tenus de déclarer tout soutien, en espèce ou en nature, que 
l’intergroupe reçoit pour le financement de ses activités. Ces déclarations doivent 
être mises à jour chaque année.
Les intergroupes peuvent être constitués non seulement au début, mais également au 
cours de chaque législation parlementaire. Conformément ces régulations, les députés 
peuvent décider librement s’ils veulent participer à l’activité de l’une des intergroupes. 
Les membres des intergroupes peuvent établir librement leur réglementation 
intérieure. La caractéristique principale de ces intergroupes consiste dans le fait 
que les membres, dans la plupart des cas, essaient de mettre en arrière leur identité 
politique et de focaliser sur la réalisation de l’objectif commun (Tuka, 2004: 153–155.).
La fréquence des réunions est fixé par la réglementation interne de chaque groupe: il 
y a des groupes qui organisent des réunions deux fois par an, tandis que d’autres une fois 
tous les deux mois et il existe également des groupes que se réunissent mensuellement.
Les membres des intergroupes utilisent activement les instruments que le 
Parlement européen met à leur disposition: ils peuvent ainsi élaborer des décisions, 
ainsi qu’introduire des questions écrites au Conseil et à la Commission (Tuka, 2004: 155.)
Actuellement, il y a 27 intergroupes au Parlement européen9. L’activité des ces 
intergroupes peut couvrir tous les domaines de la société civile, comme par exemple 
l’économie, questions institutionnelles, coopération régionale, droits fondamentaux, 
éducation, culture, santé publique, environnement etc.
L’Intergroupe du Parlement Européen des Minorités nationales historiques, 
régions constitutionnelles et langages régionaux 
L’Intergroupe du Parlement Européen des Minorités nationales historiques, régions 
constitutionnelles et langages régionaux est un forum de coopération pour les 
9 Les intergroupes du Parlement européen sont les suivants (en reprenant les noms originaux 
en anglais et/ou en français ou d’autres langues de travail, publiés sur le site du Parlement 
européen): Sustainable Hunting, Biodiversity, Countryside Activities and Forests; Ways of 
Saint James/Caminos de Santiago; Media; Urban; Public Services; Trade Union; Western 
Sahara; TIBET; Disability; Water/Wasser; Traditional Minorities, National Communities and 
Languages; Mountains, Islands and Sparsely-Populated Regions; Baltic-Europe; Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Rights; Social Economy/Économie Sociale; Mers et Zones 
Côtières/Seas and Coastal Areas; Sky and Space/Ciel et Espace; Anti-racism & Diversity; 
Youth Issues/Jeunesse; Family and the Right of the Child & Bioethics; Viticulture, Fruits 
et Légumes, Tradition et Alimentation de qualité; Welfare & conservation of animals; SME 
“small and medium-sized enterprise”; Ageing and intergenerational solidarity; Climate 
change, biodiversity and sustainable development/Changement climatique, biodiversité et 
développement durable; Extreme poverty and human rights; New media.
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groupes politiques, institutions européennes (les institutions de l’UE et le Conseil de 
l’Europe), ainsi que pour des ONG et des organes représentatifs des minorités.
L’Intergroupe des Minorités a été formé pour la première fois en 1983, mais jusqu’à 
l’adhésion des PECO à l’Union européenne, son activité s’est plutôt concentrée aux 
questions concernant les minorités régionales, en particulier l’enseignement des 
langues minoritaires.
La « nouvelle génération » de l’Intergroupe des Minorité a été formée en 2004. Il 
s’est fixé comme objectif de représenter les intérêts des minorités européennes et 
de promouvoir l’autonomie des régions constitutionnelles de l’Union. L’initiative de 
la mise en place de cet Intergroupe après l’adhésion des PECO à l’UE a été prise par 
Csaba Tabajdi (MSZP – Parti Socialiste Européen [PSE]) qui était l’un des coprésidents 
de l’Intergroupe entre 2004 et 2009.
Pendant la période examinée, l’Intergroupe des Minorités avait 58 membres. 
Ces membres provenaient de six différents groupes politiques du PE qui étaient les 
suivants: Parti populaire européen (PPE), Parti socialiste européen (PSE), Alliance 
des Démocrates et des Libéraux pour l’Europe (ALDE), Union pour l’Europe des 
Nations (UEN), Verts/Alliance Libre Européen (Verts/ALE), Groupe confédéral de la 
Gauche unitaire européenne/Gauche verte nordique (GUE/NGL).
Les pays suivants ont été représentés par au moins un eurodéputé dans 
l’Intergroupe: Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, 
Hongrie, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Pays-Bas, Pologne, République Tchèque, Roumanie, 
Royaume Uni, Slovaquie, Slovénie.
Les députés de l’Intergroupe représentait les minorités suivantes: allemandes 
sudètes, basques, catalanes, écossaises gaël (minorité linguistique),  hongroises en 
Transylvanie, hongroises en Slovaquie, irlandaises du Nord, occitanes (minorité 
linguistique), russes en Lettonie, sud-tyroliennes, suédoises en Finlande. 
L’Intergroupe des Minorités peut inviter des organisations européennes, 
internationales et civiles à ses réunions, comme par exemple l’OSCE, la Commission 
européenne, l’Agence des Droits Fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, ainsi que des 
institutions académiques et de recherches.
L’Intergroupe des Minorités a pour but de faire connaître les questions 
concernant les minorités linguistiques et ethniques en Europe. Il ne traite cependant 
ni les questions relatives aux minorités immigrantes, ni la situation des Roms10. Cet 
Intergroupe sert en tant que forum ouvert pour échanger des idées sur la situation 
politique, linguistique et culturelle ainsi que sur l’avenir des minorités nationales, 
régions constitutionnelles et langages régionaux.
10 La question des Roms entre dans le champ d’application de l’Intergroup « Diversité et 
antiracisme ».
Near Abroad – Global Actorness – Governance | 375 
St
u
d
ie
s
L’objectif de l’Intergroupe est de développer des stratégies en vue d’augmenter 
la protection des minorités au niveau européen, échanger des idées et des points 
de vue concernant la situation et l’avenir des minorités traditionnelles, de faciliter 
le développement des législations, politiques et pratiques concernant les minorités 
nationales traditionnelles et le respect des droits des minorités et de défendre la 
diversité politique, culturelle et linguistique en Europe. L’intergroupe des Minorités 
sert également en tant que forum de coopération et de coordination pour des forces 
politiques intéressées dans l’aide des communautés minoritaires (Intergroup 
concept, 2006).
Dans le but de réaliser ces objectifs, l’Intergroupe tient régulièrement des réunions 
en vue de discuter les affaires actuelles concernant les minorités, de développer des 
coopérations avec des institutions spécialisées aux questions ethniques, avec des 
ONG relatives aux droits des minorités, aussi bien qu’avec des experts indépendants 
et de coopère activement avec le Conseil de l’Europe, notamment avec son Assemblée 
parlementaire. L’Intergroupe des Minorités organise également des réunions avec 
le(s) commissaire(s) s’occupant des questions ethniques11.
La capacité de lobbying de cet Intergroupe est considérable. Cette capacité 
s’explique principalement par le fait qu’une importante partie de ses membres a 
acquis de l’expérience auprès d’autres organisations européennes ou internationales. 
L’autre explication de cette capacité réside dans le fait que plusieurs membres de 
cet Intergroupe, par exemple le vice-président hongrois de l’Intergroupe, Kinga Gál 
(Fidesz – PPE), sont membres de la Sous-commission des droits de l’homme de la 
Commission des affaires étrangères chargée du monitoring de la valorisation des 
droits de l’homme dans des pays tiers, ainsi que de la Commission des libertés civiles, 
de la justice et des affaires intérieures, responsable de la protection des droits des 
minorités au sein de l’UE aussi bien que de la Commission de la culture, chargée du 
traitement des questions concernant l’enseignement des langues minoritaires et de 
la valorisation de la culture des minorités (Bővül az EP kisebbségvédelmi arzenálja, 
2004) et jouent un rôle non négligeable dans l’élaboration des projets de rapport et 
des projet d’avis.
En général, l’établissement des positions communes de l’Intergroupe des 
Minorités est précédé par une longue négociation avec des experts académiques et 
des représentants de la (des) minorité(s) concernée(s). Les membres de l’Intergroupe 
essaient de faire valoir cette position commune dans leur groupe politique respective 
et également lors des réunions de la Sous-commission des droits de l’homme, de la 
11 Entre 2007 et 2009, ces questions relavaient de la compétence de deux commissaires: Ján 
Figel était responsable pour des questions de l’éducation et de la culture, tandis que le 
nouveau commissaire roumaine, Leonid Orban était responsable du multilinguisme.
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Commission des libertés civiles, de la justice et des affaires intérieures ainsi que de 
la Commission de la Culture.
L’Intergroupe peut également élaborer des documents, comme par exemple: 
déclarations communes (document exprimant l’opinion de l’Intergroupe sur de 
différentes questions), rapports, documents politiques (analyse politique courte 
pour des décideurs) et documents de workshop (analyses scientifiques détaillées) 
(Intergroup concept, 2006). Ces documents peuvent être envoyés aux différentes 
institutions de l’EU, ainsi qu’aux décideurs et aux gouvernements concernés. Malgré 
que ces documents ne soient pas contraignants, en attirant l’attention de l’opinion 
publique et des décideurs sur des problèmes de caractère ethnique,  ils jouent un 
rôle particulièrement important au niveau de la représentation des intérêts (Tabajdi, 
2009: 331.).
L’action de l’Intergroupe des Minorités envers les groupes régionaux 
ethniques vivant sur le territoire de la France (2004-2009)
Lors de la période traité par la présente étude, il n’y avait qu’un seul député français, 
Gérard Onesta à participer aux activités de l’Intergroupe. Gérard Onesta vient de la 
Région Midi-Pyrénées où vit l’un des plus grands groupes ethniques de la France, les 
Occitans12.
Entre 2004 et 2009, l’Intergroupe des Minorités a tenu 41 réunions et a traité 58 
sujets relatifs aux questions des minorités.
Dans de nombreux cas, l’Intergroupe a traité des sujets ethnopolitiques soi-disant 
« généraux », cela veut dire des sujets qui n’étaient pas liés à aucune des minorités. Il 
y avait 37 sujets relatifs à une question minoritaire spécifique à un pays ou une région 
du monde (dans la plupart des cas relatifs à un pays ou une région  de l’UE).
Malgré le fait que la plupart des groupes ethniques vivant sur le territoire de 
l’Hexagone ne sont pas représentées à l’Intergroupe, des sujets ethnopolitiques 
français ont été traités quatre fois pendant la période examinée. Les sujets discutés 
étaient les suivants: les expériences en France du Bureau européen pour les langues 
moins répandues (BELMR)13 (18 mai 2006), la langue et l’identité alsaciennes (14 juin 
12 L’Occitanie couvre la majeure partie du Sud de la France, au Monaco et certaines régions de 
l’Italie de l’Espagne. L’occitan et le français ont non seulement la même origine latine mais 
elles s’entre-interfèrent au niveau culturel. En Occitanie, seulement 12% de la population 
déclarent de parler l’occitan sans difficultés. (Enquête sociolinguistique en Midi-Pyrénées, 
2013). La langue occitane peut être enseignée à l’école primaire, au collège, au lycée au titre 
de langue vivante 2 ou 3 et à certaines universités. Toutefois, elle ne peut pas être utilisée 
dans la vie publique (tribunaux, actes officiels, administration etc.) Elle est présente dans la 
presse écrite, il existe également des émissions en occitan.
13 Le Bureau européen des langues moins répandues est un ONG fondée en 1982 pour 
promouvoir la diversité linguistique. L’organisation est reconnue par le Parlement 
européen et le Conseil de l’Europe. Depuis sa création, le Bureau a renforcé les contacts et 
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2006), la situation des Basques en France (17 décembre 2008). Le quatrième sujet 
traité était une question qui n’entre pas tout à fait au champ d’activité de l’Intergroupe 
des Minorités: malgré le fait que l’Intergroupe ne traite pas les questions concernant 
les minorités immigrantes, le 19 janvier 2006 il a mis à son ordre du jour la crise 
d’intégration des nouvelles minorités immigrantes en France pour réagir ainsi aux 
émeutes de fin 2005 dans les banlieues françaises14.  À part cela, le 8 mai 2006 Csaba 
Tabajdi, président de l’Intergroupe a participé à la réunion du Conseil culturel breton, 
à Carhaix. Ces cinq sujets montrent qu’après les questions concernant les minorités 
hongroises vivant dans les pays limitrophes et les minorités en Espagne, les questions 
relatives aux minorités françaises étaient les plus importantes.
Dans ce que suit, l’étude synthétise les principaux points des différentes réunions15.
La crise d’intégration des nouvelles minorités immigrantes en France 
(19 janvier 2006)
Le 19 janvier 2006, l’Intergroupe des Minorité a traité un sujet relatif aux minorités 
immigrantes pour répondre aux événements d’actualité qui ont bouleversé la France 
depuis plusieurs mois. La réunion s’est déroulée en présence de plusieurs eurodéputés 
qui d’ailleurs n’étaient pas membres de l’Intergroupe des Minorités. Ce fait illustre 
parfaitement le fait que l’Intergroupe fonctionne en tant qu’un forum ouvert et que 
son activité peut intéresser non seulement des eurodéputés s’occupant des questions 
ethniques.
Le président de séance, Csaba Tabajdi, dans son discours d’ouverture, a souligné 
que quoique le sujet ne concernait pas les minorités ethniques, il était nécessaire 
de le discuter car aucun autre intergroupe ne s’en occupait pas. Bernard Poignant, 
responsable de la délégation socialiste français au PE a souligné l’ambition 
d’assimilation de l’État français qui remonte à 1789.
Adeline Hazan, eurodéputé socialiste était d’avis que les mouvements dans les 
banlieues françaises n’étaient pas motivés pas des causes ethniques, mais plutôt par 
des raisons économiques et sociales.
Dans son discours de clôture, Csaba Tabajdi a souligné la nécessité de reconnaître 
un statut spécial aux minorités et de faire recours à la discrimination positive 
pour assurer l’égalité de droits pour des groupes défavorisés et marginalisés. Il 
est à voir que malgré le fait que l’ordre du jour de la réunion ne concernait pas les 
les coopérations entre les communautés dont les langues sont peu employées. Pour plus de 
détail voir: http://www.eblul.org.
14 Les émeutes de 2005 dans les banlieues françaises sont des violences urbaines, provoquées 
principalement par des jeunes français issus de l’immigration, qui ont commencé à Clichy-
sour-Bois le 27 octobre 2005 et puis se sont répandues à travers la France.
15 Les documents relatifs à la réunion du 17 décembre 2008 sur la situation des basques en 
France n’ont pas été rendus public.
378 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
minorités ethniques, les participants ont exprimé des critiques envers la volonté 
d’assimilation de l’État français caractérisant la France aussi bien au niveau de sa 
politique d’immigration que de son attitude envers les langues régionales. (Tabajdi, 
2009: 678–683.)
La réunion du Conseil culturel breton à Carhaix (8 mai 2006)
Dans le cadre de son activité, le 8 mai 2006 le président de l’Intergroupe des Minorités 
a participé à la réunion du Conseil culturel breton à Carhaix. Dans ce cadre, il a 
exprimé le soutien de l’Intergroupe à la lutte des Bretons pour la promotion de leur 
langue. Il a également mentionné que la réunion de l’Intergroupe du 18 mai 2006 
mettrait à son ordre du jour une discussion sur la situation des minorités vivant en 
France en présence de nombreux activistes bretons ainsi que des représentants, 
entre autres bretons, du Bureau européen pour les langues moins répandues. Il a 
également critiqué la politique de la France qui était contraire aux principes de base 
de la subsidiarité, du régionalisme et de la décentralisation. En plus, il a souligné que la 
politique de la France qui, au nom de la diversité linguistique, cherchait à promouvoir 
l’utilisation du français dans les institutions de l’Union, était contradictoire à sa 
politique d’assimilation linguistique pratiquée à l’intérieur de l’Hexagone. (Tabajdi, 
2009: 650–655.)
Les expériences en France du Bureau européen pour les langues moins 
répandues (18 mai 2006)
La réunion de l’Intergroupe des Minorités du 18 mai 2006 concernant les expériences 
en France du Bureau européen pour les langues moins répandues s’est déroulée 
en présence de Tangi Louarn, militant breton et représentant français du Bureau 
européen pour les langues moins répandues, Jean-Pierre Thomin, maire de 
Landerneau (Bretagne) et responsable des questions relatives à l’usage des langues 
dans l’Association des régions française, Étienne Roux, représentant de l’Institut 
d’Études Occitanes, Philippe Elsass, directeur de l’Association pour la langue et le 
bilinguisme d’Alsace et de Moselle et Christophe Simon, président de l’Association 
pour la protection et les développement des langues du français ancien.
Dans son discours d’ouverture, Csaba Tabajdi a exprimé son avis selon lequel 
les Bretons, les Corses et les Alsaciens vivant en France n’étaient pas de simples 
groupes ethniques, mais de véritables « nations frères ». Il a également souligné que 
la situation des minorités vivant en France est parmi les cas les plus inquiétants en 
Europe.
Tangi Louarn, représentant français du Bureau européen pour les langues moins 
répandues, après avoir esquissé la situation inquiétante des pratiques de la France 
envers les langues minoritaires, a souligné l’importance de l’Intergroupe dans 
la protection des langues régionales. Il a remercié le Parlement européen d’avoir 
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examiné la situation des minorités vivant en France et d’avoir ainsi contribué à la 
protection de la diversité linguistique et culturelle de la France.
Jean-Pierre Thomin a proposé d’instituer un fonds pour favoriser les langues 
étant en voie de disparition.
Étienne Roux a esquissé les principaux problèmes des Occitans: manque de la 
reconnaissance juridique officielle et manque d’une politique linguistique adéquate 
relative à l’occitan. Il a également demandé l’Intergroupe des Minorités d’accorder 
une attention particulière à la langue occitane qui est pratiqué dans 8 régions (30 
départements) en France.
Csaba Tabajdi, dans son discours de clôture,  a exprimé de vives inquiétudes pour 
la non-ratification de la Chartre européen des langues régionales ou minoritaires et 
de la Convention cadre sur la protection des minorités nationales par la France. Il a 
également souligné que si la France était aujourd’hui un pays candidat, il aurait dû 
ratifier ces documents, autrement elle ne pourrait pas adhérer à l’UE. (Tabajdi, 2009: 
656–663.)
À la suite de cette réunion, Csaba Tabajdi a rédigé une recommandation pour la 
protection des langues régionales en France. Dans ce document, Tabajdi a vivement 
critiqué la France pour la non-ratification de la Chartre européen des langues régionales 
ou minoritaires et la Convention cadre sur la protection des minorités nationale. Il a 
également repris les recommandations de Alvaro Gil-Robles, commissionnaire pour 
les droits de l’Homme au Conseil de l’Europe qui avait demandé la France de ratifier les 
documents mentionnés ci-dessus ainsi que de reconnaître les droits fondamentaux 
des communautés minoritaires ainsi que d’assurer l’usage des langues régionales 
dans la vie publique.
Csaba Tabajdi a également invité l’Union européenne à promouvoir la diversité 
linguistique, notamment en soutenant les langues européennes en voie de disparition 
et de mettre en place un fonds communautaire pour financer les programmes en vue 
de la protection des langues en voie de disparition. (Tabajdi, 2009: 664–665.)
La langue et l’identité alsaciennes (14 juin 2006)
L’intergroupe des Minorités a invité à sa réunion du 14 juin 2006 relative à la langue 
et l’identité alsaciennes les représentants de plusieurs organisations et associations 
luttant pour la promotion de l’utilisation de la langue alsacienne, notamment: 
François Schaffner, le vice-président responsable pour la culture et le bilinguisme 
du Conseil régional d’Alsace et de Moselle, Philippe Elsass, directeur de l’Association 
pour la langue et le bilinguisme d’Alsace et de Moselle  et Justin Vogel, vice-président 
du Conseil régional d’Alsace et responsable de l’Office pour la Langue et la Culture 
d’Alsace (OLCA).
François Schaffner a esquissé la situation de la langue alsacienne en France: il 
a souligné que les autorités françaises cherchaient à limiter l’enseignement de la 
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langue alsacienne et que l’accessibilité de la seule émission de radio était limitée. Par 
conséquent, il a demandé l’Intergroupe de sensibiliser l’opinion publique à la situation 
de la langue alsacienne. Il a également demandé le Parlement européen d’exercer une 
pression sur le gouvernement français en vue de reconnaître le droit des Alsaciens 
à faire des études en leur langue maternelle et d’inviter le gouvernement français à 
ratifier la Chartre et la Convention cadre mentionnés ci-dessus.
Dans son intervention, Justin Vogel a présenté l’Office pour la Langue et la 
Culture d’Alsace en vue de la promotion de la langue et culture alsaciennes. Il a 
souligné que l’Office focalisait sur trois questions: l’apprentissage de la langue 
alsacienne, l’organisation des événements culturels ainsi que l’édition des livres et 
des dictionnaires en alsacien.
Henrik Lax, eurodéputé finnois (ALDE) représentant la minorité suédoise vivant 
en Finlande a souligné que l’Intergroupe pourrait jouer un rôle important dans la 
soutenance des aspirations des Alsaciens. Il a également ajouté que le cas de Wales 
où la langue maternelle a quasiment disparu mais a reçu une vitalité nouvelle, peut 
servir d’exemple aux Alsaciens.
Le président de la séance, Csaba Tabajdi a souligné que l’assimilation linguistique 
était le plus grand danger pour l’existence des minorités européennes. Dans son 
discours de clôture, il a ajouté que la sauvegarde et la promotion d’une identité 
nécessitaient non seulement le soutien de la société majoritaire, mais également 
l’engagement des minorités. Il a également proposé que l’Intergroupe des Minorités 
envoie une délégation en Alsace pour visiter les écoles bilingues. (Tabajdi, 2009: 
666–677.)
Conclusion
Malgré l’intérêt limité des eurodéputés français envers la participation à l’activité de 
l’Intergroupe des Minorités (un seul député), l’Intergroupe a traité de nombreuses 
fois des questions concernant les groupes ethniques vivant en France. Ce fait montre, 
par ailleurs, la gravité de la situation en France.
Quoique les moyens de l’Intergroupe soient particulièrement limités, son influence 
n’est quand même pas négligeable: en organisant des réunions avec la participation 
de la société civile, notamment les représentant des minorités concernés, il connaît 
davantage le problème; lors des conférences de presse suivant les réunions il peut 
attirer l’attention de l’opinion publique sur les des problèmes existants et exercer, par 
conséquent, une pression sur les décideurs; et en rédigeant des recommandations 
il peut éventuellement suggérer des solutions aux responsables politiques. Cette 
capacité d’influence a d’ailleurs été reconnue par les représentants des groupes 
ethniques invités aux différentes réunions de l’Intergroupe qui ont demandé à 
plusieurs reprises le soutien de l’Intergroupe des Minorités.
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Spatial disparity in India 
indicated by SENTIENT Index of development 
and its relationship to the religious diversity
Zoltán Wilhelm1 – Norbert Pap2 – Nándor Zagyi3 – József Pete4 – Viktória Nemes5 
Abstract
In this study the data of 593 districts of India were elaborated, based on the district 
level information of the census held in 2001. As a result, the districts of India were 
classified by the relative level of development, using the so-called SENTIENT Index. 
The index of complex development that we created on the basis of the tetrahedron 
model sensitively “reacts” to the changes occurring in the geographical environment. 
It is modified as an effect of the events taking place in the individual spheres, so 
it can be a tool to produce spectacular results of comparative spatial studies. The 
present paper explores the coherences of spatial disparity within India, while it also 
makes the internal correlations of the state of development or backwardness clear. 
In addition, the authors surveyed the correlations among the proportions of the 
different religious communities in the districts and the development level shown by 
the SENTIENT Index.
Introduction
It can be stated with an absolute certainty that India is one of the most diverse 
countries in the world from a human geography perspective. The ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and caste division of its population all result in such heterogeneity, which is 
practically unmatched in any other country. This is accompanied by the differences 
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of the physical geographical endowments of this huge state.  This extreme diversity 
naturally has led to considerable regional disparities.
Since the averages of the high/low extremes within some large member states 
hide the real proportions, it seems to be more reasonable to analyse the data of 
the districts, the tier below the administrative hierarchy level of member states/
provinces and union territories (Figure 1) and to produce manageable statistical 
databases in order to feature the spatial disparity within India. Of course, not even the 
districts are entities comparable from all aspects, stemming from the administrative 
differences within the country6, nevertheless a much more accurate picture can be 
drawn than that provided by the surveys at member-state level.
The analysis of spatial disparity in India was carried out on the basis of the data 
of the census of 2001, as last authentic set of information regarding to religious 
composition of the country. The essay is also designed to create a database that shall 
be comparable with the data of this last census so that we can clearly demonstrate 
the trends of and the reasons for the changes.
The authors also intend to explore a new method of analysis built upon census 
data, which is revealed first to the wider public in this paper.
Method
The districts of India have been classified by the relative level of development, using 
the so-called SENTIENT Index. The basis of this method was the tetrahedron model 
created by Tóth (Tóth, 1981). The essence of this model is as follows: a settlement 
is to be comprehended as a system of economic, social and technical structures in 
a given geographical environment, and in intensive interaction with the elements 
of this environment. The concept can be best visualised, assuming the balanced 
development levels of the respective structure in the optimal case, by a tetrahedron, 
the foundation of which is the geographical environment, the other three sides are the 
economic, social and technical (infrastructural) spheres. Along the edges, between 
the respective spheres there are interactions of different intensities, depending on 
the development level of the structures; a settlement is the complete system of these 
spheres (and their interactions), which as a single organism is in close interaction 
with the natural environment. Depending on how complicated these systems are 
(taking the characteristics of the complete settlement network and the relative 
differences of the individual elements into consideration), different settlement types 
can be identified (Tóth, 1981).
6 The proportion between the districts with the largest and smallest numbers of population 
is like comparing the number of inhabitants in Hungary (just less than 10 million) to that of 
Esztergom (a town with approximately 29 thousand inhabitants).
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Figure 1. Administrative map of India – 1 = Sikkim; 2 = Nagaland; 3 = Manipur; 4 = Mizoram; 
5 = Tripura; 6 = Daman & Diu; 7 = Dadra & Nagar Haveli; 8 = Goa; 9 = Pondicherry
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We are convinced that the tetrahedron model is not only suitable for the definition 
of the settlement types; offering both theoretical and practical bases, it is also an 
excellent tool for the measurement of the development level of larger units.7 For the 
definition of the qualitative feature of the respective spheres we used statistical data 
taken from the results of the 2001 census in India. Giving to the temptation of using 
acronyms so popular in the West, which refer in a simple way to the research method 
and the results with meaningful words, an acronym was created pointing to both the 
method that we used and the monitoring of the changes in the research area. This 
acronym is:
SENTIENT Index = Society, Economy, iNfrasTructure, physIcal environmENT.
Synonyms for the word “sentient” are: feeling; attentive; aware. The complex 
development index that we created on the basis of the tetrahedron model sensitively 
“reacts” to the changes taking place in the geographical environment; it is modified 
as an effect of the events taking place in the individual spheres, so it can be a tool 
producing spectacular results of comparative spatial studies.
In the study, data of 593 districts of India were involved, based on the district 
level data of the census held in 2001. The data were not freely available in electronic 
version, so we had to read all data, district by district from the Java based GIS maps 
that were generated on the website of the census of India – with several months’ 
work – from which we were able to create our own digital database. In order to define 
the rank by the level of development, with simple relative ranks were involved, using 
the averages of the positions.
For the description of the social sphere the following data were used:
D1 = proportion of urban population;
D2 = literacy rate;
D3 = differences in the literacy rates by gender;
D4 = proportion of diploma holders;
D5 = proportion of people with disabilities.
In the case of D1, D2 and D4 no explanation is necessary. Data of D3 were used 
because in India it is extremely important to recognize the disparity of literacy rates 
between men and women older than seven years within the same districts. It is easy 
to understand that in this mainly male-centred society, if the respective figure of 
women is close to that of men, we are in a district relatively more developed, at least 
7 The method of spatial analysis based on the tetrahedron model is not a new phenomenon. 
It was initiated by the research team led by TÓTH, J. in 1995 (the so-called TÁGINTER-
analysis), when submitting a proposal for the tender announced for the making of the 
development concept of Baranya County in Hungary.
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as regards its human endowments. The index of D5 was selected because the more 
closed a given social circle (castes, sub-castes, isolated rural communities etc.), 
and the worse the living conditions (malnutrition, environmental damages etc.), 
the higher the chances that babies with disabilities are born. At the same time, it is 
very sad that in India there is frequent mutilation of children carried out by parents 
or so-called “beggar masters”, in some cases even self-mutilation occurs in order 
to secure the stable living from begging (Nieuwenhuizen, 2006). On the basis of 
the above-mentioned, we consider that the less the proportion of the disabled, the 
more developed a district in India is. In addition, the institutions that receive the 
disabled do not distort these figures, given the usually very high population of the 
administrative units in question.
The development levels of the economic sphere in the districts were measured by 
the following indices:
D6 = proportion of full-time employment;
D7 = proportion of non-agricultural workers;
D8 = proportion of inactive population;
D9 = use of banking services;
D10 = proportion of households possessing a car.
Data on infrastructure—in relation to the characteristics of the data collection—
is concentrated on the public utilities supply of the households and the comfort 
level of the homes. The search, acquisition and calculation of the data describing the 
economic, entrepreneurial environment can be realized in a later phase of this work. 
At present, we are using the following data:
D11 = bathroom in the house;
D12 = no toilet belongs to the house;
D13 = lighting with electricity;
D14 = number of telephones.
The application of parameters describing the natural environment is a most 
pressing task, as no data are available on the state of the environment by components. 
We made attempts to generate an index focusing on the human comfort sense due to 
the climate, but this index is not usable yet in the framework of this study. Therefore, 
only upon population density (D15) data were used in the analysis. The lower the 
number of inhabitants per square kilometre, the less degraded environment is 
expected, i.e. districts with lower population density are ranked higher in the order. 
Of course, this parameter does not describe the quality of human life adequately 
because life is rather harsh e.g. in the Himalaya of Ladakh, in an almost intact natural 
environment (Kiss-Csapó, 2009).
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In addition to the data mentioned above, several other data were also recorded 
and used in this essay, such as the population of scheduled castes and tribes, religious 
breakdown, and the number of inhabitants residing in the most populated settlements 
of the district. These become interesting when doing the mathematical-statistical 
calculations, e.g. correlation analyses.
Results
Making an average of the positions occupied on the scale of 593 items, there was an 
order by the relative development level based on the 15 selected indices. Figure 2 
features the first 100 districts marked with red. A red circle, framed black, designates 
all nine districts of Delhi, as they are in the set concentrating the most advanced one 
hundred districts. Red quadrangles framed are used to show the union territories 
while quadrangles without a frame feature the small-sized districts mostly belonging 
to megapolis.
It is clear from the map that the most developed, relatively large and almost 
contiguous area of India can be found in the southwest, along the Ahmedabad–
Mumbai–Goa–Kanniyakumari axis. This means that the industrial regions and 
traditional ports of the central and southeast territories of Gujarat state, the western 
edge of Maharashtra, with the financial and commercial centre of India, Mumbai, and 
its agglomeration, belong to this area. Extending southwards this axis is continued by 
Goa state, with the highest GDP per capita in India and a “super power” of the tourism 
industry; several districts of Karnataka, a state famous for its computer software 
industry, also joins the group of the most advanced districts. It is interesting that 
Kerala renowned for its human resources (where the literacy rate of males is higher 
than in Portugal or Malta) is only represented by six districts in this zone. If only 
the indices of human resources are taken into account, a contiguous zone in the 
central and southern parts of Tamil Nadu stretches across developed administrative 
units. The complex index, however, reaches maximum at the district Aizawl, in 
the centre of Mizoram state. The average value of its positions is 43.6. Its leading 
position is surprising among other things because this district is home, according 
to the statistics, to a large proportion of people with disabilities: scheduled castes 
and, what is more, scheduled tribes. Megapolises are represented by Kolkata, in 
the second place. Outstanding positions are held by the districts of Delhi and Goa, 
and by the district with the fourth position in the rank, a new city: Chandigarh. It is 
absolutely evident that this region of India can be called the Indian Blue Banana, its 
shape resembles the fruit much more than that of its European counterpart does. In 
addition, one has to remark, although it has nothing to do with the present analysis, 
that India is the number one banana producer in the world …
The first 100 districts outside the above-mentioned axis are usually big cities, 
megapolises and their agglomerations: Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, and Hyderabad. A 
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different development path is represented by the majority of the rich districts of 
Punjab (Delhi–Lahore axis), and the developed districts of the smaller northeast 
states with a substantial Christian population.
The inferior performance of the states in the northern Hindi zone that hold 
the leading role in political life, is striking. There cannot be found among the first 
100 districts one single entity from the states of Rajasthan, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh or Assam. Kolkata from West Bengal, and another 
unit from Madhya Pradesh are the two districts among the most developed such 
entities of India (Figure 2).
Figure 2. The hundred most developed and the hundred least developed districts in India 
by the SENTIENT Index, 2001 – legend in the text
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It comes from this analysis that the least developed districts are situated in the 
territory of the Ganges Plain, in the first place. Drawing—with blue—the last one 
hundred districts on a map (Figure 2), we actually get a contiguous block of backward 
districts. This region of India is the Aryan/Hindu core, which is also the cradle of 
the Hindu civilisation. This religion led by the (Brahman) caste of the priests is 
the stronghold of rural life, and anti-urban feelings. Religious reform movements 
have been organised against this, the ones now known, and Buddhism and Jainism 
(Wilhelm, 2008). These movements, however, could become successful in the urban 
environment. In the region of the Ganges Plain, a region with excellent agricultural 
endowments but burdened with religious ties, the socio-economic system has 
naturally remained rural.
This way a characteristic South-North dichotomy has emerged in India, the 
opposite of what is typical in the “developed” world, as in India it is usually the 
North that is backward and the south that is developed. In addition, we can also 
witness a West-East opposite, but this one is functioning “normally”. If we compare 
the averages of the geographical coordinates of the most populated settlements in 
the hundred most developed districts (using World Gazetteer and Google Earth) to 
those of the least developed districts, the statement made above is verified (Figure 
3). The centre of development moves towards southwest, the centre of backwardness 
towards northeast (Figure 3). We have to remark that the focus of the most developed 
districts can be found in the middle of the country, as these districts are located 
scattered on the map, as opposed to the block of the backward districts. We have 
to realise, however, that coming from the shape of the country (“narrower” south), 
the more advanced districts closer to the Equator have to have overweight so that 
the development pole of India can be found in the central part of the country. It is 
worth looking at the “movement” of the focal points of the categories made from the 
593 districts on the basis of their development level, where the first group consists of 
98 elements, all others have 99 elements (Figure 3). The first two groups are relatively 
close to each other. The reason for this is that the bulk of the districts making group 2 
can be linked to the southern regions. The elements of the next group are also more 
connected to the South, but the focal point is moving towards the eastern territories. 
The focal points of the remaining groups are evidently moving towards northeast.
Without giving lengthy details of our statistical analyses, it is worth taking a look 
at the correlations of religion and development level, extremely important in India. We 
surveyed the correlations among the proportions of the different religious communities 
in the districts and the development level shown by the SENTIENT Index.
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Religions and the socio-economic system
The religious action—regarding its origin—is worldly designated, and economically 
significant (Weber, 2005). According to the—probably astonishing—statement 
mentioned above, the connections between them can be the following:
(1) The endowments and challenges of the socio-economic situation may play a 
decisive, crucial role on religious behaviour, act and form, and especially on its 
organizational differentiation. In economic sense, for instance, crisis periods 
favour the emergence of religious sects and movements, as these states and 
situations highly devaluate “entrance frees” (Hámori, 1998). It can also be settled 
that the division of labour, economic growth and the distribution of excess 
goods made it possible for ‘religious specialists’ to separate (Tomka, n.d.). On the 
contrary, with economic growth the offerings for religious purposes decrease. 
(2) Religious culture represents norms, aims, values and prohibitions, thus 
regulating/controlling the way of social and economic acting, the mood of work, 
the usage of work results and social division. It follows that religions have a great 
influence on the rate of economic growth. Mainly in the aspect of the personal 
attitude to savings, use of technologies, the scope of duties in the labour market, 
but also in the education of children and in many other relations (Rinschede, 1999). 
In another sense different religious relief organizations try to help deflate/reduce 
poverty, rather than to spread faith, so this way they contribute to the growth of 
the economy (Rinschede, 1999). Weber noticed a relation between protestant/
evangelical ethics and capitalism (Weber, 1995). There are some counter examples 
as well because Weber highlighted the negative aspect of eastern/oriental 
religions on economic development. In some parts of Myanmar 30% of the income 
is used for the provisioning of monks and churches and to cover the expenses of 
feasts. For numerous catholic and Muslim communities the building of a church or 
mosque means a great financial strain, while in Theravada-Buddhist or Lamaist 
communities most of the men decide to join monasticism for months or even for 
a lifetime. Their labour force falls out and their supply places a great burden on 
society (Rinschede, 1999). The costs of certain religious and burying rituals are 
also judged negatively (Gardner, 2010). 
But the economic importance of the different denominations/sects can alter 
depending on the territory/region where they are revealing. In Italy Catholicism 
deputizes conservative policy, while in Brazil it is connected to a revolutionary 
point of view. Buddhism in Japan plays a major role in economic decision-making, 
while in Sri Lanka there is a tight connection between underdevelopment and 
Buddhism (Rinschede, 1999).
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(3) The religious organization itself is the active participant of the economy, too 
(Tomka, n.d.). These two, latter mentioned aspects are going to be explained in 
detail hereinafter. Arisen from the different cultic beliefs, culinary regulations 
and prohibitions of religions, various agricultural methods were evolved (Hindu, 
Muslim, Hebrew culinary regulations, prohibitions). Malaysia can be a good 
example of these. In the beginning, Malay people mainly produced and raised rice 
and coconuts, and employed contractual Indian and Chinese people on rubber 
tree plantations. Chinese brought with themselves the practice of pig husbandry 
and vegetable culture whereas, Indians involved milk production through cattle 
and goat husbandry (Bajmócy, 2004). 
Algeria—once being one of the biggest wine producers and exporters in the world—
faced serious economic and financial problems after achieving independence. In 1962 
the country—inasmuch as Islamic state religion had conflicts with it—pursuant 
to religious formulas/regulations prohibited alcohol consumption, thus ruining 
Algerian wine production (Rinschede, 1999).
The most conspicuous coherency of religion/al geography is the impact on the 
different branches of industry. Churches—as procurers—come into contact with the 
economy through building-, printing-, devotional article and gift industry. However, 
the religious connections of metalworking, silk- and rug/carpet weaving should not 
be neglected. In the market of devotional articles, jewels and clothes the need for 
luxury works should be taken into account.
We can find several examples for the affection of some economic activities to 
religions, nationalities in the tertiary sector. The typical trading nations of Asia were 
the Hebrews, Armenians and Chinese. They often become the source of tensions 
because of their special place, position within the host nations. At the same time, in 
mixed-religious areas e.g. in parts of Mumbai with different religions, the shops are 
closed on differing days (Stoddard, Wishart and Blouet, 1986). In the multi-ethnic and 
religious Singapore the tourist agencies popularize all churches/monuments of the 
different religions (Rinschede, 1999). Ethnic and religious relations also played a role 
in the improvement of transport networks. In the construction of the Russian broad-
gauge railway—besides isolationist and strategic considerations—the ideology of 
the Eastern Church state-religion played a great part. Church interests also led to the 
construction of connections and passes across the Alps (Erdősi, 2004).
Maybe the most prevalent and general (economically considerable) feature in 
connection with sects—belonging to the tertiary sector—is its institute-maintaining 
role. In the United States the second largest institute to offer social aids, after the 
federal administration, is the Catholic Church (Gardner, 2003). In addition to these, 
its sanitary, educational, cultural (museums) services are also considerable, as well 
as its role in mass media, which should not be neglected.
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Religious pattern and the state of development in India
In India, the majority of the inhabitants are believers of two large religions: they 
are either Hindus or Muslims (Table 1.). The political division of South Asia in 1947 
and the way of accession of the ducal states also took place on the basis of religious 
considerations. This was followed by the largest involuntary migration process in 
the world so far, coupled with massacres (Wilhelm, Pete and Kisgyörgy, 2006). The 
situation has considerably changed since then.
Figure 3. “Migration” of the focal points of population in the districts of India, by the six 
categories created with the use of the SENTIENT Index, 2001
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The averages of the different indices—note: the lower the figure, the more 
developed the district—are correlated to the number of the believers of the respective 
religions present in the district. The value calculated for the Hindus is r=0.183786, i.e. a 
very weak but existing correlation can be demonstrated between the high proportion 
of Hindus and backwardness. The value for the Muslims is r=0.1369. There is an even 
weaker but still demonstrable correlation between the larger share of Muslims and 
backwardness.
Table 1. Religious breakdown of the population of India, 2001
Source: Census India 2001
Analysing the smaller religious communities, one must consider the following: 
Christians (r=-0.16069), Sikhs (r=-0.24259), Buddhists (r=-0.15207), Jains (r=-0.26089), 
believers of other religions (r=0.018413) and non-religious (r=-0.048). No correlation 
was found in the case of those belonging to the latter two groups, but the presence 
of the believers of other religions in larger number in a district induces development. 
Of course, it is not to say that there are “backward” and “developed” religions. The 
explanation for this phenomenon is heterogeneity. In areas where Hindus or Muslims 
have a dominant proportion, the presence of other religious minorities is much less 
typical (Figure 4). However, districts that are heterogeneous from a religious aspect 
are more developed.
It is just this heterogeneity, diversity and tolerance—the tolerance of the majority 
society—is where the power of India and the key to the development of the country 
lie. Paul Johnson, British historian wrote in the Forbes magazine, 21 June 2004: “India 
is another example. It is the nature of the Hindu religion to be tolerant and, in its 
own curious way, permissive. Under the socialist regime of Jawaharlal Nehru and his 
family successors the state was intolerant, restrictive and grotesquely bureaucratic. 
That has largely changed and economy is soaring […] When left to themselves, Indians 
(like the Chinese) always prosper as a community. Take the case of Uganda’s Indian 
population, which was expelled by the horrible dictator Idi Amin and received into 
Religion Number of believers Proportion (%)
Hindu 827 578 868 80.5
Muslim 138 188 240 13.4
Christian 24 080 016 2.3
Sikh 19 215 730 1.9
Buddhist 7 955 207 0.8
Jain 4 225 053 0.4
Other (Animist, Parsi, Israelite etc.) 6 639 626 0.6
Non-religious 727 588 0.1
Total 1 028 610 328 100
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the tolerant society of Britain. There are now more millionaires in this group than 
in any other recent immigrant community in Britain. They are a striking example 
of how far hard work, strong family bonds and a devotion to education can carry a 
people who have been stripped of all their worldly assets” (Johnson, 2004).
Figure 4. Religious majority (%) in different districts of India (2001)
 
Summary
The creation of the SENTIENT Index requires the processing and analysis of a 
considerable amount of data. As an achievement of this work, the internal correlations 
of the index have also become clear (Appendix 1), which allows the later “fine-tuning” 
of the index.
Using rank correlation analyses it was possible to analyse the correlations 
between development level and relative positions (Table 2). Despite the fact that 
the most accurate measure of development level is the access to those services and 
comfort amenities in India that are everyday services and amenities in Hungary (use 
of electricity, bathroom in the flat, telephone), the proportion of diploma holders is 
still ranking lower than the acquisition of the very basic skills as a way of climbing up 
the social hierarchy (Table 2).
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We have to pay special attention to the correlation between the proportion of 
the scheduled castes (handicapped castes = untouchables = Harijans = Dalits = the 
oppressed) and development levels. It is strange to see—for those who know the 
Hungarian circumstances—that the higher share of handicapped people means more 
developed districts, or at least does not induce backwardness. The reasons can vary. 
Rural areas are usually left by those who have no property or chance of development, 
or suffer from negative discrimination. They increase the population of the big cities, 
so their proportion is higher in these settlements. This hypothesis, however, is not 
supported by the correlation matrix of Appendix 1. There is only one significant 
element of this correlation: it is the lack of toilet.
We may think, then, that India has mostly been on the right track over the last 
sixty years and the quality of life of the oppressed might have improved (positive 
discrimination), although their housing conditions are still worse than the average. 
Presumably they are working in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the advanced 
districts in larger numbers.
The scheduled tribes mostly consist of rural inhabitants (Appendix 1), which is not 
surprising, as they usually live on the outer or inner peripheries, often still following 
ancient social organisation patterns. They usually have a full-time job, the proportion 
of the inactive population is low, and there are few diploma holders among them. 
Where the proportion of scheduled castes is high, that of the scheduled tribes is 
low. In other words, they are usually missing from the territories with strong Hindu 
influence. Consequently, they usually belong to religious minorities, Christians in the 
first place, so their human development indices are good. On the whole, their presence 
does not coincide with backwardness (Table 2).
The spatial diversity of the administrative units is thus of basic importance in a 
country of extreme heterogeneity. We looked at the homogeneity of the second tier of 
the administrative hierarchy. Evidently, it is only worth making standard deviation 
calculations for the states with large territories and population numbers (Table 3).
It is understandable that Delhi, a unit in the union territory category, produces the 
least spatial disparity (nine districts). On the other hand, the extreme diversity of 
West Bengal is striking among the member states (Table 3). There is a huge contrast 
between the districts of Kolkata and its agglomeration, and the rural areas of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta that have been agricultural regions for centuries. In 
accordance with what we have said in the introduction, without Kolkata this state 
would be one of the least urbanised sub-national units of India, with all of its impacts 
on the general development level.
Nevertheless we can see that spatial disparity is the smallest within the most 
developed and the least developed states. Among the states that can be positioned to 
be around the Indian average both in their size and population—in the Indian Blue 
Banana and the Indian Drawn Bow area—it is Kerala, Punjab, Haryana and Himachal 
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Pradesh that represent the most advanced states least struck by spatial disparities. 
Also, Bihar features standard deviation below 20; however, it is one of the most 
backward areas of India without a single district with development potential in the 
near future. The situation is almost the same in Chattisgarh and Orissa states as well.
Table 2. Rank correlation between relative development level by the SENTIENT Index 
and the different parameters in India, 2001 (ed. Wilhelm, Z.)
Although the present database created with a painstaking effort even in its 
present form offers good opportunities for analysis, its continuous upgrade will be 
endeavoured, since enlarged with data further calculated from other sources it might 
give us an increasingly accurate picture of the spatial disparity in India.
Code Component rs
D1 proportion of urban population 0.714493
D2 literacy rate 0.755857
D3 differences in the literacy rates by gender 0.700396
D4 proportion of diploma holders 0.441732
D5 proportion of people with disabilities 0.050592
D6 proportion of full-time employment    0.47933
D7 proportion of non-agricultural workers 0.675819
D8 proportion of the inactives 0.157722
D9 proportion of households using banking services 0.559538
D10 proportion of households possessing a car 0.701077
D11 proportion of homes with bathroom 0.858375
D12 proportion of homes without a toilet 0.681254
D13 proportion of homes using electricity for lighting 0.878803
D14 number of telephone landlines 0.863425
D15 population density    0.08196
D16 proportion of scheduled castes 0.137104
D17 proportion of scheduled tribes 0.061192
D18 territory of the district   -0.06973
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Table 3. Standard deviation of the districts in the sub-national units of the Indian sub-continent, 
2001 (ed. Wilhelm, Z.)
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II. Documents

Section I. 
“Ideas of Europe”
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Unity in Europe
Fernand Braudel 
From Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, translated by Richard Mayne, Penguin Books
An historian of humanism, Franco Simone, has warned us to be wary of the supposed 
unity of Europe: a romantic illusion, he says. Rο reply that he is both right and wrong 
is simply to affirm that Europe simultaneously enjoys both unity and diversity -which 
οn reflection seems to be the obvious truth.
The preceding chapters have described a number of things shared by the whole of 
Europe: its religion, its rationalist philosophy, its development of science and technol-
ogy, its taste for revolution and social justice, its imperial adventures. At any moment, 
however, it is easy to go beyond this apparent ‚harmony’ and find the national diver-
sity that underlies it. Such differences are abundant, vigorous and necessary. But they 
exist just as much between Brittany and Alsace, between the North and the South of 
France, between Piedmont and the Italian mezzogiorno; between Bavaria and Prus-
sia; between Scotland and England; between Flemings and Walloons in Belgium; or 
among Catalonia, Castille and Andalusia. And they are not used as arguments to deny 
the national unity of each of the countries concerned.
Nor are these national instances of unity a contradiction of Europe’s οwn. Every 
State has always tended to form its οwn cultural world; and the study of ‚national 
character’ has enjoyed analysing these various limited civilizations. The brilliantly 
clever books of Elie Faure or Count Hermann Alexander Keyserling are not in this 
respect completely misleading: but let us simply say that they peer too closely at the 
individual tiles in a mosaic which, seen from a greater distance, reveals clear overall 
patterns. Why must one be forced to choose, once and for all, between the detail and 
the whole? Neither need exclude the other: both are real.
Outstanding art and culture
Some of Europe’s shared characteristics can justly be called ‚brilliant’. It is they that 
give European civilization, οn the highest plane of culture, taste and intellect, a fra-
ternal and almost monolithic air, as if bathed in a single, unvarying light.
Does that mean that all the nations of Eurοpe have exactly the same culture? 
Certainly not. But any movement that begins in one part of Europe tends to spread 
throughout it. Tends οnly: a cultural phenomenon may very well face resistance οr 
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rejection in one part of Europe or another - or, conversely, it may be so successful 
that, as often happens, it goes beyond Europe’s frontiers, ceases to be ‚European’, and 
begins to belong to humanity in general. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, Europe is 
a fairly coherent cultural whole, and has long acted as such vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world.
Art enjoys multiple resonance. Artistic phenomena in Europe spill over the bor-
ders of their native countries, whether Catalonia (probably the source from which 
early Romanesque spread), the Ile de France, Lombardy, fifteenth-century Florence, 
Titian’s Venice or the Paris of the Impressionists.
Regularly, every centre where princely houses, palaces or churches have been 
built has attracted artists from the four corners of Europe. This was shown in the 
fifteenth century, to take one example among a thousand, by the Dijon of the Dukes 
of Burgundy and of the sculptor Claus Sluter. The wanderings of Italian Renaissance 
artists readily explain how the style of one city was so easily contaminated by that 
of another. A particular fresco, begun by one artist, might be completed by a second; 
a particular church might have called for work by a succession of architects. Santa 
Maria del Fiore, in Florence, for instance, had to wait for the bold Filippo Brunelleschi 
before it was crowned by its cupοla:
A prince’s or a rich merchant’s caprice or love of luxury had a role to play: without 
such stimulus, it would be hard to understand how styles spread so rapidly at a time 
when communications were slow and less numerous than nοw. In the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries the Italians, like those whom Francis I of France summoned to his 
court, were in effect the teachers of all Europe. In the eighteenth century it was the 
French who carried classical art far afield: they were to be found even in Russia. And 
how many Versailles Europe possesses - how many gardens à la française.
So Europe has been swept by great waves, if not tides, which have been slow to cover 
all the area, but slow also to recede. One has οnly to think of those great successes when 
all Europe seemed to march in step: Romanesque, Gothic, Baroque and Classicism.
Each time, the phenomenon was surprisingly long-lived. Gothic art held sway, in 
general, for three centuries. Tο the South, it reached little further than Burgos and 
Μίlan: the true Mediterranean spirit rejected it. Yet Venice, at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, was entirely Gothic -in its οwn unique way. Paris was still Gothic in 
the mid-sixteenth century. Renaissance architecture was confined to a few places: to 
the Louvre, which was under construction; to the Palais de Madrid, nοw demolished; 
and to Fontainebleau, where Francesco Primaticcio (‚Le Primatice’) had worked 
and where Leonardo da Vinci returned before he died. From the sixteenth century 
onwards, Baroque enjoyed immense success: an offshoot of both Rome and Spain, it 
was the art of the Counter-Reformation (so much so that at one time it was known 
as ‚Jesuit art’). But it also spread to Protestant Europe; and it made great inroads 
toward the East, in Vienna, Prague and Poland.
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In the eighteenth century, French architecture took much less time to establish 
itself. Tο understand how so many French towns, like Tours and Bordeaux, were re-
modelled, the most illuminating sight is that of the former Leningrad. St Petersburg, 
built in an empty space with nο buildings to restrain the freedom of the architects, 
certainly was and still is the most beautiful of eighteenth-century cities, and the one 
that best expresses that century’s sense of grouping, proportion and vistas.
Painting and music spread nο less freely. Musical techniques or pictorial preoccu-
pations were easily taken up into general circulation, and went the rounds of Europe.
It would be impossible to deal adequately in a few lines with the fascinating story 
of the rapid changes in musical instruments and techniques which accompanied suc-
cessive stages in Europe’s history. The instruments used in classical antiquity, from 
the flute to the harp, were handed down from generation to generation; next came 
the organ, the harpsichord, the violin (made popular especially by Italian virtuosi, al-
though the present-day bow, which dates from the eighteenth century, was invented 
by a Frenchman), and then the various types of piano.
The history of musical form is obviously bound up with the development of musi-
cal instruments. In the Middle Ages, singing predominated, whether accompanied or 
not. Polyphony, which developed in the ninth century, used the organ as bass accom-
paniment to liturgical song. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ars nοva 
of the Florentines was a vοcal polyphony in which a number of instruments were 
introduced as if they were voices. This ‚new art’ reached its zenith in the a capella 
music of Palestrina (1525-94).
But vοcal music gave way to instrumental music, especially with the development 
of bow instruments. It was the beginning of the concert, of so-called ‚chamber music’, 
written for a small number of instruments (for example, a quartet). Originally, cham-
ber music meant secular music, or that of the court as distinct from that of the Church. 
In 1605, Enrico Radesca was ‚musico di camera’ to Amadeus of Savoy; in 1627, Carlo 
Farina was ‚suonatore di violino di camera’. Chamber music was above all a form of 
dialogue: it was the art of conversation. Italy was its birthplace, with the concerto 
in which groups of instruments conferred together, followed by a solo instrument 
responding to the whole orchestra. Arcangelo Corelli (1653-1713) was the first to play 
as a soloist; Antonio Vivaldi (1678-1743) was the master of the art. Germany preferred 
the sonata, with two instruments or sometimes one alone. In France, the suite very 
freely brought together a number of dance movements.
With the symphony, finally; came large-scale orchestral music - large-scale in the 
number of instruments and in the number of listeners. In the eighteenth century, with 
the Stamitz family, the sonata form was already treated symphonically. In the next 
century, in the Romantic period, the tendency was to enlarge the orchestra, but also 
to give a more prominent role to the soloists, of whom Niccolò Paganini and Franz 
Liszt were characteristic examples.
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Special mention must be made of Italian opera, which seems to have originated 
in Florence at the end of the sixteenth century. It went οn to conquer Italy, Germany 
and Europe: Mozart, Handel and Gluck all at first wrote operas ‚in the Italian manner’. 
Then; of course, came German opera.
Revolutions in painting -and they were virtual revolutions- also affected the 
whole of Europe. Even when ideas about painting seemed contradictory, the same 
contradictions appeared everywhere. There were perhaps two major revolutions. 
One was Italian, that of the Renaissance, when the pictorial space became geometric, 
with the laws of perspective, long before the science of Galileo and Descartes had 
‚geometrized’ the world. The second revolution took place in France towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, and affected the very nature of painting itself leading to 
cubism and abstract art. We have mentioned Italy and France οnly to identify the 
places where these revolutions began: in fact, if one takes the great names or the 
great innovators, they clearly belong to European painting as a whole. Today, indeed, 
we should have to say ‚Western painting’, since it has travelled far beyond Europe’s 
οwn shores.
Philosophies, too, carry unique messages. Europe has had a single philosophy, or 
something very like it, at every stage of its development. At the very least there has 
always been what Jean-Paul Sartre liked to call ‚a dominant philosophy’, reflecting 
the needs of society at the time -nο doubt because the whole of the West, at any given 
moment, has had a single dominant economic and social structure. Whether or not 
the philosophy of Descartes was that of a rising bourgeoisie and a slowly growing 
capitalist world, it certainly dominated and pervaded the Europe of its day. Whether 
or not Marxist philosophy is that of the rising working classes and of Socialist society, 
or industrial society, it has clearly played a dominant role in the West and in the 
world, which it divided as, until οnly very recently, it divided Europe.
For philosophies to spread so readily, there had to be innumerable international 
links. Take two important periods in German philosophy: from the publication of Im-
manuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 to the death of Hegel in 1831; and from 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) to Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). The influence of these 
German thinkers cannot be understood unless one bears in mind the many transla-
tions -French, English, Italian, Spanish, Russian, etc.- that were made of each of their 
works. Translation is one measure of the degree to which two major movements in 
German philosophy were integrated into the intellectual life of Europe.
It may be noted that, in the case of existentialism, it was its reinterpretation by 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty that retransmitted it to the rest of the 
world, and especially to Latin America.
As regards the natural sciences, there can be nο question: they were strictly pan-
European from the time of their first success. It is difficult to give any one nation in 
Europe the credit for this discovery or that, because so many of them were the result 
Ideas of Europe | 409 
D
oc
u
m
en
ts
of work that was going οn everywhere at once, in a series of stages that successively 
involved all the scientists in Europe. Any example will serve to prove the point. That 
of the Keplerian revolution, so well described in Alexandre Koyre’s 1962 study, is ideal 
for the purpose. Johann Kepler (1571-1630) belonged to a virtual family of kindred 
spirits - his predecessors (above all, Copernicus), his contemporaries (above all, Gali-
leo) and his disciples. If we were to mark οn a map their birthplaces and the centres 
where they worked, the whole of Europe would be covered with black dots.
Medicine, biology and chemistry showed a similar pattern. None of the sciences 
can be described as having been German, British, French, Italian οr Polish, even for a 
short time. They were always European.
Developments in the social sciences; by contrast, resembled those in philosophy, 
in the sense that they tended to originate in particular countries and then spread 
rapidly to the rest of Europe. Sociology began as a. predominantly French speciality; 
economics, especially in the twentieth century, has been mainly a British or Anglo-
American achievement; geography has been both German and French (as witness 
Friedrich Ratzel and Vidal de la Blache). In the nineteenth century, history was 
dominated by Germany, and by the great name of Leopold vοn Ranke (1795-1886): 
German historiography impressed all Europe with its erudition and its meticulous 
reconstruction of the past. Today, the situation is less simple; but European histo-
riography -nοw in fact world historiography- forms a coherent whole. Within it, a 
French school is important, dating from the days of Henri Berr, Henri Pirenne, Lucien 
Febvre, Marc Bloch, Henri Hauser and Georges Lefebvre, supported by economists 
like François Simiand or sociologists like Maurice Halbwachs. This school seeks to 
synthesize all the social sciences, and it has revitalized the methods and prospects of 
historiography in France.
Literature in Europe shows the fewest signs of unity. Rather than European lit-
erature, there is national literature, and while there are cross-frontier links, there 
are also considerable contrasts. The lack of unity in this field is by nο means regret-
table, and indeed is natural. Literature, whether essays, novels or plays, is based οn 
what most differentiates national civilizations: their language, their daily life, their 
way of reacting to sorrow, pleasure, the idea of love, or death, or war; their way of 
entertaining themselves, their food, their drink, their work, their beliefs. Through 
their literature, nations once more become characters, individuals whom one can try 
to analyse -even to psychoanalyse- with the help of this essential evidence.
There are, of course, clear and lasting cases of convergence: literature has its 
fashions. In the nineteenth century, for instance, the Romantic Movement that fol-
lowed the rationalist Enlightenment affected the whole of Europe; and in its turn 
it was followed by social realism. There has been ceaseless interplay of ‚influences’ 
-between individuals and among groups of writers or ‚schools’. Clearly, however, 
every literary work has its roots in a particular social and emotional milieu, and in 
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unique personal experience. One can scarcely speak of unity in national literature. 
Nοw then, a fortiori, can one seek unity οn a European basis?
Is there not, furthermore, a major obstacle in the question of language? Νο trans-
lation can fully convey a literary experience, Each of the great languages of Europe, 
it is true, owes some of its riches to others, even if οnly one of them could become the 
lingua franca, like Latin in former times and French in the eighteenth century. The 
royal treatment that Voltaire received, in St Petersburg or in Paris, can be explained 
οnly by .the royal status of the French language. Today, however, resort to a single 
language is possible for science (which has almost created a universal artificial lan-
guage with its international technical terms): but it is not possible for literature -the 
more so in that literature is all the time growing more demotic. The ‚international’ 
French of the eighteenth century was after all the language of an élite minority.
Should the cultural unity of Europe be safeguarded, or does it need to be com-
pleted? With Europe bent οn abolishing its internal frontiers, is this chequered 
cultural unity enough? Evidently not, because those who seek a politically united 
Europe are much concerned with the unifying effects that could be achieved by a 
well-thought-out reform of education. If qualifications were harmonized it would 
be possible to pursue one’s studies from one university to another; and this, more 
than the establishment of one or more European universities (such as that nοw set up 
outside Florence), would create a European arena for study and research.
And would that not promote, of necessity, a modern form of humanism embracing 
all the living languages of Europe?
Economic interdependence
For centuries, Europe has been enmeshed in what has amounted to a single economy. 
At any given moment, its material life has been dominated by particular centres of 
privilege and influence.
During the later Middle Ages, Venice was the channel where everything gathered, 
to pass in or out. With the beginning of modern times, the centre of gravity for a time 
was Lisbon, then Seville -or rather, it alternated between Seville and Antwerp until 
the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Then, at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, Amsterdam became the great trading centre until the early years οf the 
eighteenth century, followed by London, which maintained its supremacy until 1914 
and even 1939. There has always been an orchestra and a conductor.
Each time, the centre of gravity has been all the more influential, at its best, 
because not only European economic life has been attracted there, but also the eco-
nomic life of the wider world. For Europe, οn the eve of war in 1914, London was not 
only the great market for credit, for maritime insurance and reinsurance, but also 
for American wheat, Egyptian cotton, Malayan rubber, Banca and Billiton tin, South 
African gold, Australian wοοl and American and Middle Eastern oil.
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Very early οn, Europe became a coherent material and geographical whole, with 
an adaptable monetary economy and busy communications along its coasts and riv-
ers and then via the carriageways and roads for pack animals that complemented its 
natural thoroughfares.
Early in Europe’s history, pack animals conquered the great barrier of the Alps, 
through the Brenner Pass (οn the way to Venice), the Gothard and the Simplon (οn the 
way to Milan) and by the Mont-Cenis. At the tirne, the curious term ‚great carriages’ 
was used to describe the mule trains that carried this trade across the mountains, 
enabling the Italian economy to expand towards the North and North-West of Eu-
rope, eager for its luxury textiles and for the products of the Levant. In Lyon, in the 
sixteenth century, trade and trade fairs flourished owing to the confluence of car-
riage roads, river traffic, and these ‚great carriages’ from the Alps.
From the mid-nineteenth century the railways rid continental Europe of its rigid-
ity and inertia, and spread a civilization of material well-being and rapid communica-
tions, boosted by busy industrial and commercial cities.
Twο examples out of this long history may illustrate Europe’s economic interde-
pendence, although they do not explain it. One is that of the mude, the fleets of Venetian 
merchant galleys. In the fifteenth century they mostly plied the Mediterranean, but 
some went as far as London and Bruges, while well-frequented land routes, especially 
through the Brenner Pass, led from.the North to Venice, where the German merchants 
shared a huge warehouse, the Fondego dei Tedeschi, near the Rialto Bridge.
The second example, in the sixteenth century, is that of the circulation of money and 
bills of exchange, starting from Seville and going the rounds of Europe. In fact, approxi-
mately the same sums passed from hand to hand and place to place in the process of trade 
and payments. It is easy to understand, then, why the different regions of Europe were 
affected almost simultaneously by the same cycles of economic change. In the sixteenth 
century, a huge price rise began in Spain as a result of the sudden influx of precious 
metals from America. The same price inflation affected the whole of Western Europe, 
and penetrated even as far as Moscow, then the centre of a still primitive economy.
This does not mean that all of Europe has always developed at the same rate or 
attained the same level. A line could be drawn from Lubeck or Hamburg, through 
Prague and Vienna as far as the Adriatic, to divide the economically advanced West-
ern part of Europe from the backward area to the East -a fact already attested by 
the difference in the respective situation of peasants οn either side of the line. The 
contrast is beginning to fade; but it still exists.
Furthermore, even in prosperous Western Europe, there are richer centres 
-’growth areas’ - interspersed among less developed regions, some of them backward 
or ‚under-developed’. Even today, in almost all European countries, some places are 
still pοοr by comparison with the nation as a whole, the more so since new invest-
ments tend to be attracted to the most thriving areas.
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Indeed, there can be nο commercial relations, and hence nο economic interdepend-
ence, unless there are differences of voltage or of development, in which some regions 
lead the way and others follow. Development and under-development complement 
and depend upοn each other. By way of brief illustration, take the history of banking 
in France. In the second half of the nineteenth century it expanded rapidly owing to 
the belated mobilization of savings and dormant or semi-dormant capital in parts of 
the French provinces and countryside. The immediate beneficiaries were banks like 
the Credit Lyonnais, established in 1863, and destined to grow very powerful; but 
the once backward areas that had supplied the capital soon felt the recoil, as it were, 
stimulating their economy and linking it to the general life of the nation.
The logic of the Common Market: despite the differences between regional and 
national economies, economic links have long bound Europe together. Can they be 
organized to form a coherent and fully interdependent whole? That is the question 
facing the series of ventures launched since the end of the Second World War, of which 
the Common Market or European Community is the most successful, although it was 
not the first and is not the only such endeavour.
Everything began, undoubtedly, οn account of Europe’s miserable situation after 
1945: its total collapse threatened the equilibrium of the world. Hence the first con-
structive steps: the United Europe Movement publicly launched in London in Μay 
1947; the Marshall Plan (3 July 1947), conceived for a variety of reasons, some political 
and military, others economic, cultural and social. Europe -a certain kind of Europe- 
was groping forward.
For the moment, let us consider only economic problems. From this point of 
view, the relative failure of EFTA, the Europe of the Seven (‚the shipwrecked’, as 
one journalist called them), cleared the way and the future for what was then the 
‚Europe of the Six’, commonly known as the Common Market but in fact grouping in 
the European Community three legal entities: the ECSC, set up by the Treaty of Paris 
in 1951, and the EEC and Euratom, established by the Treaty of Rome οn 25 March l957. 
Even nοw, the European Community does not include all Western-Europe, let alone 
Europe as a whole. But if Europe is really to be built, the Community will grow both 
broader and deeper.
At the time of writing, in February 1962, a number of requests for entry were un-
der negotiation. Since then, the Community has grown to number twelve; and further 
applications for membership or association are pending. So the Community may well 
grow to cover the whole of what is traditionally known as Europe -even if it is forbid-
den to stretch ‚as far as the Urals’.
Through the Common Market, then, it should be possible to gauge the chances of 
achieving European economic union.
The formation of the EEC or Common Market resulted from the laborious negotia-
tion of the Treaty of Rome, whose complex provisions began to come into effect from 1 
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January 1958. This experiment is still relatively recent, and must therefore, be judged 
with caution.
The undeniably rapid economic growth enjoyed by the Six during the early years 
of the Common Market was the double result of a favourable world climate and the 
beneficial effects of the first measures taken by the Community itself. The gradual 
opening of frontiers was clearly a stimulus, as was shown by the increase of trade 
among the countries concerned.
All the same, the vital part of the experiment still lies ahead. The Treaty of Rome 
and the subsequent decisions of the member Governments provide for a series of 
further steps. The question is: do the steps taken so far promise well for a future 
which, οn paper, should involve total economic integration?
Contrary to some pessimistic forecasts, the Community’s industries (including 
those of France which it was once feared might prove more vulnerable than their Ger-
man competitors) have adapted well to the Common Market. There have been struc-
tural changes, including a tendency towards mergers which has favoured large-scale 
firms such as the Régie Renault οr Pechiney and St-Gobain in France. There have had 
to be industrial shake-ups: for instance, certain less productive cοal mines have had 
to be closed - although these painful decisions would have been necessary in any case.
Certainly, if only industry were concerned, agreements and compromises would 
be easy. Given modern technology, firms can be flexible vis-à-vis the market and vis-
à-vis government plans. Equally, there are few difficulties with credit, which depends 
οn the stability and mutual support of Europe’s currencies. These enjoyed a long 
period of relative calm, so much so that the dollar gradually and fitfully ceased to be 
the only standard currency held in reserve alongside gold. Plans for closer monetary 
integration in Europe, moreover, made great strides in those years.
Such, then, is the rosy, reassuring side of the Common Market. But that is not the 
whole story, as recent events have shown. And there are further shadows: Some are 
political; and to these we shall return in a moment. Others are economic.
These economic problems concern: the geographical limits of the Common Market 
within Europe; its relations with the rest of the world; and the internal difficulties of 
agriculture.
The Common Market is clearly incomplete. It has important lacunae in the West. 
In the East, there was for a long time the ‚Iron Curtain’, behind which Comecon tried 
to develop its οwn counterpart to the Common Market in the West. At the time of 
writing the major problem was whether or not Britain would join the Community: 
negotiations had begun in 1961, and they were still in progress. Since then, Britain, 
Denmark and Ireland have joined, followed by Greece, Spain and Portugal. But 
Britain’s entry, in particular, posed a number of problems. She had greatly to loosen 
some of the ties that bound her to the Commonwealth, in particular the preferential 
economic regime which was a relic of Empire. This was difficult from an economic 
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point of view, and required Commonwealth agreement. Psychologically, it also meant 
as it were turning the last page in the most successful imperial history ever known.
Νο less important is the problem of the Common Market’s relations with the rest 
of the world, and in particular with Africa south of the Sahara. (The North African 
countries, with the exceptions of Libya and Egypt, remained for a long time within 
the economic orbit of France.) This problem of the Community’s external relations 
also included that of relations with the Commonwealth -solved for the most part, 
with the exception of the former Dominions, by the Lomé Convention linking African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries with the Community. Last but nοt least, there was the 
question of the Community’s relations with the United States. In 1962, some feared 
that a ‚colossal’ Atlantic market might swallow up the European Common Market. 
Others saw Europe as the first step, the Atlantic as the second and the world as the 
third. They, however, were unrealistically optimistic. All these problems, moreover, 
were also political; and that in nο way made them easier to solve.
The problems of European agriculture, οn the other hand, are primarily economic, 
and of great importance for the Common Market. They are also extremely compli-
cated.
Change was inevitable for the old peasant world of Europe -an admirable world, 
deeply rooted in the past, but with a fairly modest level οf productivity, as the 
statistics show. The six founder-member States of the European Community had 25 
million country-dwellers (families included) out of a total pοpulatiοn of 160 million. 
In the early 1960s, Sicco Mansholt, the former Dutch Minister of Agriculture who was 
then Vice-President of the Common Market Commission responsible for agricultural 
policy, estimated that 8 million of these farmers would have to find other employ-
ment if farming was to be modernized.
Modernizing agriculture meant increasing the output per person and reducing the 
number employed in it, not only because greater productivity implied more mecha-
nization, but also because the total agricultural income lagged behind the general 
growth-rate of the European economy. In an expanding economy, growth tends to 
concentrate οn industrial goods and services. In developed countries, an increase in 
income nο longer leads to greater demand for food. If I have more money, I buy a car, 
a television set, books or clothes; I travel; I go to the theatre. But I do not eat more 
bread and meat or, let us hope, drink more wine or spirits.
Broadly speaking, then, if farm incomes were to increase at the same rate as those 
in other sectors of the economy, it was calculated in the early 1960s that by 1975 one 
farmer in three should leave the land so that more could be produced by a smaller 
number of people. The annual reduction, it was thought, should be about 4 per cent, 
whereas the actual rate was 2 per cent in Britain and l.5 per cent in France. At that 
pace, it would take Britain twenty-two years and France twenty-seven to reach the 
target figure. What was more, there could be surprises. The tapering-off of Europe’s 
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boom years meant that there were fewer jobs in industry for former farmworkers; 
and in Italy, for example, with a peasant population originally numbering 4.5 million, 
those who left the land were mostly unemployed farmworkers; so, despite the drift to 
the towns, the structure of agriculture remained almost unchanged.
For all these reasons, European farm prices remain uncompetitive οn the inter-
national market, where American and Canadian surpluses are sold at very lοw prices 
-lower sometimes than οn the home market, owing to government subsidies. So the 
high prices of European agricultural products remain possible only as a result of 
protection, which isolates them from the world market.
The other serious agricultural problem for the Common Market lies in the disparities 
in production and prices as between different member States. Before the Community 
adopted its Common Agricultural Policy, France (which was more than self-sufficient, 
especially in cereals) could sell its surpluses abroad only at world prices. This obliged 
the French Government to buy them at home-market prices and sell them at a loss 
outside France. Thus in 1961, French wheat and barley were sold to Communist China, 
and chilled meat to Russia. Italy had the same problem with fruit and vegetables, and 
The Netherlands for dairy products. Germany, by contrast, imported many of the agri-
cultural products it needed, but it bought them outside the Common Market, and was 
reluctant to lose the export opportunities that were the counterpart of these imports.
Farm prices were also different from country to country, depending both οn rela-
tive productivity and οn the degree of protection that governments were willing or 
obliged to supply. Thus, grain prices were lowest in France and highest in Germany, 
while milk was cheapest in The Netherlands. At what level, in a Common Agricultural 
Policy, were prices to be levelled out?
Finally, since agriculture had to be modernized, and since this was costly, who 
was to foot the sizeable bill? The solution adopted in Brussels, when the Common 
Agricultural Policy began to be established οn 14 January l962, was that the 
Community as a whole should bear the expense. This solution was unfavourable to 
Germany, whose economy was predominantly industrial. But the predominantly 
agricultural countries -France, Italy and The Netherlands- refused to move to the 
second stage of the Common Market’s transition period unless at least the outlines of 
the Common Agricultural Policy were in place. The agreement took so long to reach, 
after 200 hours of discussion, that for a time the fate of the Community seemed to be 
in the balance. Which led one journalist to remark that ‚Europe happily swallowed 
cοal and steel and the atom, but it baulked at fruit and vegetables.’
The agreement provided for progress by stages: the first steps were to be taken in 
July 1962. But the Governments and the farmers’ unions knew that the days of the old 
national systems were numbered and that adaptation was nοw unavoidable.
The movement of farm products throughout the Community was to be unrestricted, 
if necessary with compensatory taxes to offset remaining differences in price. This 
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principle alone required institutional arrangements, regulation and supervision. 
Means already existed for the settlement of disputes. At the same time, there had to 
be a variable levy at the Community’s external frontiers to prevent its prices being 
undercut by imports from abroad.
In later years, the Common Agricultural Policy was subject to countless arguments, 
criticisms, adjustments and compensatory arrangements: it seemed always to be 
undergoing reform. But it made possible a Common Market in farm produce, however 
much it might be flawed. With a single market in industrial products due to be 
perfected by the end of 1992, the Community was οn the way to becoming an economic 
union. Will it stop at that stage? Νo. There remains the problem of political unity
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The Archaeology of the European Identity: 
From National Identity to Nationalism
Pan Drakopoulos
1. Troy, City of Dreams
WHENEVER THE RIVER Skamandros overflowed its banks it descended rushing 
and foaming over the slopes of Mount Ede into the wide valley below, and it went on 
roaring and carving out a deep, wide gorge, until it encountered a smaller brother, 
the river Simoen. For a while the two rivers continued to run parallel with each other, 
and then the smaller one poured into Skamandros, which no longer wild, continued 
its course, depositing its yellow mud on the fertile land, creating marshes and small 
gullies that were aptly called „Stomalimni”,(1) until dirty and sluggish, emptied into 
the open Aegean Sea.
In that same valley, where the wild rivers stared at each other before they em-
braced, rises a low hill which can still be seen today. Once on that hill there stood 
immensely strong walls—a creation of the gods!(2) And within those walls and all 
around them there were the most magnificent temples, a great palace (3) , mansions, 
shops and evidence of fabulous riches. It was Priam’s great city: the powerful, well-
loved and immensely rich Troy, built upon fertile land, with many horses.
2. The Destiny of the Enemies
IT WAS under the imposing walls of that city that a conflict among many races took 
place. Races that were deeply divided into two sides.
That conflict in the valley of Skamandros was to be decisive for both armies, 
although the result would not mean the same for each of them. What the Trojans 
wanted was to maintain their power and dominate the northern Aegean and the 
straits of Bosporus. If they lost the war, they would disintegrate. If they won it, they 
would remain what they already were. Homer, a great master of stage craft, places 
Hector to take leave of his wife not in her rooms, but before the walls of the city where 
her anguish has led her (while he shows Paris laying in Helen’s rooms, sinking into 
an ultimately and indolent melancholy). Homer dresses Hector—the most excellent 
of the brave—in a bright suit of armor and a shiny helmet; he wants him to hold a 27-
foot spear, and speak to his wife tenderly, with a sweetness alien to the manner of a 
warrior. Therefore, he introduces a silent but important actor, a boy, their son, so that 
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the atmosphere is tempered by his presence. Homer also makes Hector converse with 
her, not in the words of a conceited soldier who thinks he is about to kill and win, but 
in those that are more suited to a brave and prudent man who knows that he is about 
to fight and die. Hector knows that the war is lost for the Trojans, and he also knows 
that even if it were to be won, the only thing he could hope for is that life in Troy would 
continue to be as it always had been, and that the Achaeans would melt away into a 
valley mist and disappear like an incubus with the first silver light of morning.
For the Achaeans, unlike the Trojans, whatever the outcome of the war, they would 
no longer be what they used to be. Having throughout the ten years war experienced 
an unprecedented comradeship in the battlefield, and having at last found a common 
leader and a common enemy, for once they would either all of them be losers, or all 
of them winners. In any case, whatever the result of that age-long conflict would be, 
it was there, before the impregnable castle of Troy that their unity would be forged.
What they wanted was not a unified hegemony and submission to a king based 
on the detested model of the Egyptians and Assyrians, but the consolidation of the 
feeling that their various kingdoms constituted one racial, linguistic and religious 
community, recognizable as such by themselves and by strangers also.
3. The Making of Hellenism
HOWEVER, temptation makes me say—invoking historical accuracy, the so called 
objective truth, or at least the reality which we have no right to neglect—that the 
Achaeans originally set sail for entirely different waters: what they in fact wanted 
was only a piece of the cake of the Hittite Empire which controlled Asia Minor and 
the North Aegean. This is what the great Tempter hisses to me with his snaky tongue 
as he winds round „the tree of knowledge”. But if I listen to it, if I commit such a 
deadly sin, I submit myself to this offense: that the Hellenes were already a certain 
race (4) whose lineage, ancestors, and descendants we can unquestionably define , 
rather than a ship that the poet has built and launched into the frozen waters of his-
tory to disappear into the mist, so that we might realize her existence only when she 
rams against prim and proper ‚reality’ and turns a miracle into an ordinary event; 
only when she materializes without any preconditions and against all preconditions 
whatsoever, otherwise even we, the Hellenes, her sailors, say: „She doesn’t exist” or 
„she has been lost forever!” Thus, if I commit such a mortal sin, I must impeach Homer, 
attack that story-teller, and say: „He is telling a lie (5), and what is more, a bad lie!”
But Homer is invited to dinner, and certainly to a royal one at that. He goes from 
one kingdom to another and sings for them in a language that by now all of them 
have learned and feel to be their own. He gives an account of gods (6) that all of them 
worship as their own: they accept their names, their qualities, and their relation to 
them as though they had worshiped them for centuries. And all of them, after having 
been well-fed, listen to him singing about ideal times and destinies.
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They certainly feel that are listening to old stories of their own race. Homer is 
convincing them that yes, those unprecendently brave, those insuperable heroes, the 
beloved gods, incomparably beautiful in soul and body, are their own ancestors. An 
irrational identification: the heroes in the Iliad had lived five hundred years before 
Homer, and the ancestors of most of the table companions were exactly those who had 
wiped out the towns of the Achaeans’ heroes by burning, devastating and demolish-
ing them. There were also some who derived from intermarriage, and the Achaeans 
were ancestors of theirs only in a vague and extremely odd way. However, all of them 
felt as a whole: is there any doubt that they had established common sacred places 
(7) and feasts? Hadn’t all of them accepted the same alphabet (8), the same letters, 
with some differences hardly worth troubling about? Hadn’t they all accepted to be 
called by the same name—Hellenes!—(9) despite all the differences that separated 
them, and which were not always settled without bloodshed? And if they indeed 
loved Homer, if they did want him to recite for them for hours on end, and if they 
learned all he said by heart, wasn’t it because he spoke to them about such an unusual 
and dreamlike world as though it were their own, identical to them, their fatherland? 
Wasn’t it because he was defining that insuperable glory as their own yesterday?
Homer expressed the demand of this time, the demand for unity, yes; but who 
expresses something without molding it as well?
4. Unity and Loneliness
BY ASKING for unity the Hellenes did not mean that they wanted to hear the heavy 
hammer of Thor smashing Giants, Demons and Chaos; they did not mean either that 
they needed the less mythological, but more effective figure of Bismark, who united 
Germany with blood and iron. These solutions would have been unnatural for these 
people who had been used to living not in the inaccessible Black Forest, but in the lu-
minosity of the Mediterranean Sea. What exactly they did mean by unity is described 
in rhapsody B of the Iliad : Agamemnon convenes parliament where he is discuss-
ing events of the war and proposes its termination. His proposal is not accepted 
by the majority , because of goddess Athena’s interference and her beloved—her 
close companion—Ulysses. Agamemnon keeps his position as a leader, by obeying 
Ulysses; dogma, „one master should be, one king”. But „one master” does not suggest 
an absolute monarch. It is simply a phrase able to silence the defeated soldiers and to 
alleviate the existential guilt of the burdened king. Thus, „one master”, yes; but only 
in the hour of danger! As soon as the crisis passes, each of them will set out to his 
own kingdom, his own home to his detachment from the others, to his individuality 
and—why not—to his loneliness. As soon as their common sufferings pass, each of 
them will return to his familiar place, ready or not to face his own being, whether his 
being has a Persefonian or a Klytaemnestrian persona .
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Hellenism was born before the Skaian Gates and with its first gasp—a breath like 
a deep sob which marked its entry into the world—we see it struggle against its own 
reluctance to exist as a single body. In the Iliad, this singularity is illustrated in sharp 
relief; it is the epic of the united Hellenes only to the degree that it is the drama of 
their split: it starts with Achilles’ decision not to fight any longer together with the 
rest of the Achaeans, and continues with the attempts at reunion and the calamities 
of dissension. The war has lasted for ten years. The Iliad refers only to the events of 
the last one.
Yet, Agamemnon says to Nestor: “But Zeus the stormking sent me misery, / plung-
ing me into futile brawls and feuds. / I mean Achilles and myself. We fought / like 
enemies, in words, over a girl / and I gave way to anger first. We two, / if we could 
ever think as one , the Trojans’ / evil day would be postponed no longer”.
The declaration seems strange and raises a question: If a concord between Agam-
emnon and Achilles would immediately bring about the fall of Troy, what have you 
been doing during those whole nine years ? How did it happen then that you haven’ t 
conquered Troy?
But Agamemnon is not just hurling oratorical phrases in order to dazzle the wise 
and honored Nestor; he speaks about many brawls and feuds, which means that he 
reminds us that he is someone who knows about these things, that his conflict with 
a leader, with its attendant disunity, has been neither the first, nor the only one. It is 
clear that oppositions and secessions during the nine years of war were conspicuous. 
And of course a frequent reason for their quarrels must have been the distribution of 
plunder, Thersites and Achilles accuse Agamemnon that all those years the Hellenes 
were conquering various cities and were sharing the booty, and he was having the 
lion’s share. Moreover, what else was the cause of the quarrel between Agamemnon 
and Achilles but the distribution of booty from the conquest of Lernessos whose 
queen was Bryseis. Troy must have remained the last impregnable city, whose fall 
would consummate the war. With this prospect, Homer is speaking about the great 
unison of the Hellenes that has led to victory, unison that has been built when Achil-
les, in the parliament of the Hellenes, cursed the moment he conquered Lernessos 
and took Bryseis as a slave, the moment that saw the beginning of his conflict with 
Agamemnon to whom he says: “(from our enmity) Hector’s gain, the Trojans’ gain. 
Akhaians / years hence will remember our high words, / mine and yours. But now we 
can forget them, / and, as we must, forego our passion. Aye, / by heaven, I drop my 
anger now! / No need to smolder in my heart forever! Come, / send your long-haired 
Akhaians into combat”.
5. Shaping Reality
WE WOULD NEVER finish if we started discussing what exactly Homer teaches us; 
moreover, what he taught and implanted in the mind of his ancient audience. Every 
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time I read Homer, looking for something in particular, I find in him—the root of our 
poetry and the poetry of our root—at least a transition, if not a completion: Order, 
as well as a passageway beyond order.. This is Homer and this is the whole great 
poetry. In the Iliad we find the first principles of the Republic; in the Iliad we are 
taught that the (forum) is where men win their glory. In this epic of war parliament, 
reasoning and argument (10) are, in one way or another, revered at least as much as 
supreme prowess. In the Iliad we find that the individual is accepted unconditionally, 
so that personal deeds might become his character, identified with his nature, and 
be recognized and manifested as an epithet added to the names of god and men—the 
luminous Apollo. the swift-footed Achilles, Nestor the fair-spoken. In the Iliad we are 
taught that certain events are not inscribed in the circle of the relation between cause 
and effect, but they are wombs within which realities are created; this process we 
call history—a field where an individual is not contained, but where he creates his 
future and leads it towards a completion through his own choices.
Without Homer, the Trojan war would never have acquired its pivotal significance. 
It would have been absorbed by the omnivorous darkness of prehistory and would 
have at most reached us as an unfounded hypothesis, as the echo of a pickax beating 
on hollow ground, as Sibylla’s breath forgotten in a shell and buried in the sand of 
meaningless events. What of other conflicts that took place before the Trojan War, 
for instance, the war between the Achaeans and Cretans? We know that in the 15th 
century BC Knossos began to come under Achaeans’ rule. How did this happen? Just 
like that, and wholly bloodless (11), I wonder. Is it possible that such a transition of 
power from natives to foreigners could ever happen without a war? It is to be won-
dered whether Knossos was once not in the position of Troy, the Achaeans having 
conquered one city after the other, until in the end they swallowed up the Minoan 
Empire’s jewel.We can neither exclude, nor prove anything.
Thus, the Cretan Achilles’ ghost will vainly wander, waiting to be incarnated in 
the world of poetry. Placing the Cretans (12) among the rest of the Hellenes, Homer 
obliges to characterize a war between Cretans and Achaeans as a civil one, a struggle 
similar to that engendered by the descent of the Doric tribes.
Homer was the one to establish the Trojan War as an act of creation for Hellenism. 
And this is just the reason that the fall of Troy—which became possible when the 
Hellenes’ discord ceased—should be considered as the very first historical action of 
Hellenism, since it was not the work of a local power (e.g., Cretans or Myceneans), but 
of Hellenism’s total powers.
“Before the Trojan war”, Thucydides says, “there is no indication of any common 
action in Hellas, nor indeed of the universal prevalence of the name [...]. The best 
proof of this is furnished by Homer. Born long after the Trojan War, nowhere calls 
them by that name, nor indeed any of them, except the followers of Achilles from 
Phthiotis [...]. He does not even use the term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes 
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had not yet been marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive appellation. 
It appears therefore that the several Hellenic communities, not only those who first 
acquired the name city by city, as they came to understand each other, but also those 
who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before the Trojan 
War prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual intercourse from 
displaying any collective action”.
6. Defining the Aliens
THE ILIAD leaves no margin for misinterpretations: the poet, by mentioning all who 
have participated in the great conflict, forces us to notice that on one side there are 
only Pan-Achaeans, without any strangers among them, whilst on the other side there 
are the Trojans, with a heterogeneous mass of people coming from Asia and from the 
North. Thus, Homer considers as an absolute reality the distinction “ourselves and 
the others”” (13).
Homer, of course, was not the first to introduce that distinction. Eight whole cen-
turies before Homer—the first of all Hellenes—Camose I spoke in his sacred palace 
and told the noblemen of his retinue that there was some question as to his power. 
How could they think, he asked, that he, Camose I, had virtually all the power, since 
one master was in Avaris and another one in Ethiopia, which meant that he shared 
his throne with an Asian and a Negro (14), and each of them, seizing his land, had a 
piece of Egypt? Then, he carried on saying that he could not rest assured, since he 
was robbed by those thieves -the Asians- and he promised that he would fight them 
and disembowel them, because what he wished was to save Egypt and break down 
the Asians.
This is the oldest written use of the distinction “ourselves and the others” I could 
find, but I imagine that there must be even older ones. It is worth paying attention to 
the ‘between the lines’ distinction: The Egyptian monarch expresses his contempt for 
Negroes, whilst he hates Asians. And it is obvious that he cannot seriously accept that 
Asians are as competent as Egyptians who could boast an empire, conquests, institu-
tions, and laws. (I can understand the Pharaoh’s sneering comment: even Asians have 
now acquired a taste for having a king, imagine!)
Homer, on the contrary, does his best not to insult and underestimate his enemies. 
Thucydides, in his famous and much discussed passage, says that Homer does not 
even call them barbarians. In both camps, he sees brilliant heroes destined to meet 
their doom; sons of gods, under an implacable destiny; gods whose power is tested 
in bravery and deceit. Each side honors the other, and it is not unusual to exchange 
presents in order to show in this way their mutual esteem (15). Priam, having called 
Helen at the walls of the city, is pointing to Agamemnon and asking her, full of admira-
tion rather than curiosity, who that man is: “I never saw a soldier / clean-cut as he, as 
royal in his bearing”; and of Odysseus he says that he remembered from an old meet-
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ing of theirs that whenever Odysseus opened his mouth to speak, he “could have no 
mortal rival as an orator” etc. On the other hand, the Trojans are as equally honored 
as the Hellenes: they are called “brave men and of a first rate”, while Diomedes does 
not hesitate to confess, moaning: “Friends, / all we can do is marvel at Prince Hector. 
/ What a spearman he is, and what a fighter!”
It is true that we are far from Pharaoh’s way of thinking; I would say, playing with 
time but not with the substance, that Homer joins with Nietzsche (16) in this dialogue, 
not only in respect of his heroes’ subject-matter, but also because throughout the 
Iliad he wants the Achaeans to feel proud of their enemies.
However the distinction “ourselves and the others” is not only alive and kicking, 
not only is it present during the exchange of compliments between the opponents, 
but it is also the unmoving mover of the epic, the reason and the way of its existence.
The demand for the unity of Hellenism was followed by the desire for a constitu-
tional framework, and a role for individuals within it, Lyrical poetry promoted the 
replacement of the oligarchic state by a democratic society, that is, the conversion 
of subjects into citizens as the only ones who can be formed into a society. Thus, 
lyric poetry turned to address personal feelings (17), psychological conditions (18), 
the moral behavior (19) of an individual and certainly, the demand for a moral society 
(20). Lyric poetry reverses any attempt that submits a person to a traditional mytho-
logical authority: a tyrant (21) is as directly controversial as the mob (22); Archilochus 
is praised, despite denying virtues (23) such as bravery. Until the Persian Wars, the 
authorities only had to offer some kind of instigation, to stir up warlike ardor (24).
7. The Birth of European Identity
HOWEVER, all three brothers -Amenios, Kynegiros and Aeschylus- had to go to Mara-
thon and rush at the Persians like hawks of destiny; Kynegiros had to leave the army 
behind him and plunge into the shallow sea of Schinia, to seize an enemy ship full of 
panicking Persians and drag it back on shore, instead of letting it go. The Persians, 
on the other hand, though condemned to utter loss, at the height of their terror, had 
to find an axe and sever his hated grip, so that the other brother, Aeschylus, unique 
among the great tragedians, was able to inscribe with unfading colors the distinc-
tion between “ourselves and the others” and carve in stone the specific distinction 
between our own world and their own crowd.
Aeschylus is not constrained by the victor’s grandiloquence as so often happens, 
but he places the Hellenes’ superiority within a wider geopolitical perspective. In the 
Persians, the first tragedy he wrote and the only one with a historical rather than 
mythological subject-matter that has reached us from the ancient times, the warrior 
poet of Marathon sets the queen mother of Xerxes to tell the chorus of her dream.
It was then, in the end of March 472 BC, while the Athenians were listening to her 
and while the blood of war still hung like the Aurora Borealis above Attica, that what 
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they heard set out the first geopolitical doctrine of history. According to this doctrine, 
which Aeschylus formulated by the words put into Atossa’s mouth, Europe and Asia 
are two worlds related to each other by race, since all people are brothers, but they 
are entirely different and incompatible with each other from a spiritual point of view.
It is worth us listening here to the following extract from the queen’s dream: “[...] 
Two women as an apparition came, / One in Persian robes instructed well, / The 
other Doric, both in splendor dressed (25), / Who grand and most magnificent ex-
celled / Us now, their beauty (26) unreproached, spotless; / Sisters they, who casting 
for their father’s land (27), / She Europe received, she Asia, where to dwell (28). / 
Then strife arose between them, or so I dreamed; / And my son, observing this, tries 
to check / And soothe them (29); he yokes them to a chariot, / Bridles their necks: and 
one, so arrayed, towers / Proud, her mouth obedient to reins; / But the other stamps 
annoyed (30), and rends apart / Her trappings in her hands; unbridled, seizes / The 
car and snaps its yoke in two; / My son falls, and his father (31), pitying, / Stands by 
his side, but at whose sight Xerxes / Tears his robes. Thus in the night these visions 
/ Dreamed [...]”
Aeschylus wants this specific distinction between the two worlds to be unam-
biguous; therefore, he makes the respected mother of Xerxes clear up the matter by 
speaking to her familiar chorus of old women -a chorus that honors her and her son 
without restraint- at a moment that a suffocating agony over the outcome of war acts 
like a lump in their throat. Atossa, their mistress, looks at all those who have suffered 
along with her, and reminds them in an icy voice: “My son, should be succeed, would 
he admired; / But if he fails, Persia cannot hold him / To account. Whichever comes, 
safe returned, sovereign / He shall rule”.
Thus, Xerxes may only be worshiped; nothing obliges him to account for anything. 
He has power of life and death over all his subjects. But when the queen mother asks 
about the Athenians: “Who commands them? Who is the shepherd of their host?”, 
that is, who is the master -the equivalent of Xerxes- she receives an answer entirely 
strange to her cinnamon-perfumed ears, ornamented with sardonyx: “They are 
slaves to none, nor are they subjects”.
8. Geopolitics of Athenians
PUTTING FORWARD his geopolitical doctrine, Aeschylus makes an impressive leap 
even for a well-trained acrobat, making logic and history look at him in astonishment. 
This leap of course demands an explanation: how has it happened that when we speak 
about the relations between Hellenism and the East, we consider it self-evident that 
Athens is the substance (probably the beginning and the end) of Hellenism? Also, it is 
necessary to explain the eagerness with which the Athenian public hastened not only 
to applaud the doctrine of a permanent conflict with the Asians, but also to accept 
promptly to play the role of Hellenism’s sacred Heart.
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Aeschylus formulated his Athenian-centric concept through the words of the cho-
rus: he makes Atossa ask the chorus why her son so wants this undisciplined city, so 
that the old Persians could answer her: “Then all Hellas would be subject to the king”.
On the other hand, on reading the play, one acquires the impression that the only 
exclusive opponents of the Medes were the Athenians. The paean, of course, says: “O 
Greek Sons, advance!”, but the queen starts lamenting and stretching her forefinger 
towards the murderer: “ O hateful deity! how the Persians / You deceived! Bitter was 
the vengeance / Which my son at famous Athens found”.
The explanation of the sudden and undisguised Athenian-centricity is to be found, 
I think, in the political developments of the time. After Xerxes’ defeat, the Spartans 
believed that the Persians, by way of retaliation, would put to fire and sword whatever 
was Helladic in Asia. Thus, the always soberly-minded Spartans hastened to suggest 
an immediate withdrawal from Ionia; and what is more, they pointed out places in the 
mainland of Hellas where the refugees could be installed. But the Athenians refuse 
to sign the evacuation of Ionia; (and surely they could not have guessed how different 
history would have been if they had agreed: they failed to consider that that disagree-
ment was indelibly impressed on the Hellenes’ fate...). The Spartans didn’t conceal 
their hegemony and their contempt for the Ionians who, therefore, asked protection 
from Athenians. Thus, the Athenians found themselves leaders in an alliance which 
became a hegemony (what else?) . Thucydides explains how Athens, immediately and 
leisurely, put on the sovereign’s purple and why the rest of the Hellenes accepted it 
to the extent they did. How far the rest of the Hellenes accepted it was proved by the 
success of Aeschylus’ tragedy The Persians, not only in Athens, but in Sicily as well.
However, Athenian-centricity does not come to an halt with the Marathon-warrior 
poet. Pindar also, although he had sided with the Medes, felt constrained to transmit 
on the same wavelength: “Oh! the gleaming, and the violet-crowned, / and the sung in 
story; / the bulwark of Hellas, famous Athens, / city divine!”
The same laudatory trend was to be followed by Sophocles, the Athenian bard, 
in almost all his works, and particularly in Oedipus at Colonus, Sophocles, speaks 
of Athens in a way that reminds us of a prophet in ecstasies over the vision of a new 
Zion; he describes her as the most powerful in Hellas, the leading naval and cavalry 
power, with an excellent regime that has been a refuge of the victimized.
Xerxes’ authority was assumed by Mardonius, a general of the Persian army in 
Hellas --a force particularly powerful and impatient to efface the shame resulting 
from the defeat of the Persian navy at Salamis. According to Herodotus, Mardonius 
dreamed of crushing the Hellenes politically first, and afterwards of fighting them 
off. Thus, he suggested an alliance with the Athenians, offering valuable concessions 
for it. The Spartans, terrified, hastened to beg the Athenians to reject the Persians’ 
tempting offers. The Athenians, with the crude directness of those who feel they have 
a mission, those who have stopped weighing the pros and cons, and with a soul as hard 
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as black basalt, felt that any action of theirs has the seal of destiny itself; therefore, 
they could say nothing but “Liberty or Death” and more pragmatically, “for the sake of 
Liberty we are prepared to die”: and that is their answer to the Persian ambassador: 
“Return rather at once, and tell Mardonius that our answer is this: So long as the sun 
keeps his present course, we will never join alliance with Xerxes”.
And to the Spartans they answer:” Not all the gold that the whole earth contains 
--not the fairest and most fertile of all lands-- would bribe us to take part with the 
Medes and help them to enslave our countrymen.” First of all, they said, they were 
prevented by the gods themselves. And they added that momentous: “Again, there 
is our common language, the altars and the sacrifices of which we all partake, the 
common character which we bear. Did the Athenians betray all these, of a truth it 
would not be well.”
However, it didn’t take the Athenians long to change their language; it happened 
as soon as their position changed and they themselves became a sovereign power.
9. The Rise of Nationalism
AND THAT also didn’t take long to come about. Hellas, after Mardonius’ defeat, was 
soon reconstructed. “[...] but they also won for themselves great glory, and every city 
of Hellas enjoyed such an abundant prosperity, that all men were filled with wonder 
at the complete reversal of their fortune. For from this time over the next fifty years
Greece made great advance in prosperity[...]
The first place belonged to the Athenians, who had advanced so far in both fame 
and prowess, that their name was known throughout practically the entire inhab-
ited world; for they increased their leadership to such a degree, that by their own 
resources and without the aid of Lacedaemonians or Peloponnesians they overcame 
great Persian armaments both on land and on sea, and humbled the famed leadership 
of the Persians to such extent that they forced them by terms of a treaty to liberate 
all the cities of Asia.”
Thus, the Athenians became the sovereign power of Hellas, realizing for them-
selves the dream of the king of the Persians. Those proud men who, not without the 
daring of a suicidal nature, had only recently won over the Spartans, by assuring 
them that nothing could enslave the Hellenes, are now trying to justify their attitude 
within Sparta: “[...] it was not a very wonderful action, on contrary to the common 
practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused 
to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives: fear, honor and 
interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that 
the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be 
worthy of our position [...]”
Under the pressure of three of the strongest motives: here it is then! There are 
things greater than liberty; things that exceed even the gods’ demands; they are 
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honor, fear, and interest: An unbelievable statement! Why then, had this people lost 
their principles? Had they become bereft of any ideals? And not only do they seem to 
have replaced the recently spilled blood with the trinkets thrown before them, but 
have they also converted this fallacy into an inevitable law, into a great principle? 
Inconceivable transformation! Is it ever possible for a whole people of heroes to give 
up the burning torch, in order to keep the kettle? “Yes, precisely this”, the sharp-
witted Thucydides tells us.
Did the Athenians really dare and did they really say that fearful phrase? I think 
it is wrong for us to believe, together with some specialists, that Thucydides has 
given us a reliable and objective history to the highest degree imaginable. I suggest 
that Thucydides has not given us an objective history but an isotonic one -a drama 
in which a speech and a counter speech exhibit equal tension, equal vigor. there is 
no way and no reason for the truth to be proved; there is no objective truth so that 
argument approaches it less or more. Thucydides excludes the kind of truth that ex-
ists somewhere beyond people, beyond interpretations. Thucydides wants us to be 
precise: the army was that big and not otherwise, the event happened then and in that 
way. But the truth of events (which arises from precision) is one thing, and the truth of 
Man (which arises from interpretation) is another, and an absolutely different truth. 
In the first case, it is enough for one to be careful, an eyewitness, a critical receiver 
of information. But when we speak of Man. it is self-evident that truth doesn’t exist 
beyond Man’s reason, beyond the ability to interpret events and motives. Thucydides 
is not wandering over the gardens with a magnifying glass in hand, truing to track 
down truth among the coleoptera; with his orations he teaches us that what makes 
us differ from, or fight against something is not that one of us or one of our sides acts 
rationally, since all of us and both our sides may act so, but it is our ability to interpret 
our motives. Thucydides is a product of the sophists, he has been convinced that 
reasoning never has an one and only outcome. Thus he does not attribute truth to the 
one or to the other “objectively”, according to the case; what he tries to do is to reveal 
the reason for each side’s fight. Thucydides is not read creatively if in his writings 
we see nothing but a display of oration: with his orations, equally favorable and with 
equally forcible expression on behalf of both sides opposed to each other, he gives us 
the truth itself of Man, the explanation of his motives, the flow of history’s blood; and 
he does this by regenerating what has already been said, or by constructing the facts 
from the outset.
And behold! The war hasn’t really started yet, the storm—which appears as 
a small dense cloud on the horizon—hides all eventualities within itself in a most 
threatening way. And it was before the thunder was heard and while dogs were cow-
ering and sweat was oozing from men’s brows in the humid air that Thucydides set 
the Athenians to put forward the cause of war. They are commonplace, anonymous 
Athenians, who have found themselves in Sparta on a commercial mission. They have 
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taken the initiative in speaking to the Spartans, but they haven’t thought it advisable 
to be convincing; their reasoning is expressed as a style, rather than as a n argu-
ment. We are listening to them through Thucydides in the inelegant forum where the 
crabbed old men of Sparta used to gather in order to judge rather than talk politics. 
We listen to the Athenians speaking unequivocally and being completely familiar 
with the language of power -the language of Xerxes- which they used to think impos-
sible for themselves to speak.
Born after the battle of Salamis, Thucydides could hear the Athenians speak, after 
the victory and their new and complete dominance, a language that only Marlow and 
Shakespeare were able to revive in the Elizabethan theater. Pericles, a hero in plays of 
those tragedians, will explain to those who haven’t the nerve to understand:
“Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of her 
position. There are a common source of pride to you all, and you cannot decline the 
burdens of empire and still expect to share its honors. You should remember also that 
what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, 
but also loss of empire and danger from animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, 
to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has 
become enamored of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, 
to be somewhat plainly, a tyranny: to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is 
unsafe.”
And following this Machiavellian reasoning, he finishes his speech as follows: “[...] 
These glories may incur the censure of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast 
of energy they will awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an 
envious regret. Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all 
who have aspired to rule others.”
We hear that language even more unvarnished and without nuisances of ethical 
dignity in the dialogue “Athenians - Milians”. In that famous dialogue, Thucydides 
brings us to the frozen plateau of the undisguised cynicism of power. There, under 
the cold light of the midnight sun, the pragmatic and psychopathological appear to 
come together, associating with each other and coiling themselves round one another. 
From that dialogue, which has to be studied throughout and with great attention, I 
give only an extract that represents the clear reason that governs the language of 
power.
“When you speak of the favor of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as your-
selves; neither our pretensions, nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what 
men believe of the gods, or practice among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of 
men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule whenever they can. 
And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: 
we found it existing before us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and 
everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.”
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10. The Madness of Power
THE CEILING of the stage was an implacable black void with a round celestial body 
suspended from its center; a sphere, a planet which symbolized the position of our 
world and its loneliness within the universal darkness, or it might have been the eye 
and sword of God, uncovering every action and intention, pondering everything care-
fully against the omnivorous evil, setting a limit to time beyond which all acts become 
imprisoned. The floor of the stage, sloping towards the audience, seemed like a huge 
book stand. Thus we could see exactly where the drama was taking place; a drama 
wherein the leading actor was the mechanism of history itself: a mechanism whose 
parts -kings, hangmen, princesses, innkeepers, noblemen, attendants, soldiers, the 
Great Fool himself, and above all, the insatiable will for power- were at the same time its 
creators. The whole stage was covered with a map of our world showing the frontiers 
between countries, towns, rivers, mountains and all the rest paraphernalia of space. 
Within that space, which pretends to be immobile, our pre-ordained world exists and 
all the actions of human beings are played out. This was the setting for a performance 
of King Lear at Stratford-upon-Avon, directed by Adrian Noble, with Robert Stephens in 
the title role, in January 1994: a lesson on how power composes its reasoning and how 
it decomposes it by following that very same reasoning to its extremes.
Lear: What’s that hath so much thy place mistook / To set thee here?”
What does he really tell us in a voice more furious than the storm? It is true that 
his words reveal some immutable truths. He is a king who has divested himself of 
kingship, believing that he has retained his authority, despite giving up its execution; 
a king who is homeless in every sense because he hasn’t realized that to have author-
ity means to have institutions; a king who feels embittered at discovering that royal 
robes only fit the person who wears them; a king who has sensed, after having gone 
mad -only then- that you cannot have power if others are indifferent to it; that is, you 
have authority only as long as you exert it at all costs and until the end -until your end.
Here now, Lear, divested of all authority and homeless as a tramp, lies down to 
sleep on the heath; with him is the wise fool (32) (therefore a great fool) who is going 
to show him what indeed a king is, what a ruler is: he will tear at the map which is 
covering the stage, and squashing a piece of it, will turn it into a pillow and put it 
under Lear’s head, and he will draw the rest of the map over Lear and cover him with 
it, And let this be a hard lesson to any Lear: (33) Between a Lear who masters the 
world and a Lear who is mastered by it, intervenes the clothing of human nakedness 
in the garment of power, nothing but the substance of power itself.
But what is that “garment” of power that can be identified with its substance? 
A garment of power is the use of its language (34) -different use means a different re-
gime or different functional conditions of the same regime. In any case, its language 
is necessarily institutional: the cowl does not make the monk, if the monk represents 
sanctity, but the cowl does make the monk if he represents the power of authority. 
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The state and violence are always the representative forms of authority, as Aeschylus 
has taught us in his Prometheus, but this work does not always speak with harshness 
that Thucydides wants. Authority is exerted in the name of something transcenden-
tal (God, race, homeland, or a supreme moral principle embodied in class or justice), 
and by incorporating a series of symbols which will give its language an institutional 
character, something entirely different from the language of a powerful person -a 
ruler or even an embezzler of power. Even tyrants and dictators can be legalized in the 
perception of the public, provided that they use an institutional language; otherwise 
they are simply a group of interlopers, rebels or whatever people call the bearers of a 
non-institutional, and consequently, antisocial power. In plain speech, the difference 
between institutional and non-institutional language is just the difference between a 
policeman and a robber at the moment they are shooting each other.
Whenever a man, having got to the pinnacle of power, and from there, without 
making any excuse whatsoever, imposes his own will crudely and brutally, without 
its institutional clothing, then that man has changed the leading class into a robber 
band. Caligula was murdered (35) because he not only thought he was above the 
gods, but also outside the orbit of institutions. In contrast, Napoleon impressed on 
rebellious France the authority of institutions (36), and he continuously fought, not to 
overthrow tyrants, and surely not so much to extend the boundaries of the country, 
but to have his authority recognized as an institutional one. Even Genghis Khan had 
to dedicate himself to unifying the peoples of the Mongolian race, in order to be rec-
ognized as the Great Khan, an emperor of Mongolia with institutions and laws, and 
not to be considered simply as a brigand chief.
The most political-minded Athenians would not escape that necessity. Their 
hegemony could not escape that necessity. Their hegemony could not remain an 
expression of brutal force. Those masters of dialectic could not allow themselves a 
reasoning that would turn them into the simple image of Thucydides’ Brueghelian 
vision of the “Triumph of Death” depicted by that poet of history and priest of reason.
On those conditions, what could Athens contend for? The apologetic argument 
that it didn’t seek hegemony, but that circumstances gave it to it, could not be of much 
use, since every non-Athenian could immediately answer: “Even so; but that’s the 
limit.” The argument that under the hegemony of Athens the fight for their fatherland 
against the Persians would continue could stand up only if that fight were a universal 
demand, and not a forcibly imposed one -and it is well-known that even Sparta would 
have gone over to the Medes, if the Persian king had let her alone to stew in her own 
juice; the claim to freedom, the resistance to tyranny, the juxtaposition of Hellenes 
and Persians were in fact the spirit of the Athenian forum. And the Athenians imposed 
that spirit on the rest of Hellenes by means of force and misinformation.
The rhetoric about a hegemony that has arisen naturally by itself uninvited, with 
the flow of the current, is dishonest even for the Athenians, since at any time and 
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place nobody can be convinced to fight and be killed for something that has taken 
place accidentally. In order to be mobilized, an Athenian would have to face fierce en-
emies who threaten his indisputable supremacy; sensible arguments and geopolitical 
analyses hardly lead to heroism and self-sacrifice. On the other hand, the fire that 
civil war had kindled -the war that was later to be called Peloponnesian- ruined the 
argument that under Athenian hegemony the Medes would be crushed. It was quite 
plain that it was a civil war, and what excuses massacre among brothers is passion 
only, not explanations and defenses. Gorgias denounces each side’s triumphs with a 
most dramatic checkmate:
“Trophies against barbarians demand hymns of praise, but those against Greeks, 
lamentations.”
For a while Plato, perhaps in some of his sober moments, was on the same wave-
length, asserting that all Hellenes constitute a united national being and that this 
being had been in unvarying and national collision with the barbarians, but he also 
asserted that civil war was a “devastating” collision with the mother herself and the 
wet-nurse, Hellas.
Nevertheless, Athenian hegemony acquired its language and owed it to a “poet 
without talent, a plagiarist, a worthless writer, an exponent of squalor, a corrupter of 
the public, who instead of teaching virtues as the old poets did, plunges his public into 
wickedness; in fact, to a poet, who replaces precision with empty words -to the most 
ignorant Euripides”. This is how Aristophanes’ harsh-language describes Euripides.
Yes, to Euripides, whom even professor Aristotle criticizes for being a most-tragic 
poet, but unable to manage his material; to the poet that ancient philologists -and not 
only the ancient ones- think of as inferior compared to Aeschylus or Sophocles.
Euripides dodges the Athenian-centricity of those that preceded him, initiating 
an aggressive, most explicit, purely Athenian nationalism, and not, in a wider sense, 
a Hellenic one. Offending common sense and any elementary knowledge of history, 
at any rate certainly in Hellenic history, he puts forward a racial doctrine. He insists 
that there is a race -the Athenian race- which differs from the others by being ra-
cially superior, and therefore, it has particular rights over the others. Homer gave 
the Hellenes a national identity, Aeschylus raised them to the point of expressing an 
exceptional spirit, Sophocles put the bases of their difference in moral superiority, 
but Euripides put their difference on a racial basis: he justifies the claim of Athens to 
be sovereign over Hellas and hallows the war against Sparta by wrapping up a grim 
policy in a fine metaphysical cloak.
First of all, he cuts off the stern ropes that have tied the ship of war to the moral ground, 
by refusing to characterize it as a civil war; he triumphantly restores the apparently non-
sense and forgotten notion of “being a native”, and makes it a touchstone of politics.
In his tragedy Ion he rejects the formerly acceptable mythico-religious genealogy 
of the Hellenes, according to which Hellenicus begot three sons: Dorus (from whom 
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come the Dorians), Aeolus (the Aeolians), and Xuthus who begot Achaeus (Achaeans) 
and Ion (Ionians). Euripides returns to the forgotten genealogy of the “founders” 
of Athens and declares that Ion was an illegitimate son of Apollo and Erechtheus’ 
daughter, Kreousa. Kreousa swaddled up the newborn baby and left it to die. 
However, Apollo saved his son by sending Hermes to “the native people of glorious 
Athens”, to take him to Delphi. Later, Kreousa married Xuthus -who was a native, but 
an Aechaean and a son of Aeolus.
During the whole of the tragedy, Euripides brings pressure to bear on his audience: 
Kreousa’s father (her name means noblewoman or the best) Erechtheus or Erech-
thonios (coming from the underworld), sprang up from Attic soil (Autochthonous) 
and the goddess Athena took him away from the earth. So, this city’s ancestors 
were natives; the famous people of Athens were born and bred Athenians; none of 
them ever came from another country, etc. In an irrational and entirely untenable 
way for any kind of criticism, he affirms that Athens is a “pure city”, unadulterated 
with racial intercourse. He insists that Xuthus was not a native, but an immigrant, 
and an immigrant can never be a ruler of the country. Besides, he entrusts Athena 
“with the prophecy” that Ion’s sons will be the founders of the city’s races, that their 
descendants will be glorified, and the land between Asia and Europe will be theirs. 
And the destiny for the other Hellenes has also been destined: The sons of Xuthus and 
Kreousa (offspring of human, mortal parents, whereas her previous son was fathered 
by a god) will be Doros and Achaeus. Thus, the other Hellenes (non-Athenians) have 
been brought forth by the intercourse between an immigrant and a native; they are 
younger and inferior to their older and purely Athenian brother, despite having the 
same mother. Therefore, the rest of Hellenes owe to the Athenians one thing only: 
submission!
And it was not in Ion only; in another of his tragedies Erechtheus Euripides de-
clares: “Not from another land our people have come; / This soil is that brought us 
forth, The other cities, / Which where’er and by accident have been built, / One people 
after another go and stay, / But whoever goes to stay in a city from another / Seems 
like an odd latch nailed upon a door, / And although a citizen is called, as such he 
doesn’t act.” back to contents
11. Before the Voracious Altar
BUT LET US be seated for a while in the theater of Dionysus, let’s caress these stone 
ruins, scorched by sun and sculpted by time, with dry weeds between them. Let’s stay 
in this warm hour under the thin shadow of the little scanty pine-tree and be calm, 
lest we should disturb the little lizard that is now running and then stops frozen as 
though it had cocked its ears, listening to the ancient crowd’s breathing, as though it 
felt the gasp of ancient fury. Let’s stay in the theater, beside the former temple, on the 
chance of our hearing, between two frenzied chirps, of a cicada, the distant song of 
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Dionysus who, having always hidden his face under a mask, is longing for the strange 
drunkenness of truth.
And behold: the enthusiastic audience feel that whatever there was to be said has 
been said. They are clapping and cheering and laughing, pleased with themselves, 
and snorting that they are ready to throw themselves into the battle -they are pure 
Ionians against the adulterated Hellenes. The tragedy continues, the reactions of the 
audience bear witness to it: Euripides lifted a curtain in this theater which since then 
has never fallen.
The audience is continuing the play: they are going out, jumping over the tiers and 
will proudly fling themselves into war in Sicily. Sitting on this cracked marble, flicking 
away an annoying insect and omitting all other strange sounds, we are listening to 
cheers, triumphal hymns and the sharp instructions of officers. We are also listening 
to the trump of people who will stop at nothing; we are looking at sombre faces ready 
to kill, to force, to crush down opposition in order to build the world according to the 
measure that their poet has taught them to make their own. Immediately afterwards, 
we are looking at that very same crowd fleeing to save their lives. Abandoning their 
own dead to the vultures, leaving behind them the wounded who are snatching at 
their at their filthy tunics. And we go on looking at some of them who, moaning and 
helpless, stumble in the mud to be slaughtered, and while stupefied, dash into the 
small river to drink a little water, and at the others who are taken prisoners and 
bowed down to be dragged into quarries to break stones day long without food, or 
to rot away in prisons, or to be broken by being drowned in shame and guilt. It was 
that war in whose mud, blood and tears that the ideal of the Hellenic city collapsed 
forever. As Diodorus Siculus narrates, a Syracusian named Nicholas was perhaps 
the last of the Hellenes who tried to redeem the sacred heart of Hellenism in one of 
his orations. He passionately spoke for the virtues that the Hellenes should uphold, 
and at all costs the city should remain virtuous and benevolent; he also spoke for 
the Athenians, begging for an end to their massacre, since they were the ones who 
founded the laws and taught the other Hellenes the tranquil and benevolent life. He 
begged his compatriots to spare the Athenians their lives, saying: “As many as you 
have acquired education and have learned the art of speech, show mercy to those that 
their city has been school for all people; as many of you have been initiated into the 
purest mysteries [Eleusinian], save the initiates!”
Nicholas prevented nothing; neither massacre, nor the corruption of conscience. 
Euripides will also leave the theater of Dionysus and will go to Macedonia -having 
perhaps a presentiment of destiny’s steps.
The theater of Dionysus, however, has remained there to wait for a new audience. 
In the center, its voracious altar has seen many brilliant celebrities enchanted by it 
and given themselves up to its fire. But the largest audience and the most determined 
was brought into this theater by the famous official in the court of the Duke of Weimar: 
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Goethe found in Euripides all the necessary material that allowed him to raise the 
banner of German nationalism. And while he was writing the second part of Faust—a 
Bible of Germanism—he wrote excitedly in his personal diary: “But has any nation 
in the whole world ever given birth to a poet worthy of holding Euripides’ slippers?”
Goethe opened up the road; the German public responded to it immediately. 
And we ourselves still sitting in the theater; although everything has already been 
enveloped up in the frail twilight, we are listening to new acclamations, new sharp 
orders, the new and much more icy the silent approach of Nemesis, new -indeed how 
new?- shouts of triumph which so quickly turn into havoc, abandonment, despair and 
pain of an infinite pain which leads direct here, before us, to this altar that has again 
and again been covered with the thick blood of sacrificial animals.
In the theater of Dionysus—the theater of history—we can assess the Euripidean 
eagle: nationalism is a way to create havoc in the people who follow it; it is a celebra-
tion of death. However, it is necessary for us here to focus our attention more clearly: 
Euripides is too great a poet to give us a dud cheque, an idea without a strong foothold 
in reality. As soon as you are about to dismiss his idea as unsupported, or you have 
been roused to throw it away, even breaking the container because of the devastation 
and massacres that have emerged from it, at once the primordial Sphinx appears, and 
the Sphinx never cares for devastation and massacres, but only for truth. It is look-
ing at us and is waiting—and I remember the Egyptian Sphinx very well, standing 
close to the great pyramid, at the slope of the hill, corroded by the wind and sand 
of the desert, with its nose broken, but its look incorruptible; I remember it raising 
the question (a question smothered not only with the dust and ashes of tourism, but 
of several other concerns as well): “Who are you? Where are you going to, and what 
for?” And the question we are now being asked by a sphinx, smaller than the Egyptian 
one but no less aquiline, is this: “Is it ever possible to have a glorious history without 
having nationalism?”
In this debate, only those who want to share a bottle of wine for the sake of wine 
and not for the bottle that contains it, should take part. Because a Sphinx -any Sphinx- 
presupposes that a being cannot be meaningful by itself. Whoever believes that life 
and history do not have a particular meaning which we must try hard to fathom; 
whoever believes that each person and each people do not have a different face from 
the one that circumstances dictate to them, all of these cannot participate in a debate 
with the Sphinx. But we -all of us- who have been seated in the theater and feel in the 
twilight that we are in a place which is a constituent part of our being, all of us who 
feel that our place and our history have been both the graveyard of our people and the 
cradle of our being / person, all of us have been transfixed before this Sphinx.
Indeed, it is impossible to have a national identity without singularity- but why 
arrogance? Singularity does not necessarily entail contempt of the other, just as rec-
ognition of a differentiation does not inevitably involve enmity. Homer and Aeschylus 
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have imparted to all of us experiences of volcanic clashes from which glorious Hellen-
ism came into being and matured in an entirely particular spirit and culture, which 
became a matrix for other civilizations, too, without having used any of Euripides 
weapons.
Also, it is impossible for anyone to have a long history, an embossed national 
identity, and a cultural offering, without believing in a particular historical mission 
for one’s own nation. But history means intermarriage -at its best it means accultura-
tion. Racialism is a disease ignorant of history, even for the Eskimos isolated in the 
North Pole. On the other hand, a strong nation is not interested in the purity of its 
race, but in the clarity of its values and the luminous civilization it creates.
Nationalism is “useful” only to decaying orders, to powerless and impotent na-
tions that exist during a period of collapse and dissolution. It is an avowal of a nation’s 
bankruptcy. The transference from the self-consciousness of Homer to the national-
ism of Euripides is not inevitable; and it is doubtful if Euripides’ sermon would have 
been listened to, if Athens had been vigorous and could have supported strong crea-
tive forces. But Athens of democracy had been replaced by an Athens of cynicism. The 
values that had founded the greatness of Athens had been overthrown.
Euripides’ speech is the most poetical, the most exquisite dagger that Athens 
thrust into its own heart when it ceased to create civilization.
NOTES
1 Strabo, Geography, 13,v.31, stomalimni means a lake shaped like a mouth.
2 Founded by Poseidon, as he himself reminds Apollo: Homer Iliad, 21. 446-7.
3 Fifty rooms were shared among the sons of Priam and their families, and twelve 
among his daughters and their own.
4 This is what many historians believe and they try in vain to answer the ques-
tions: Who exactly are the Hellenes? they are desperately looking for it in a racial, 
linguistic or religious background, refuting one another ingloriously, since they 
deny to accept that ‘Hellenes’ is the creation of a poet!
5 Plato, Republic, II 377. 
6 Herodotus assures us that “Homer and Hesiod were the first to compose Theogonies, 
and give the epithets to the gods, to allot them several offices and occupations and 
describe their forms”: II 53. Gods, and in fact more than twelve, had already existed 
-but in each place they had different names, forms, qualities, relations and origin. 
Homer, by presenting in his epics the life of gods, their interference with human 
affairs, the intensities, intrigues, power and relations, their position in the Pantheon 
and above all, their form,allowed if not enforced the local gods to be identified with 
and absorbed by his own gods/heroes, leading his people to a religious unity. Cf. 
James Adam, The religious Teachers of Greece, 1908, 21-67, and Walter Burkert, 
Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche, 1977, III 1.
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7 Such common religious places were Delos, Delphi, Dodona, Olympia etc. The Olym-
pic Games had taken place before Homer, and it was a pure religious festival with 
one Game only - an Olympian stadium race (630.83 feet). 
8 It seems that in the days of Homer, the so-called “Phoenician” alphabet was brought 
into general use, and the linear B script was abandoned. Cf. L.M. Jeffery, “Greek 
Alphabetic Writing”, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. III, I part of second ed. 
pp. 819 ff. 
9 Hesiod had already used the name Hellas to notify the country, and Panthellenes 
for its inhabitants: Works and Days, 653 and 528. 
10 A lively account is rendered (rhapsody 19) of the form of Parliament: there are 
seats, and Agamemnon obviously speaks from the illustrious one, without going 
to take the floor. He asks his soldiers to listen to each orator quietly, without inter-
ruption and uproar, because even the most experienced orator can be harassed by 
interruption (19.76-82). On the other hand, Ulysses, addressing Achilles, admits 
that Achilles was unquestionably better than himself in arms; all the same, Achil-
les should obey Ulysses because he was intellectually superior to Achilles -and 
it was done (19.216-19). Here we have, as in the whole of Homer’s work, not an 
underestimate of war-virtue, but a predominance of intellect. The same we find in 
the Agamemnon-Nestor dialogue (2.370-4), when the leader of the army asserts 
that he would have won the war if he had ten wise men like Nestor - he didn’t ask 
for ten Achilleses.
11 F. Matz supposes so, although he admits that it is difficult for us to accept it: “The 
Maturity of Minoan Civilization”, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol.2 part 1, 3rd. 
ed., p.580. Many other scientists share the same supposition. 
12 Iliad, 2. 645-52; but according to Herodotus, Cretans are barbarians; History A, 173.
13 To the question, What differentiates the gods who defend the Hellenes from the 
gods who fight against them, G.S. Kirk gives the following answer: Aphrodite, 
Ares, Artemis, Apollo are gods who came to Hellas from the East, by contrast with 
Poseidon, Hera, Athena, Hermes, Demeter who are of Indo-European and Baby-
lonian origin. Zeus is both an Indo-European and Babylonian deity. Cf. G.S. Kirk. 
The Iliad: A Commentary, vol. 2, pp. 1-14. It is very probable that Homer imprints 
these origins, since he collects on the Trojans’ side the eastern peoples, and on the 
Hellenes’ side the Indo-Europeans. As we know, the different tribes which Homer 
presents as one people and calls Hellenes came to Hellas from the Siberian plateau 
of today’s Kurgan. Some of them descended from the southwestern side of the 
Caspian Sea passed the Caucasus, crossed Asia Minor, and reached the Aegean 
Sea, while some others came from the eastern side of the Caspian Sea, reaching 
Hellas by crossing the Ukraine and following the course of the Danube River. It is 
probable that in Homer we see in relief the prevalence of northern tribes the ones 
that happened, accidentally and for a short time, to represent the East!
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14 Cf. James B. Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, Princeton, 1969, p. 232.
15 It is the same with the Diomedes-Glaukos case: Iliad, 6.215-31. Even if one consid-
ers that the Hellenes gave back the dead body of Hector to the Trojans because 
they simply obeyed gods will, the ceasing of war for twelve days was a gift from 
Achilles to Priam; ibid., 24. 660-73. 
16 Because he says: “You may have only enemies whom you can hate, not enemies you 
despise. You must be proud of your enemy; then the successes of your enemy are 
your successes, too (transl. Walter Kaufmann, the Viking Press, 1966, p.48. 
17 Archilochus explains this with a characteristic immediacy:” Gyges and all his gold 
don’t interest me. I’ve never been prey to envy, I don’t marvel at heavenly things, 
or yearn for great dominion, that’s all beyond the sights of such as me” (fr.19). 
18 “I have a placid heart”, tells us the most amorous Sappho, (fr. 120), while Mimner-
mus is afraid of old age: “I hope I die...when painful age comes on, that makes a 
man loathsome and vile, malignant troubles ever vex his heart; seeing the sunlight 
gives him joy no more. He is abhorred by boys, by women scorned: So hard a thing 
God made old age to be”.(fr. 1) And gives a bit of advice: “Enjoy yourself. As for the 
wretched townsfolk, some will speak ill of you -but only some”(fr.7). But Alcaeus 
reacts differently: “Rain in the sky, foul weather coming down, the water courses 
frozen... Defeat the weather: light a fire, mix the sweet wine unstintingly, and put 
a nice soft cushion by my head” (fr.388). 
19 Particularly Theognis: “Be sensible, and do not stoop to shameful deeds to seize 
your self-esteem, prestige or wealth. ... do not consort with knaves, but hold fast 
always to the men of worth” (fr.29 - 32).
20 Mainly in Solon: “Lawlessness brings the city countless ills. while lawfulness sets all 
in order as is due; many a criminal it puts in irons. It makes the rough smooth, curbs 
excess, effaces wrong, and shrivels up the budding flowers of sin; it straightens out 
distorted judgments, pacifies the violent, brings discord to an end, brings to an end 
ill-tempered quarreling. It makes all men’s affairs correct and rational” (fr.11). 
21 Alcaeus prompts his fellow citizens to rebel against the tyrant: “Let us bow to 
one’s man rule, and let us not accept...” (fr.6). 
22 Solon won’t hesitate to tell Athenians who were reduced to Pisistratus’ tyranny 
and asked for their freedom: f by your own fault you have suffered grief and harm, 
put no part of the blame upon the gods. You raised these men up by providing 
bodyguards, and that’s why wretched slavery is your lot. Your trouble is, each of 
you treads the fox’s way, but your collective wits are as thin as air; you watch a 
crafty fellow’s tongue and what he says, but fail to look at anything he does”(fr.11) 
23 Archilochus dares say to an audience nurtured with the Iliad: Some Saian sports 
my splendid shield: I had to leave it in a wood, but saved my skin. Well, I don’t care. 
I’ll get another just as good” (fr.5)
24 Turtaeus is the cardinal exponent of this kind.
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25 Also in this point as in the whole of the work, we see how far Aeschylus is from 
trying to underestimate his opponent. Following the Homeric tradition, he shows 
his respect to the Persians at any given chance. Recent studies have pointed out 
that there are instances where it seems that Aeschylus took care to learn the his-
tory, religion and habits of the Persians (H.D. Broadread, The Persae of Aeschylus, 
pp. XXX ff.).And of course, the warrior-poet of Marathon is admirable in that he 
respects his enemies and he does not look on them as though they were “dogs”. 
26 Perfect beauty, noble origin: this is the ideal of Hellenic spirit. Gods, heroes, or 
even concepts (history, homeland, freedom, justice, truth, etc.) are portrayed as 
a projection of Man on to a level beyond this present world, and hence they are 
magnified. These ideal forms are taller, more beautiful, more vigorous than we 
are, but they always remain of a noble origin beside Man. The monstrous forms 
represent deities of the “ancient religion” -as it was called by the early people- or 
deities of the underworld. To these two categories we must add the forms re-
lated to the technique of metal: here we find a symbolic deformity whose analysis 
would have taken us too far away. Superb examples of this ideal of Hellenic spirit, 
which so plainly and wisely Aeschylus describes, we can see in the so-called “Elgin 
marbles” and on the pediment of Olympia. Plato asserts the opposite: the good and 
beautiful within the world is a reflection of the invisible and divine reality.
27 Which means that the division of land was by chance. Aeschylus doesn’t bring 
forward the racial differentiation, believing that the only important thing is the 
institutional one, from which our differences derive. This conviction of Aeschylus 
rejects Euripides as well as Plato and Aristotle, but it is supported brilliantly by 
Spinoza in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.
28 As a geographical term, the word Europe appears for the first time in the so-called 
Homeric Hymn to Apollo. There we find out that Apollo founded an oracle in a 
district where people could come easily to worship him and make use of it: “all 
of them who live in rich Peloponnese / and the ones in Europe and all-around 
washed islands” (Homeric Hymns, “Hymn to Apollo”, 250-1). Europe then was, 
at first, a district of Hellas (perhaps Epirus), but very soon became a synonym 
for Hellas, and later , it became what Hegesipos defines as “the whole continent 
to the North wind is called Europe” (Hegesipos, fr.6). According to How and 
Wells, the words Asia and Europe have the Assyrian roots acu and irib respec-
tively. Thus Asia means East and Europe means West -it might also mean darkness 
(A Commentary on Herodotus, p. 320). They also add that Asia and Europe were at 
first place names of districts which were on two coasts of the Aegean Sea, facing 
each other. M.L. West, Hesiod Theogony, p.31), got round the version that Europe’s 
origin is Assyrian and insists that it was a place name of ancient Hellas; he refers 
us to the river in Thessaly Europa (today it is called Xiria) and the Europa spring 
in Dodoni. He also asserts that the name Asia doesn’t derive from Hellenic Asis 
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(slime of a river, ibid., p.p.266-7). The theory that name Europe derives from irib 
seems to be strengthened with the myth of Europa’s rape by Zeus. However, the 
rape of the virgin deity by the bull-god seems to have come to Hellas not from 
the Middle East but from the North ( Marija Gimbutas, The Goddesses and Gods 
of Old Europe), that is, our myth is based on older material. On the contrary, the 
theory that the names Europe and Asia derive from Hellenic roots is strengthened 
by the relations of Europe with springs and waters (Eurotas=a name of many 
rivers; Euripos=a common name of many straits; euros=fluid etc.). On the other 
hand, Asia probably derives from the Indo-European root ap (=water, a current of 
water) that in the Hellenic language becomes as - and - ap - Asis , Asia, Asea (lake), 
Asopos (river), Apidon, Apidanos (rivers) etc., and this strengthens the theory of 
M.L.West. A strong argument is that Europe and Asia are, according to Hesiod, 
water nymphs, spirits of springs and Oceans (Hesiod,Theogony, 357 and 357). 
29 He attributes to Xerxes a noble motive and not expansionism, barbarism etc.). 
30 Here, there is a fundamental distinction between an Asian and a European: the 
Asian is proud of the tight rein on him, while the European will fight tooth and nail 
for his own freedom. This uncompromising claim for freedom is the foundation of 
the European spirit. 
31 Darius, Xerxes’ father,was defeated at Marathon. Aeschylus, however, does not 
refer to his own Marathon, but to the Persians’ defeat at Salamis and above all, at 
Plataea, which means that although Darius had a taste of defeat only, Xerxes drank 
the cup of defeat to the drop. 
32 S.T. Coleridge points out that the Fool in King Lear is not at all a comic clown 
destined to say certain biting truths to provoke the laughter of an audience: the 
Fool conveys to us the terror and passion of the events that take place. Coleridge 
compares the Fool in King Lear with Caliban in Tempest (Cf. Coleridge’s Shake-
spearean Criticism, ed. T.M. Raynov, 1930). In the performance I am referring to, 
the Fool was a co-leading actor with Lear, and his folly was nothing but the despair 
of discretion; the expression of certainty that he is not going to be listened to; he 
was a Cassandra, what else? 
33 Shakespeare, in order to write King Lear, used elements taken from Raphael 
Holinsheld’s Chronicles of Englande, Scottlande and Irelande; and for Gloucester’s 
story he used elements taken from Philip Sydney’s Arcadia. Shakespeare saw 
that it was, in substance, the same subject: Lear and Gloucester made the same 
mistake, and their lot was the same. In the 6th scene of the 4th act the two old men 
meet, not in the chambers of power, but in the wasteland of a crushing defeat: one 
blind, and the other mad, both destroyed; they recognize each other and they feel 
as though they were nothing but two riggings of the same shipwreck. 
34 Obviously, the language of totalitarianism is different from that of democracy,and 
also there is a difference between Greek and British democracy. Absolutely igno-
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rant of those elementary distinctions, some who reject nationalism have recently 
ranked Alexander the Great among the great slaughters in history. One cannot 
say much about this lack of judgment coming across others who consider that 
Napoleon and Genghis Khan differ from each other only because the one moved 
Eastwards and the other Westwards. 
35 Suetonius, De Vita Caesarum, 4; also Albert Camus, Caligula. Camus keeps close to 
Suetonius, but he reads the events philosophically. 
36 The end of the Revolution and its replacement with institutions was announced 
with the Proclamation to the French Nation on 24 Frimaire, Year VIII (12.15.1799) 
by the troika: Bonaparte, Roger Ducos, Sieyes.
Source: Pro Europa
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The Man of Letters and the Future of Europe
Τ.S.Eliot
I WISH first to define the sense in which I shall use the term ‘man of letters’. I shall 
mean the writer for whom his writing is primarily an art, who is as much concerned 
‘with style as with content; the understanding of whose writings, therefore, depends 
as much upon appreciation of style as upon comprehension of content. This is prima-
rily the poet (including the dramatic poet), and the writer of prose fiction. To give 
emphasis to these two kinds of writer is not to deny the title ‘man of letters’ to writ-
ers in many other fields: it is simply a way of isolating the problem of responsibility of 
the man of letters qua man. of letters; and if what I have to say is true for the poet and 
the novelist, it will also be true for other writers in so far as they are ‘artists’.
The first responsibility of the man of letters is, of course, his responsibility to-
wards his art, the same, which neither time nor circumstance can abate or modify, 
that other artists have: that is, he must do his best with the medium, in which he 
works. He differs from other artists, in that his medium is his language: we do not all 
paint pictures, and we are not all musicians, but we all talk. This fact gives the man 
of letters a special responsibility towards everybody who speaks the same language, 
a responsibility which workers in other arts do not share. But, in general, special 
responsibilities which fall upon the man of letters at any time must take second place 
to his permanent responsibility as a literary artist. However, the man of letters is 
not, as a rule, exclusively engaged upon the production of works of art. He has other 
interests, like anybody else; interests “which will, in all probability, exercise some 
influence upon the content and meaning of the works of art which he does produce. 
He has the same responsibility, and should have the same concern with the fate of 
his country, and with political and social affairs within it, as any other citizen; and 
in matters of controversy, there is no more reason why two men of letters should 
hold identical opinions, and support the same party and programme, than why any 
other two citizens should. Yet there are matters of public concern, in which the man 
of letters should express his opinion, and exert his influence, not merely as a citizen 
but as a man of letters: and upon such matters I think that it is desirable that men of 
letters should agree. In proceeding to suggest some of these, I have no expectation 
that all men of letters will agree with me: but if I confined myself to statements to 
which all men of letters, as men of letters, could give immediate assent, I should only 
be uttering platitudes.
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The man of letters as such, is not concerned with the political or economic map of 
Europe; but he should be very much concerned with its cultural map. This problem, 
involving the relations of different cultures and languages in Europe, must have 
presented itself first, to the man of letters, as a domestic problem: in this context, 
foreign affairs are merely an extension of domestic affairs. Nearly every country, 
that has been, long settled, is a composite of different local cultures; and even when 
it is completely homogeneous in race, it will, between east and west, or more often 
between north and south, exhibit differences of speech, of customs, and of ways of 
thinking and feeling. A small country of course, is usually assumed by foreigners to 
be much more unified than it realty is: and although the educated foreigner is aware 
that Britain contains within its small area several races and several languages, he 
may underestimate the importance of both the friction, and the often happy com-
bination toward a common end, of the different types. It is a commonplace that 
industrialism (of which totalitarianism is a political expression) tends to obliterate 
these differences, to uproot men from their ancestral habitat, to mingle them in large 
manufacturing and business centres, or to send them hither and thither as the needs 
of manufacture and distribution may dictate. In its political aspect, industrialism 
tends to centralize the direction of affairs in one large metropolis, and to diminish 
that interest in, and control over, local affairs by which men gain political experience 
and sense of responsibility. Against this tendency, ‘regionalism’—as in the demand, 
from time to time, for greater local autonomy in Scotland or in Wales—is a protest.
It has often been the weakness of ‘regionalist’ movements, to assume that a, 
cultural malady can be cured by political means; to ascribe, to individuals belong-
ing to the dominant culture, malignant intentions of which they may be innocent; 
and, by not probing deep enough into the causes, to ‘prescribe a superficial remedy. 
By the materialist, these regional stirrings are often regarded with derision. The 
man of letters, who should be peculiarly qualified to respect and to criticize them, 
should be able to take a longer view that either the politician or the local patriot. He 
should know that neither in a complete and universal uniformity, nor in an isolated 
self-sufficiency, can culture flourish; that a local and a general culture are so far from 
being in conflict, that they are truly necessary to each other. To the engineering mind, 
the idea of a universal uniformity on the one hand or the idea of complete autarchy 
on the other, is more easily apprehensible. The union of local cultures in a general 
culture is more difficult to conceive, and more difficult to realize. But the man of 
letters should know that uniformity means the obliteration of culture, and that self-
sufficiency means its death by starvation.
The man of letters should see also, that within any cultural unit, a proper balance 
of rural and urban life is essential. Without great cities—great, not necessarily in the 
modern material sense, but great by being the meeting-place of a society of superior mind 
and more polished manners—the culture of a nation will never rise above a rustic level; 
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without the life of the soil from which to draw its strength, the urban culture must lose its 
source of strength and rejuvenescence. Fortttnatus et illc qui deos novit agrestes.
What we learn from a study of conditions within our own countries, we can ap-
ply to the cultural economy of Europe. The primary aim of politics, at the end of a 
great war, must be, of course, the establishment of a peace, and of a peace which will 
endure. But at different times, different notions of what conditions are necessary for 
peace may prevail. At the end of the last war, the idea of peace was associated with 
the idea of independence and freedom: it was thought that if each nation managed all 
its own affairs at home, and transacted its foreign political affairs through a League 
of Nations, peace would be perpetually assured. It was an idea which disregarded the 
unity of European culture. At the end of this war, the idea of peace is more likely to 
be associated with the idea of efficiency—that is, with whatever can be planned. This 
would be to disregard the diversity of European culture. It is not that ‘culture’ is in 
danger of being ignored: on the contrary, I think that culture might be safer if it were 
less talked about. But in this talk of ‘culture’, the notion of a European culture—a 
culture with, several sub-divisions, other than national boundaries, within it, and 
with various crossing threads of relationship between countries, but still a recogniz-
able universal European culture—is not very prominent: and there is a danger that 
the importance of the various cultures maybe assumed to be in proportion to the 
size, population, wealth and power of the nations.
I have mentioned the problem of regional diversities of race and culture within one 
nation (as in Great Britain) not merely as a helpful analogy to the diversity of Europe, 
but because I think the two problems are essentially one and the same. I do not think 
that a unity between the main regional cultures of Europe is possible, unless each 
of the units is itself comprehensive of considerable diversity. A completely unified 
national culture, such as has been the ambition of German ideologues and politicians, 
for the last hundred years and more, to bring about in Germany, tends to become, 
as is easily seen from a purely political point of view, a menace to its neighbours. 
What is not so immediately obvious is that, from a cultural point of view, a nation so 
completely unified is a menace to itself. We can all see that in a nation the citizens of 
which have been trained to regard each other as brothers, we shall find the brotherli-
ness intensified by, and in turn intensifying, a common hatred of foreigners. We can 
even say that a nation in which a good deal of internal bickering and quarrelling does 
not go on, cannot be a desirable member of the European community of nations. But 
I think that a nation which is completely unified culturally, will cease to produce any 
culture: so that there must be a certain amount of internal cultural bickering if it is to 
achieve anything in the way of art, thought and spiritual activity—and thereby make 
its contribution to the culture of Europe.
The achievement of a creative balance of local and racial forces, within a single 
nation or between the communities of Europe, seems to me, however, nothing like so 
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easy as some theorists like Professor E. H. Carr, whose attention is concentrated upon 
purely political problems, seem to believe. ‘There is every reason to suppose,’ says 
Professor Carr in his Conditions of Peace, ‘that considerable numbers of Welshmen, 
Catalans and Uzbeks have quite sufficiently solved the problem of regarding tlrem-
selves as good Welshmen; Catalans and Uzbeks for some purposes and good British, 
Spanish and Soviet citizens for others.’ I do not know how considerable numbers of 
Catalans and Uzbeks feel about it; but so far as the Welsh are concerned, Professor 
Carr seems to me to have answered a question which no Welshman would ask. The 
majority of Welsh, I have no doubt, would regard themselves as both ‘good Welsh’ 
and ‘good Britons’ (apart from, the fact that the Welsh have a better ancestral claim 
than most of us in this island, to regard themselves as Britons—but Mr. Carr has been 
a professor at Aberystwyth, so he ought to know): the question for them is, whether 
Welsh culture can maintain and develop itself, against the pressure towards indif-
ferentiated uniformity which is exerted from London. The same question is asked 
in Scotland; the same guestion should be asked in every county of England which 
has not already been absorbed by London or by some great provincial industrial 
town. And if all the parts of Britain lose their local cultures, they will have nothing 
to contribute to the formation of British culture, and, consequently, Britain will have 
nothing to contribute to European culture.
I have suggested that the cultural health of Europe, including the cultural health 
of its component parts, is incompatible with extreme forms of both nationalism and 
internationalism. But the cause of that disease, which destroys the very soil in which 
culture has its roots, is not so much extreme ideas, and the fanaticism which they 
stimulate, as the relentless pressure of modern industrialism, setting the problems 
which the extreme ideas attempt to solve. Not least of the .effects of industrialism is 
that we become mechanized in mind, and consequently attempt to provide solutions 
in terms of engineering, for problems which are essentially problems of life.
I may seem, in the foregoing pages, to have been departing further and further 
from the subject of this paper; the responsibility of the man of letters. Political 
problems will continue to be dealt with by politicians, and economic problems by 
economists; and there must continually be compromises between the political and 
the economic points of view. And just as these are not two wholly separate areas of 
activity, which can be satisfactorily dealt with by two mutually independent groups 
of specialists, so the ‘cultural’ area cannot be isolated from either of these. It would 
be very convenient if it were so, and if the men of letters, and the other people whose 
special concern may be said to be matters of ‘culture’, could pursue their policies in-
different to what happens in the political and economic realms. The assumption that 
such a clear separation of activities can be made, seems to underlie such a statement 
of Professor Carr’s as the following: “The existence of a more or less homogeneous 
racial or linguistic group bound together by a common tradition and the cultivation 
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of a common culture must cease to provide a prima facie case for the setting up or the 
maintenance of an independent political unit” (Conditions of Peace, p. 62.)
One cannot say that this statement, as it stands, is unacceptable. But it needs 
qualification; for, otherwise, one might infer from it that the ‘culture’ of a ‘more or 
less homogeneous racial or linguistic group bound together by a common tradition 
and the cultivation, of a common culture’ can flourish unimpaired, whatever its 
degree of political subordination. In other words, I raise the question whether the 
culture of such a group can remain independent, without some degree of political 
independence: though on the other hand, I assert that complete cultural autarchy, is 
not compatible with the existence of a common European culture. The world’s real 
problems are in practice a complex, usually a confusion, of political, economic, cul-
tural and religious considerations; in one or another situation, one or more of these 
will be sacrificed to the one which is, in that situation, the most compulsive; but every 
one of them involves the rest.
The responsibility of the man of letters at the present time, according to this 
point of view, is neither to ignore politics and economics, nor, certainly, to desert 
literature in order to precipitate himself into controversy on matters which he does 
not understand. But he should be vigilantly watching the conduct of politicians and 
economists, for the purpose of criticizing and warning, when the decisions and 
actions, of politicians and economists are likely to have cultural consequences. Of 
these consequences the man of letters should qualify himself to judge. Of the pos-
sible cultural consequences of their activities, politicians and economists are usually 
oblivious; the man of letters is better qualified to foresee them, and to perceive their 
seriousness.(1)
I should not like to give the impression that I assume there to be a definite frontier, 
between the matters of direct and those of indirect concern to the man of letters. In 
matters of Education, for instance, he is less directly concerned with the problems of 
organization and administration of popular instruction, than he is with the content of 
education. He should certainly be aware, of what many persons seem to be ignorant, 
that it is possible to have a high state of culture with very little education, and a great 
deal of education without any consequent improvement of culture: from some points 
of view he will not take education, quite so seriously as other people seem to do. But 
he is very much concerned with the maintenance of quality, and with the constant 
reminder of what is easily overlooked: that, if we had to choose, it would be better 
that a few people should be educated well, than that everyone should be educated 
moderately well. He should also be particularly concerned with the maintenance of 
those elements in education which the several European nations have in the past had 
in common. We are not only in danger of, we are actually suffering from, excessive 
nationalism in education. The common higher elements of European secular educa-
tion are, I presume, the cultivation of Latin and Greek language and literature, and 
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the cultivation of pure science. At a time when science is chiefly advertised for the 
sake of the practical benefits, from invention and discovery, which the application of 
science may confer, the reminder is perhaps not inappropriate, that applied science is 
always liable to be contaminated by political and economic motives, and that inven-
tions and discoveries appeal to people as often for their usefulness in getting the 
better of other people, in peace and in war, as for their common benefits to mankind. 
And also, that it is not the use of the same machines and the enjoyment of the same 
comforts and therapeutic aids that can establish and develop a common mind, a 
common culture. I speak of science, however, with some hesitation: but I am wholly 
convinced that for the preservation of any European culture, as well as for the health 
of its national components, a perpetual cultivation of the sources of that culture, in 
Greece and Rome, and a continual refreshment from them, are necessary. I should say 
Israel also, but that I wish to confine myself, so far as that is possible, to the cultural, 
rather than the religious aspect.
There are other matters over which the man of fetters should exercise constant 
surveillance: matters which may, from time to time, and here and there, present 
themselves with immediate urgency. Such are the questions which arise in particular 
contexts, when the freedom of the man of letters is menaced. I have in mind, not 
merely questions of censorship, whether political, religious or moral: my experience 
tells me that these issues must be faced as they arise. I have in mind also the dangers 
which may come from official encouragement and patronage of the arts; the dangers 
to which men of letters would be exposed, if they became, in their professional capac-
ity, servants of the State.(2) Modern governments are very much aware of the new 
invention ‘cultural propaganda’, even when the governors are not remarkably sensi-
tive to culture: and, however necessary cultural propaganda may be under modern 
conditions, we must be alert to the fact that all propaganda can be perverted.
As I said earlier, I do not expect that all men of letters, in every country of Europe, 
will concur with my views; but I venture to hope that some of them, will agree, that 
there is a range of public problems in which we all have, irrespective of nationality, 
language or political bias, a common interest, and about “which we might hope to 
have a common mind; and I hope that some will agree that I have stated some of these 
problems. Such agreement woufd give more content to the phrase ‘the republic of 
letters’. The ‘republic’ or (to use a stronger term) the ‘fraternity’ of letters does not, 
fortunately, demand that all men of letters should love one another—there always 
have been, and always will be, jealousy and intrigue amongst authors: but it does 
imply that we have a mutual bond, and a mutual obligation to a common ideal; and 
that on some questions we should speak for Europe, even when we speak only to our 
fellow-countrymen.
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Notes
1 A case in point is the recent Education Act in this country. No one so far, appears to 
have devoted any attention to the probable effects of such a measure upon English 
culture: even the ecclesiastics have not arrived at any definite view of the prob-
able effects upon English religion.
2 Formerly, English men of letters often found their livelihood in the Civil Service. 
But this kind of dependence upon the State enabled them to be all the freer to 
follow their own aims and observe their own consciences as writers. This was a 
very different thing from serving the State as men of letters. In the future it seems 
likely that Civil Servants will be far too busy to be authors in their spare time, and 
that the Civil Service will not enlist men of this type.
Source: Pro Europa
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Europe and the Challenge of Democracy
Bronisław Geremek
Freedom and democracy are normally taken to be the child of Western civilization, 
a heritage of European history. Now when I was in Beijing in the 1990s and raised 
the issue of the universal nature of human rights, hoping the Chinese politicians and 
ideologists I was speaking to would subscribe to the view, they retorted that they 
human rights varied. In fact they added, civilizations define them each in a different 
manner, according to their traditions: in the Confucian tradition fundamental hu-
man rights could best be described as person’s right to feed to their satisfaction, to 
have clothes to dress and a roof over their head. According to my Chinese speakers, 
rights referred to freedom and democracy, so dear to the Western tradition, came 
second after fundamental rights, and could be seen as opposing the imperatives of 
social and economic development. Freedom and democracy were seen as foreign. The 
outcome of a cultural and historical tradition which was not theirs. The Eurocentric 
democratic and free market or libertarian doctrine upheld by Western historians and 
ideologists was fine for those who formulated it but those rights were not universal 
and that there were ‘Asian rights’ which were opposed to them.
In 1998 Amartya K Sen, a Bengali lecturer teaching in British, American and Hindi 
universities was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for having proved 
the theoretical and empirical link between democracy and an effective fight against 
major famines. According to Sen, democracy is not merely a matter of free elections: 
it requires decision making, public debates and the principle of social choice, the 
respect for individual freedom, the plurality of ideas and political practices.
A political culture with these far reaching boundaries, underlies social progress 
and according to AK Sen it is a universal value the roots of which can be found in 
Asian. African and European civilizations. His theories refute those who believe the 
West has a civilizing mission, a duty to promote democracy the world throughout and 
also to use economic and political (i.e.: using weapons) . Having said that Europe is 
where the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights are the rooted 
deepest. The European Union has made these principles the tenets of its neighboring 
policy, aid to developing countries, trade and economic cooperation. That notwith-
standing these principles have not always been part of the conscience and identity 
of Europeans : it was moulded over time and by way of complex historical evolution.
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In European history, the development of mutual understanding and the exchanges 
between human communities have been the result of means of social communication 
becoming universal, of the progressive acceptance of common standards making it 
possible to go beyond political, linguistic or ethnic borders. For instance that was the 
case of weights and measures which for had been local for a long time, their value 
being attributed in a rather arbitrary manner which gave rise to endless conflicts. In 
recent times most European countries have adopted the metric system as a weights 
and measures standard. Could one metaphorically compare the development of 
weights and measures to that of democracy? Of course, as modernity progresses, 
the democratic organization of the public space increasingly appears as a universal 
value. This is the truth of thesis underlying ‘The End of History’ although it referred 
to the history of ideas rather than to the social sphere. It would be mistaken to think 
that all the civilisations of the world mean the same when they talk about democracy. 
However, it would be just as wrong to believe that any of its forms (or variations) 
could be used as a yardstick for the others. For instance it would be a rather far step 
if one were to compare Thucydides (who in his famous funeral oration for Pericles 
opposed the rule of the majority to despotic and tyrannical systems) to the 2000 
Warsaw Declaration toward a Community of Democracies.
The democratic system developed as more and more governments allowed their 
citizens to decide who they wanted to be governed by and by what means they were 
going to control their governments. The process was not cumulative, there were steps 
back and forward, but the balance of the 20th century unquestionably weighs to that 
side. Fareed Zakaria starts his book « The Future of Freedom » with a sentence that is 
striking: «We live in a democratic age. In 1900 not a single country had what we would 
today consider a democracy: a government created by elections in which every adult 
citizen could vote. Today 119 do…”. The march of democracy throughout the world 
which appears to follow in its wake throughout all civilizations and continents, albeit 
with varying degrees.
Samuel Huntington describes successive democratization in his Third Wave: he 
writes about how the privileged position the Western nations has become a little 
frayed since democracy has been universally recognized as the source of the legiti-
macy of power. Even the totalitarian systems of the Central and Eastern European 
countries had felt it a sine qua non to organize elections every so many years. It was 
all appearance since they were neither free nor honest but the fact they existed was 
symptomatic: they were the means to legitimate power.
Free transparent elections open to all are a fundamental tool of democracy which 
as Huntington states, would make it possible to measure the progress of democracy.
The unquestionable global progress of democracy in the later part of the 20th cen-
tury has been accompanied by an ongoing debate on its weaknesses. In 1975 a Report 
on the Governability of Democracies was submitted to the Trilateral Commission. 
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The Authors concluded that democracy was going through a crisis due to the fact 
that governments lacked legitimacy, effectiveness and that collective interests were 
breaking down. Michel Crozier, one of the Authors of the report stated that Western 
Europe was increasingly affected by the mismatch or inadequacy of the democratic 
system and the imperatives of the time, by its inability to govern in an effective man-
ner. Michel Crozier also concluded that state socialism was going to gain an upper 
hand and that the spread of Communism was unavoidable. Considering the range of 
available options, he felt becoming like Finland was the lesser evil. Nowadays after 
the collapse of the Communist system, Michel Crozier’s pessimism appears absurd 
and groundless. However, he is right when he recall that democracy is fragile by 
definition, that it is never acquired once and for all. In particular, democracy is an 
ongoing challenge.
Democracy may abide by the principle of representativeness in the political sphere 
in a more or less satisfactory manner, and there are challenges, such as the extent to 
which citizens support the executive power because they consider it legitimate, their 
participation in the public sphere, the way in which a Government is able to represent 
collective interests.
When one considers democracy as a challenge one must carefully observe the rela-
tionship between the power of the majority and the respect for minority rights, that is to 
say the balance between the strong and the weak and the strong in implementing power, 
a problem which concerned Thucydides. Lastly, one has to deal with conflicting forces, 
such as the tendency of the State to centralize power and the increasing aspirations the 
lower tiers of government have in drive towards self-government or autonomy.
Whatever the answers to these challenges by the various civilisations, the proc-
ess cannot be described as mere accumulation over time following a single direction. 
As we stand on the threshold of the 21st century, democracy is seen as a political 
system with free and fair voting guaranteeing the election of a government, a system 
whereby the public sphere abides by the principle of the Rule of Law, where minority 
rights are respected. Furthermore, the constitutional system guarantees a balance 
between institutions and their monitoring (known as checks and balances) and 
where local self government (autonomy) is mostly guaranteed.
Political pluralism in the field of ideas, thinking and the organization of political 
structures are some of the tenets of democracy. Debate is another key element of the 
democratic public arena. And, last but not least, democratic political culture, other-
wise known as the civic virtue which makes citizens tale part in public debate and in 
the decision making process.
Daily political life in the world clearly indicates how democracy challenges us, 
both where it is lacking and where it is strong. This is also true in Europe the cradle 
of the principles of democracy which has largely subscribed to them. Europe has its 
own ways (structures) to promote and control democracy:
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1. The Council of Europe, the first European institution established in 1949 and cur-
rently 45 members strong. Its treaties first and foremost the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, its charters and recommendations establish the principles 
and frame work for the members states to act;
2. The European Court of Human Rights operates under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe. It receives individual applications;
3. The highly respected European Commission for Democracy through Law (also 
known as the Venice Commission) which is concerned with the implementation 
of democratic legislation;
4. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established in 
1975 as a result of the Helsinki process, currently involved amongst other issues, 
in the defence of Human Rights. The organization has a current membership of 
55, including all the states formed from the breaking up of the Soviet Union which 
means there are Central Asian states as well as European ones. The Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Council of Europe was set up in 
post Soviet areas to monitor democratic institutions and procedures with great 
effectiveness; and
5. Lastly, the European Union which over 50years from its establishment has 27 
member states organized in an increasingly cohesive federation of nation states 
which see democracy as the foundation for the community and a sine qua non for 
membership.
The above institutions lead the way to what democracy is becoming in the 
European continent, a universal principle and an element of cohesion of European 
civilisation.
All this became possible as from 1989 when the historical changes ended the Com-
munist System and the cold war, thus making it possible to unite Europe.
The European conscience should also hold the memory of the totalitarian systems 
which started within its boundaries closet o its heart, along with how Western de-
mocracy was successfully defended in Western Europe, then its growth and lastly the 
peaceful shift to democracy in Eastern Europe.
The democratic process of European unification took place peacefully, without 
violence. The reference to commonly accepted standards was one of the reasons why 
the process was peaceful: the Orange Revolution which took place in the Ukraine in 
December 2004, the peaceful transition in Georgia proved that the transition model 
used in Central Europe in 1989 maintained all its potential as a model to follow.
A community rose up with courage and demanded that the procedures which 
Europe considers normal should be applied, that government should be changed 
through voting, that parliament should really be representative and that physical 
violence should not paralyze citizens: is this not significant?
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Believing in free and fair elections means believing in ethical dimension of de-
mocracy banking on freedom, human dignity and the respect for truth. The people of 
Belarus, the only European state that fails to fulfil the fundamentals of democracy is 
faced with a similar perspective.
The European debates on democracy and its future are not the expression of a 
pessimism or of a catastrophic outlook. Quite the opposite, they have a realistic aspi-
ration, that is to say that democratic institutions function correctly and that citizens 
may support them.
Let me now mention some of these issues:
Populism is an especially dangerous threats to the future of European democracy. 
It is inherent to the essence of democratic procedures. Was the painful experience 
Europe not the result of having failed to see its enemies arise victorious from demo-
cratically fought elections?
In the summer of 1895 the City of Vienna fin de siecle fell into the hands of a na-
tionalist radical by the name of Karl Luger. For two years the Emperor Franz Joseph 
blocked the results of the elections. In 1933 the Republic of Weimer fell under Adolf 
Hitler’s democratically earned victory. Democratic procedures may turn into instru-
ments of death for democracy and freedom when the social frustrations generate a 
climate conducive to radical slogans and the quest for a leader send from above. A 
critical analysis of the situation is needed to prevented such development, fighting 
the causes of frustration, enriching the democratic procedures and culture.
In spite of all the above there is no real barrier against such a threat which is 
why much to everyone’s surprise, countries with deep democratic roots like Holland 
conceded to the calls of the populist leaders suffering from waves of violence such as 
the recent ones.
One is led to admit that democracies, even the most stable and mature ones are 
powerless in the face of the challenges of the times. In the case of the Netherlands and it 
also applied to France, voters and society as a whole seem to have been shocked by the 
massive inflow of migrants which has affected their behaviour. Europe needs migrants 
to maintain its demographic and economic balance. However, it has so far been unable to 
develop the cultural mechanisms to quell tensions between the native or local popula-
tion and migrants which are often coming from foreign cultures or different religions.
Countries with a large migrant Muslim populations as is the case for France, 
experience conflict as a result. If ethnic tensions are used, this does not per se under-
mine the foundations of democracy, but it does open the door to dangerous radical-
ism. Austria is a case in point where a radical party went to power but was used 
by democracy rather than destroying it showing that the system has an operating 
defence system. On a more general level the story also shows how important it is to 
develop a democratic culture favouring an open society, opposing exclusion, ethno-
centrism and the building of cultural barriers. Nowadays populism is thought to be 
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an especially dangerous threat: 40 years ago Gita Ionescu and Ernst Gellner wrote: 
A spectre is haunting Europe --the spectre of populism. This take on the first line of 
the Communist Manifesto has come true in a number of European countries freed 
from Communism in 1989 or at least from the danger of having to tackle it.
The definition is also used with reference to developing countries where dictator-
ships gain power with the support of the masses. It may be compared to the 19th 
century Russian narodniki. The definition is used loosely referred to a variety of 
historical situations and political manifestos. The definition covers situations where 
both the debate and the procedures followed to legitimate the government are demo-
cratic – according to the basic meaning attributed in Pericles’s oration, but there is no 
trace of minority rights, freedom of speech, freedom of association, division of powers 
and political pluralism. Populism suffocates liberal democracy with its democratic 
procedures and declarations. Populism is opposed to representative democracy in 
the name of a direct contact between the political leader and the people.
The structure and ideological tool box of a populist discourse also have to ana-
lysed: one has to remember the demagogical promises of populism exploit the build 
up of hostility and aggressiveness which harbour in the psychology of the masses.
In 1930, Jose Ortega y Gasset was concerned by future of culture invaded by mod-
ern technology. He also considered the revolt of the masses against elites. Populism 
does not content itself with the mere exploitation of these phenomenon, so it gener-
ates it anew. The destruction of the ethical foundations of politics opens the door to 
authoritarian regimes while maintaining the formal trappings of democracy, a trend 
which became stronger as the 21st century opened its doors.
The ‘short’ 20th century which Eric Hobsbawm called the Age of Extremes, the 
century of the Cold War and the division of the world into two opposed camps was 
followed by being stuck in confusion and chaos. Hobsbawm wrote about it in the con-
clusion of his book when he writes that the short “citizens of the fin de siecle tapped 
their way through the global fog that surrounded them, into the third millennium ... 
certain ... that an era of history had ended.” “They knew very little else,”
Populism draws its strength from these mixed feelings: confusion, powerlessness 
faced with the major challenges of social change brought by globalisation.
In Europe populism has a different time and space frame: there are moments and 
special places which at times appear at a meaningful cross road.
In 2003 an Austrian magazine started a series of debates on populism in Europe 
and clearly the focus was Austria itself governed by a coalition of the Christian Demo-
crats and Populists, an unholy alliance with a strong populist trait.
In 2007 the same magazine hosted another debate on populism this time with 
reference to Central Europe.
The history of 20th century Europe suggests that populism is a danger that does 
not stop at geographical and cultural borders.
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Nevertheless, it is now reasonable to speak about the ‘populism’s hour’ having 
come to the post-Communist countries that joined the European Union in 2004-2007: 
Slovakia has a left wing populist government, or o Hungary where the right wing 
populists are trying to gain power, or yet again Poland where a left/right coalition 
governed for a year and a half and still bears quite a lot of clout.
Populism in this part of Europe can be attributed to the weakness of their demo-
cratic structures in the interwar period. However, the nature of the problems seems 
to be more closely linked to post-Communist events.
After 1989 fears were rife that Poland would be overrun by nationalism and Ro-
man Catholicism which had been barriers against Communism. The worry was that 
they could be a powerful hurdle against the return of free market and capitalism and 
that they would oppose entry to the European Union. Nothing came of it and Poland’s 
transition can be considered as a text book success story.
The success of the Kaczynski brothers’ Law and Justice Party with their anti –state 
propaganda fighting corruption and crime, their nationalist and social politics can 
only be understood in the framework of the specific traumas a country experiences 
in the transition and transformation period.
A Gallup International survey (Voice of the People 2005 : Trends in Democracy) 
highlights the weakness of these feelings: only 22% of those interviewed in eastern 
Europe said their participation in the elections was at all relevant. A recent Polish 
socio-psychological study showed strong ethnocentric and xenophobic feelings in 
correspondence to a weak attachment to democracy. Attitudes and approaches in-
dicate that a strengthening of the State is linked to social orientation and to a lack of 
trust for the elites.
The success of populism can be read into these landscapes: its propaganda and 
action are usually focussed around a particular political constellation which Ralf 
Dahrendorf defines as Law and Order , that is the idea that one questions the legitimacy 
of the government which is then accused of being weak and ineffective or even linked 
to mafia milieus, and to be part of all the social pathologies starting with corruption.
Populist actions and speeches are extremely aggressive, they usually incite hate 
at times appeal directly to violent actions to expressing wariness against Parliament 
and promoting referenda as a means to tap into people’s feelings and reactions.
Populists never raise their voices against democracy as such, they just reduce it to 
procedures to vote in a majority. They appear as enemies of liberalism which enables 
them to address all the social and political traumas of the Central European transi-
tion legacy in Central Europe or of the whole of Europe, addressing themselves to all 
those who are excluded, who are not part of the political and economic life of Europe 
and who are caged in by the fears of globalisation.
It would be difficult to find a single consistent recipe to fight populism or free 
one’s self of it.
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Governance and implementing promises are not the strong point of populists, but 
it would be costly and pitiful to let one’s self be used in action because the experience 
would be detrimental to citizens. In fact the real means of defence are democracy and 
its specific tools: the increase of citizen participation in public life, the use of voting 
on practical topics rather than plebiscites or referenda on general issues, strength-
ening of international cooperation and European integration as well as reasonable 
social policies.
The mitezza (lit: meekness) should be developed in the public arena instead of ag-
gressiveness, extremism and authoritarian drifts, as suggested by Norberto Bobbio.
Public debate on issues raised by populists on the weaknesses of the democratic 
system should not be avoided in representative and executive institutions; nor should 
any debate about ‘social pathologies’ such as corruption or the need for policies of 
social solidarity.
The risk is of course to try and win the populists at their game and use their 
methods to beat them. It should never be forgotten that modern Europe considers 
the principle of Karl Popper’s Open Society paramount, as intimately connected to 
European democracy. Populism raises its head against democracy trying to use it, 
but one must not fall for it. If a long term view is taken, is one looks at distant changes 
there is no possible compromise between populism and modern democracy.
Let me dwell upon one of the key great transformation, the role of the nation-state. 
In the 19th and 20th centuries all historical processes were determined by the Joint 
destinies if democracy and the of the nation-state. Together they legitimated demo-
cratic politics as they made it possible for the public space to operate so that citizens 
saw the State as defending fundamental public goods such as education, health and 
social security, and not just as the defender of internal and external security.
Jurgen Habermas proved that the sovereign nation-state created by the Treaty of 
Westphalia had been replaced by other administrative and fiscal models, by other 
states. The European social model known as the Welfare State is the result of the 
19th century nation state. The link between this model and democracy is quite clear 
as it has proved to be more beneficial to its citizens than any other. Unlike what hap-
pens with the political rhetoric the right and the left agreed t express their political 
differences through suggestions and bills on tax, public spending and inheritance 
law. Globalisation has meant that the regulatory function of the nation state became 
inadequate, or at least not very effective.
It is not mere a matter of just changing a geographical scale, a deeper change 
which questions the meaning of the scale of the nation state is taking place while 
supranational interdependence is surfacing.
The internal balance of European democracy waivers under choices that can no 
longer be stopped at a national level: they have to be dealt with on a supra-national 
level and which citizens do not influence much.
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It is not a matter of inherent weaknesses of democracy but of new institutional 
forms which still have to be found, to enable citizens to take an active part in political 
life, favouring economic growth, social cohesion and political freedom.
European democracy is expected to open a new and wider space for direct partici-
pation of citizens in the democratic process.
Personally I do not believe that we need to switch from a representative system to 
direct democracy: I feel it is a matter of reinforcing civil society agencies.
Civil society is a natural out come when it is a reaction or an opposition tool against 
an authoritarian government. This is what happened with dissent in the Eastern and 
Central European countries., and I believe it to be a general rule.
Throughout Europe civil society programmes are a reaction to a hypertrophic cen-
tral power: the French historian Pierre Rosanvallon has proved that since the beginning 
of modernity France has been constantly torn between two views, political democracy 
which attributes a prevailing role to central power and to the general interest, and citi-
zen democracy which aims to satisfy specific interests and meet the needs of a number 
of bodies, such as mediators, association, trade unions and local communities.
The institutions of civil society have managed to acquire a considerable weight in 
Europe and their role is not just consultative or representative, but partly executive 
as in many countries they distribute part of the national budget. Europe is trying to 
make up for its delay and catch up with the US and their contacts with NGOs wherever 
they are, trying to strengthen the community or collective of citizens.
As a result Europe is developing a mixed model of political and citizen democracy. 
Its role is vital in counterbalancing or foiling the low level of political participation in 
the traditional forms of political organisation through political parties. Rather than 
taking a party membership card citizens commit themselves to specific causes, often 
following a very pragmatic approach. Low levels of confidence in political parties 
lead to a general drop in political commitment. The indifference of citizens is a threat 
to democracy which why it is important to involve them, so that they do not distance 
themselves considering it another struggle for power. They must be encouraged to 
take part in the managing and running of the procedures and mechanisms of democ-
racy: this is how one defends democracy.
Let us not forget that democracy is being redefined and most countries are ex-
tending forms of direct democracy and resorting to referenda when there are system 
related or constitutional issues at stake.
Lastly, the sudden surge in new Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) has greatly affected relationships between the State and Civil society that 
already makes great use of them. Internet’s power to open new doors cannot be 
underestimated: it has already opened an interactive space of participation and may 
in the future open new routes of general consultation where citizens will be able to 
play a more active role in the political process than the one they had so far as voters.
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The 20th century European experience harbours a bitter truth on the dark side of 
the nation-state which had proved able to destroy democratic institutions and culture. 
Chauvinism had little in common with the lyrical and romantic avatar of the 19th cen-
tury idea of a nation. In fact that ideal came from a cosmopolitan idea of the previous 
century: Michelet, Mazzini, and Victor Hugo had a universal order in mind, a universal 
homeland. However, as well as other reasons, the surge of aggressive nationalisms and 
wars pusher Europeans to develop supranational solutions such as the process of Euro-
pean unification which became the European Community and hen the European Union.
Fifty years ago the core of what was to become the European Union was a project of 
integration developed around economic objectives. It was seen as matter of ensuring 
peace in Europe through the economy and to progressively guarantee prosperity to all.
Initially, the political structure of the community was not addressed, but when it 
became urgent to deal with it not to slow down economic growth, the change proved 
difficult. The first difficulty was the bureaucratisation of power: had Montesquieu 
not said that bureaucracy was the modern form of despotism? Later a line had to 
be drawn between democracy and the nation state which it was historically and 
inherently linked to. To overcome these difficulties they appealed to the virtues of 
the citizen, that is to say to the culture of participation in public life. Then a feeling 
of belonging to a European community had to be forged, going beyond the ethnic dif-
ferences and national histories, without levelling the specific facets of either, without 
erasing European diversity.
In all the fields where integration was sought, success was accompanied by 
concern about the decision-making mechanisms. The larger the area of common 
decisions the more pressing the issue of democratic control. One would clearly be 
wrong in reproaching the Union of having created a non democratic political entity 
as all its member states are consistent parliamentary democracies, which respect 
the rule of law, civil liberties and human rights. The issue concerns the community 
decision making mechanisms, which in some cases pertain to the representatives of 
the member states and other times to the institutions of the Community, that is to say 
unelected officials.
It was precisely one of those institutions Larry Siedentop was thinking of when 
he said they were neither understood nor accepted by European public opinion. The 
democratic legitimacy of these procedures inside a post-national institution can in 
fact be questioned. Treaties have so far been used as a basis to the union, and the 
courageous plan to have a constitution instead would have put an end to all opposi-
tion. However, it was not fully approved but the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the modified EU Treaty are sound steps in the right direction.
The hybrid structure of the Union has meant its members can enjoy democratic 
rules. But the hybrid structure has not generated a space enabling citizens to exercise 
their rights with the host of community institutions.
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Parliament has acquired more powers since 1976 with elections in all member 
states. It now has the power to appoint the European Commission, to vote the budget: 
this means we can now hope the European Union will be more that a democracy of 
States, as it will also be a democracy of citizens.
This presumes a redefinition of European citizenship, as just saying that any 
citizen of the European Union is also a citizen of Europe is not enough: rights and 
obligations towards the European Union have to be clearly stated.
At times the European debate on democracy leads to tensions very much like 
those which have developed in past years between Europe and the United States, at 
least as far as the political discourse is concerned: the US believe human rights are 
universal and that one can resort to force to guarantee their respect. Democracy is 
seen as a sort of political religion which can be spread by all means including force.
This explains the resurfacing of words like ‘crusades’ in the neo-Conservative 
language, a term which had been used by another US president, Dwight Eisenhower, 
many years ago. A link between democracy and moral values underlies this meaning, 
a position which Americans and Europeans s appear to share. The Europeans pull 
back when they hear that one can spread democracy with the use of force, as they 
believe that in that case the means could defeat the purpose. Democracy is based on 
persuasion and discussion and has to be a comprehensive process. It feeds on the 
aspiration of societies for freedom and their quest for a democratic political culture.
International relations will benefit from these spread of these values through dia-
logue. In this context they may exercise a degree of pressure in favour of democracy, 
but it democracy itself has to be a contract free of any paternalist attitudes. Let me offer 
a few examples: the Council of Europe and its admission procedures, or the European 
Union and its principles of accession (the Copenhagen Principles). Democracy in Europe 
can be considered a historical success story, assimilation practiced according to the 
principle Abraham Lincoln had summarised as government of the people, by the people, 
for the people. Of course the process is neither complete nor entirely satisfactory : the 
shift from Communism to freedom has not yet been completed, as Belarus witnesses.
In certain countries authoritarian regimes leave Parliament a decorative role and 
the situation of the Roma in certain European countries is a constant concern.
Equal political rights for women is still a hope rather than a fact in spite of it being 
written into constitutions.
The independence of the media, the funding of political parties and the relation-
ship between the Capital and political parties ought to be better regulated.
The strengthening of civil society and the improvement of education are also chal-
lenges to be met. Whatever the weaknesses, the way public life is actually put into 
practice makes Europe a continent of democracy.
Having said that democracy is no universal panacea against the evils of the Uni-
verse, although the European experience shows that without it is harder to control the 
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hypertrophic nature of power, poverty, the insecurity of human beings, the violations 
of human rights and intolerance. Democratic Europe can and must act to strengthen 
solidarity among democracies the world throughout.
Possibly we could go a step further and state that every dictatorship, every anti-
democratic putsch is a threat to world order. At the same time, one must remember 
one’s democratic successes (aquis democratiques) are never t be taken for granted 
or forever. Democratic politics grants a space to demagogues, to war mongers and 
those who incite hate, to those with an unquenchable thirst for power. There is only 
one answer to counteract these drives: to increase spaces of freedom, to guarantee 
separation of powers and freedom of speech and expression.
However self evident it may appear, one has to also guarantee education. Jacque-
line de Romilly, a scholar of Ancient Greece, speaks about this in a lively manner. In 
her essay ‘L’elan democratique dans l’Athenes ancienne’ she described the breeding 
ground which enabled democracy to flourish in Athens, and conveys the idea that it 
could work in our day and age too. Politics must be seen as the citizens’ deed not as 
the privilege of the professionals of the city.
Now, as in the past, one has to defend everyone’s right to take part in the res 
publica. Now, as in the past, there has to be space for debate as without it one cannot 
search for truth without which democracy is an empty shell. And lastly, education 
must supply us all with a general culture, preparing everyone to take part in the pub-
lic arena, putting everyone is a position where they can express themselves clearly 
and offer a clearheaded judgement.
This is what the public space is for and this is what has to be created on a Euro-
pean Community scale, through the European political parties and continent-wide 
NGOs. However, first and foremost, the issues which concern the citizens of the Union 
opening up arenas have to be raised where they can be addressed.
National laws state that key European Treaties have to approved by referendum. 
In future it would be more appropriate to organise a pan-European consultation on 
the key European policies. This is how we will try and breathe new life into European 
democracy.
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The Discovery of Europe
John Hale
From “The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance”, 1994, Macmillan Pub.Co.©1993 by John Hale
The Word and the Myth
When in 1623 Francis Bacon threw off the phrase ‘we Europeans’, he was assuming 
that his readers knew where ‘Europeans’ were, who they were, and what, in spite 
of national differences, they shared(1). This was a phrase, and an assumption, that 
could not have been used with such confidence a century and a half before. It was 
during the period covered by this book that the word Europe first became part of 
common linguistic usage and that the continent itself was given a securely map-based 
frame of reference, a set of images that established its identity in pictorial terms, and 
a triumphal ideology that overrode its internal contradictions.
Though scholars throughout the middle ages had known that they lived in a con-
tinent called by classical geographers ‘Europe’ to distinguish it from Africa and Asia, 
the other land masses partly known to them, the word had little resonance. In all 
likelihood the great majority of those who lived in Europe and could read only with 
difficulty, if at all, had not even heard of the word. Their knowledge of a world beyond 
their local or national confines came from the stories of martyrs, missionaries and 
crusades and from the pulpit. The clergy harangued them as Christians forming part 
of the particular continent which had been chosen by divine providence to be the 
home of witness to the true faith: Christendom. Without spatially accurate maps, 
and without the mass of itineraries and traveljournals to be released by the advent 
of printed books, Europe’s identity was above all emotional: Us, uniquely privileged 
(and thus also punishable by wars, plagues and famines for our sins) versus Them, 
the godless or the erroneous believers.
As early as 1471, in a moment of enthusiastic gratitude for the welcome he was grant-
ed in Nuremberg, the astronomer Johannes Müller (Regiomontanus) praised the city as 
‘the middle point of Europe’(2). For Bacon it was always Europe; Henry VII was buried 
in Westminster Abbey ‘in one of the stateliest and daintiest monuments’—by the Italian 
Pietro Torrigiano—‘in Europe’; England was involved in the ‘affairs of Europe’(3).
But the notion of Christendom was a long time a-dying. It continued to drip from 
the quills of those inditing peace treaties, for given man’s incurable urge to fight, 
what better resolution to a domestic conflict than a joint Christian enterprise against 
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the infidel? It surfaced in the prayer which a devout citizen of Milan adopted in 1565, 
with the advice of his confessor, for his family devotions: he prayed that God keep 
his family ‘in perfect union and love, us and all of Christendom’(4). Even in 1590 a 
conservative but travelled English squire, Sir John Smythe, alternated between re-
ferring to the countries of western ‘Europe’ and the ‘nations of the occidental parts 
of Christendom’(5). Its more personal appeal was expressed as late as 1620, when 
the young Cornishman Peter Mundy, labouring his way back across the Turkish-
dominated Balkans after a trip to Constantinople, passed the boundary stone of the 
Venetian enclave of Spalato (Split): ‘wee were no sooner past it, but wee entred into 
Christendome, then seeminge to be in a new world’(6).
This way of expressing the relief of coming home from alien lands is as moving as 
it was by then rare. The sense of Christendom being a sacred sheep-fold, within which 
European peoples shared at least the comforting uniformity of their faith, had been 
subject to many erosions. Princes had struck bargains with popes, amongst other 
things over appointments to high clerical offices and the use of taxes levied on church 
lands, that anticipated the public reasons for the withdrawal of England under Henry 
VIII from all obedience to Rome. In 1439 an ecumenical conference in Florence had 
opened many eyes for the first time to the extent of the gap in doctrine and observ-
ance that divided the Catholic and the Greek Orthodox varieties of Christianity. And 
from the early sixteenth century, propaganda for the notion that Moscow was the 
Third Rome and the tsar the true leader and protector of orthodoxy drew attention 
to the extent and weirdness of the Russian version of the faith. Christendom, in the 
sense of a traveller knowing what images and services to expect when he entered a 
church abroad or passed clerics and friars in the street, was becoming at best ‘the 
Christendom of Europe’, as a priest put it in 1572 - and was having its centre of gravity 
pushed westwards(7). The most dramatic push in this direction was the Ottomans’ 
conquest of territories in south-eastern Europe which began well before their oc-
cupation of Constantinople in 1453; by 1529 it had brought them to the walls of Vienna, 
which they besieged but failed to take.
But Christendom had, until now, always been a flexible concept. It had flowed 
outwards to include the Byzantine Christians in Anatolia, the Coptic Christians in 
North Africa, even to the community of Christians, supposedly founded by the apostle 
Thomas in southern India, which led Vasco da Gama, when he reached Calicut in 1498, 
to see fanged Hindu deities as eccentrically portrayed angels and saints. Similarly, 
the concept had been able to shrink. After his trek across the Ottomanized Balkans, 
Mundy could still recognize Christendom when he re-entered the world of its cus-
toms and worship. The impact of the Turkish presence in Europe was not so much on 
the elastic notion of Christendom as on the increasingly concrete one of Europe.
What more convincingly shattered the idea that Christians shared membership in 
a club whose address was most of Europe was the Reformation, a split from the 1520s 
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of the most piercing kind that divided non-Orthodox Christianity between Catholic 
and Protestant zones each emitting, especially from the 1550s, an equally hectoring 
and sincere call to rethink belief behaviour and observance. Watching the process of 
antagonism from his headquarters in Geneva in the 1560s, Calvin, the most shrewdly 
observant of Protestant leaders, summed up the political and social results of the 
split as ‘the shattering’ -not, significantly, of Christendom, but ‘of Europe: Europae 
concussio’(8).
By then scores of thousands had been claimed - or allowed it to be thought that 
they were claimed - for Christ by missionary activity in America and Asia. But they 
were no longer seen as members of Christendom. The elasticity of the term was worn 
out. And what had, for a century, been grouched at as a sinful failing was now accepted 
as a fact of life: that the Christian powers would not stand up together against the 
Ottoman Turks for Christendom’s sake. It was also in the 1560s that Matteo Bandello, 
a professional writer of diverting stories but also a cosmopolitan member of a new 
breed of Euro-watcher, inscribed one of Christendom’s many epitaphs. The Turks, he 
wrote, have reduced Christianity to a mere ‘part of Europe, thanks to the discords 
between Christian princes which grow from day to day’(9). He reviewed them and 
concluded that ‘we can affirm that few ages have seen such sudden changes as we 
witness daily; how it will end I simply cannot say, for it seems to me that things go 
from bad to worse and that the discord between Christians is stronger than ever 
before.’ It comes as no surprise to find an entry in the Geographical Encyclopaedia 
(1578) of the great cartographer Abraham Ortelius that simply reads ‘For Christians, 
see Europeans’(10).
For unexpansive minds England was different: mercifully sundered from ‘trans-
marine nations’ or, as a poet wrote in 1611, ‘the CONTINENT’(11). And when reviewing 
the Protestant isolation that followed Elizabeth’s succession in 1558 to the Catholic 
Mary, the Spanish ambassador in London described England as ‘the sick man of Eu-
rope’(12).
That Europeans shared something other than forms of Christianity had been 
expressed by an editor for the first printing press to be established in Italy in 1465; 
he saw them as the ex-subjects and present successors of the Roman Empire and thus 
as ‘men of the Latin world’(13). This secularization of the attitude to those who lived 
in Europe led the very word to become colloquially vague. When Falstaff bragged 
that ‘an I had but a belly of any indifferency, I were simply the most active fellow in 
Europe’, Europe simply means anywhere(14).
Perhaps the most striking example of the shift from Christendom to Europe comes 
in an oration of 1559 by the French scholar and political philosopher Louis Le Roy, 
for it comes in the context of a plea for the end of hostilities among Christian rulers. 
‘Think how far Christendom once extended and how many lands are now lost to the 
victorious Turk, who holds North Africa and the Balkans and has besieged Vienna. 
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Meanwhile, as though in answer to Mohammedan prayers, Europe is soaked in her 
own blood. What blindness there is in this! If you will not listen to me, hear the voice 
of our common mother Europe: “I who in the past hundred years have made so many 
discoveries, even of things unknown to the ancients—new seas, new lands, new 
species of men, new constellations; with Spanish help I have found and conquered 
what amounts to a New World. But great as these things are, the moment the thought 
of war arises, the better arts of life fall silent, and I am wrapped in flame and rent 
asunder. Save me from more of this: honour the arts of peace, letters and industry; 
and you will be rewarded by the grateful memory of mankind”.’ He ends with the 
plea, ‘Do but listen to the sacred voice of Europe’(15).
Mother Europe with a sacred voice: to an age that liked to have pictorial images of 
abstractions, whether it was Architecture, or Commerce, or Theology, or a Continent, 
how would Europe have looked to the mind’s eye?
It was the only continent whose name was linked to a Greek myth. Europa was 
the daughter of Agenor, King of the Levantine city of Tyre. One day Jupiter, who from 
Olympus had noted her charms, swam ashore in the form of a white bull when she 
was whiling away the time with the young women of her entourage. The attraction 
was immediate (though the encounter was later sensationalized as a rape). The story 
was paraphrased in the late 1470s by the Florentine scholar- poet Angelo Poliziano, 
describing the relief sculptures beside the door of an imagined palace of Venus.
On the other side of the door, Jove, transformed for love into a handsome white 
bull, is seen carrying off his sweet rich treasure, and she turns her face towards the 
lost shore with a terrified gesture; in the contrary wind her lovely golden hair plays 
over her breasts; her garment waves in the wind and blows behind her, one hand 
grasps his back, the other his horn.
She gathers in her bare feet as if fearing lest the sea wash over her: in such a pose 
of fear and grief she seems to call in vain to her dear companions; they, left behind 
among flowers and leaves, each mournfully cry for Europa. “Europa”, the shore re-
sounds, “Europa, come back.” The bull swims on, and now and then kisses her feet(16).
Jove carries her from Asia to Crete. Here he turns into a man, impregnates her, and 
her progeny, thus divinely sired, become the Europeans and she the tutelary deity of 
their continent.
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the source of this glowing fable, was well known to medi-
eval writers who moralized the story to make it palatable to Christian readers. In the 
fourth century, Lactantius, an early Christian writer, had tried without much success 
to cut the legend to size by claiming that the bull was simply the name of a ship. Later, 
Jove’s transformation into the bull was likened to God becoming man in order to be 
able to carry souls to Paradise, abducting them from sin and paganism. A woodcut 
in a 1471 treatise on the virginity of Mary shows Europa leaning chastely forward to 
touch the bull in an idiom that drew on earlier imagery of the virgin and the unicorn. 
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But by the 1550s she is shown on a majolica dish sitting naked on a rock in Crete, 
with the shore of Tyre in the distance, while the bull firmly parts her legs with his 
forefoot and Cupid looks approvingly on. The contrast typifies the way in which, in 
a relatively short time, classical myths regained their original part-magical but also 
largely human resonance.
There was some hesitation in accepting so frankly pagan a founding myth. A pen-
and-ink drawing (c. 1512), by the Nuremberg artist Peter Fischer the Younger, added 
explanatory labels—‘Europa’, ‘Jove in the form of a bull’—for those to whom the story 
of the abduction might still be unfamiliar(17). But already another German, Albrecht 
Dürer, had caught the Italian habit of revitalizing myth and assuming a familiarity 
with its subject-matter. Leaving her wailing maidens, Europa, wondering but un-
frightened, rides on while ‘one hand grasps his back, the other his horn’, across a 
sea peppered with reedy islets and those creatures, satyrs and sea-nymphs, through 
whom the Greeks had expressed their feelings about natural phenomena.
What a subject this was! Sex, violence, seascape, landscape, beauty and the beast, 
gestures of alarm and affection, all enriched by analogies with other increasingly 
popular subjects. Europa’s abduction drew on representations of that of Deianira 
by the centaur Nessus; Europa’s cosseting by her companions for what lay ahead 
took hints from images of the toilette of Venus before meeting Mars or of Bathsheba 
before obeying the summons of David. Artists rushed with pleasure to- wards their 
subject. In every medium, from painting to pottery, relief sculpture to enamel, the 
story soared on, never more rapturously at one with the spirit of Ovid’s poem and 
the feeling for landscape, colour, climate and female density of beauty than in Titian’s 
supremely confident vision. Appropriately, he painted it for Philip II of Spain whose 
family dominated almost half of western and central Europe.
Whether Christianized, remythologized, or swept as a sugar-plum into the maw 
of aesthetic appetite, there is no hint that Europeans actually thought of themselves, 
or their continent, as owing anything material to this Europa. There were attempts 
to revive the more respectable medieval legend that the world had been divided be-
tween the sons of Noah: after the Flood Shem had populated Africa, Chem Asia, Japhet 
Europe. In 1561 a formidably intellectual Frenchman, Guillaume Postel, declared that 
it was indecent to pay homage to an affair between an animal and a woman who was 
no better than she should be, and suggested that Europe should be renamed, after 
Japhet, Japétie.18 This had no future. The continent, like the others, had, in this age 
of revived Latinity, to be feminine. When the late sixteenth-century cosmographer 
Johann Rauw described the appearance of the continent in words, it was in the form 
of a woman’s body, her head forming the Iberian peninsula, France and Germany her 
chest, Italy and Denmark her arms, the other countries filling the rest of her legless 
torso19; and it was thus that Europe was represented in a map illustrating the work 
of a contemporary geographical enthusiast, Sebastian Münster. With the continent 
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wrenched into female shape, Queen Europa’s crowned head is Spain and Portugal 
(ruled jointly by Philip II from 1580), Sicily is the orb she holds in her right hand, the 
British Isles flutter from the sceptre she holds in her left.
This somewhat bizarre anthropomorphism had been influenced by another tra-
dition of personifying Europe as a woman. While the mythological Europa became 
increasingly abducted back into her own, personal story, a regal and less romantic 
figure had risen to take her place. The two coexist in a particularly delightful painted 
Austrian stucco relief of the 1580s: Europa sits on the bull, but rides it as an armed 
empress in tranquil triumph. Ortelius, in 1570, had in the introductory text to his map 
of Europe, shrugged the mythical Europa impatiently and ingenuously aside: ‘why 
Europe should be so called, or who was the first author of this name, no man as yet 
has found out.’ But on his atlas’s title-page of 1572, nonetheless, is a figure of Europe. 
Sternly she sits on a throne beneath an arbour. In one hand she holds the sceptre of 
world domination. The other extends over an orb, of globe-like dimensions, marked 
with the Christian cross. Below, and subservient to her, are three other female 
characters, a richly clad Asia, a semi-naked Africa, and a nude America holding up a 
human head as witness to her cannibalism.
For an expensive book dependent on the patronage of the rich as well as fellow 
scholars who might hope for a complimentary copy, such a display of personifications 
was shrewd. The realization from the early sixteenth century that America was a 
separate continent (even if its dimensions remained cartographically uncertain), 
impugned the three-continents-only basis of classical authority and, with it, the tinge 
of truth that had been accorded to the Jove and Europa story. It also, save for brilliant 
eccentrics like Postel, knocked out the children-of-Noah theory of continental ori-
gins. It fed the new taste for sophisticated entertainments in which European rulers 
were flattered by actors representing the other continents kneeling in homage to 
them, as they did in Antwerp when the city welcomed Philip as the Emperor Charles 
V’s heir. It was not just that Ovid’s abductee lost ground to the more striking images 
showing America as a naked lady whose larder was stocked with human joints, but 
that an extending world view, based on political and commercial control, wanted 
personifications more congruent with reality. So ‘Europe’, while remaining feminine, 
became a sterner, more dirigiste figure, keeping her breasts but losing her poetry.
In the 1603 edition of Cesare Ripa’s Iconologia, an influential hand-book telling 
artists how to represent personifications, allegories and abstract ideas, the image of 
Europe is described as follows. She wears a crown ‘to show that Europe has always 
been the leader and queen of the whole world’. Two spilling cornucopiae are beside 
her because ‘this part of the world above all others is fertile and abundant in all those 
products that nature can produce.’ In one hand she holds a church to represent the 
Christian religion, ‘the truest, and superior to all others’. She points with her one 
hand to crowns, sceptres and coronets because ‘the greatest and most powerful of 
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the world’s rulers are in Europe.’ She is surrounded by a horse and weapons, wisdom’s 
owl, and books and musical instruments because Europe ‘has always been superior 
to other parts of the world in arms, letters and all the liberal arts’.
Now Ripa does end by saying that Europe ‘took its name from Europa, daughter 
of Agenor King of phoenicia, abducted and taken to the island of Crete by Jove’. But 
of far greater influence on his description was Strabo, whom he cites, and whose 
Geography of c. AD 10 was carefully studied in the fifteenth century by, among oth-
ers, Christopher Columbus, who was encouraged by it to believe that Asia could be 
reached directly by sailing westwards across the Atlantic.
While Strabo is best known for his encouragement to overseas exploration, his in-
fluence was also great in helping Europeans to think of their continent, in spite of its 
smaller size, as superior to the others. He stressed its range of microclimates and their 
products, its greater concentration of towns and cities, and its inhabitants’ orderly, 
law-obeying life whether in peace or war. Seeing Europe through pre-Christian eyes 
at a time of new and intense respect for the authors of classical antiquity, encouraged 
a secular, pragmatic view of its human and natural resources. It was this that now 
encouraged the topographical, anthropological and historical ‘Discovery of Europe’ 
which gave Europeans the high ground of information from which they surveyed the 
larger, but lesser known continents with a fairly generally shared disdain.
Here, again, is Ortelius, in the English version of his atlas of 1570, The Representa-
tion of the Lands of the World (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum). Europe, with its temperate 
climate and fruitful soil, ‘is so pleasant and so beautiful with stately cities, townes and 
villages, that for the courage and valour of the people and severall nations, although 
it be less in quantitie and circuit, yet might it be accounted, and indeed of all ancient 
writers hath it ever beene accounted, superiour unto the other parts of the world’.20
So, though possibly to the disappointment of those ladies of the court who would 
have preferred to appear in eastern silks and perfumes or with bodies dyed and 
bared to represent the rich suns of Africa or the athletic man-hunting of America, the 
chief role in tableaux and masques of the continents was played by a white, well-clad 
and stolidly commanding Europa, and the image of the ‘real’ Europa, the ravished 
Asian princess on her yearning mount quietly faded. What lingered was the image 
of her captor Jove, and Jupiter became for astrologers the dominant sign of Europe. 
It was under his planetary influence as law-giver of Olympus and God of gods that 
Europe’s destiny was held to lie. And the nations of Europe were, following this lead, 
given masculine signs, Mars, Aries, Leo, Sagittarius, and Taurus itself Europe and 
its components became associated with strength, with the toughest of the planets 
as with the most dominant of the continental queens. Was it not to Europe, and the 
peoples who comprised it, that the other continents, including the vast and astonish-
ing trouvaille America, were being forced to bow?
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Yet it was to be maps, far more than planets or images of queens, that helped to 
disseminate the idea that those who lived in Europe were Europeans. It was maps that 
made the Flemish diplomat Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, when he reached Constantino-
ple in 1554, ignore the idea of Christendom and simply write that the city ‘stands in 
Europe but looks over Asia’,21 and that helped the cartographer Francesco Basilicata 
in 1612, when commenting on his exquisite map of Crete, to forget the island’s associa-
tion with the beautiful Europa and bluntly describe it as ‘on the confines of the three 
parts of the world, Africa, Asia and Europe’.22
[...]
Us And Them
Early in the seventeenth century an English collector of travel narratives, Samuel 
Purchas, made himself the spokesman for the European family of nations: ‘Asia 
yeerely sends us her spices, silkes and gemmes; Africa her gold and ivory; America 
... [is] almost everywhere admitting European colonies.’ In every department of 
life, whether it is the cultivation of the liberal arts or ingenuity in the mechanical 
ones (like ‘the many artificiall mazes and labyrinths in our watches’), the palm goes 
to ‘wee in the West’, it belongs to ‘us’, it is ‘ours’.47 By now Strabo’s distant trium-
phalism, had worked its way again into a shared consciousness of separateness and 
superiority. Squeezed in physically by the alien Turkish lodgement in the south-east, 
extended imaginatively by increasing contacts with the other ‘old’ continents, Africa 
and Asia, and above all by the heady confidence inspired by the discovery of America, 
Europeans thought harder about their own identity, especially when mere curiosity 
about the men and manners of other continents came to be accompanied by compari-
sons—not always comforting—between us and them.
When in his Utopia (1516) Thomas More referred to political behaviour ‘in Europe 
. . . and especially in those parts where the faith and religion of Christ prevails’,48 he 
was accepting that the Ottoman Turks were likely to remain the masters of Greece 
and the Balkans, much of Albania and the whole of Bosnia. By the time Sultan Sulei-
man in the 1530s added to his other titles ‘Lord of Europe’, they had moved up from 
Bucharest, Belgrade and Budapest to within a few days’ march of Vienna. There they 
were held. In a medal struck at about the same time, the bust of the Emperor Charles 
V was shown supported by an angel and haunted by the turbaned profile of Suleiman. 
That summed up what was to remain the status quo.
To counter the Turkish move into Europe the idea of crusade spluttered to life from 
time to time. But the Christian powers were all concerned with urgent housekeeping 
and local enmities. And, in any case, the late Byzantine Empire in south-eastern Eu-
rope, with its curious beards and non-Catholic form of Christianity, had never, save to 
scholars of Greek, seemed a natural tenant of the continent. As for the Holy Land itself 
crusading ideas were muted by the realization that the Turks allowed a reasonably 
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effective tourist service to be run for pilgrims. Indeed, the confident tolerance which 
the Ottomans extended to the other beliefs they absorbed (even if Christian churches 
within their domain were not allowed to sound their bells) was one of the factors that 
complicated Europe’s reaction to them. And as Christian conquerors increasingly 
imposed their presence on overseas lands that did not want them, the more difficult 
it became to deny the Turk his rights of occupation. The Venetians opted for coexist-
ence. A Franco-Turkish alliance in 1536 was explained by the French King, Francis I, 
in the following, only partly apologetic terms: ‘I cannot deny that I very much want 
to see the Turk powerful and ready for war, not for his own sake, for he is an infidel 
and the rest of us are Christians, but to erode the power of the Emperor [Charles V] 
and involve him in crippling expense.’49 Thanks to the growing, inward-looking cult 
of centralizing national power, Erasmus could write in 1530 - and in a book designed 
to shape the behavioural development of the young - that ‘even if the Turk (heaven 
forbid!) should rule over us, we would be committing a sin if we were to deny him the 
respect due to Caesar.’50
Many talented Christians went to Constantinople and turned Muslim to advance 
their career prospects, knowing the Sultanate’s distrust of promoting its own sub-
jects to positions of military or administrative responsibility, and its need to draw 
on the more advanced technologies of the West. In 1581 Elizabeth endorsed trading 
relations with Constantinople through the Turkey Company and supported its suc-
cessful operations there and in Aleppo. Nonetheless she castigated her unofficial 
ambassador Edward Barton for accompanying Mahommed III on his war of 1593 
against Austria, ‘for he had borne the English armes upon his tent ... in the Turkes 
campe against Christians’.51 In the same vein her successor, James I, shrank from the 
idea of accepting a formal embassy from Constantinople on the grounds that it would 
be ‘unbecoming to a Christian prince’.52
In this atmosphere of double-think about Europe’s alien, infidel but permanent 
lodger, two strands of opinion can be isolated. One focused upon monstrous inhuman-
ity; the other on high standards of material well-being. Religion had little to do with 
either. The Islamic faith, spreading along the North African coast, into Asia Minor and 
on through the Persian Empire into India, was to most Europeans summed up as the 
religion of the Turks. And save for propaganda purposes; the Turks were judged as 
much in terms of behaviour as of belief.
To those who saw the Ottoman Empire from the outside, they were, above all, 
cruel. What European monarch would have all his brothers strangled -as Mahommed 
III had all nineteen of his- to prevent any subsequent challenge to his succession? 
Europeans burned, tortured and maimed: but only the Turks impaled, ramming a 
pointed stake up the anus and out between the collar-bones regardless of age or sex, 
and leaving it stuck in the ground with its skewered victim as a warning. Views by 
German artists of the siege of Vienna in 1529 and later Imperial-Turkish wars pep-
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pered the landscape with such writhing figures. Whenever a Turk featured in an 
English or French play of the later sixteenth century, he appeared laden with dread 
associations, however facetiously they were deployed.
To those who actually travelled in Turkey, however, this indifference to human 
suffering, while noticed, was diffused among more positive observations. Unlike the 
Russians-in-Europe, the Turks appreciated learning, the arts, and civilized comforts. 
The learning may have been Islamic, the arts unrepresentational, the comforts re-
jecting chairs and wine, but the style of life was sympathetically sophisticated. More 
than this, the Turks had lessons to teach Christians. In spite of their tolerance of the 
views of others, they took the faith and rituals of their own religion with a serious-
ness that was a reproach to all too many Christians. The Protestant radical Thomas 
Müntzer went so far in the 1520s as to say that if a devout Turk came to worship in 
Catholic Europe in search of added grace ‘he would gain about as much as a midge 
could carry on its tail.’53 The discipline and patient endurance of hardship of Turkish 
soldiers was often cited in contrast to the behaviour of Christian troops. Streets were 
filthy but the spotlessness within Turkish houses, the emphasis on personal hygiene, 
and the cleanliness of clothes and turbans (which provided so many highlights in 
Carpaccio’s narrative paintings) put smelly and infrequently laundered Europeans to 
shame. A tiny observation made by an Italian visitor to Constantinople in 1614, Pietro 
della Valle, contrasts the fidgety, self-preening behaviour of Europeans at a grand 
reception with the decorous stillness that prevailed in Turkey. He notes that ‘it seems 
to them very strange that we should be hurrying about like that, as if on important 
business, walking from one end of the rooms to another, and then returning, and then 
going back yet again, either alone or accompanied, with nothing else to do.’54
As he moved further east (he was on his way to India), della Valle continued to 
make comparisons. He contrasted the skilful and unviolent Persian national sport, 
polo, with brawling ball games like the Florentine calcio. The Hindu devotion to their 
idols ‘puts us Christians to shame for the laziness with which we exert ourselves in 
the cult and service of the true God’.55 And as trade and missionary work led to a 
flow of information about China, Joseph Hall, in his The Discovery of a New World of 
1608, could ask ‘who ever expected such wit, such government in China? Such arts, 
such practice of all cunning (i.e. skill)? We thought learning had dwelled in our part 
of the world; they laugh at us for it, and well may, avouching that they of all the earth 
are two-eyed men, the Egyptians the one-eyed, and all the world else, stark blind.’56 
And to move further east still, from St Francis Xavier’s first mission to Japan in 1549, 
Portuguese, Spanish and Italian Jesuits learned the language and tried to grasp the 
nature of the nine religious sects they identified there in order to argue the Christian 
case against them. Constantly, in their letters and reports, they compared European 
with Japanese customs. When defecating, one noticed, ‘we sit, they crouch.’57 ‘I am 
sending you’, wrote St Francis to his superiors at home, ‘a copy of the Japanese alpha-
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bet; their way of writing is very different from ours because they write their lines 
from the top of the page down to the bottom. I asked Paul [a convert] why they did 
not write in our way? He explained that as the head of a man is at the top and his 
feet are at the bottom, so too a man should write from top to bottom.’58 And as the 
acquaintanceship deepened, so, along with surprise, did admiration. Writing of Japan 
later in the century, Alessandro Valignano recorded that the politeness of all classes 
makes them in this respect ‘superior not only to other eastern peoples but also to 
Europeans as well’. Their children learn more quickly than ours, ‘nor do they fight or 
hit one another like European boys’.59
Summing up his impressions, Valignano wrote that ‘it may truly be said that Japan 
is a world the reverse of Europe; everything is so different and opposite that they 
are like us in practically nothing. So great is the difference in their food, clothing, 
honours, ceremonies, language, management of the household, in their way of ne-
gotiating, sitting, building, curing the wounded and sick, teaching and bringing up 
children, and in everything else, that it can be neither described nor understood. Now 
all this would not be surprising’, he continues in a telling passage, ‘if they were like 
so many barbarians, but what astonishes me is that they behave as very prudent and 
refined people in all these matters. To see how everything is the reverse of Europe, 
despite the fact that their ceremonies and customs are so cultivated and founded on 
reason, causes no little surprise to anyone who understands such things.’60
In contrast to Asia, Africa offered little challenge to reconsider the nature of Eu-
ropeanness. Startling as was the achievement of Portugal in establishing trade and 
missionary links with West Africa, pushing across the equator in the teeth of legends 
about its heat burning men to cinders and, after Vasco da Gama’s voyage of 1498, 
establishing a chain of Indian ocean bases from Mozambique to Mombasa, the Eu-
ropean imagination was hardly stirred by information about the native peoples that 
were encountered. The Portuguese, already in the fourteenth century experienced 
discoverers and traders (the Madeiras, the Canaries, the Azores), were practical and 
laconic, all the more so because discussion of their overseas empire was -in the face 
of potential competition- severely frowned on by government.
An earlier trans-Mediterranean trade in slaves had, however, familiarized south-
ern Europeans with a range of skin colours varying from that of Ethiopians to the 
paler complexion of trans-Saharan ‘Moors’.
Africans rowed gondolas for their Venetian employers, added a note of dusky 
exoticism to north Italian courts, and as servants were treated as pets (and lovers) 
in wealthy households throughout the northern Mediterranean. (The hero of the 
early Spanish picaresque novel Lazarillo de Tormes (1554) was undismayed when his 
mother took a negro lover.) Nor were Africans altogether unfamiliar in the North: in 
1596 Elizabeth pronounced that there were too many ‘blackamoores’ competing with 
needy Englishmen for places as domestic servants.61 While Portuguese and Span-
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iards exploited the domestic slave trade in Africa (and blacks had worked on whites’ 
plantations in Madeira and the Canaries well before they were imported to work the 
mines and cultivate the sugar of the Americas), the shipment of Africans as labourers 
and military auxiliaries from Peru to Ceylon was scarcely remarked in Europe. Mis-
sionaries were uninterested in their transplanted customs and beliefs; Africans were 
commodity imports, irrelevant to the challenge of saving indigenous souls. Even in 
Africa itself missionaries took few pains to understand the men and women they hur-
ried into baptism and whose idols they destroyed. Within Europe they were thinly 
dispersed and subservient. In drama their colour almost automatically established 
them as evil, even if among the Magi who came to adore the Christchild on behalf 
of the continents of the pre-Columbian world, Balthazar was respectfully shown 
as a negro. Shakespeare’s Othello was unique in building a sympathetic if alarming 
character between these extremes. More typical was the tissue-thin concept of Ben 
Jonson’s Masque of Blackness, performed at the court of James I in the same year as 
Othello, 1605. In this a courtier representing the River Niger comes to London with 
his black daughters (wearing black masks, gloves and stockings) to see how -in a 
representative example of indifference to African geography- the English sun can 
‘blanch an Ethiop’. Assured that this will undoubtedly happen in the English climate, 
the River retires happy in the conviction that his daughters will become white and 
therefore in European and his own ambitious eyes, more beautiful. And as the ac-
tresses, the Queen and her ladies, remove their disguises, they do.
Of a quite different order was the intellectual energy devoted to understanding 
the hitherto unknown Amerindians. Introducing his account of his first voyage in 
1492-3, Columbus reminded Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain of the orders they had 
given him. ‘You commanded’, he wrote, ‘that I should not go to the East by land, by 
which way it is customary to go, but by the route to the West, by which route we 
do not know for certain that anyone previously has passed.’62 While Columbus 
remained convinced until his death that he had done by sea what Marco Polo had 
done by land, his East, though still called from habit ‘the Indies’, rapidly came to be 
seen for what it was. Lopez de Gomera, dedicating in 1552 his History of the Indies to 
Ferdinand’s successor Charles V, hailed the discovery of the ‘new’ continent as ‘the 
greatest event since the creation of the world, excepting the incarnation and death of 
Him who created it’.63 And within the intervening sixty years, Europeans had had to 
come to terms not only with a new continent but with new men and women. Here was 
an enormous landmass, unsuspected by ancient geographers, filled with societies 
covering a great range of organizational sophistication from the Aztecs and the Incas 
to the Caribs and the Tupinamba.
When the Spaniards struck at the city-building empires of Mexico and Peru they 
saw them as weaker versions of the empires of Alexander and Augustus, problematic 
enough in logistic and diplomatic terms, but, because of this analogy, not a radical 
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challenge to rethinking the nature of political societies. Those ancient empires had 
been overcome. So, now, had these. It was the greater number of apparently more 
primitive peoples in central and southern America that aroused a crisis of conscience, 
public debate, and an element of self scrutiny. Missionaries’ consciences were initially 
troubled by two questions. The first was: do people living in a state of nature have 
property rights? If they do, do we have the right to dispossess and enslave them? The 
second was: do these people, who seem to live the instinctive lives of animals, have 
souls? If they do, should we not convert and protect rather than exploit them? This, 
the first pertinent and passionate discussion of abstract human rights, went on for 
a generation and more between settlers’ needs for labour and priests’ concern for 
potential converts. It was at last resolved in the mid-century in favour of the view 
that the Amerindian masses were, like their better-armed and more single-minded 
masters, men with legal rights and souls to save. But by then it was too late to stop a 
dreadful shrinkage of their numbers due to forced labour, war and the more devious 
pillage of lives by imported diseases, chiefly sexual and pulmonary, to which there 
was no native immunity. By then, too, the issue of the status of the native Americans 
had become naggingly repetitious. Far more interesting to those not personally 
concerned in its outcome was the continued adventure of the expansion of Spanish 
control, and its ability to produce the drug which the increasingly hectic monetary 
system of Europe craved: silver.
Then followed, however, what amounted to a rediscovery of the Amerindians as 
peoples with conventions, ‘ceremonies and customs’, of their own. With the Domini-
cans and Franciscans in America, as with the Jesuits in Japan, ethnographic inquiry 
was in the interest of conversion. But now it was more patient, less polemical. Instead 
of bullying converts, through a halting use of their language eked out by gestures, 
into acknowledging beliefs as weird as their own -a god who was tripartite and could 
be eaten and drunk by specially garbed intermediaries- languages were properly 
learned and native religions explored.
‘In my case’, wrote the historian of the Indies Jose de Acosta in 1590, ‘the realities 
of the Indies seemed after I had had personal experience of them to be both the same 
as I had heard and not the same. Indeed, I found them to be the same in that those 
who told me about them had not actually lied about them; but nevertheless I judged 
them to be very different and unlike what I had first thought.’64 The same tone was 
sounded in the life work of the Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagun who from 1529 to 
his death in 1590 lived in Mexico preaching, teaching and trying to convert. At the 
same time he familiarized himself, through a disciplined course of reading and a 
carefully planned programme of interviews, with the language, literature and view-
points of his enormous spiritual constituency. So great was his involvement with its 
members that he wrote up his findings first in their own, Nahuatl language in order 
to tell them who they had been and were within their conqueror-battered ex-empire. 
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It was only later that he translated his work back into Spanish -a Quixotry that denied 
it publication in his lifetime.
As with the earlier struggle to obtain justice for the natives, the effort to under-
stand the nature of the Amerindian societies was so single-minded that it did not 
throw off comparisons with European ones. That was left to the third, the intellectu-
ally weakest, most ‘romantic’ reaction: the wish to see them not as representatives 
of a New World but of the oldest world of all, that of the pre-civilized state of all 
mankind, unselfconscious, spontaneous and peaceful.
In 1589 a charming northern engraving showed Amerigo Vespucci discovering 
America. A stocky figure, armed but wearing a merchant’s hat, Vespucci holds in one 
hand a banner with the sign of the cross, in the other his navigator’s astrolabe. He has 
just stepped ashore from the pinnace which has brought him from his ship and finds 
himself immediately confronting a startled naked woman on a hammock. Leaning 
against one of the trees between which it is slung is her club. Strange animals roam a 
peaceable and otherwise deserted landscape.
This somewhat comical vision of Amerigo meeting America springs from the 
historical accident whereby the new lands, first shown as a separate continent in the 
world map published in 1507 by Martin Waldseemüller, were called -following Mar-
tin’s own suggestion- not after Columbus, but after Vespucci’s later voyages to South 
America in 1499 and 1501. At the top of this redoubtable enterprise -the map is 2.40 
metres wide and composed of twelve woodcut sheets- Ptolemy ruefully considers his 
outmoded three-continent world and Vespucci holds the dividers which symbolize 
the division of America from Asia. And that Amerigo-America became conflated and 
accepted owes much to the irresistible appeal to Martin and others of the sensation-
ally exoticized versions of Vespucci’s own descriptions of the peoples of Amazonia 
and Brazil which were printed in 1504.
We shall see with what nostalgia Europeans looked back to the mythical Golden 
Age when men lived close to nature without the frets of business or political life, and 
free from the restrictions of class, laws and moral codes.65 Akin to this was the idea 
of an Earthly Paradise, prelapsarianly sinless men living peaceably together with 
animals on the fruits of a bountiful nature. On 17 August 1498, putting out to sea after 
investigating the mouths of the Orinoco, Columbus noted in his journal that south 
of the Venezuelan coast extends ‘a great continent where is located the Terrestrial 
Paradise’.66
The Vespucci account catered for a readership avid for myths and marvels and 
prepared to believe that while these had evaded the investigations of travellers in the 
old continents they would be encountered in the new. Much was made of the theme 
that was associated with personifications of America: cannibalism. According to his 
editors, Vespucci had spoken to a man who had helped to eat three hundred others, 
had seen salted human hams dangling for future consumption in native huts, and 
Ideas of Europe | 475 
D
oc
u
m
en
ts
who remarked that it was not just enemies who were eaten but, on occasion, wives 
and children. The same flair for titillation marked Vespucci’s discussion of sexual 
customs; not only were the women so lubricious that they would offer themselves 
freely to any male, but they envenomed the penises of their regular partners to make 
them swell into ever more satisfying proportions.
These were immediately catchy themes, but what most affected Vespucci’s more 
serious readers was that, in spite of these excesses, something like an ideal society 
did seem to exist there. ‘They wear no clothes of wool or linen or cotton because they 
have no need of them. There is no private property; everything is held in common. 
With neither king nor magistrate each man is his own master. They have as many 
sexual partners as they want . . . They have no temples, no religion, worship no idols. 
What more can I say? They live according to nature’.67
And while later in the sixteenth century the missionary ethnographers were 
realizing that to be primitive was not to be simple, and that underneath an appar-
ently ‘natural’ way of life were complex religious beliefs, laws and codes of behaviour, 
enough reports of peaceable, unhierarchical and unmaterialistic ways of life were 
passed back to prompt comparisons with European ways of life.
Montaigne caught the tone perfectly. In one of the most concentrated of his usually 
discursive Essays, ‘Of Coaches’, he noted (with French voyages to Canada particularly 
in mind) that ‘our world hath of late discovered another ... no lesse-large, fully-peopled, 
all-things- yeelding, and mighty in strength, than ours ... It is not yet full fifty yeeres 
that he knew neither letters, nor waight, nor measures, nor apparell, nor corne, nor 
vines, but was all naked, simply-pure, in Nature’s lapp, and lived with such meanes 
and food as his mother-nurce affoorded him.’ But since then, he went on, ‘I feere that 
by our contagion, we shall have directly furthered his declination, and hastened his 
ruine; and that we shall too dearely have sold him our opinions, our new-fangles and 
our arts.’ Broadening his target, he summed up the extinction of a Golden Age society 
by the imposition on it of the Iron Age values of his profit-crazed, land-hungry and 
war-loving fellow Europeans: ‘so many goodly citties ransacked and razed; so many 
nations destroyed and made desolate; so infinite millions of harmlesse people of all 
sexes, states and ages, massacred, ravaged and put to the sword; and the richest, the 
fairest and the best part of the world topsiturvied, ruined and defaced for the traffick 
of pearles and pepper. Oh mechanicall victories, oh base conquest.’68
In another essay, ‘Of the Caniballes’ he commented ‘I finde (as farre as I have been 
informed) there is nothing in that nation that is either barbarous or savage, unlesse 
men call that barbarisme which is not common to them.’69 That note of bitter relativ-
ism reflects the collapse of Montaigne’s own world within the feuds, from the 1560s, 
of the French civil wars. For the great majority, however, who did not share Mon-
taigne’s interest in the universality of human nature, the inner demons of Europe’s 
commercial, political and religious antipathies came to pull a hood of self-regard over 
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their imagination, enclosing it, despite continuing signals from the outside, within 
a shared interest in exploring the less disturbing, newly revealed world of classical 
antiquity and the more immediately relevant investigation of local identities and dif-
ferences. By 1600 a concern for ‘them’ had become marginalized by a clamant interest 
in ‘us’.
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The Myth of Europe
Lucian
Dialogues of the Sea Gods - West Wind and South Wind
West Wind: I’ve never seen a more magnificent pageant on the sea, ever since I began 
to live and blow. Didn’t you see it, Notus?
South Wind: What pageant do you mean Zephyrus? Who were in it?
W.W: You missed a most delightful spectacle, the like of which you’ll never see again.
S.W.: Well, I was at work about the Red Sea, and I blew also over the parts of India near 
the cost. So I’ve no idea what you are talking about.
W.W.: But do you know Agenor of Sidon?
S.W. :Yes, Europa’s father. Of course I do.
W.W.: I’ll tell you something about the girl herself.
S.W.: Not that Zeus has long been in love with her? I’ve known that for ages.
W.W.: Well, you may know about his love, but let me now tell you what followed. 
Europa in her play had come down to the beach with her companions, and Zeus took 
the shape of a bull, and started playing with them, looking magnificent, for he was all 
white with nice curly horns and gentle eyes. Well, he too started skipping about on 
the beach, and bellowed most charmingly, so that Europa even dared to climb up on 
to him. Thereupon Zeus galloped off to the sea with her on his back, plunged in and 
began to swim; she was quite terrified, and clutched his horn with her left hand so 
as not to slip off, while she held her robe down against the wind with her right hand.
S.W.: Indeed a delightful spectacle, for you, my dear Zephyrus -a real love-scene! Zeus 
swimming along and carrying off his beloved!
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W.W. But what followed was far more delightful, Notus. The sea became waveless 
at once, and draping herself in calm, made herself smooth; we all kept quiet, and 
followed beside them, just watching what was going on, while the Loves fluttered 
alongside just above the sea, occasionally just touching the water with their feet, car-
rying lighted torches, and singing the marriage hymn, and the Nereids, coming to the 
surface, rode alongside on dolphins, clapping their hands, pretty well half-naked. The 
Tritons and all other creatures of the sea that do not frighten the eye, were dancing 
round the girl. Poseidon astride his car, with Amphitrite beside him, was driving in 
front, delighted to lead the way for his brother as he swam. To cap all, two Tritons 
were carrying Aphrodite reclining on a shell, and sprinkling all manner of flowers 
over the bride. This went on all the way from Phoenicia to Crete; but when he set foot 
on his island, the bull was no more to be seen, but Zeus took Europa’s hand and led 
her to the cave on Mount Dicte -blushing she was, and looking on the ground, for now 
she knew why she was being carried off. But we each assailed a different part of the 
sea, and stirred up the waves.
S.W.: How lucky you are, Zephyrus to have seen all that! All I saw was griffins and 
elephants and black men.
Source: Pro Europa
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A Temple for Europe
Herman van Rompuy
In a key note speech, delivered on 4 June 2012 at the Chapel of the Resurrection, President Herman Van 
Rompuy recently set out his vision for a united Europe based on values and on the Christian conviction that 
caring for others means finding yourself.
Ladies and gentlemen,
1. The Person
Martin Buber, the Viennese-born Jewish philosopher, had a great influence on person-
alist thinking. In his fundamental work “I and Thou” he wrote the following: “In the 
beginning is relationship. All true life is encounter. It is encounter which creates, with 
the presence of the other, the reality of time as present. I become myself in contact 
with “You”, I become “I” by saying “You”.
This is, in a nutshell, the essence of my thinking, my personalist approach. Person-
alist and Christian.
In placing the emphasis on the other, it is not the other as an individual that I am 
interested in, but the other as a person, a person whom, in Christian terms, I call 
neighbour, my neighbour.
The individual characteristically defines himself by reference to what is not 
himself. His approach is to isolate himself, to think in terms of isolation, voluntarily 
chosen. Taken to extremes, the isolated individual tends to think that the world began 
when he was born and that the future of the world will be linked to his own future.
Conversely, the person is profoundly and essentially a being of relationship. 
The person is a being who shows solidarity. This does not prevent him from being 
fully himself, both “solitary and in solidarity”, to take the title of a talk I gave at the 
Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. The person is thus fully both: solitary and 
possessed of fellow-feeling; his solitude is not isolation.
2. Closed or open
You will have understood that it is in the light of this philosophy of relationship, this 
philosophy of encounter, that I wish to see Europe’s destiny unfold.
For Europe means friendship too. Some may think me naive, but was the first 
Franco-German Treaty not a friendship treaty?
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Let us now extrapolate the concepts of individual and person to the whole of soci-
ety. We end up with political ideas expressed on the one hand in populism and inward 
looking and on the other hand in solidarity, a sense of responsibility, and openness 
to the world.
In the course of its history Europe has often hesitated between these two ap-
proaches.
To mention only the last century, nations and peoples were tempted by “experi-
ments” in ultra nationalism [nationalism is not a homogeneous concept], national 
socialism, fascism and communism, which were all driven by a desire to distance 
oneself from the other or even exclude the other.
I tremble at the thought of the horrors we endured, and I think of the millions of 
people who were tortured and killed. Those millions are not just statistics for me. 
Each of them is a person, one by one.
Happily those same nations and peoples then returned to the source of mankind’s 
greatness, that is to say essential human values, expressed in the beginning with 
Christian Democrat, Social Democrat or Liberal nuances. Fortunately, societies and 
men do not live out the same values in the same way, and in a democratic society, the 
emphasis can and must vary.
But while the mode of expression may vary, the values themselves do not change. 
They are drawn from the depths of that which confers greatness on man, and enables 
him to reach his full potential.
3. The values
Those values include human rights, equality between men and women, justice, the 
“common good”, responsibility and solidarity. Another such value is “secularism”, or 
what is called in French “laicite” in the narrowest sense of the word, i.e. distinguish-
ing clearly between what is owed to Caesar and what is owed to God.
In short, values which are catholic (with a small “c”), universal and capable of 
being universalised.
Values which are rooted firmly in European culture - a culture forged over the 
centuries by the Judeo-Christian world, Greek and Latin thought and, more recently, 
humanism and the Enlightenment. Values which form our heritage - a heritage which 
we must render fruitful through tireless application, as Boileau said.
4. The identities
Let me be clear: in speaking of a retreat into one’s own identity I am not of course de-
nying anyone the right to have an identity, or rather identities. I myself am personally 
and indeed intimately acquainted with someone who defines himself as a resident of 
Sint-Genesius-Rode, a child born in Brussels, Flemish by language and culture and 
both Belgian and European through his membership of a community of destiny!
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Being European does not therefore entail a blind belief in the possible emergence 
of the “European” per se, i.e. someone who identifies himself or herself primarily as 
European.
Moreover, I believe that the future of the European Union lies in its acceptance 
of a European identity defined as an identity of spirit, feeling and indeed destiny 
rather than one based on ‘Fortress Europe’. This is an identity defined, not negatively 
in comparison to others, but positively. To that extent I “feel European” but have 
no desire to be submerged in an amorphous community or “melting pot”. That is 
something which does not appeal either to me personally or to Europeans in general 
since such an exclusive identity would run counter to the very idea of Europe and of 
European civilisation as it has developed over the course of the centuries. We need to 
belong to smaller groups, such as a family, a neighbourhood, a circle of friends, a local 
community, a people or a country, in order to have some sense of stability.
At the same time, however, we also need ideas and ideals which transcend the 
individual. The words do not matter, as long as it can be translated into reality.
5. Transcendence
But can man seek or indeed find an added dimension, such transcendence, in religion, 
I hear you ask?
For some of us, the answer is yes. And the fact that the Chapel of the Resurrection/
Chapel for Europe, whose ten-year anniversary we are celebrating today, stands in 
such close proximity to the European institutions reflects both a geographical and a 
spiritual closeness.
Others will find this added dimension in non-religious spirituality or philosophy, 
even if it is atheist in nature.
Whatever the case, we must embark on a journey in search of this “extra some-
thing” which is within us and just waiting to be revealed. We must seek a purpose in 
life in general and in our own lives in particular. Such a purpose will never be found 
in the Ego. It resides in the Other and/or in our relations with the others.
6. The Union
By embarking on such a search, each in our own individual way, we can bring to the 
community of Europe this added dimension which will eventually turn it into a Union in 
the true sense of the word. In fact, I would prefer to use the original term “community” 
rather than “Union” since this original, founding term has more human connotations.
A Union and not a Unity. And here I would put forward the same argument as that 
expounded with regard to the European identity.
For Unity is static, while a Union is dynamic and evokes the relations arising from 
an ongoing process. A Union, therefore, in the sense of understanding, harmony, 
concord and peace.
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And indeed, if there is one value above all others which has enabled the European 
Union to last as long as it has, it is that of peace. After more than 1500 years of fratri-
cidal wars and an almost endless list of peace treaties broken in quick succession, and 
following the destruction of Europe in the two world wars, the continent’s rebirth 
[and I deliberately choose the word rebirth, not resurrection] was made possible by 
forgiveness, reconciliation and cooperation between the peoples of Europe.
It is a Union which has been growing ever since, without a drop of blood being 
shed. This is a major achievement. Many nations have entered this alliance over the 
past sixty years, while its borders have grown ever wider and the list of countries 
knocking on its door is getting longer each year. For the “new Member States”, memo-
ries of war are fresher than for us here in Western Europe. For them, the Cold War did 
not end until 1989, and for those living in the Western Balkans, the experience of civil 
war and genocide is still painfully recent.
A new form of governance is emerging, and it is one in which I have been heavily 
involved for more than two years now.
Admittedly, the process may seem slow, for we are not rushing to build a Union 
founded on sand. Rather, we are moving forward in small steps, laying down one 
stone after another in order to construct, slowly but surely, an edifice as solid as a 
cathedral.
And what form will this “cathedral” or “temple” of Europe ultimately take? That is 
up to you, the men and women of the European Union.
For the European Union’s response could take the same form as the words uttered 
by God to Moses through the burning bush: “Ehye acher ehye”. “I will be all that you 
make me be”.
We, the European Union, will be all that you, the men and women of Europe, make 
us be.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
Source: Pro Europa
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The Idea of ‘Europe’ 
and the Origin of the European Union 
A Sociological Approach
Richard Swedberg
Stockholm University, Department of Sociology, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden. 
Notes and references are excluded.
A united Europe is not a modern expedient, be it political or economic, but an ideal which has been accepted 
since thousands of years by the best spirits of Europe, namely those who can see into the future. Already 
Homer described Zeus as „europos” - an adjectiv meaning „one who sees very far”.
Denis de Rougemont, Vingt-huit siècles d’Europe (1961)
It is usually claimed that the European Union (EU) traces its beginnings to the years 
just after World War II and possibly also to various political-economic developments 
during the interwar period.  A recent and very valuable contribution to the literature 
on this subject is, for example, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955 by 
John Gillingham, where it is argued that the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) represents a solution to the so-called Ruhr problem. But there also exists a 
number of works which are often ignored in the academic debate and which claim 
that today’s EU has a much more distant origin, as illustrated by the quote at the 
beginning of this article. These works look at what they call „the European idea” and 
its development over the centuries. Often they claim that the idea of a European com-
munity goes as far back as the Middle Ages -and sometimes even to Antiquity. One 
thing that is interesting with this latter type of literature is that it focusses more or 
less exclusively on the impact of ideas, ideals and cultural symbols as opposed to the 
more hardnosed political and economic forces, which play a key role in the standard 
literature on the emergence of EU. In this article I shall first present the literature on 
the European idea and then try to determine to what extent works of this type can 
complement our understanding of the origin of EU. In assessing this type of discourse 
I shall primarily be relying on Emile Durkheim’s sociolo-gy, especially his theory of 
how a society is constituted via symbols or „collective representations”. I will in par-
ticular try to determine if the European idea itself can be understood as one of these 
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community creating symbols (or collective representations) that Durkheim was so 
fascinated by.
1. The Birth and Development of a New Discourse: 
Studies on the European Idea (1940s-)
The very first work on the European idea appeared in 1947 and was written by the 
Italian historian Federico Chabod (1947). Its title was „L’idea di Europa” and the ar-
ticle represented the author’s installation lecture at the University of Rome. Chabod 
(1947:3) said that when studying the European idea one has to begin by looking at 
„the origin of the concept of Europe”. And to decide the time of „the birth of Europe”, 
one would have to know when Europe became conscious of itself. What mattered 
was not so much Europe as a geographical concept - much more central were „the 
political Europe, the cultural and moral Europe”. Of particular importance in tracing 
the history of the European idea, Chabod added, was to realize that a concept always 
emerges in opposition to some other concept. „The concept of Europe is formed by 
counterposition to all that is not Europe, and it acquires its characteristics. . .through 
a confrontation with what is not Europe” (Chabod 1947:4). In his analysis of the idea 
of Europe Chabod began with Antiquity and continued till World War I. He paid par-
ticular attention to what he called „the European Republic of Letters”, that is, thinkers 
such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Voltaire. This Republic of Letters constituted 
the essence of Europe to Chabod as well as his own, personal ideal.
The notion that one could trace something called the European idea throughout 
history quickly caught on, and during the 1950s three major works in this genre were 
produced: Heinz Gollwitzer’s Europabild und Europagedanke (1951), Denys Hay’s 
Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (1957) and Carlo Curcio’s Europa, storia di un’idea 
(1958).  Gollwitzer, who was mainly interested in the development of the European 
idea in 18th and 19th century Germany, emphasized that writing about the European 
idea must not be confused with writing the history of Europe. For the former task it 
was necessary to focus on „perceptions of Europe as a family of nations, a cultural 
unity and a political community of fate” („Europabild”) and also on „specimen of 
European consciousness as a community as well as proposals for organizing this con-
tinent” (Europagedanke”; Gollwitzer 1951a: 8). While Gollwitzer saw his analysis as 
a straightforward history of ideas, Hay tried to analyze the emergence of the notion 
of Europe with the help of what Marc Bloch has called „historical semantics”.  For all 
practical purposes, however, the analyses of Hay and Gollwitzer were quite similar 
in that both presented themselves as professional historians while emphasizing the 
importance of studying the European idea as a specific form of consciousness. The 
approach of Carlo Curcio in his enormous 2-volume work Europa, storia di un’idea 
is in contrast more idealistic. According to Curcio (1958:5), „Europe is above all an 
idea” and it is extremely hard to isolate an idea of this type („Can you weigh a soul?”). 
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In order to get closer to the essence or to the vital core of the European idea, it was 
particularly important to look deeply into „the thoughts and colors with which it has 
been formulated”.
During the 1960s the discourse on the European idea continued to be popular. 
Chabod expanded his essay into a book and both Gollwitzer and Hay revised and 
reissued their studies.  A few new important works were also published, including 
Denis de Rougemont’s Vingt-huit siècles d’Europe (1961), Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s 
L’idée d’Europe dans l’histoire (1965) and Henri Brugmans’ L’idée européenne 1918-
1965 (1965). Both Rougemont and Brugmans had been active in the movement to unite 
Europe and their works reflect this involvement very strongly. Brugmans (1970: 11) 
thus defined the European idea as „the grand stages of the European consciousness, 
its hopes and its deceptions, its advances as well as its dramatic setbacks”. And 
Rougemont’s statement that „We shall only find Europe in making it, as the myth of 
Cadmus teaches us” could stand as the motto for his book on the twenty-eight cen-
turies of Europe (Rougemont [1961] 1990: 8). Duroselle’s work, on the other hand, is 
considerably more academic in tone even though the author emphatically states that 
„Europe is a construction of the human spirit” (Duroselle 1965:25). The main novelty in 
Duroselle’s work is otherwise that the author pays very close attention not only to the 
idea of Europe throughout history but also to European history in general. While this 
could be seen as refuting Duroselle’s own statement that he is not in principle inter-
ested in what „objectively” happened in Europe but only to „represent the subjective 
views of thinkers and politicians in each of Europe’s epochs”, the potential contradic-
tion is resolved by the author’s statement that the most important task is to analyze 
how prominent political actors have viewed „Europe” during different periods in 
history (Duroselle 1965: 21). Since the late 1960s several new works have continued to 
appear that draw their inspiration from the European idea-approach. Among the most 
important of these are Walter Lipgens’ A History of European Integration 1945-1947 
(1982), the same author’s Documents on the History of European Integration (1985-
1986) and Jean- Baptiste Duroselle’s Europe: A History of Its Peoples (1990).  Lipgens’ 
work is devoted to the efforts to unite Europe during the period 1940-1950, which in his 
opinion had been neglected by historians. The most outstanding part of Lipgens’ work 
is his attempt to trace the European idea in the Resistance groups during World War 
II and among the political emigres in England and the United States during the same 
period. The result of his effort to cover these topics were two huge volumes in the 
series Documents on the History of European IntegrdtionJ Duroselle’s Europe from 
1990 represents a further step in the author’s attempt to integrate an account of the 
discourse on the European idea with a more conventional approach to the history of 
Europe. While Duroselle’s 1965 book had been totally dominated by the material on 
the European idea, much more room has been given to ordinary material on Europe’s 
history in Europe. Duroselle’s latest work, it may be added, is also remarkable in that 
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it was published in a lavish, textbook-like edition which appeared simultaneously 
in eight European languages. The extraordinary promotion of this book was made 
possible by the generous assistance of Frederic Delouche, a banker interested in the 
European idea. Europe has also received moral support from the Commission of the 
European Union, including its President Jacques Delors. That some of the key people 
in the European Union have been interested in associating themselves with the Euro-
pean idea is also clear from the fact that Jean Monnet wrote the preface to Duroselle’s 
L’idée d’Europe dans l’histoire and Jacques Delors the preface to a recent réédition of 
Denis de Rougemont’s Vingt-huit siècles d’Europe.
2. Main Themes in the Discourse on the European Idea
The discourse on the European idea differs on several scores from the accounts that 
one can find in ordinary historical works on the origin of the European Union, as 
mentioned in the introduction. While the latter, for example, tend to date the origin 
of the European Union to some time between 1920 and the 1940s, the writers on the 
European idea go very much further back in time. The title to Rougemont’s book - 
Vingt-huit siècles d’Europe -gives an indication of the difference involved. There is 
also the fact that the more conventional histories of the European Community tend 
to focus on a rather narrow range of actors in the founding of the European Com-
munity—basically on politicians and leaders of various interest groups. Those who 
write in the tradition of the European idea, on the other hand, pay attention to a much 
broader set of actors, including poets, philosophers and artists—in brief, to anyone 
who has tried to express what „Europe” is, what it could be, and what it should be. 
Related to this is also the fact that the proponents of the European idea have a very 
different concept of what it means to create a European community than mainstream 
writers on EU. While the latter see this as a mainly a political task, it is perceived in 
a totally different way by the former. The writers on the European idea argue that 
the most important thing is to develop a European consciousness and to anchor this 
in appropriate institutions - something which necessitates a vision of what such a 
European community may look like so that people can be energized into action.
Even though there exist considerable differences between the various works on 
the European idea, it is still possible to construct an ideal-typical picture of the dis-
course they all are part of. In this kind of discourse one basically follows the different 
incarnations of something called the European idea, from Antiquity to the European 
Union of today. The European idea is typically defined as the consciousness of Europe 
that ex-isted at some particular point in history. This con-sciousness has strong 
idealistic overtones and it is clear that the European idea cannot be fully realized 
by a dictator or in an oppressive Europe. The literature on the European idea usu-
ally discusses some or all of its dozen or so incarnations. These different concepts of 
Europe are, in all brevity the following:
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(1) Europe as a word with a distinct etymology; (2) Europe as a geographical 
concept; (3) Europe as a concept in mythology; (4) Europe in the thought of Medieval 
Christianity; (5) Charlemagne as the Father of Europe; (6) Europe in the peace plans 
of the 17th and 18th century; (7) Cosmopolitan Europe; (8) Napoleon’s attempt to 
unify Europe; (9) The Concert of Europe; (10) Europe and Nationalism („The United 
States of Europe”); (11) Move-ments for a united Europe during the interwar period; 
(12) Hitler’s New Europe; (13) The plans for a federal Europe in the resistance move-
ments during World War II; (14) The revived European movement after World War 
II; (15) The creation of the European Union (the European Coal and Steel Community, 
Euratom, The European Common Market, the European Union). (See Table 1 for more 
information).
Readers of a list of definitions of this type may easily feel dizzy, and one is re-
minded of an ironic passage in one of Borges’ writings where he quotes a „certain Chi-
nese encyclopaedia” according to which „animals” are: „(a) belonging to the Emperor, 
(b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) 
included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a 
fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that 
from a long way off look like flies” (Fou-cault 1970: xv). There does, however, exist a 
certain logic to the discourse on the European idea, and it is also clear that it contains 
a wealth of information about the concept of Europe, which otherwise would have 
remained unknown. Anyone familiar with the fine scholarship of people like Jean-
Baptiste Duroselle, Denys Hay and Walter Lipgens also know that contemporary 
European historiography has become enriched by their works on the European idea.
3. The European Idea as a Collective Representation
If we now return to the problématique that was in-troduced at the beginning of this 
article - the origin of the European Union - what answer do we then find in the works 
on the European idea? The most obvious one is that the roots of the European com-
munity stretch very deep into the past, well beyond the common dating of the first 
institutions of EU. It should also be noted that there exist differences between the 
answers that can be found in the various works on the European idea. According to 
Carlo Curcio in Europa, storia di un’idea, for example, there was a sense of Europe as 
a community already in Antiquity. Rougemont sees the empire of the Franks in the 
8th century as decisive in this context, while Duroselle sees the birth of Europe as 
occurring some time in the 17th century when the universalism of Christianity was 
replaced by the self-consciousness of the European nation states. Still, the origin does 
go centuries back in time, according to all the works on the European idea. This type 
of literature also insists on the relevance of a very broad range of material, includ-
ing the Greek myths, peace plans from the Middle Ages, the writings by Voltaire and 
Montesquieu, and so on.
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There also exist, however, certain qualities to the literature on the European idea 
which makes it difficult to accepts its findings at face value. Some of this literature is, for 
example, based on rather dubious historical research. This is something that Geoffrey 
Barraclough (1963) has emphasized and which also Denys Hay addressed very early:
Table 1: The Different Meanings of „Europe” in the Discourse on the European Idea
(1) Europe as a word with a distinct etymology
Though the original meaning of the word „Europe” is not clear, it is often thought that it comes 
from the Greek words „euros” (meaning „broad”) and „opsis” or „optikos” (meaning „eye”, 
„sight” or „face”).
(2) Europe as a geographical concept
In Antiquity, „Europe” was mainly used as a geographical concept. According to the Greeks, 
the world consisted of Europe, Asia and Libya (later called Africa).
(3) Europe as a concept in mythology
According to Hesiod, Europe was a beautiful princess who Zeus took a fancy to. In the shape of 
a bull, he lured Europe away to Crete („Europe and the Bull”).
(4) Europe in the thought of Medieval Christianity
During the Middle Ages the two concepts of Christianity and Europe started to merge. In the 
1600s the terms were often used interchangeably.
(5) Charlemagne as the Father of Europe
Charlemagne’s empire in the 8th and 9th century is seen as an early incarnation of a united 
Europe. The famous epitath that a court poet bestowed on Charlemagne („Rex pater Europae”) 
is often approvingly cited.
(6) Europe in the peace plans of the 17th and 18th century
The famous peace plans by such people as Henry IV (Sully), Abbe de Saint-Pierre and William 
Penn are seen as early attempts to unify Europe.
(7) Cosmopolitan Europe
Cosmopolitanism is seen as associated with les philosophes, especially Voltaire („l see with 
joy that an immense republic of cultivated minds is being formed in today’s Europe”).
(8) Napoleon’s attempt to unify Europe
Some people argue that Napoleon’s real aim was to unify Europe - including Metternich ac-
cording to whom Napoleon wanted to create an empire like that of Charlemagne.
(9) The Concert of Europe
Some of the statesmen who met in the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 were positive to some 
kind of united Europe, such as Castlereigh who spoke of the need to create a European Com-
monwealth.
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(10) Europe and Nationalism („The United States of Europe”)
While the rise of nationalism threatened the ideal of a united Europe, some literary figures 
(e.g. Victor Hugo) tried to fuse nationalism and Europeanism („The United States of Europe”)
(11)  Movements for a united Europe during the interwar period
The interwar period was very difficult for the European ideal. Nonetheless, there were some 
attempts to unite Europe, such as those by Aristide Briand and Count Coudenhave-Kalergi.
(12) Hitler’s New Europe
In the early 1940s the Nazis started to use the notion of „Europe” as part of their anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda. Hitler, however, said that what matters is blood, not if one is born in Europe.
(13) The plans for a federal Europe in the resistance movements during World War II
In practically all of continental Europe the resistance movements had a united Europe as their 
ideal. At a conference in Switzerland in 1944 the unification of Europe was discussed.
(14) The revived European movement after World War II
There existed strong sentiments for a united Europe during the years just after World War 
II. High points include Churchill’s plea for a United Europe in 1946 and the founding of the 
Council of Europe in 1949.
(15) The creation of the European Union (the European Coal and Steel Community, 
Euratom, The European Common Market, the Single Market, the European Union)
In 1950-1951 Jean Monnet began the creation of today’s European Union by helping to form 
the European Coal and Steel Community. Despite various ups and downs during the years 
after the early 1950s, the European Union has continued to advance.
There seem to be a number of new myths in the making in the ‘European idea’ 
books which have recently appeared. Their authors are concerned to promote Euro-
pean unity; they try to do this by invoking great generalizations about the past. (Hay 
1957: xvii).
There is also the fact that the typical work on the European idea is structured in a 
rather peculiar manner. Different interpretations of “Europe” are removed from their 
original contexts, and then presented one after the other in a way that often gives a 
strange rhythm to these works. The reader is forced to wrestle with the problem of 
how to make sense of something that makes its first historical appearance as a Greek 
myth, then becomes a geographical concept, a Frankish empire and so on.
One also wonders whether the word “Europe” is not treated a bit like a fetish in the 
literature on the European idea - or as a flag, to use Curcio’s apt formulation (Curcio 
1958: l).  Everything that has ever been called “Europe” is thus presented in enormous 
detail, while little or no effort is made to discuss those phenomena that may very well 
be part of “Europe” but which happen to be called something else. There is finally also a 
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strong link to activism and idealism in this type of literature, often leading to a mixture 
of values and facts. “A united Europe”, to cite Rougemont ([1961]1990: 8), “is [...] an ideal 
which has been accepted since thousands of years by the best spirits of Europe”.
But many of these “drawbacks” to the discourse on the European Idea take on an-
other meaning if they are analyzed with the help of Durkheim’s theory of community 
creating symbols. These collective representations usually display, for example, a 
mixture of values and facts since their main function is to create a society by energiz-
ing people into action. The motto of one of the works on the European Idea captures 
the purpose of this mixture perfectly: “The truth shall set you free” (Albonetti 1963).
The European idea literature typically also contains appeals to higher moral 
values and it displays a strong aversion to utilitarian concerns—two attitudes that 
are fundamental to the construction of a new community, according to Durkheim. 
A society can only be constructed on a foundation of morality and non- individualistic 
values, in the French sociologist’s opinion. The obsession with finding and citing pas-
sages which contain the word “Europe”, also has an explanation from a Durkheimian 
perspective: the symbol of “Europe” is used as a totem. A totem, Durkheim says, is not 
only a symbol of something that is holy to the believer, but it is part of this holy itself. 
Consequently it has to be located and safeguarded, wherever it may be.
Durkheim’s approach may be of help in explaining why the discourse on European 
Idea is structured in such a peculiar way, with section after section on the various 
incarnations of “Europe”. Could it not be that a reason for this is that strength is 
gathered among those interested in European unity when they read about earlier 
attempts to create a European community—similar to the way that “the believer is a 
man who is stronger” (Durkheim [1912] 1965: 464)? Durkheim also describes collec-
tive representations in terms of “energy” and “electricity”: they are as if charged with 
currency and they attract one another. In the works on the European Idea the word 
“Europe” positively seems to glow with energy. The different “Europes” are strung 
along, one after the other, in such a way that the whole effect becomes a little bit like 
when several lamps are placed next to one another: festive and celebratory.
4. The European Idea and Collective Effervescence
Durkheim’s theory of collective representations is also of value in that it points us in 
novel directions when looking for the origins of the European Union. What we have 
in mind is especially Durkheim’s notion that collective representations, which are 
involved in the creation of a community, are born at particularly intense moments in 
history which are characterized by so-called “collective effervescence”. Where, then, 
does this theory lead us in relation to the literature on the European idea? For a start, 
we know that the European idea literature came into being something like during the 
years 1943-1951.  Durkheim thus invites us to view this period—World War II and its 
immediate aftermath—in terms of collective effervescence.
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World War II clearly gave a “collective shock” to Europe, to use one of Durkheim’s 
terms for collective effervescence (Durkheim [1912] 1965: 241). The destruction and 
collective suffering that took place in Europe from the 1940s and onwards was enor-
mous and profoundly unsettling: whole populations were exterminated, societies 
were dismembered, and new brutal regimes were imposed in many countries. That 
a new political ideal, such as that of a united Europe, was to be born in opposition 
to the Nazis’ glorification of the national state is perhaps not so peculiar.  The re-
sistance movements with their notion of a federal Europe actually appear more or 
less simultaneously with the first works on the European idea, namely in the early 
1940s. Lipgens (1985: 15), for example, dates the emergence of the first resistance 
groups of importance in Europe to 1942. The ideals of the resistance movements also 
display that moral purity and aversion to utilitarian concerns which is so typical 
of community creating collective representations, according to Durkheim. Lipgens 
describes, for example, the goals of the resistance movements in the following way: 
the arguments of the resistance differed from those of most of the individuals who, 
between the wars or in exile from Hitler’s Europe, had pleaded or were still pleading 
for the unification of the continent on rational, geopolitical or economic grounds. 
The resistance writers did not want the kind of association of European states which 
would accomodate the latter’s economic and political expansion while ‘limiting’ their 
sovereignty as cautiously as possible. On the contrary, they wanted firmly to restrict 
sovereignty as such by means of a federation which would destroy the foundation of 
the state’s claim to absolute authority. (Lipgens 1985: 18-19)
The immediate postwar period did not initially lead to any attempts to construct 
a united Europe. Instead all energy was concentrated on reconstructing the nation 
states in the various countries which had been occupied by the Nazis. This policy was 
supported by the United States which discouraged all attempts to unite Europe, in 
accordance with its 1943 agreement with the Soviet Union (in exchange for which the 
United States had received Stalin’s promise of support for its plans for the United Na-
tions). But there is also the important fact that the resistance movements themselves 
did not advance any plans for how to unite Europe immediately after the war. Henri 
Brugmans (1970: 102-103) points out that in the political parties, which grew out of 
the resistance movements in Europe just after World War II, it was felt that national 
reconstruction represented the most urgent task.
By early 1946 it was as if there never had existed any plans for a federal Europe, 
Brugsman (1970: 105) notes. This, of course, did not mean that the ideals of a united 
Europe, which had emerged during World War II, had suddenly disappeared. On the 
contrary, opinion polls from 1945-1950 show that an absolute majority supported some 
form of a United States of Europe during the post-war period (Vilemeier 1991: 581). 
And all that was needed for this opinion to become visible again was that someone so-
to-speak tapped into this consciousness and gave it a political expression. As things 
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turned out, this someone happened to be Churchill, and his historic speech in favor of 
a United States of Europe at the University of Zurich in September 1946 galvanized the 
whole pro-European movement into action. Alluding to the fact that the relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union was rapidly deteriorating, Churchill 
emphasized: Time may be short. At present there is breathing-space. The cannons 
have ceased firing. The fighting has stopped; but the dangers have not stopped. If we 
are to form the United States of Europe or whatever name or form it may take, we 
must start now. (Churchill 1948: 201)
In direct response to the electrifying speech by Churchill, several important or-
ganizations for a united Europe were formed in 1947 and Coudenhove-Kalergi revived 
his Pan-European Union. The United States also changed its policy towards Euro-
pean integration in 1947, now arguing that some kind of cooperation between the 
individual countries in Europe was desirable (e.g. Hogan 1984, Kindleberger [1947] 
1984).  A strong wave of enthusiasm for a united Europe was clearly mounting and the 
whole thing culminated in a congress at the Hague in May 1948. This meeting was to 
become extremely important for the unification of Europe, and according to Jacques 
Delors (1992: 9), “the congress at the Hague in May 1948 set off that whole process 
[of constructing a European Union] that is still occupying us today”. For this reason 
and also because it represents such a pure case of collective effervescence, we shall 
present the congress at the Hague in some detail.
The historical meeting at the Hague opened on May 7, 1948 and was to last for 
four hectic days. The core participants consisted of some 800 prominent politicians, 
including Churchill, Adenauer, Mitterand and Macmillan. All in all about 7,000 people 
attended. The atmosphere was immediately so heavy with emotions and enthusiasm 
that Rougemont, who was one of the speakers, felt that the whole thing was more 
like a dream than an ordinary congress. Describing the initial meeting in the mag-
nificent Ridderzaal, where usually the Dutch parliament convened, his thoughts 
began to swirl: “Where am I? In what epoch? In a dream?...Someone speaks in front 
of a microphone and I hear a voice saying... ’We must here and now resolve that a 
European Assembly be constituted’...Yes, it is a dream” (Rougemont in Brugsman 
1970: 135; cf. Rougemont 1966-67). Also other people who were present describe the 
high emotional level at the meeting. Churchill had tears in his eyes when he spoke. 
There was a “climate of enthusiasm and fervor”, Brugsman (1970: 134) says; and “for 
a time, anything and everything seemed possible”, according to the usually so sober 
Duroselle (1990: 384). The meeting reached its climax in the dramatic closing session. 
“The final session ended in a unanimous elan”, Brugsman (1970: 134) says, “and a ter-
rible thunderstorm drowned the voices of the speakers, even that of Churchill”.
Many resolutions were taken at the Hague meeting, including one that demanded 
the convening of a European Assemby. But as was pointed out by one of the partici-
pants, the resolutions were not as important as the tremendous sense of enthusiasm 
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that existed at the meeting.  This enthusiasm continued unabated during the rest of 
1948 and probably inspired the important decision by the French government, a few 
weeks later in July, to support the creation of a European Assembly. “This is a moment 
in history, which is perhaps unique—when it is possible to unite Europe”, said the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Bidault (Duroselle 1986: 15). In Duroselle’s 
opinion, the decision in July 1948 by the French government truly represented a his-
toric moment and was crucial to the future history of the European Union. About a 
year later the Council of Europe was created and Europe now got its Parliamentary 
Assembly. A real step towards the unification of Europe had been taken - or so it 
seemed.
But as we know, the Council of Europe immediately got bogged down in trivial 
details while the important decisions were vetoed by England and other countries 
(e.g. Milward 1984: 393, Duroselle 1990: 394). After a promising beginning the whole 
movement for a united Europe now came to a standstill. Why the momentum was 
suddenly lost, once the Council of Europe had been created, has been explained in 
different ways: England had only allowed the creation of the Council for Machia-
vellian reasons and it was now time to stop the game; the rules of procedure at the 
Council forbid majority decisions; and the traditional politicians had soon outwitted 
the European activists. What happened after the Council came to a stand-still is also 
well known. By operating behind the scenes Jean Monnet succeeded in launching 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950-1951. This event took place 
far away from the noisy Council and the effervescence at the meeting at the Hague. 
Indeed, Monnet himself had only contempt for the inefficient Council of Europe and 
he had deliberately stayed away from the Hague (Monnet 1978: 281-82, 495).
5. Concluding Remarks
It is clear that Jean Monnet’s plan consisted of a fairly narrow, economic agreement 
on how to coordinate the French and German coal and steel industries; and that, as 
such, it could hardly arouse very much enthusiasm and usher in a new community. 
But as many historians have noted, the European Coal and Steel Community was im-
mediately surrounded as if by magic—the magic of “Europe”—and ECSC did become 
the starting point for today’s European Union:
At the very moment of its announcement the Schuman Plan proposal [which was 
to lead to the formation of ECSC and which had been inspired by Monnet] became 
an established part of the context of events, a force for change, and a myth: The 
word “Europe” would never be spoken in quite the same way again. The power of 
the message impressed even skeptics at the time and has since made it difficult to 
disentangle the realities of the coal-steel negotiations from the aura envelopping 
them. (Gillingham 1984: 231; cf. Milward 1984: 237).
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From a Durkheimian viewpoint, it seems that the pragmatically oriented Mon-
net had somehow succeeded in tapping into the enthusiasm that already existed for 
Europe and let it infuse his own plan (cf. Milward 1984:397).  Insofar as our central 
query is concerned—how far back does the history of EU reach?—we would then end 
up with the following answer: the European Union has its roots in the post-World 
War II period, as mainstream historiography suggests. The European Coal and 
Steel Community was founded in 1950-1951 for a number of economic and political 
reasons having to do with the Realpolitik of the time, as e.g. Milward (1984) and 
Gillingham (1991) have shown—but it also drew inspiration and strength from the 
collective effervescence that grew out of World War II and which came to such an 
intense expression at the congress in the Hague in May 1948. While the literature on 
the European Idea may not be ultimately convincing in its claim that the European 
Union has indeed its origin in the very distant past, it does prove one very important 
point: that our knowledge about the birth of major social institutions—such as the 
European Union—can be complemented and enriched by insights into the role that 
ideas, ideals and cultural symbols do play in history.
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Erasmus
Hugh Trevor-Roper
DESIDERIUS ERASMUS was a scholar who in the early days of printing, sought to 
give his contemporaries clear and accurate texts of certain neglected works. He 
retranslated the Bible and edited the Christian Fathers. He also wrote, in his clear, 
elegant Latin, colloquies, satires, and works of evangelical piety; and he carried on, 
mainly with scholars, a gigantic correspondence. Offered opportunities of practical 
responsibility, he consistently evaded them, and in the crisis of his time he appeared 
to many a timorous neuter. He was neither a courtier in the age of courts, nor a revo-
lutionary in an age of revolution. Though a friend of kings, his ideal society was the 
republican city-state. In religion, Luther and Rome alike accused him of tepidity. He 
was not even an admirer of fashionable classical culture: ancient Rome displeased 
him both by its paganism and by its empire. His personal character was not heroic. 
He was valetudinarian, comfort-loving, timid, and querulous. He lived in his study 
and died in his bed.
And yet Erasmus is a giant figure in the history of ideas. He is the intellectual hero 
of the 16th century, and his failure was Europe’s tragedy. For his failure seemed, at the 
time, immense and final: as immense as his previous success.
Consider his success. Born the illegitimate son of an obscure priest, he rose, 
merely by his pen, to a position of undisputed supremacy in Europe. Cosmopolitan in 
an age of awakening nationalism, he was born in Holland, studied in Paris, found his 
intellectual home in Oxford, took his doctorate in Savoy, travelled to Germany and 
Italy, published his works impartially in Louvain, Paris, Venice, and Basel, and had 
disciples throughout Europe. When he travelled, customs-officers treated him as a 
prince, princes as a friend. The royal bastard or Scotland was his pupil, the King of 
Poland his correspondent ; the King of Portugal tried to lure him to Coimbra, the King 
of France wrote twice, and in his own hand, to tempt him to Paris. He was offered 
professorial chairs in Bavaria and Saxony, bishoprics in Spain and Sicily. The Emperor 
made him his Privy Councilor, the Pope offered him a cardinal’s hat. His disciples 
formed a European elite: they included, he once proudly wrote, “the Emperor, the 
Kings of England, France, and Denmark, Prince Ferdinand of Germany, the Cardinal 
of England, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and more princes, more bishops, more 
learned and honourable men than I can name, not only in England, Flanders, France, 
and Germany, but even in Poland and Hungary...”. Such was the fame of Erasmus in 
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1524, when it was almost at its peak. Twelve years later, his failure seemed complete. 
The great crisis of the Reformation had split his followers and Popes and Princes could 
not help him. To save his independence, Erasmus had declined their gifts, avoided 
their courts, and fled to die in a republican city in Switzerland. He died defeated, 
foreseeing the future. Soon his name and works would be condemned, his disciples 
persecuted, his patrons unavailing. “If that is a crime,” protested a Spanish thinker 
whom the Inquisition accused of having corresponded with Erasmus, “it is a crime 
committed also by many great princes, many men of all conditions in all countries... 
among whom I see the Pope, our Lord the Emperor, and most Christian princes, as 
well spiritual as secular. ...” It was in vain. By mid-century Erasmus had become a 
heretic. In Catholic countries it was dangerous even to have known the last great 
thinker of united Catholic Europe.
How did this great tragedy come about? For it was a real tragedy, not only of one 
man but of a whole generation. The disciples of Erasmus, in the early 16th century, 
were the spiritual and intellectual elite of Europe. There is scarcely a great name 
in those years which is not among them. They were the saints, the humanists, and 
the reformers who, by their universal diffusion, might have created a new Europe 
but were in fact swallowed up in the great and widening gulf which they had sought 
to bridge. To understand this tragedy of a generation it is not enough to study their 
leader only. We must consider the century which produced both him and them.
In the 14th century the decline of Medieval Europe began. The great age of 
medieval industry, medieval art, the medieval Church was then over. Particularly 
of the Church, whose vitality then began, as it seemed, a long, uninterrupted  ebb. 
This spiritual ebb was accompanied by other developments. First, the wealth of the 
Church was increased. New religious orders were not founded, but the old became 
increasingly rich and none more arrogant, more ostentatious of their wealth, than 
the former ‘Mendicant’ orders, the Franciscans and Dominicans. This increasing 
wealth of the Church led, as a natural consequence, to greater aristocratic control. 
The system of’ commendation’—”the leprosy of the Church” as Montalembert called 
it—made the Church, in the 15th as in the 18th century, into “a system of outdoor 
relief for the upper classes.” Hence those aristocratic teen-age bishops, those highly 
promoted papal bastards who so enliven the history of the pre-Reformation Church. 
Meanwhile, as spiritual life ebbed away from religion, new forms of piety were devel-
oped upon its arid crust. In the schools, Thomism triumphed: a mechanical dissection 
of dead doctrine; among the people ‘works’ replaced ‘faith’: mechanical devotions—
pilgrimages,  veneration of images and relics, ostentatious ceremonies, and finally, 
the sale of indulgences. Genuinely religious spirits turned away from this oppressive 
incrustation of religion to an inner mysticism. It was not for nothing that the 15th 
century was the great age of mysticism. Mysticism, as so often, was the refuge of the 
defeated.
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But Christianity was not everywhere defeated. Sporadically, throughout Europe, 
the evangelical protest was raised. In England the Lollards appealed to — and trans-
lated — the Bible. In Medicean Florence, the new Platonists, Ficino and Pico della 
Mirándola, challenged the formalism of the schools, and Savonarola, the puritan friar, 
preached his crusade against the mechanical ‘works’ of religion, hi the other great 
centre of European wealth, the Netherlands, Gerard Groote founded the evangelical 
order of the Brethren of the Common Life, whose new primitive Christianity spread 
through the monasteries of Northern Europe and produced the greatest mystical 
work of the century, The Imitation of Christ. But all these remained local movements, 
doomed (it seemed) to local extinction. By the end of the 15th century the Lollards had 
been crushed in England, Savonarola had been burnt in Florence, and the Brethren of 
the Common Life remained rude and parochial in their Northern simplicity. None of 
these were able, by themselves, to mobilise the scattered forces which demanded the 
reform of the Church.
For all over Europe there were practical men eager to reform both the Church 
and society. Princes, noblemen, officials, clergy, lawyers, scholars asked only to be 
inspired and used. Already serious efforts had been made within the Church itself, 
but the machinery was clogged by its own vested interests, against which even a 
reforming Pope was to prove helpless: the prisoner of his own patronage and the 
powerful monastic orders around his throne. Other reformers obtained local suc-
cesses by invoking the lay power: which how-ever had dangerous appetites. So 
Cardinal Ximenes in Spain, thanks to royal support, was able to purge monasteries, 
to reduce papal patronage, to advance Biblical study, and to found the new humanist 
university of Alcalá. But Ximenes was exceptionally fortunate : generally these early 
reformers were broken by the impossibility of their task or achieved success only 
among a few disciples. They remained a scattered minority of enlightened men in an 
apathetic or hostile world. Then Erasmus appeared and gave them, not a constitu-
tional programme but a message, not new machinery but a new spirit. He turned the 
disconnected reformers into an army which seemed—for a time—invincible.
How did he do it? One technical advantage which he possessed must not be over-
looked. Erasmus had the good fortune to coincide with the spread throughout Europe 
of the printing-press, first used ten years before his birth. The great printers of his 
time were his natural allies. They were scholars and humanists, members of that edu-
cated urban patriciate from which the reformers naturally sprang. Thierry Martens 
of Louvain was a pupil of the Brethren of the Common Life; so was Josse Badius of 
Paris, who had also studied in Italy; and Aldus Manutius of Venice was a humanist 
and a Greek scholar. These men, his publishers and friends, lent their services to Er-
asmus and his contemporaries as they could not have done to his predecessors. The 
printing-press, coinciding as it did with a European Church, a European movement 
of reform, and an international language, gave to the educated classes a weapon of 
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sudden, miraculous potency: a new way to learning, to the Scriptures, even to heresy, 
bypassing the control of the Church. The age of Erasmus was that golden age which 
lay between the European discovery of printing and the invention of its antidote, the 
Index Librorum Prohibitorum.
But of course this was not the only reason for Erasmus’s success. Erasmus did not 
go to the printing-press: the printing-press came to him. He was the first modern 
best-seller, the first great writer whose works publishers competed to commission, 
to print, and to distribute. They did so because he had discovered as none other 
had done, a universal idiom. Behind his lucid, nimble, pungent style he had united 
the intellectual appeals of all the reformers: Lollard Biblicism, Dutch piety, Italian 
scholarship, and Florentine Platonism. Fusing all these he had made them into one 
message. And finally, there was his irony, which carried that message everywhere. 
Like Pascal after him, he discovered that in moral questions it is not earnestness but 
irony that kills.
This great achievement, the uniting in one cosmopolitan message of the various 
local protests of the 15th century, occupied Erasmus for the first forty years of his life 
as a wandering scholar. The process began in his native Holland, where he studied 
under the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer and there discovered the deep 
evangelical piety which marked him for life. In Holland also he made his first contact 
with the exact classical scholarship of Renaissance Italy, and particularly of Lorenzo 
Valla, the papal secretary who had exposed the false Decretals of the Church. As 
a scholar, Valla remained Erasmus’s master all his life; it was by Valla’s strict and 
disconcerting textual methods that Erasmus would afterwards delete, as spurious, 
the only reference to the Trinity in the New Testament. But Erasmus’s most fruitful 
contact with Italy was not with the Italy of the philologists: it was with the Platonist 
Florence of Ficino, of Pico, and of Savonarola; and Erasmus made that contact not in 
Italy, where it was already extinct, but in England. There, in Oxford, English scholars 
—Grocyn, Linacre, Colet—returning from Italy, had grafted Florentine Platonism 
on to the stump of Lollard Biblicism and produced a new movement, Platonist and 
Pauline, by which Erasmus, coming to England in 1499, was at once inspired. From that 
moment, Oxford became his spiritual home. He became a disciple of Colet, the fellow-
pupil of Thomas More, and for the rest of their lives remained intimately attached to 
both of them. After that discovery, Erasmus’s intellectual experience was complete. 
He visited Italy, only to be disappointed by the cold, proud cult of pagan antiquity 
which had now replaced the Florentine renaissance. He went to Cambridge, but, as 
his biographer Renaudet observes, “l’esprit de Cambridge n’est pas l’esprit d’Oxford,” 
and he was disappointed there too. Thus, from four sources, from Wyclif and Gerard 
Groote, from Lorenzo Valla and Savonarola, Erasmus drew together his philosophy 
of reform. Out of these separate elements he created a single cosmopolitan force, a 
combination of Latin and Northern piety capable of inspiring the army of reformers 
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throughout Europe and conquering, from its Northern base, even orthodox France, 
even Jewish Spain, even pagan Rome.
And what was this philosophy? Erasmus himself called it Philosophia Christi, the 
philosophy of Christ. Rebelling against the dead intellectual apparatus of the School-
men and the mechanical devotions which monks and friars had multiplied among the 
ignorant people— the ‘works’ which seemed no longer to express or illustrate but to 
have replaced that ‘faith’ which St. Paul had preached—he urged men to turn to the 
Bible and, in particular, to the New Testament, and there to discover the primitive 
spirit of Christianity, as it had been before a jealous priesthood had desiccated it in 
formal dogma and overlaid it with “judaic” observances.
After all, thanks to the new art of printing, the Bible need not any longer be with-
held from the Christian world; thanks to the new scholarship of Italy, the text could 
be cleaned of all excrescences and incrustations and presented widespread in its 
original form. The message of Christ, he wrote, was not either complex in itself or 
a mystery of state which princes, out of prudence, must conceal: it was simple, and 
it should be spread. “I would have women read the Gospels and the Epistles of St. 
Paul; I would have the ploughman and the craftsman sing them at their work; I would 
have the traveller recite them to forget the weariness of his journey. Baptism and the 
sacraments belong to all Christians; why should knowledge of doctrine be reserved 
to a few men only, theologians and monks, who form but the smallest part of Chris-
tendom and often think only of their lands and goods? True theology is possessed 
by every man who is inspired and guided by the spirit of Christ, be he a digger or a 
weaver.” The theologian, said Erasmus, by his expert knowledge has a duty to divulge 
the simplicity of the Scriptures; but it is the layman who, if he understands it, is the 
measure of Christianity.
This teaching was soon to become ‘Protestant’ teaching; but when Erasmus first 
advanced it ‘Protestantism’ had not yet been heard of. Luther had not yet spoken, nor 
the Church panicked. Therefore clergy and laity alike listened to it without alarm. It 
seemed a new and fruitful message, capable of renewing the Church from within. In all 
Erasmus’s works this “Philosophy of Christ” is expressed. It is in his Adages, in his Para-
phrases, in his Colloquies, in his Praise of Folly, in the introductions and dedications 
of his great scholarly editions, in the vast correspondence by which he held together, 
throughout Europe, the evergrowing Erasmian elite. But most simply it appears in one 
of his earliest works, Enchiridion Militis Christians, “The Manual of a Christian Soldier.” 
When the Enchiridion was first published, in 1504, it attracted little notice, for Erasmus 
was not yet famous. But in 1508, with the publication in Venice of the great Aldine edi-
tion of his Adages, his fame was established, and in 1516, his wonderful year (for it saw 
the publication of his New Testament, his edition of St. Jerome, and his Institute Prin-
cipis Christiani), it swept over Europe. In that year the Enchiridion was rediscovered 
and began its conquest of Germany. Two years later a new edition, prefaced by a new 
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manifesto of the Philosophy of Christ, was printed at Basel. Translations soon appeared 
in German, Dutch, and French. The great French reformers —Lefèvre d’Etaples and his 
friends—accepted Erasmus as their leader. And meanwhile (for in 1517 the Archduke 
Charles, ruler of the Netherlands, had gone with his Flemish court to be King of Spain) 
the works of Erasmus had crossed the Pyrenees. In 1522 began that extraordinary 
phenomenon, the Erasmian conquest of the Peninsula. “It is astonishing,” wrote one 
of his disciples, “this devotion to Erasmus among all classes of Spaniards, learned and 
ignorant, clergy and laity alike.” “They say,” another reported to him, “that in reading 
your works they feel illuminated by the spirit of God. They say that you alone know how 
to publish the teaching of God for the peace and consolation of men’s souls.” In 1524, 
the Enchiridion was translated into Spanish. The translator himself was astonished by 
his success. “At the court of the Emperor,” he wrote, “in the towns, in the churches, in 
the monasteries, even in the inns and on the roads, everyone now has the Enchiridion 
of Erasmus. Hitherto it was read only in Latin by a few scholars, who did not always 
understand it; now it is read in Spanish by men of all conditions, and those who had 
previously never heard of Erasmus now know him through this little book.” From Spain 
the Enchiridion soon conquered bilingual Portugal. In 1531 an Italian translation was 
published at Brescia. The rest of his works soon followed. The piety of the North had 
triumphed throughout Europe.
Thus Erasmus conquered the élite everywhere. He conquered them because they 
were ready to be conquered. Particularly they were ready for him in Spain, where 
the reformation of Cardinal Ximenes had prepared the ground and the upper classes 
were deeply penetrated by a leaven of converted Jews. This connection between 
Erasmianism and the Jews in Spain is interesting. The fact is indubitable ; it is also 
somewhat paradoxical, for Erasmus him-self was anti-Semitic and hated Spain and 
Portugal, which he declined ever to visit, precisely because of their indelible Semitic 
tincture: “Italy,” he once wrote, “contains many Jews, but Spain scarcely contains 
any Christians”; and he dismissed Portugal (whose ‘Grocer-King’ had been offended 
by Erasmus’s strictures on the royal spice-monopoly) as “that Jewish race.” But in 
fact the paradox is explicable, and explicable partly by Erasmus’s own confusion of 
terms. To him Judaism was a religious term: it meant Talmudic formalism, pharisaical 
observances—in fact, precisely those ‘mechanical devotions’ which, in his eyes, had 
stifled, in official Christianity, the Philosophy of Christ. But the Spanish Jews of his 
time were of course converts to Christianity—the believing Jews had been expelled 
from the Peninsula before he had begun to publish; and being converts, newly ar-
rived at Christianity, they had not acquired, and were not prepared to acquire, that 
heavy apparatus of dogma which the born Christian has more gradually learnt to 
wear. Ironically, it was the born Christians, the cristianos viejos, who, in Spain, rep-
resented the ‘Judaism’ hated by Erasmus, and who, mobilised by the Orders and the 
Inquisition, ultimately destroyed Erasmianism in Spain: it was the ‘new Christians’, 
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the conversos, who were the natural Erasmians. Thus the Spanish Jews, by that same 
emancipation from dogma which afterwards made them prominent among the Span-
ish mystics, provided Erasmus with some of his greatest disciples and helped to make 
Spain, for a time, the bulwark of Erasmianism in Europe.
Such then was the position in the early i52o”s. At that time the ultimate triumph 
of Erasmianism in the Church must have seemed almost certain. For what power 
had the corrupt Court of Rome against so unanimous a Europe? And this Erasmian 
Europe was, moreover, politically mobilised under an Erasmian sovereign. Since 
1516 Erasmus had been a privy councillor of his own native sovereign, the Archduke 
Charles, ruler of the Netherlands, to whom he afterwards dedicated his Education of 
a Christian Prince. By 1520 the Archduke was not only King of Spain, the most power-
ful military monarchy of the day, but also, as Emperor in Germany, the greatest lay 
sovereign in Europe; and both Spain and Germany were now deeply penetrated by 
movements of reform. Further, the Emperor was surrounded and advised by what 
has been called an “Erasmian general staff.” Mercurino Gattinara, his Piedmontese 
chancellor, was a devoted disciple of Erasmus. So was Alonso de Valdés, his indispen-
sable Spanish secretary. Finally, in 1521 the Pope himself was a Netherlander. He was 
the Emperor’s old tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, a compatriot, almost a friend of Erasmus, 
and he had taken to Rome, just as the Emperor had taken to Spain, an entourage 
of Netherlanders, familiar with the Christian revival of the north. To complete his 
triumph, all that Erasmus required was a period of peace: for it is peace, not war, 
he always insisted, that forwards spiritual movements among men. Unfortunately, 
Europe did not obtain peace. Moreover, two other forces threatened from either side 
the victory which Erasmus sought: two rival fanaticisms to which his whole spirit 
was hateful : Luther and the monks.
From first to last monks were the bane of Erasmus’s life. Between them there 
was no peace. He hated and despised them as the irreconcilable enemies of learning 
and true piety, and they in turn pursued him with the vindictiveness of a depressed 
class whose very livelihood is threatened by reform. For if the spirit of monasticism 
was now dead—save among the Carthusians whom Erasmus himself, like More and 
Colet, excepted from his condemnations—its vested interests were still living, and 
these vested interests were threatened at their very base by Erasmus’s Philosophy 
of Christ. Were there monks in the New Testament or in the primitive centuries of 
the Church? What did monks do, asked the Reformers, except perpetuate among the 
ignorant people those mechanical devotions, those ‘works,’ those pilgrimages, those 
relics, those indulgences which the Philosophy of Christ had never admitted? In the 
last two centuries, all agreed, monks had contributed nothing to religion, nothing 
to society, nothing to learning. They had become a mere religious vested interest, 
a pressure-group which, by its wealth and its influence with the illiterate people, 
could intimidate even the sometimes liberal court of Rome. In the early 16th century 
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all liberal men believed that monasticism must be abolished: it was a disease in the 
Church. A year before that great practical reformer, Thomas Cromwell, began to 
abolish it in England, a committee of cardinals, appointed by the Pope, and including 
Cardinal Pole and the future Pope Paul IV, advocated its gradual abolition throughout 
Christendom. The battle-cry against the monks had been uttered thirty years before, 
by Erasmus, in his Enchiridion: Monachatus non estpietas, “Monkery is not piety.” It 
was a phrase which the monks would remember, and revenge.
The monks, of course, had their answer. The Philosophy of Christ, they could say, 
was all very well for educated men: for bishops and cathedral clergy, princes and 
officials, cultivated merchants, lawyers, scholars—that educated bourgeoisie in 
which Erasmus found his disciples. But what of the poor and unlearned who could not 
understand such an intellectual message? For them visual images, ‘mechanical devo-
tions,’ pilgrimages, relics, ceremonies, were the necessary evidence of the Church. 
The images which the Reformers attacked were the Bible of the illiterate. Erasmus 
might credit the ploughman and the craftsman with a capacity for apprehending the 
truth apart from such visual aids, but he was wrong: he romanticised the gross facul-
ties of the fallen plebs. And as for the monks and friars, the religious tribunes of that 
plebs, the recruiting-sergeants of that Christian army, who purveyed to their crude 
senses this necessary trash and bric-a-brac of religion—was it not their living also? 
Pigs’-bones and indulgences, spiritual necessities to the ignorant people, were bread-
and-butter to their tub-chaplains... Unfortunately this argument, though strong as 
cement to rally the monks in defence of their interests, did not seem very cogent to 
the Princes of the Church—at least as long as those Princes were not frightened. Un-
frightened, the educated classes turned naturally to Erasmus: it was only if they were 
frightened and needed an army that they would turn to the recruiting-sergeants, and 
lower their intellectual standards in deference towards them. Fortunately for the 
monks, a benefactor arose who did so frighten the upper classes in the Church and 
drove them into dependence on these hitherto despised allies. This benefactor was, 
appropriately enough, a renegade monk: Martin Luther.
When Luther made his frontal attack on the Roman Church, he incorporated in it, 
of course, many of the criticisms already made from within the Church by Erasmus. 
Consequently he naturally looked to Erasmus for support against Rome. But Eras-
mus, though a critic, was still a Churchman. He would support the Church of Rome, he 
replied, until be saw a better: and although he sympathised with Luther’s criticism, 
he did not think that Luther offered a better alternative. Consequently the Roman 
Church also looked to Erasmus for support against Luther. From 1519 onwards both 
sides began to court Erasmus: each hoped that the greatest uncommitted spiritual 
writer in Europe would declare roundly against its adversary.
What was Erasmus to do? He could not support Luther, whose philosophy he 
rejected and who was seeking to disrupt the Church. On the other hand he could hot 
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denounce him completely, without repudiating his own criticism of the Church—in 
other words, without ceasing to be Erasmus. The more he was pressed, the more he 
refused to commit himself, or use his unique position to endorse the rage of either 
party. He urged the Elector of Saxony to protect Luther against the Catholic fanatics; 
he urged Luther to persevere “against the tyranny of the See of Rome and its satel-
lites, the mendicant monks”; on the other hand he disavowed the heretical views of 
Luther. But the proper answer to Luther, he insisted, was not condemnation, for “the 
accusations of Luther against the tyranny, the rapacity, the corruption of the Court 
of Rome” were only too true—”would to God,” he wrote to the Pope’s chaplain, “that 
they were not.” The true remedy for Lutheranism was not denunciation, it was “to cut 
the roots from which the evil continually springs: of which one is the hatred of the 
Court of Rome, with its intolerable avarice and tyranny, and another certain human 
ordinances which weigh heavily upon Christian liberty”. These “human ordinances” 
were of course monasticism and mechanical devotions.
To this philosophy of reform Erasmus remained constant. He sacrificed to it his 
comfort, his influence, his friends, his peace of mind. He has often been accused of 
timidity, but in fact his refusal to take sides is a sign rather of consistency : consist-
ency to his ideal of a still united Church peacefully reformed from within. Pressed by 
Luther, he refused to support him or separate himself from Rome. Pressed by Rome, 
he refused to deny the truth or justice of Luther’s criticism. “All the Princes urge me 
to write against Luther,” he said; “I will not, or if I do, I shall so write that the Phari-
sees will wish I had kept silent”; and rather than be converted into an inquisitor in 
the Nether-lands, he fled to the free city of Basel to preserve his intellectual integrity. 
The monks were delighted. From now on Erasmus, though he had opposed Luther 
and been spurned by Luther, could be blackened as a Lutheran. The monasteries set 
to work: packs of monks dived into Erasmus’s writings; and soon a series of cleri-
cal tally-hos denoted the flushing, in many a deep theological thicket, of suspected 
heresy. In reply to the Erasmian phrase “Monkery is not piety,” a monk of Cologne 
invented a rival battle-cry which was to become just as famous: Erasmus posuit ova, 
Lutherus eduxit pullos.. . “Erasmus laid the eggs, Luther hatched them. God grant that 
we may smash the eggs and stifle the chicks!’’
But Erasmus’s patrons were not yet prepared to abandon him to such enemies. In 
1527 the Spanish monks prevailed on the Inquisitor-General to permit a general in-
quest on the works of Erasmus by an assembly of theologians in Valladolid. Erasmus 
was attacked for his doubting spirit, his inconvenient scholarship, his insinuating 
style. Had he not advocated toleration in religion, basing it on uncertainties which 
the monks in no way felt ? Had he not maintained that questions of hypostasis and 
homoousia did not justify setting fire to the world? But it was no good. The great of 
the world stood by Erasmus. The Inquisitor-General himself championed him. The 
Emperor wrote personally to promise his support. Even the Pope would not support 
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the monks. From the Conference of Valladolid Erasmus, thanks to his great patrons, 
emerged triumphant. Alas, it was his last triumph. In the very same year an event 
occurred which led to the loss of those patrons and precipitated the ultimate defeat 
of Erasmus, the ultimate victory of Luther and the monks.
For in 1527 the Spanish Erasmists appealed to the sword. Erasmus hated war. Only 
in peace, he thought, could the spirit reform the world. It was his great grievance 
against the kings who patronised him that they treated war so lightly, as a royal sport. 
Never did Erasmus’s basic republicanism express itself more eloquently than when he 
attacked the whole tribe of kings for their crimes against peace, their cynical profusion 
in dissipating the prosperity built up by the ceaseless labour of ‘that despised and hum-
ble crowd,” the people. Rightly, he once declared, was the eagle chosen as the symbol 
of royalty, since it is “neither beautiful, nor musical, nor fit for food, but carnivorous, 
greedy, hateful to all, a curse to all, able and eager to do more harm than all.” Even 
Popes, instead of controlling the warlike rage of kings, now joined and encouraged them 
in their crimes in order to establish their families in Italian duchies. Even theologians 
and clergy committed la trahison des clercs, prostituting their learning in support 
of secular wars. Even the Erasmians, he was now to discover, were not exempt from 
this disastrous fever. In 1527 the government of Charles V, fired by Erasmian visions of 
reform, launched its cosmopolitan armies against the incorrigible Court of Rome, and 
the Spanish Erasmists applauded both the war and the violent sack of Rome which it ac-
cidentally entailed. Meanwhile the Erasmian chancellor Gattinara applied to Erasmus 
to re-edit, as an imperial manifesto against the Papacy, Dante’s De Monorchia. Once 
again Erasmus refused: he declined to be the agent of the messianic Erasmianism of 
Spain. He was wise in his refusal. The sack of Rome was, for him, a fatal turning-point. 
Shocked by his own action, the Emperor himself lost his nerve: he moved gradually 
over to the papal side. And the Pope, shocked by his own failure, decided—if only the 
Emperor would secure his family in the duchy of Florence—to become an imperial-
ist. On these terms the bargain was sealed. The Medici returned to Florence, the Pope 
decided to live and die an imperialist, and the Emperor decided not, after all, to clean 
up the Papacy. Thus the Emperor abandoned the Erasmians, and soon afterwards they 
suffered still further blows. In 1530 Gattinara died, in 1532 Valdes. Five years after the 
sack of Rome the ‘Erasmian general staff’ was dissolved. Against Luther and the monks 
the Erasmians were left to rely on themselves. At once they began to feel the increasing 
pressure of persecution. Already the books of Erasmus had been censured in Paris; 
soon his French translator was burnt at the stake. In Spain too some of his disciples 
were burnt and even the Inquisitor-General could not save them. From now on the pace 
quickened. Rome, said its nuncio with satisfaction, was only waiting for Erasmus to die 
in order then to declare him formally a heretic.
Erasmus died in 1536 in Basel, already by then a Protestant city. He died uncon-
demned —indeed it was in his last year that he was offered, by a new ‘Erasmist’ pope, 
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the cardinal’s hat: but this honour he refused, as he had always refused other than 
purely intellectual authority. Nevertheless, he died defeated and defeatist. His hope, 
which had once seemed so near to fulfilment, of seeing the Philosophy of Christ ac-
cepted throughout Europe, was broken. Already, on the first emergence of Luther, he 
had foreseen the future: the re-crudescence of monkery, the defeat of the Philosophy 
of Christ, the victory, within the Roman Church, of the Council of Trent. “A fine de-
fender of evangelic liberty is Luther,” he had then written. “By his fault the yoke which 
we bear shall become twice as heavy. Mere permissible opinions shall become arti-
cles of faith. It will become dangerous to teach the Gospel... Luther behaves like a wild 
man; his adversaries goad him on. But if they prevail, we shall be left to write only the 
epitaph of Christ, dead without hope of resurrection.” Erasmus was a true prophet. 
After his death all this came about. Nevertheless, a whole generation passed before 
his ideals were formally defeated; and the fate of this generation is in-teresting, for 
it bears some resemblance to our own. It was the generation of the liberals who were 
obliged to choose between rival orthodoxies.
The period from about 1530, when Erasmus lost his protectors, until 1559, when 
his teaching was most emphatically condemned by Rome, was the generation of the 
Erasmian epigoni, the men who had grown up under his influence and who were now 
feeling the ever-increasing pressure, on either side, of Lutheran-ism and the Monks. 
What were they to do in such a crisis? Liberal men, believers in the Philosophy of 
Christ, they wished to remain true to that ideal, but they could no longer hope to 
realise it within an undivided Church: they must make the difficult choice between 
opposing bigotries. Some, in hope, chose Catholicism: but it was a ‘Protestant’ Ca-
tholicism, the Catholicism of Erasmus himself and, after his death, of the ‘reforming’ 
cardinals, Contarini, Sadoleto, Morone, Pole. They believed in such ‘Protestant’ doc-
trines as Justification by Faith, the renovation of the soul by Grace, and in the cult of 
mental prayer. They looked back through Erasmus to Savonarola and The Imitation of 
Chrüt, and their favourite contemporary book was a little work which a Eenedictine 
disciple of the Spanish Erasmian, Juan de
Valdcs, had composed in a monastery on Mount Etna, The Benefit of Christ. Others, 
in despair, chose Protestantism, but it was a ‘Catholic* Protestantism, the Protestant-
ism of the German Melanchthon, the Alsatian Bucer, the Spaniard Encinas, still hop-
ing for reunion across the narrowing Erasmian bridge. But ultimately such attempts 
proved futile: the gulf widened, the bridge crumbled, and the Erasmians who sought 
to meet upon it had to scramble to opposite sides or perish in the intervening abyss. 
The middle position became impossible.
Thus, little by little, in the generation after Erasmus’s death, the Erasmian elite 
was dissolved. Death, desertion, or martyrdom carried away its members and they 
were not replaced. But before each desertion, or each martyrdom, what a crisis of 
conscience occurred! Wherever we look, it is the same: groups of friends broken up 
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by the agony of divergent choice and retrospective recrimination. Of the liberal cardi-
nals who in 1534 had proposed the abolition of monasticism, one—Caraffa—became 
a reactionary, persecuting Pope and threw another of them, Morone, into prison as a 
heretic; a third, Pole, died in disgrace, accused of heresy. The little book of devotion 
which they had read together, The Benefit of Christ, was so thoroughly dealt with by 
the Inquisition that 300 years afterwards no copy of it could be found. It had become 
a Protestant work, like its precursors, The Imitation of Christ and the devotional 
writings of Savonarola.
Everywhere it was the same story. But perhaps the most famous of these Eras-
mian separations was that which divided not the living but the dead: the separation 
of Erasmus himself from his closest friend, Sir Thomas More. In all their lives, More 
and Erasmus had never diverged. Florentine Oxford had been the inspiration of both. 
Both had admired Pico della Mirandola and translated Lucian (afterwards a suspect 
author). Both had rejected monasticism, but exempted the Carthusians from that 
rejection. They had influenced each other’s work, shared each other’s irony, believed 
alike in toleration and republican city-government. And yet these inseparable allies 
were separated after death by rigid divisions of belief which they had never admit-
ted. In the foundering of the Erasmian ‘Third Church,’ More was converted into a 
saint of post-Tridentine Rome; Erasmus was uttetly disowned by the same Rome, 
discarded—and accepted—as a Protestant. Already in the Protestant England of Ed-
ward VI his Paraphrases were printed for use in churches; by 1559 all his books were 
on the Roman Index ; thereafter, while the Inquisition was obliterating even his name 
from Catholic Europe, his works, which had once been universal, were printed only 
in Protestant cities. The imprints of Paris, Augsburg, Mainz, Alcalá, Seville, Zaragoza, 
Venice, Modena gradually disappear from their title-pages, to be replaced by Basel, 
Geneva, Amsterdam, Leyden, Hanover, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Oxford, Stockholm, Aber-
deen.
Thus by 1560 the division seemed complete. The Reformers were outside the 
Church; and within the Church the Counter-Reformation, as it was formulated by 
the last session of the Council of Trent, was a victory for the monks. Every specifi-
cally Erasmian position was emphatically rejected by Rome and declared a mark of 
Protestant heresy. Thereafter the remaining Erasmists in the Church, however 
distinguished, were summarily dealt with. Even an Archbishop of Toledo, Primate of 
all Spain, was persecuted by the Inquisition and thrown into prison to die because 
of his Erasmian views. To avoid such a fate, the European Erasmists went over to 
the Protestantism of which they were accused, the Spanish Erasmists took refuge 
in mysticism—only to find that mysticism was persecuted also as an ‘Erasmian’ 
deviation. And on the other side, all that Erasmus had attacked in the Roman Church 
was now strengthened, reasserted, multiplied. Instead of appeasing the Reformers, 
Rome had decided to defy them. New monastic orders, new relics, new images, new 
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devotions—this was now the order of the day, and art was called in to advertise ever 
more ostentatiously this re-invigorated apparatus of belief. Of the old concessions to 
reason, nothing was left. Even the achievements of Erasmian Biblical Criticism were 
rejected, by both sides: the Book of Revelations crept back into the canon of the New 
Testament, the Epistle to the Hebrews was restored to St. Paul, the spurious comma 
iohanneum returned, for two centuries, into the New Testament. Erasmianism, it 
seemed, was killed stone-dead.
It would be easy to end here, as has often been done; but it would, I think, be unfair. 
Political programmes may be defeated entirely, but not ideas: at least, not great ideas. 
Political circumstances may alter around them, ideological frontiers may be formed 
against or across them, but such convulsions merely alter the terrain: they may di-
vert or divide, but they do not permanently dam the stream. The idea of ideological 
blocs systematically opposed to one another in intellectual matters is a naive idea 
such as can only occur to doctrinaires and bigots. The Age of the Reformation had 
of course its bigots: monks who, in 16th century Spain, denounced Liberal Catholics 
as ‘Lutheran’ heretics, puritans who, in 17th century England, denounced Liberal 
Protestants as ‘popish’ conspirators. But the historian of ideas is not interested in 
these stunted McCarthyites. The victims of persecution are always more interesting 
than their persecutors ; and if we wish to discover the heirs of Erasmus, rather than 
to assume too easily that they were crushed by the Counter-Reformation, we should 
not accept as final and mutually exclusive the barren categories of ‘Protestant’ and 
‘Catholic’ into which Christendom was officially and superfically divided. There was 
an Erasmianism after Erasmus, a secret stream which meandered to and fro across 
those loudly proclaimed but ill-guarded frontiers, creating oases of rational thought 
impartially on either side.
In Protestantism this stream is, of course, more easily identified, for the Protestant 
Churches openly adopted Erasmus and used his name. In some ways his direct heir 
was Calvin. Calvinism, at least in its early days, had a double appeal: it appealed to the 
laity in general, the simple gentry revolting against the privileges and usurpations 
of the priesthood, and it “exercised its most profound attraction not on this or that 
economic class but on the intellectual élite of all classes.”  Now these were precisely 
the two social groups to whom Erasmus also had appealed. The ideal  of Erasmus had 
been the ideal of lay piety, simple, sincere, animated by faith, nourished by prayer, 
free from the ostentatious trappings of priestly ‘works’; and his scholarly rationalism 
had drawn to him too “the intellectual élite of all classes.” When Rome had yielded 
to the monks, the intellectual élite moved over to Protestantism: from Italy, Spain, 
and Marian England there was an exodus of Erasmists to Geneva and Basel ; and 
Calvin, for those harder times, cast the ideas of Erasmus into his harder mould. It is 
easy, if we are blinded by the later, less intellectual form of Calvinism, to overlook 
its earlier character ; but if we look more closely, it is clear. Calvin was brought up 
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under the influence of Erasmus and himself professed the “Philosophy of Christ”; 
the inspiration of Erasmus is clear in his works; and it was in Basel, the capital of 
Erasmianism, that Calvin, in the last year of Erasmus’s life, wrote and published his 
Institutes. Admittedly Calvinism had also many features which Erasmus would have 
condemned, and in theocratic Geneva was dogmatic and intolerant ; but as practised 
under more tolerant lay rulers in England and the Netherlands, it could become, in 
many ways, the continuation of Erasmianism. Unfortunately, Calvinism, becoming 
intolerant, was unable to retain for long the intellectual Erasmian élite. Falling back 
therefore on its other basis, the poorer gentry, it degenerated into a religion of back-
woods squires: the Huguenot hobereaux of Southern France, the Covenanting lairds 
of Scotland, the Orangist petite noblesse of Gelderland. With this change, the spirit of 
Erasmus left Calvinism and sought, within Protestantism, another body.
It found it in the ‘rational theology’ of the 17th century, a theology which was 
‘unitarian’ in origin and began with Erasmus. Erasmus, on purely scholarly grounds, 
had correctly rejected from his New Testament the Trinitarian interpolation in 
the Epistle of John. Under pressure from the orthodox, he had in the end wearily 
restored it, but he had made it clear— to the fury of the monks—that he only did so 
for the sake of peace. Erasmus was therefore regarded as a unitarian, the founder 
of a rationalist unitarian school. The other founders were the French and Italian 
rationalists, Castellio, Acontius, and the two Sozzini who, fleeing from the Inquisition 
to the Erasmian city of Basel, there formulated their views and published the first 
systematic defence of toleration, De Haereticis an sint Persequendi. Afterwards the 
younger Sozzini went on and preached these views, under the name of Socinianifm, in 
the Italianised kingdom of Poland. Thus fathered, Socinianism incorporated not only 
anti-trinitarian conclusions but also Erasmian tolerance, Erasmian rationalism, and 
Erasmian respect for the Bible as the purest source of Christianity. In the late 16th 
century, England and Poland were the two most tolerant countries in Europe, and it 
was no accident that they proved the most accommodating homes for the unorthodox 
spirit of Erasmus. But by the next century the Jesuit reconquest of Poland was com-
plete; the Socinian univeristy of Rakow, ‘the Sarmatian Athens,’ was snuffed out, and 
the Erasmian professors fled to a new area of tolerance which had been reconquered 
from the Counter-Reformation : the United Provinces of Erasmus’s own home, the 
Netherlands. There already Calvinism had begun to harden into a rigid, illiberal 
system. The fresh breath from Erasmian Poland suddenly regenerated it, creating 
in its midst the liberal, tolerant ‘Arminianism’ of Amsterdam ; and from Amsterdam 
the same refreshing air was carried back to increasingly puritan England and there 
recreated the religious liberalism which Erasmus himself had found 130 years before.
What an extraordinary revenge it was! In 1500 Erasmus had helped to create in 
Oxford that Florentine, Platonist piety which challenged the rigid Catholicism of the 
Middle Ages. Now, in 1630, his spirit, having fled first to Poland, then to Holland, had 
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returned to Oxford to challenge the rigid Calvinism which had at one time seemed his 
more direct inheritor. Throughout the 1630’s ‘Socinian’ books poured into England 
from Amsterdam. Their ideas penetrated both parties in the Church alike, show-
ing themselves both in In-dependency to the Left and in Laudianism to the right of 
strict Calvinism. It was in high-church Arminianism that they first made themselves 
noticed. Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland, and ‘the incomparable John Hales of Eton’ 
were eaci described as ‘the first Socinian in England’; John Chillingworth and Jeremy 
Taylor were also, for their tolerance, called Socinians; and Archbishop Laud himself, 
for all his illiberal politics, was regarded as too liberal towards such ideas. The great 
patron ofthis ‘Socinian’ reception, Lord Falkland, who built up a fine Socinian library 
and made his house at Great Tew into the centre of such studies, was a particular 
admirer of Erasmus; and it is from the famous convivium theologicum of Great Tew, 
the headquarters of the new Oxford movement, and from the Cambridge Platonism 
of the next generation, that rationalist Christianity ultimately spread over England.
Meanwhile, what of the Catholic Church? Ostensibly, of course, Erasmus had no 
place in it. His name and works were carefully blotted out of its official records. But if 
Sir Thomas More could ultimately  find a place in Rome of the Counter-Reformation, 
could Erasmus really be excluded? Silently, secretly, anonymously, he returned. He 
returned by two roads: first with the Jesuits; afterwards, when they had degenerated 
from his exact spirit, with the great mystical revival of 17th century France.
For although the Counter-Reformation was, ostensibly at least, a victory for the 
monks, it was not only a victory for the monks. That indeed would have been impos-
sible. The Holy Office might condemn all Erasmian doctrines; it might repudiate the 
Erasmian cult of prayer, the Erasmian teaching of grace and faith; it might burn the 
books of Erasmus in Rome; it might forbid the translation of the Bible in whole or in 
part; it might reject rational criticism; and instead of all these it might offer again, 
redoubled, the old apparatus of religion on whose dead weight Erasmus had poured 
his irony, the other reformers their scorn. But if it had done no more than this, how 
could Rome have reconquered, as it did, a third of the provinces lost to Reform? In fact 
the Counter-Reformation was more positive than this. It rejected Erasmus indeed, 
but in name only. It stole his spirit and used it not to purge away but to reanimate 
the lifeless cumber of monastic religion. The first to do this, the real architects of the 
Counter-Reformation, were the newest order, the Jesuits. It was they who showed 
that both the new learning and the new piety of Erasmus could be used to reinvigor-
ate the old forms of religion. The Philosophia Christi of Erasmus could become the 
Spiritual Exercises of Loyola; his fluent Latinity could be continued in their polished 
schools; his Biblical criticism could become ultimately the astringent scholarship of 
the Bollanchsts. Thus refreshed, the spirit of Christianity could carry still that deposit 
of previous centuries whose dead weight Erasmus had sought to lessen: perhaps it 
could even be enriched by it.
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The Jesuits, of course, had to walk warily, especially in Spain and at Rome where 
the power of the old orders was greatest. They had to denounce one half of Erasmian-
ism before they could safely appropriate and exploit the other. Thus Loyola himself 
had read Erasmus’s Enchiridion, and he based his Spiritual Exercises fundamentally 
upon it; but he was careful to ensure that his pupils read it only in an expurgated and 
anonymous version, and he added to the Spiritual Exercises the rigorous and correc-
tive Rules for Thinking with the Church. And of course the Jesuits, like the Calvinists, 
rejected altogether the Erasmian belief in toleration. Even so they often found them-
selves in trouble on account of their ‘Erasmian’ innovations. They were distrusted by 
Pope Paul IV whose total condemnation of Erasmus they deplored. Their ‘Erasmian’ 
cult of ‘mental prayer’ was attacked as heretical by Dominicans and Pope alike. They 
supported, against the Pope, Cardinal Morone, who was accused of heresy for dis-
seminating the Erasmian book The Benefit of Christ; their support, against the In-
quisition, of the Erasmian Archbishop Carranza nearly compromised their order and 
they had to wriggle out of their commitments ; and they were constantly suspected 
of ‘illuminism’—that heresy of direct contact with God, without the expensive and 
oppressive help of the Church, for which the Spanish Erasmists were persecuted by 
the Inquisition. Nevertheless, by opportune denials, tactical tergiversations, and firm 
discipline over their indiscreet members, the Jesuits survived these difficulties: they 
made room for some at least of the ideas of Erasmus in the monk-ridden Church of 
Rome; and thereby, in half Europe, they saved it. It is not surprising that the writers of 
Counter-Reformation Europe in whom the spirit of Erasmus has been most observed 
were often the pupils, sometimes the admiring pupils, of the Jesuits.
The intellectual supremacy of Jesuits in the Catholic Church, like that of the 
Calvinists among the Protestants, was brief. Ii the 17th century it soon declined 
into mere intellectual smartness. But just as the desiccated Calvinist orthodoxy of 
the 17th century was refreshed by the ‘Socinian’ spirit from Poland, so the courtly 
vapidity and moral ‘laxism’ of the 17th century Jesuits was challenged—at least in 
Northern Europe—by a new liberalism: the great mystical revival which triumphed 
in France. Once again, since it was a Catholic movement, the name of Erasmus was 
suppressed : Erasmus was still, in the eyes of orthodox French Catholics “malheu-
reusement catholique s’il est encore digne de ce nom” (André du Val) and only a bold 
writer, like Claude Joly, could openly name him as the source of his inspiration. But 
the ideas of the new mysticism were his : they were, in the words of one of its histo-
rians, “idéesérasmiennes débaptisées” ; and they came into France not from Italy, 
dominated by the now disreputable Jesuits, nor from Spain, reconquered by brute 
monkish reaction, but from the Catholic Rhineland and, above all, from the Catho-
lic South of Erasmus’s home, the Netherlands. Just as the Protestant Netherlands 
received back the ‘Socinian’ spirit of Erasmus and therewith refreshed the wooden 
Calvinism of Holland and England, so the Catholic Netherlands, recreating the mysti-
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cal spirit of Erasmus, discharged it upon France to refresh the wooden orthodoxy of 
the Sorbomie. The result was what the abbé Brémond called “the mystical invasion” 
of France: an invasion which, like the ‘Socinian’ invasion of England, flowed alike in 
all parties in the Church, bearing fruit in the dévots and the Jansenists, in Bérulle 
and Pascal, in St. Francis of Sales and St. Vincent de Paul—the great figures who gave 
to Catholicism in 17th century France a warmth, a richness, and a humanity which 
it could claim nowhere else. At the beginning of the new century the fact could be 
admitted. In his “Apology or Justification for Erasmus,” a French Catholic, in 1713, paid 
at last open tribute to “that great man” whose work, so long resisted, had at last been 
achieved. The age of rational, tolerant piety had begun.
That age now seems to be closing. Therefore it may be useful to consider Eras-
mus, who was, in a sense, both its prophet and its martyr. What does a humanist 
do when bigotries swell, black and red, on either side? There are some today who 
say that intellectuals should line up on either side as a species of army chaplains to 
encourage the troops. But I do not think that Erasmus, if he had yielded to political 
pressure and joined the Gadarene stampede of Lutherans or monks would have had 
so lasting and beneficent an effect in the history of thought as he did by continuing 
to advocate peace for the diffusion of unarmed sense. Intellectuals may be citizens; 
they may even, as such, have to become soldiers; but it is not their business to be 
recruiting-sergeants. If their rational message is not heard in their time, let them 
still utter it rather than turn it into a battle-cry: it may still be heard tomorrow. For 
history, closely considered, suggests that opposite sides in an ideological struggle, 
for all their high-sounding abstract slogans, are not so opposite as they think that 
they are. The humanist message in fact can be understood by both. It may take a long 
time and a devious route; it may have to survive by stealth; but there is no proper 
alternative to it. Whether we think of secular or religious ideologies, the words of a 
sensible 18th century Whig bishop remain true: “the Church, like the Ark of Noah, is 
worth saving: not for the sake of the unclean beasts that almost filled it, and probably 
made most noise and clamour in it, but for the little corner of rationality that was as 
much distressed by the stink within as by the tempest without.” In the ideological 
struggles before the Age of Reason, that “little corner of rationality” was occupied by 
Erasmus; and therefore it is he, not Luther or Calvin, the Pope or the Jesuits, who still 
speaks to us with a human voice.
Source: Pro Europa
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European Cultural Identity? 
A Matter of Dialogue
Umberto Eco
L’ESPRESSO 11 November 2013
Those who practice the same profession as me make titanic efforts to avoid con-
gresses, symposia, and interviews on the obsessive theme of European identity. It is 
a question that is not new, but one that has become a burning issue in recent years, at 
a time when people often deny its existence.
Many of those who reject European identity are largely unencumbered by cultural 
baggage apart from an almost congenital xenophobia, which would like to see the 
continent broken up into a patchwork of tiny homelands. They are unaware that it 
is an identity which has been in the making since the founding of the University of 
Bologna (in 1088), and the “vagrant clerics” of all kinds who roamed across the con-
tinent from university to university — from Uppsala [in Sweden] to Salerno [Italy] 
— communicating in the one common language they knew, Latin. European identity, 
it seems, is only perceived by educated people. And that is sad, but it is a start.
Germanophile speeches
In this regard, I would like to quote a few pages of Proust’s Time Regained. The 
scene takes place in Paris during World War One. At night, the city fears the arrival 
of Zeppelins, hovering over the rooftops. The people blame the hated Boches for all 
kinds of atrocities. Yet these pages of Proust give off a Germanophile fragrance that 
permeates the conversations between the characters.
Charlus is a Germanophile, even if his admiration for the Germans seems less 
linked to cultural affinities than to his sexual preferences: “‘Our admiration for the 
French should not make us belittle our enemies; that would be to diminish ourselves. 
And you do not know what a soldier the German soldier is, you who have not seen him 
as I have, goose-stepping on parade.’ Returning to the ideal of manhood that he had 
outlined to me in Balbec […], he told me: ‘You see, the superb and strapping fellow that 
is the Boche soldier, a strong, healthy being, who thinks only of the greatness of his 
country, Deutschland über alles.’”
Let’s leave Charlus and the literary reminiscences we have discovered in his pro-
German speech, and move on to Saint-Loup, a brave soldier who is later killed in com-
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bat. ”[Saint-Loup], to make me understand certain oppositions of light and shadow 
that had been ‘the enchantment of his morning’ […] was not afraid to allude to a page 
of Romain Rolland, or even of Nietzsche, with the independence of those men who 
had been in the trenches, and who, unlike those who stayed in the rear, never had the 
slightest fear of pronouncing a German name […]. Saint-Loup spoke to me of a melody 
from Schumann; he gave the title only in German and told me straightaway, without 
any dithering, that when at dawn he had heard a first chirp at the edge of a forest, he 
had been enthralled as if this bird had spoken to him of that ‘sublime Siegfried’ that 
he very much hoped to hear after the war.”
Nothing that a war can wipe away
Or: “I learned that Robert de Saint-Loup was killed two days after his return to the 
front, covering the retreat of his men. Never had any man fed less on hatred of a whole 
people than he [...]. The last words I had heard from his mouth, six days earlier, were 
those that began a song by Schumann, which he hummed to me on my stairs, in Ger-
man; but because of the neighbours, I had to shut him up.”
And Proust hastens to add that even then, nothing in French culture proscribed 
the study of German culture, which could be undertaken albeit with a few precau-
tions: ”A professor wrote a remarkable book about Schiller, and it was reported in the 
newspapers. But before talking about the author of the book, he wrote, as if it were 
a licence to publish it, that he had been to the Marne, at Verdun, and that he had five 
citations, and two of his sons had been killed. After that he praised the clarity and 
depth of his book on Schiller, who could be described as “great” only as long as you 
said, instead of ‘this great German’, ‘this great Boche’.”
This is what constitutes the basis of the European cultural identity: an endur-
ing dialogue between the literatures, philosophies, musical and theatrical works. 
Nothing that a war can wipe away. And it is this identity that is the foundation of a 
community that resists the biggest barriers, that of language.
Source: Pro Europa
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But who, after all, is European?
Paul Valery
Extract
I SHALL NOW risk—with many reservation and the infinite scruples we must have 
when we wish to make a provisional statement of something not susceptible of true 
accuracy—I shall risk proposing a tentative definition. It is not a logical definition I 
am about to work out for you. It is a way of seeing, a point of view which recognizes 
that there are many others neither more nor less legitimate.
Well then, I shall consider as European all those peoples who in the course of his-
tory have undergone the three influences I shall name.
The first is that of Rome. Wherever the Roman Empire has ruled and its power has 
asserted itself; and further, wherever the Empire has been the object of fear, admira-
tion, and envy; wherever the weight of the Roman sword has been felt; wherever the 
majesty of Roman institutions and laws, or the apparatus and dignity of its magistra-
ture have been recognized or copied, and sometimes even incongruously aped -there 
is something European. Rome is the eternal model of organized and stable power.
I do not know the reasons for this great achievement; it is useless to seek them now, 
as it is idle to wonder what would have become of Europe if it had not become Roman.
The fact alone matters to us, the fact of the astonishingly durable imprint that was 
left on so many races and generations by this superstitious and systematic power, 
oddly permeated by the spirit of law, of military discipline, religion, and formalism... 
the first power to impose on conquered peoples the benefits of tolerance and good 
administration.
Then came Christianity. You know how gradually spread throughout the area of 
the Roman conquest. If we discount the New World )which was not so much Christian-
ized as peopled by Christians) and Russia (which for the greater part was unaware 
of Roman law and the empire of Caesar) we see that the area covered by religion of 
Christ still coincides almost exactly with the domain of the Empire’s authority. These 
two very different conquests yet have a kind of resemblance, and that resemblance is 
important to us. The policy of the Romans, growing ever more supple and ingenious 
with the increasing weakness of the central power, that is to say, with the extent and 
heterogeneity of the Empire, brought about a remarkable innovation in the practice 
of one people dominating many.
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Just as the City par excellence in the end took to its bosom practically all beliefs, 
naturalizing the most distant and incongruous gods and the most diverse cults, so 
the imperial government, conscious of the prestige attaching to the Roman name, did 
not hesitate to confer the title and privileges of civis romanus on men of all races and 
all tongues. So, by the deeds of that same Rome, the gods ceased to be associated with 
one tribe, and locality, one mountain, temple, or town, and became universal and to 
some extent common. And moreover, race, language, and the fact of being victor or 
victim, conqueror or conquered, gave way to a uniform juridical and political status 
inaccessible to no one. The emperor himself could be a Gaul, a Sarmatian, a Syrian, 
and could sacrifice to very strange gods. ... This was a great political innovation.
But Christianity, at St. Peter testifies, although it was one of the very few religions 
to be looked on with disfavor in Rome... Christianity, born of the Jewish people, itself 
spread to the gentiles of every race; through baptism it conferred on them the new 
dignity of Christians, as Rome conferred its citizenship on its former enemies. It 
gradually spread throughout the area of Roman power, adapting itself to the forms 
of the Empire, even adopting its administrative divisions (in the fifth century, civitas 
meant the episcopal city). It took all it could from Rome, and fixed its capital there 
rather than in Jerusalem. It borrowed Rome’s language. A man born in Bordeaux 
could be a Roman citizen and even a magistrate and at the same time a bishop of 
the new religion. The same Gaul could be imperial prefect and in pure Latin write 
beautiful hymns to the glory of the Son of God born a Jew and a subject of Herod. 
There, already, we have almost a complete European. A common law, a common God; 
one and the same temporal judge, one and the same Judge in eternity.
But while the Roman conquest had affected only political man and ruled the mind 
only in its external habits, the Christian conquest aimed at and gradually reached the 
depths of consciousness.
I do not wish even to attempt to measure the extraordinary changes which the re-
ligion of Christ brought into that consciousness, with the aim of making it universal. I 
do not wish even to show how singularly that religion influenced the formation of the 
European. I must here touch merely upon the surface of things and, in any case, the 
effects of Christianity are well known.
***
I SHALL DO no more than remind you of some of the features of its influence. In 
the first place it introduced subjective morality, and above all it brought about the 
consolidation of moral thought. This new unity took its place alongside the juridical 
unity contributed by Roman law; in both cases, abstract analysis tended to make 
regulations uniform.
Let us go beyond that. The new religion imposed self-examination. It may be said 
that it introduced Western man to that inner life which the Hindus had cultivated in 
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their own way for centuries, and which the mystics of Alexandria in their way had 
also felt, recognized, and studied.
Christianity proposed to the mind the most subtle, the greatest, and indeed the 
most fruitful problems. Whether it were a question of the value of testimony, the criti-
cism of texts, or the sources and guarantees of knowledge; of the distinction between 
faith and reason, and the opposition that arises between them. or the antagonism 
between faith, deeds, and works; a question of freedom, servitude, or grace; of spir-
itual and material power and their mutual conflict, the equality of men, the status of 
women -and how much else- Christianity educated and stimulated millions of minds, 
making them act and react, century after century.
***
HOWEVER, this is not yet a finished portrait of us Europeans. Something is still miss-
ing from our make-up. What is missing is that marvelous transformation to which we 
owe, not the sense of public order, the cult of the city and of temporal justice; nor even 
the depth of our consciousness, our capacity for absolute ideality, and our sense of an 
eternal justice... what is missing is rather that subtle yet powerful influence to which 
we owe the best of our intelligence, the acuteness and solidity of our knowledge, as 
also the clarity, purity, and elegance of our arts and literature: it is from Greece that 
these virtues came to us.
In this case too, we must admire the role of the Roman Empire. It conquered only 
to be conquered. Permeated by Greece and Christianity, the Empire offered to both an 
immense field, pacified and organized; it prepared the site and fashioned the mold into 
which Greek thought and the Christian idea were to pour and combine so curiously.
What we owe to Greece is perhaps what has most profoundly distinguished us 
from the rest of humanity. To her we owe the discipline of the Mind, the extraordinary 
example of perfection in everything. To her we owe the method of thought that tends 
to relate all things to man, the complete man. Man became for himself the system of 
reference to which all things must in the end relate. He must therefore develop all 
the parts of his being and maintain them in a harmony as clear and even as evident 
as possible. He must develop both body and mind. As for the mind, he must learn to 
defend himself against its excesses and its reveries, those of its products which are 
vague and purely imaginary, by means of scrupulous criticism and minute analysis of 
its judgments, the rational separation of its functions, and the regulation of its forms.
From this discipline, science was to emerge -our science, that is to say, the most 
characteristic product and the surest and most personal triumph of our intellect. 
Europe is above all the creator of science. There have been arts in all countries, there 
have been true science only in Europe.
Of course, before the age of Greece a kind of science had existed in Egypt and 
Chaldea, some of whose results may still seem noteworthy; but it was impure , being 
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in no way different, at times, from the technique of some trade, or, again, including 
extremely unscientific considerations. There has always been such a thing as obser-
vation. Man has always practiced reasoning. But these essential activities have no 
value an cannot regularly succeed unless other factors are prevented from vitiating 
their use. To develop science as we have it, a relatively perfect model had to be estab-
lished, a first work had to be set up as an Ideal, representing every form of precision, 
every proof, every beauty, every solidity, and which should once for all define the 
very concept of science as a pure construct, free of every consideration but the edifice 
itself.
Greek geometry was that incorruptible model, no only for every kind of knowl-
edge that aims at the state of perfection, but also and above all for those virtues 
most typical of the European intellect. I never think of classical art without seeing as 
its ineluctable example the monument of Greek geometry. The construction of that 
monument required the rarest gifts and those ordinarily most incompatible. The men 
who built it were hard and astute workmen, profound thinkers, but also artists of 
great subtlety and an exquisite sense of perfection.
Think of the cunning and the persistence required for them to accomplish such a 
delicate, such an improbable adaptation as that of common speech to precise reason-
ing; think of all their analyses of the most complex motor and visual operations; and 
how they succeeded in clearly matching those operations with linguistic and gram-
matical properties. They trusted words and their combinations to lead them safely 
through space. Of course their space has now become a plurality of spaces; it has 
been singularly enriched, and their geometry, which formerly seemed so rigorous, 
has been shown to have many flaws in its crystal. We have examined it so closely that 
where the Greeks saw one axiom we now count a dozen.
For each of the postulates they introduced, we know that several others may be 
substituted, and the result is a coherent geometry that sometimes can be physically 
applied.
But think what an innovation was that almost ceremonial form, which in its gen-
eral outline is so beautiful and pure. Think of that significant division of the Mind into 
separate moments, that marvelous order in which each act of reason is clearly placed, 
clearly distinct from the others. It reminds us of the structure of a temple, a static 
assemblage whose elements are all visible and all declare their function.
The eye considers the load, its support and distribution the bulk and its system 
of balance; the eye effortlessly distinguishes and orders those well-aligned masses 
whose very shape and vigor are appropriate to their role and volume. Those columns, 
capitals architraves, those entablatures and their subdivisions, and the ornaments 
that derive from them, never protruding beyond their proper place and fitness, all 
make me think of those elements of pure science as the Greeks first conceived them: 
definitions, axioms, lemmas, theorems, corollaries, porisms, problems ... that is to 
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say, the mechanism of the mind made visible, the very architecture of intelligence 
drawn to a plan -the temple erected to Space by the Word, yet a temple that can rise 
to infinity.
***
These, it seems to me, are the three essential conditions that define a true European, 
a man in whom the European mind can come to its full realization. Wherever the 
names of Caesar, Caius. Trajan, and Virgil, of Moses and St. Paul, and of Aristotle, Plato, 
and Euclid have had simultaneous meaning and authority, there is Europe. Every race 
and land that has been successively Romanized, Christianized, and , as regards the 
mind, disciplined by the Greeks, is absolutely European.
Some have undergone only one or two of these influences. There is a certain trait, 
then, quite distinct from race, nationality, and even language which unites the coun-
tries of the West and Central Europe, making them alike. The number of notions and 
ways of thought they have in common is much greater than the number of notions we 
have in common with an Arab or a Chinese.
In short, there is a region of the globe that is profoundly distinct from all others, 
from the human point of view. In power and precise knowledge, Europe still, even 
today, greatly outweighs the rest of the world. Or rather, it is not so much Europe that 
excels, but the European Mind, and America is its formidable creation.
Wherever that Mind prevails, there we witness the maximum of needs, the 
maximum of labor, capital , and production, the maximum of ambition and power, 
the maximum transportation of external Nature, the maximum of relations and 
exchanges.
All these taken together are Europe, or the image of Europe. Moreover, the source 
of this development, this astonishing superiority, is obviously the quality of the 
individual man, the average quality of Homo europaeus. It is remarkable that the 
European is defined not by race, or language, or customs, but by his aims and the 
amplitude of his will... And so forth.
Source: Pro Europa
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End of Nationalism
Konrad Adenauer
[From „World Indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for All”; 
transl. Richard & Clara Winston; © Harper & Brothers, New York 1955]
THOUGH IT IS often said that mankind is incapable of learning from history, this is 
not absolutely correct, to judge by our German experience.
As a result of the disaster which two world wars have brought to Germany, the 
great majority of our people have consciously or intuitively realized that nations can-
not continue to live exclusively according to their own desires and inclinations, but 
must merge their interests with those of the other peoples of the world. There is no 
longer any important problem which is only a German or even only a European one. 
We must learn to think and to act in larger terms.
The saying „We are all brothers!” is not an empty phrase and must never be allowed 
to become one. We must not think of certain countries as far away and therefore of 
no interest to us. Every country concerns us, for peace is indivisible and unless every 
country, in its decisions and acts, takes thought of the state of the whole world, this 
peace will never come.
What happens in East Asia concerns us every bit as much as what happens on our 
borders. When it comes to the repercussions of political events, East and West are 
connected by a direct line.
We are not alone. We are needed in the world, but still more we need the world. 
We are harshly misjudged by those people who say our present foreign policy is an 
attempt to bargain with the West at a point when she needs every ally she can get. 
On the contrary, we realize very clearly that purely national-political advantages, 
which have no bearing on the larger interdependency in which we all live, will do us 
no good whatsoever. It is not only a question of political problems. In the economic 
and cultural sphere as well we are no longer alone. In the long run, nobody can exist 
relying only on himself. This holds true for both the East and the West.
The present-day world situation is such that one can only serve the interests 
of one’s country by acting in concert with other countries. Old-fashioned politics 
whereby a great nation maintained its supremacy or enforced its will on others on 
the basis of sheer power is a thing of the past, for every country.
524 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
The age of national states has come to an end. Everyone must feel that a change 
has taken place, that an era has vanished and that a new age is dawning in which men 
will look beyond the borders of their own country and work in fraternal co-operation 
with other nations for the true aims of humanity. Whoever fails to realize this is 
beyond help. This very task and the construction of a Europe dedicated to this goal 
afford a great mission for German youth. And when this Europe, this new Europe, is 
built, our young people will once more find scope for active and peaceful lives.
We in Europe must break ourselves of the habit of thinking in terms of national 
states. As a result of the last war and the technological development of weapons, the 
strides of technology in general, a set of completely new conditions obtains in the 
world.
If the political and military implications of the recent H-bomb tests would induce 
the Soviet regime to reconsider its own position, we might well see a new chapter in 
East-West relations. First, however, the West must organize itself in full conscious-
ness of its strength. In Europe the answer is integration. The process of integration, 
which in my opinion is the great movement of our time, is also a process of regenera-
tion.
I believe that the distortion of the idea of the national state and the growth of 
nationalistic dogmas have been the chief stumbling block so far. Nationalism blinds 
nations to the fact that all peoples have a right to live and that neighborliness best 
serves the interests of every one of them. An age of peace and co-operation will dawn 
only when nationalist ideas are banned from politics.
Here in Europe, we have made a start in that direction by building plans for 
European unity. The first steps, then, have been taken. I wish to issue an appeal to 
all Europeans whose dream is peace. Let us cast aside our nationalistic ideas and 
outdated conceptions of the past and confidently move toward a new era when we 
shall all live together in peace.
In the state is a system of order willed by God, and therefore necessarily founded 
on God, then everyone within the political order who bears responsibility, anywhere 
and in a manner, must always be aware that he bears this responsibility before his 
own conscience and before God.
In a democratic, parliamentary state, in which the system of democracy is actual-
ized down to the smallest community, everyone of us bears responsibility. Some have 
more, some less, but all of us have a responsibility that no one can take away from us. 
If we do not meet this responsibility, there are consequences. And those consequences 
can be frightful for us, for our children and children’s children. That the state was a 
thing apart from the divine order was an idea most pronounced during the French 
Revolution. The French Revolution gave birth to nationalism, which dominated the 
last century, and dominated it more and more as the century advanced. The thinking 
of men and of nations was colored by nationalism. In the Napoleonic wars national-
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ism brought on the first great disaster. that involved almost the whole of mankind. 
In National Socialism nationalism celebrated a second orgy in Germany. It brought 
blood and tears, destruction and ruin on a tremendous scale. A third wave of na-
tionalistic thought is exemplified by Soviet Russia, which already has also brought 
tremendous suffering down upon mankind and will produce even greater disasters 
unless it proves possible to erect a powerful bulwark against that flood tide.
Nationalism, no matter where and in what form it appears, violates the divine or-
der. It makes the state an idol—for every people its own state. One of the fundamental 
principles of Christianity is the love of neighbor, respect for our neighbors. That 
principle does not apply only to individuals; it applies also to the attitudes of nations 
toward other nations. Because nationalism violates this principle of Christianity, our 
new state must never again be dominated by nationalism. As Christians we must go a 
step further: we must help to erect the bulwark against Soviet Russian nationalism.
It would be a wonder if there were no convinced Nazis left in the German Federal 
Republic. Of course there are. Neither fools nor criminals die so fast. But they cer-
tainly constitute no real danger to the security of the Federal Republic. There can 
be no question of their seizing power once more. A few Nazis do not make a National 
Socialist movement. And crude questionnaires are a poor method for finding out the 
truth about Germany. A little more respect for facts and a little less sensationalism 
can be urgently recommended to foreign observers of German conditions. The thirti-
eth of January, 1933, will not be repeated. We have a viable and alert democracy here. 
The Federal Republic is a useful and dependable building block for a united Europe.
We have a purpose that goes beyond that of preventing National Socialism 
from ever arising again among us in Germany. We also want to forestall a revival 
of nationalism in Europe. European agreements work toward that end. It is quite 
wrong to consider them primarily or even exclusively in terms of defense against 
Soviet Aggression. I am convinced that these tensions between East and West will 
pass in time. But the European agreements look forward toward a far more distant 
future. They will be in force for fifty years, and are intended to make war among the 
European nations impossible in the future. I believe we can rest certain of this: If the 
idea of European community should survive for fifty years, there will never again be 
a European war; in particular, there will never again be a war between France and 
Germany.
Source: Pro Europa

D
oc
u
m
en
ts
The Age of Empires
Raymond Aron
Extracts
(...) The fact remains that, within the narrow framework of existing economic units, 
none of the nation states of Western Europe has been able to use the resources of 
modern technology to the full, as the continental state of the USA has been able to 
do thanks to its undeveloped spaces. The old states of Europe which do not have the 
advantage of a large population or unexploited resources like those of the Soviet 
Union must rest their hopes on brain-power and the quality of their equipment and 
organization. Must they not also extend their frontiers so as to broaden their mental 
outlook?
To put it differently, the French crisis tends to merge into the crisis of our conti-
nent as a whole. For various reasons France’s expansion in the nineteenth century, 
on the human and individual level, lagged behind that of other great countries. But 
now that Germany has been overthrown and mutilated, and Britain brought closer to 
the continent by the development of aviation, the V1’s and V2’s and other inventions 
yet to come, we can see that France’s backwardness is only an extreme form of the 
backwardness of all nation states. The arrival on the scene of multinational, conti-
nental states has in a sense aggravated the backwardness of our country, but it has 
also given us a better chance of recovery provided we link our fate to that of others.
If we despair of France, therefore, we must also despair of Europe. If France does 
not recover, what other country would play the part that history offers us? If France 
is done for, what hope is there for Europe, drenched in blood and covered by ruins? 
To anyone who tries to see into the future there are in fact three main possibilities.
The first is that Europe, torn by rival influences, will be divided into spheres of 
influence by the non-European empires in the same way as the European states once 
partitioned the world. In that case France will be torn more savagely than any other 
country, because French people will pursue their ideas to the uttermost and fight 
tooth and nail for their conflicting aspirations.
Or it may be that Europe is ready to be unified by the arms and laws of a conqueror. 
The worst threat—that of a conqueror seeking to establish racial inequality as a prin-
ciple for all time—has been overcome. The Soviet Union, though at present it resorts 
to methods that arouse our repugnance, at least professes a universal ideal. When it 
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has solved the problem of poverty it may perhaps give up the forms of coercion and 
violence on which its economy has been based. But even if we believe that the USSR is 
bound to triumph, or at least likely to do so in the more or less distant future, how can 
we imagine Anglo-American influence being excluded from the old continent in the 
space of a generation, or in the next fifteen to twenty years? It is in this initial phase of 
reconstruction that the fate of Europe will be decided. For, assuming that unification 
is bound to come, its meaning will be different according to whether it is more or less 
freely welcomed by a restored, vigorous Western Europe, or shamefully endured by 
a group of exhausted countries.
Or again, it may be that Western Europe will exist in and for itself - not in op-
position to the Soviet Union and the other Slav countries, indeed cooperating with 
them, but firmly resisting external pressure. And independence does not only mean 
the strength to take one’s own decisions but also the power to conceive an original 
solution to the problems of our time, that is to offer an original synthesis of the two 
basic principles of freedom and planning, or, if you prefer, plurality and organization.
Most Frenchmen wish to play their part in a European future, but at present 
everything is uncertain. Neither political nor economic reconstruction is under way: 
the future is dark and confused, in France as in the rest of Europe, and it would be 
presumptuous and fruitless to offer any dogmatic solution.
There is an essential ambiguity in the situation. The governing principle is to en-
large economic and political units without abolishing the nation state or superseding 
the patriotism by which our historical groups are knit together. But it is Utopian to 
envisage a union of the whole of Western Europe, including Germany and Italy as 
well as France, Spain and Britain. One can imagine a system combining respect for 
nationalities with the economic and military advantages of empire; but for the time 
being such an idea is no less vague than attractive. (...)
At one time the present writer believed that the solution lay in a Western federa-
tion, and we still regard this as the ultimate aim; but for the moment it is beset by 
obstacles which we must not shrink from recognizing.
Britain is much stronger than France. A union between such unequal partners 
is bound to appear to the weaker one as a disguised form of abdication. In any case, 
Britain will never be wholly linked to the old continent, even in an age when the 
shores of the Channel are liable to be covered with launching-pads. The most elabo-
rate weapons of destruction have not overcome the insularity of the United Kingdom, 
which remains the metropolis of a worldwide empire.
At the same time we must not forget that Britain’s position has undergone a 
profound transformation, since command of the seas has passed from her to the US. 
Certainly any conflict between these two powers, with their common language and 
civilization, is unthinkable. Nevertheless, Britain’s freedom of action is definitely lim-
ited by the fact that, as a maritime nation, she is bound to remain on friendly terms 
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with the US. If a Western union were created as a third world power, its orientation 
would be westward from the outset. To put it more clearly, if France were to unite 
with Britain she would not be turning herself into a third world power, but would 
only become part of the Anglo-American system.
One can also imagine a Latin Union, though the idea has been discredited in 
France by the use that right-wingers have made of it. The total population of Italy, 
Spain and France would establish a Latin union on the level of the great political 
units of our century. The three countries today have a similar political structure and 
are, if one may so put it, in a similar state of mind. Soviet opposition to any form of 
Western federation would not apply to the same degree, since under this scheme the 
Latin countries would enjoy a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the British and Americans. 
Does this mean that the latter would object? In the age of air-power France will never 
separate herself from Britain, any more than Britain could live with a France that 
was potentially hostile or subject to hostile influence. The chief result would be some 
degree of equalization of resources as between the two chief members of the Western 
union. It would also be rather more likely that Europe could remain outside the con-
flicts that arc possible in the present age.
Unfortunately, however, Latin union is no more an immediate objective than 
Western union. The latter is suspect to the Russians and the former is bound to be 
viewed askance by the British empire, which is more than ever concerned for its 
Mediterranean bases. At present France is too weak for either type of union. There 
is no general enthusiasm for throwing in our lot with Spain and Italy, and we must 
consolidate ourselves before we can think of helping our distracted neighbours to do 
the same.
Our first and most urgent task is internal reform. A country influences the world 
by what it is, not by the flattering picture that propagandists seek to present to out-
siders. Unless France puts her house in order there will be no hope for her, either in 
alliances or in a Western bloc, because she will have lost the ability to exist by herself 
as a political community. If, on the other hand, she recovers her strength and will-
power, her efforts and sacrifices will be fitly rewarded. She will be able to take part, 
and a major part, in the work which Germany tried to accomplish by inhuman means 
and which the defeat of the Third Reich has bequeathed to us: that of restoring to 
Europe a sense of unity without sacrificing its heritage of rich and fruitful diversity.
France, the first model of the nation state, is now sharing in the decline of Europe 
and of nationalities. Is it not her mission to save the nation states and to save Europe, 
by helping the states to transcend themselves and by helping Europe to recover a 
sense of unity?
To the west of those lands that are governed by Soviet force and prestige there 
is a population of between 200 and 250 millions of the most civilized inhabitants of 
the globe, with huge industrial possibilities. They belong, as we know, to different 
530 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
states, some of which are divided by traditional prejudice or deep-seated hostility. 
No miracle is going to substitute order for chaos all at once; but to transcend national 
states without obliterating them is a historic task to which France can and should 
make a unique contribution.
How, and to what extent, this task can be accomplished is a matter for another 
study, to which the present essay may be regarded as a mere introduction. Let us 
only conclude by saying that constant and trusting cooperation between Britain and 
France will be an indispensable condition. The less we speak of a Western bloc, the 
better: it is an idea that arouses too much passion and opposition. But if our two coun-
tries can find a means, in practical day-to-day terms, of speaking with one voice and 
acting in unison, then there will be a hope of resurrection for our war-torn continent.
Source: Pro Europa
D
oc
u
m
en
ts
We must build a kind of United States of Europe!
Three Speeches
Sir Winston Churchill
An address at the University of Zurich, 19 September 1946
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I AM HONOURED to-day by being received in your ancient university and by the ad-
dress which had been given to me on your behalf and which I greatly value.
I wish to speak to you to-day about the tragedy of Europe. This noble continent, 
comprising on the whole the fairest and the most cultivated regions of the earth, 
enjoying a temperate and equable climate, is the home of all the great parent races 
of the western world. It is the fountain of Christian faith and Christian ethics. It is 
the origin of most of the culture, the arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and 
modern time. If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance, 
there would be no limit to the happiness, to the prosperity and the glory which its 
three or four million people would enjoy. Yet it is from Europe that have sprung that 
series of frightful nationalistic quarrels, originated by the Teutonic nations in their 
rise to power, which we have seen in this twentieth century and even in our own 
lifetime, wreck the peace and mar the prospects of all mankind.
And what is the plight to which Europe has been reduced? Some of the smaller 
States have indeed made a good recovery, but over wide areas a vast quivering mass 
of tormented, hungry, care-worn and bewildered human beings gape at the ruins of 
their cities and their homes, and scan the dark horizons for the approach of some 
new peril, tyranny or terror. Among the victors there is a babel of voices; among the 
vanquished the sullen silence of despair. That is all that Europeans, grouped in so 
many ancient states and nations, that is all that the Germanic races have got by tear-
ing each other to pieces and spreading havoc far and wide. Indeed but for the fact that 
the great Republic across the Atlantic Ocean has at length realized that the ruin or 
enslavement of Europe would involve their own fate as well, and has stretched out 
hands of succor and of guidance, but for that the Dark Ages would have returned in 
all their cruelty and squalor. Gentlemen, they may still return.
Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously 
adopted by the great majority of people in many lands, would as if by a miracle trans-
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form the whole scene, and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part 
of it, as free and as happy as Switzerland is to-day. What is this sovereign remedy? It 
is to re-create the European Family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with 
a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build 
a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers 
be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living. The process 
is simple. All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women 
to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing.
Much work, Ladies and Gentlemen, has been done upon this task by the exertions 
of the Pan-European Union which owes so much to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and 
which commanded the services of the famous French patriot and statesman Aris-
tide Briand. There is also that immense body of doctrine and procedure, which was 
brought into being amid high hopes after the first world war. I mean the League of 
Nations. The League of Nations did not fail because of its principles or conceptions. It 
failed because these principles were deserted by those States who had brought it into 
being. It failed because the governments of those days feared to face the facts, and act 
while time remained. This disaster must not be repeated. There is therefore much 
knowledge and material with which to build; and also bitter dear bought experience 
to stir the builders.
I was very glad to read in the newspapers two days ago that my friend President 
Truman had expressed his interest and sympathy with this great design. There is no 
reason why a regional organization of Europe should in any way conflict with the 
world organization of the United Nations. On the contrary, I believe that the larger 
synthesis will only survive if it is founded upon coherent natural groupings. There 
is already a natural grouping in the western hemisphere. We British have our own 
Commonwealth of Nations. These do not weaken, on the contrary they strengthen, 
the world organization. They are in fact its main support. And why should there not 
be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common 
citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent? And why 
should it not take its rightful place with other great groupings and help to shape the 
onward destinies of men? In order that this should be accomplished there must be an 
act of faith in which millions of families speaking many languages must consciously 
take part.
We all know that the two world wars through which we have passed arose out of 
the vain passion of a newly-united Germany to play the dominating part in the world. 
In this last struggle crimes and massacres have been committed for which there is no 
parallel since the invasion of the Mongols in the fourteenth century and no equal at 
any time in human history. The guilty must be punished. Germany must be deprived 
of the power to rearm and make another aggressive war. But when all this has been 
done, as it will be done, as it is being done, then there must be an end to retribution. 
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There must be what Mr. Gladstone many years ago called „a blessed act of oblivion”. 
We must all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past. We must look to the future. 
We cannot afford to drag forward across the years that are to come the hatreds and 
revenges which have sprung from the injuries of the past. If Europe is to be saved 
from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must be this act of faith in the 
European Family and this act of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past. 
Can the free peoples of Europe rise to the height of these resolves of the soul and of 
the instincts of the spirit of man? If they can, the wrongs and injuries which have been 
inflicted will have been washed away on all sides by the miseries which have been 
endured. Is there any need for further floods of agony? Is the only lesson of history to 
be that mankind is unteachable? Let there be justice, mercy and freedom. The peoples 
have only to will it, and all will achieve their hearts’ desire.
I am now going to say something that will astonish you. The first step in the re-cre-
ation of the European Family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In 
this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe. There 
can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great 
Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be 
such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations 
will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the 
common cause. The ancient states and principalities of Germany, freely joined to-
gether for mutual convenience in a federal system, might take their individual places 
among the United States of Europe. I shall not try to make a detailed programme for 
hundreds of millions of people who want to be happy and free, prosperous and safe, 
who wish to enjoy the four freedoms of which the great President Roosevelt spoke, 
and live in accordance with the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter. If this is 
their wish, if this is the wish of the Europeans in so many lands, they have only to say 
so, and means can certainly be found, and machinery erected, to carry that wish to 
full fruition. But I must give you a warning. Time may be short. At present there is a 
breathing-space. The cannons have ceased firing. The fighting has stopped; but the 
dangers have not stopped. If we are to form the United States of Europe, or whatever 
name it may take, we must begin now.
In these present days we dwell strangely and precariously under the shield, and I 
will even say protection, of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb is still only in the hands 
of a state and nation which we know will never use it except in the cause of right and 
freedom. But it may well be that in a few years this awful agency of destruction will 
be widespread and the catastrophe following from its use by several warring nations 
will not only bring to an end all that we call civilization, but may possibly disintegrate 
the globe itself.
I must now sum up the propositions which are before you. Our constant aim 
must be to build and fortify the strength of the United Nations Organization. Under 
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and within that world concept we must re-create the European Family in a regional 
structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe. And the first practical step 
would be to form a Council of Europe. If at first all the States of Europe are not wiliing 
or able to join the Union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine 
those who will and those who can. The salvation of the common people of every race 
and of every land from war or servitude must be established on solid foundations and 
must be guarded by the readiness of all men and women to die rather than submit to 
tyranny. In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. 
Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America and I trust 
Soviet Russia-for then indeed all would be well-must be the friends and sponsors of 
the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.
A Speech at the Congress of Europe, The Hague, 7 May 1948, 
(extracts)
[...] This Congress has brought together leaders of thought and action from all free 
countries of Europe. Statesmen of all political parties, leading figures from all the 
Churches, eminent writers, leaders of the professions, lawyers, chiefs of industry 
and prominent trade-unionists are gathered here. In fact a representative grouping 
of the most essential elements in the political, industrial, cultural and spiritual life 
of Europe is now assembled in this ancient hall. And although everyone has been 
invited in his individual capacity, nevertheless this Congress, and any conclusions 
it may reach, may fairly claim to be the voice of Europe. It is time indeed that that 
voice should be raised upon the scene of chaos and prostration, caused by the wrongs 
and hatreds of the past, and amid the dangers which lie about us in the present and 
cloud the future. We shall only save ourselves from the perils which draw near by 
forgetting the hatreds of the past, by letting national rancors and revenges die, by 
progressively effacing frontiers and barriers which aggravate and congeal our divi-
sions, and by rejoicing together in that glorious treasure of literature, of romance, 
of ethics, of thought and toleration belonging to all, which is the true inheritance of 
Europe, the expression of its genius and honor, but which by our quarrels, our follies, 
by our fearful wars and the cruel and awful deeds that spring from war and tyrants, 
we have almost cast away.
[...] Some time ago I stated that it was the proud mission of the victor nations to 
take the Germans by the hand and lead them back into the European family, and I 
rejoice that some of the most eminent and powerful Frenchmen have spoken in this 
sense. To rebuild Europe from its ruins and make its light shine forth again upon the 
world, we must first of all conquer ourselves. It is in this way only that the sublime, 
with its marvelous transmutations of material things, can be brought into our daily 
life. Europe requires all that Frenchmen, all that Germans, and all that every every 
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one of us can give. I therefore welcome here the German delegation, whom we have 
invited into our midst. For us the German problem is to restore the economic life of 
Germany and revive the ancient fame of the German race without thereby expos-
ing their neighbors and ourselves to any rebuilding or reassertion of their military 
power of which we still bear the scars. United Europe provides the only solution to 
this two- sided problem and it is also a solution which can be implemented without 
delay.
It is necessary for the executive governments of the sixteen countries, associated 
for the purposes of the Marshall Plan, to make precise arrangements. These can ap-
ply at present only to what is called Western Europe. In this we wish them well and 
will give them all loyal support; but our aim here is not confined to Western Europe. 
We seek nothing less than all Europe. Distinguished exiles from Czechoslovakia, and 
almost all the European nations, and also from Spain, are present among us. We aim 
at the eventual participation of all European peoples whose society and way of life, 
making all allowances for the different points of view in various countries, are not 
in disaccord with a Charter of Human Rights and with the sincere expression of free 
democracy. We welcome any country where the people own the Government, and not 
the Government the people. It is not the fault of those who are gathered here today, 
nor of the Governments involved in the Marshall Plan or in the Western Union, at 
least of all is it the fault of the United States, that the unity of Europe cannot be at 
present complete. All the States of the East and South-East of Europe, except Greece, 
are constrained to hold aloof from us and most of them are not allowed to express 
themselves by free democratic electoral processes. We must aim at nothing less than 
the union of Europe as a whole, and we look forward with confidence to the day when 
that union will be achieved.
[...]We are here to lay the foundations upon which the statesmen of the western 
democracies may stand, ant to create an atmosphere favorable to the decisions to 
which they may be led. It is not for us who do not wield the authority of Governments 
to confront each other or the world with sharply-cut formulas or detailed arrange-
ments. There are many different points of view which have to find their focus. We in 
Britain must move in harmony with our great partners in the Commonwealth, who, 
I do not doubt, though separated from us by the ocean spaces, share our aspirations 
and follow with deep attention our trend of thought. But undue precipitancy, like 
too much refinement, would hinder and not help the immediate mission we have to 
fulfill. Nevertheless we must not separate without a positive step forward. The task 
before us at this Congress is not only to raise the voice of United Europe during these 
few days we are together. We must here and now resolve that in one form or another 
a European Assembly shall be constituted which will enable that voice to make itself 
continuously heard and we trust with ever growing acceptance through all the free 
countries of this Continent.
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A high and a solemn responsibility rests upon us here this afternoon in this 
Congress of a Europe striving to be reborn. If we allow ourselves to be rent and disor-
dered by pettiness and small disputes, if we fail in clarity of view or courage in action, 
a priceless occasion may be cast away for ever. But if we all pull together and pool the 
luck and comradeship—and we shall need all the comradeship and not a little luck if 
we are to move together in this way—and firmly grasp the larger hopes of humanity, 
then it may be that we shall move into a happier sunlit age, when all the little children 
who are now growing up in this tormented world may find themselves not the vic-
tors nor the vanquished in the fleeting triumphs of one country over another in the 
bloody turmoil of destructive war, but the heirs of all the treasures of the past and the 
masters of all the science, the abundance and the glories of the future.
A Speech to the people of Amsterdam, in the Square Dam, 9 May 1948, 
(extracts)
[...] You have heard it said no doubt about extremes resembling one another, certainly 
the North Pole and the South Pole are very far apart. But if you woke up tomorrow 
morning at one or the other you would not know which it was. There might be more 
penguins at one end of the world, and more polar bears at the other. But all around 
you would be ice and snow and the blast of freezing winds over vast dreary spaces.
Our idea is something different. We make another picture in our minds. We think 
that United Europe might be a better place to live in than either the Arctic or Antarc-
tic. And that is why we, your visitors and guests, have come here from so many lands, 
speaking so many languages to accept the generous hospitalities of the Hague and 
Amsterdam and to try to take a step forward together in harmony with the policy of 
our freely-elected governments towards reviving the old glories of Europe and ena-
bling this famous Continent to resume its place as an independent and self-supporting 
member of a World Organization. As a part in this World Organization we hope that 
there will soon be formed a Council of Europe which will comprise the governments 
and peoples of as many European states as hold our convictions and accept the broad 
freedoms of democratic life established on the freely—expressed will of the people 
in many places, though we make great allowances for difficulties in great populations 
acting through Parliamentary institutions. This is the Europe which we wish to see 
arise in so great a strength as to be safe from internal disruption or foreign inroads. 
We hope to reach again a Europe united but purged of the slavery of ancient, classical 
times, a Europe in which men will be proud to say, “I am a European”.
We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think as much of being 
a European as of belonging to their native land, and that without losing any of their 
love and loyalty of their birthplace. We hope wherever they go in this wide domain, 
to which we set no limits in the European Continent, they will truly feel “Here I am at 
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home. I am a citizen of this country too”. Let us meet together. Let us work together. 
Let us do our utmost—all that is in us—for the good of all. How simple it would all 
be, how crowned with blessings for all of us if that could ever come, especially for 
the children and young men and women now growing up in this tortured world. How 
proud we should all be if we had played any useful part in bringing that great day to 
come. And here I invoke the interest of the broad , proletarian masses. We see before 
our eyes scores of millions of humble homes in Europe and in lands outside which 
have bees afflicted by war. Are they never to have a chance to thrive and flourish? Is 
the honest, faithful, breadwinner never to be able to reap the fruits of his labor? Can 
he never bring up his children in health and joy and with the hopes of better days? 
Can he never be free from the fear of foreign invasion, the crash of the bomb and the 
shell, the tramp of the hostile patrol, or what is even worse, the knock upon his door 
by the political police to take the loved one from the protection of law and justice, 
when all the time by one spontaneous effort of his will he could wake from all these 
nightmare horrors and stand forth in his manhood, free in the broad light of day?
But if we are to achieve this supreme reward we must lay aside every impedi-
ment; we must conquer ourselves. We must rise to a level higher than the grievous 
injuries we have suffered or the deep hatreds they have caused. Old feuds must die. 
Territorial ambitions must be set aside. National rivalries must be confined to the 
question as to who can render the most distinguished service to the common cause. 
Moreover we must take all necessary steps and particular precautions to make sure 
that we have the power and the time to carry out this transformation of the western 
world. Much of this of course belongs to the responsibilities of the chosen govern-
ments responsible in so many countries. But we have gathered together at The Hague, 
to proclaim here and to all the world the mission, the aim and the design of a United 
Europe, whose moral conceptions will win the respect and gratitude of mankind and 
whose physical strength will be such that none will dare molest her tranquil sway.
Source: Pro Europa
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It Is Necessary to Work Together
Jacques Delors
Speech to Trades Union Congress, Bournemouth, 8 September 1988.
President, dear friends,
It was with great pleasure that I accepted the invitation to address congress today. 
Europe is again on the move. This is confirmed by your report ‘1992: Maximizing the 
benefits—minimizing the costs’, and the wide interest in the topic, evident from the 
large number of motions that have been put forward. I look forward to hearing the 
debate that follows.
Europe matters to each and every one of us. As your general secretary says things 
have changed, there will be more change, as your excellent report demonstrates. We 
are living through a peaceful revolution in which we must all participate. We must 
all adapt. This is why the challenge of 1992 is now being taken up by Trades Unions 
across Europe. The commission will respond.
Today I wish to concentrate on four main themes:
First, there is the challenge before us. The potential benefits of completing the 
internal market by 1992 are very large. But we must, as your report says, maximize 
these benefits while minimizing the costs, we must also preserve and enhance the 
uniquely European model of society.
Second, we must again become masters of our destiny. It is only by relying on our 
own strengths that we will be able to resist adverse external pressures.
Third, close co-operation and solidarity as well as competition are the conditions 
for our common success.
Fourth, the social dimension is a vital element; your report shows that you are 
ready to be involved.
1. The challenge
Your organization has played a pioneering role in the history of the trade union 
movement. It has served as a model for other trade unions in neighbouring European 
countries in their fight for the rights of workers and for the defence of their dignity. 
This historic achievement helped to forge in Europe a new model for society, a model 
based on a skilful balance between society and the individual. This model varies from 
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country to country, but throughout Europe we encounter similar mechanisms of so-
cial solidarity, of protection of the weakest and of collective bargaining. This model 
was associated with three decades of expansion following the Second World War. In 
recent years it had been threatened by adverse economical developments, some of 
which have an external origin. Europe has grown increasingly vulnerable. We must 
now rely on our own forces.
The globalization of markets and new technologies affect our perceptions and our 
way of life. All those concerned with the organization of our society must adapt. This 
of course includes the Trade Unions of Europe.
The countries of Europe are responding to the challenge in more or less the same 
way. They have rejected drastic reductions in wages and levels of social protection. 
They have sought to adapt to the new world situation through an increase in produc-
tivity. They have succeeded in part, but at the price of massive unemployment.
Unemployment is our major challenge. It is particularly young people and the 
disadvantaged who are suffering. A number of policies have been tried. There have 
been successes: but the problem is far from being solved. The policies tried have not 
been adequate.
2. Mastering our destiny
It is essential to strengthen our control of our economic and social development, of 
our technology, and of our monetary capacity. We must rely on our own resources, 
and preserve our European identity. We must pool our resources. In keeping with 
this spirit, there must be full and broad consultation with those involved in the pro-
duction of wealth. Since we are all closely dependent upon each other, our futures are 
linked. Jointly, we can enjoy the advantages to be derived from this situation.
It is necessary to give a broader framework to this co-operative action, 1992 does 
this.
The governments and Parliaments of the 12 member states have solemnly com-
mitted themselves through the Single European Act to such a framework. European 
unions and employers have also approved the objective of a truly common market, 
with their own conditions. This shared objective calls for a concrete and productive 
social dialogue at the European level. That is the reason why I invited those concerned 
to relaunch this dialogue in January 1985.
Many of the major decisions necessary for the completion of the internal market 
have already been taken or are in the pipeline, as explained clearly in your report. The 
Heads of State and government at the European Council in Hanover in June agreed 
that implementation of the 1992 programme has become an irreversible process.
Your report rightly points out that there will be far-reaching consequences for 
industry and the economy. The potential benefits are enormous. Realizing that po-
tential depends on all of us.
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There are a number of ways of reacting to 1992.
First, there are the sceptics. They doubt that the potential benefits are large. They 
also fear that increased competition will only put at risk our social achievements. 
These people are already pointing an accusing finger at the single market and blam-
ing it for all difficulties.
Second, there are the enthusiasts. They see the completion of the internal market 
as the answer to all their problems. They maintain that it, alone and unaided, will 
result in the convergence of economic policies, the creation of millions of jobs, and 
spectacular growth.
Third, there are the architects. They see the opportunities that it creates and are 
ready to tackle the difficulties to which it might give rise. I am in this camp: and I 
hope that you will join it. Your report gives me confidence that you will do so.
Membership of the camp requires constant effort and imagination. Without these, 
the reality will not correspond to the dream.
3. Co-operation - solidarity
The European Community will be characterized by co-operation as well as competi-
tion. It will encourage individual initiative as well as solidarity. If these characteris-
tics are not present, the goals will not be achieved.
A large market of 320 million will increase competition. It will benefit the con-
sumer, and allow European industry to compete on a world scale. It will create new job 
opportunities and contribute to a better standard of living. These benefits will only be 
fully achieved with increased co¬operation, and they must be spread throughout the 
Community. It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the governments of the 12 
member states would reach the agreement that they concluded in Brussels in Febru-
ary of this year. The measures agreed will increase the solidarity of the Community.
Between now and 1992 about £40bn will be devoted by them to following five 
objectives:
• The development of the backward regions of the Community
• The restructuring of regions in industrial decline
• The fight against long-term unemployment
• The provision of jobs for young people
• Rural development
You will notice that most of these objectives concern all member states. Some have 
expressed a fear that the North/South problems of a nation like the United Kingdom 
would be neglected at the Community level. This is not the case, as the list of objec-
tives clearly shows.
With these accompanying policies and with an increased co-operation in areas 
like technology and the environment, 1992 will not only be a factor contributing to 
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additional growth and employment: but it will also be possible to ensure that the 
advantages of the single market spread to all regions.
4. The social dimension
Our Europe also needs clear rules and respect for the law. While we are trying to pool 
our efforts, it would be unacceptable for unfair practices to distort the interplay of 
economic forces. It would be unacceptable for Europe to become a source of social 
regression, while we are trying to rediscover together the road to prosperity and 
employment.
The European Commission has suggested the following principles on which to 
base the definition and implementation of these rules:
First, measures adopted to complete the large market should not diminish the 
level of social protection already achieved in the member states.
Second, the internal market should be designed to benefit each and every citizen 
of the Community. It is therefore necessary to improve workers’ living and working 
conditions, and to provide better protection for their health and safety at work.
Third, the measures to be taken will concern the area of collective bargaining and 
legislation.
Now we have to make concrete progress. For this we need the contribution of the 
architects. In May last year, when addressing the European Trade Union Congress, I 
made three proposals, which were designed to clearly show the social dimension of 
the European construction. You have noted these in your report. They are:
• The establishment of a platform of guaranteed social rights, containing general 
principles, such as every worker’s right to be covered by a collective agreement, 
and more specific measures concerning, for example, the status of temporary 
work.
• The creation of a Statute for European Companies, which would include the par-
ticipation of workers or their representatives. Those concerned could opt, on the 
basis of their traditions and wishes, between three formulae.
• The extension to all workers of the right to lifelong education. This would be done 
on the basis of existing provisions, and after a full consultation of unions and 
management.
These initial proposals should be studied and discussed. Other suggestions from 
both sides of industry are welcome. In my opinion social dialogue and collective 
bargaining are essential pillars of our democratic society and social progress.
Dear friends,
Europe must reassert itself. The world is looking at us. It is watching you, the 
British; it is watching the Germans, the French, the Italians and all the others. It is 
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wondering how these nations, which have fought each other over the centuries, have 
managed to rise up again when so much was pointing to their decline.
The answer is that Europe is reaffirming itself by managing its diversity. You, 
dear friends, will remain British. More precisely some, like you President will remain 
Welsh: others will remain Scottish, Irish or English, and I am not forgetting the others. 
You Mr Breit [Chairman of the German Trade Union Federation] will remain German. 
We will all maintain our individual ways of life, and our valued traditions. Thanks to 
co-operation and solidarity between Europeans, we will succeed in preserving our 
identity and our culture. Through the richness of our diversity and our talents, we 
will increase our capacity for decision and action.
I did not come here with a miracle cure, with promises of millions of jobs, and 
general prosperity. There are no easy solutions. This world is harsh, and rapidly 
changing. Properly managed, 1992 can help us to adapt, to meet the challenges and 
reap the benefits. It will re-invigorate our European model of development, 1992 is 
much more than the creation of an internal market abolishing barriers to the free 
movement of goods, services and investment. To capture the potential gains, it is 
necessary to work together.
Source: Pro Europa
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On Integration
Jacques Delors
Report on his speech to the Institutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
on 17th March ‘98
In an appeal for a powerful and generous Europe, Mr Delors argued that if we were 
to avoid creating a soulless Europe it was essential to be aware of how Europe had 
declined and show greater political will, more imagination as regards institutional 
matters and greater realism when implementing policies. Europe needed to be easier 
for the public to understand, so that they could take part in this European adven-
ture—the first which they had been summoned to take part in for a long time.
Turning to the criteria for improving the political and institutional set-up of the 
EU—transparency, subsidiarity, efficiency and democratic scrutiny—Mr Delors 
emphasised that transparency did not just mean having access to documents; above 
all, it meant that what was happening at European level must make sense to ordinary 
people, as Europe was now an integral part of their everyday lives. As to subsidiarity, 
he was in favour of relaunching the debate for the sake of greater simplicity. On effi-
ciency, it was important to make clear who took the decisions, the Commission or the 
Member States. In this connection, he criticised the role now played by the “rampant 
undergrowth” of committees. Mutual trust was crucial in this area. Mr Delors went 
on to distinguish between external and internal efficiency the system of pillars, he 
said, was a form of “organised schizophrenia” -Europe must speak with one voice in 
order to negotiate all aspects of external policy. As to democratic scrutiny, he was in 
favour of reducing the area of shared powers and of affirming clearly the powers of 
the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
As regards institutional changes, Mr Delors was surprised that the last IGC had 
only dealt with the Commission and the weighting of votes—and this only at the last 
minute—whereas in his view the most important point was the preparation of deci-
sions. He argued for a return to the simple situation under which the Commission 
had a right of initiative; the public had to be able to know what the goals of the EU 
were as regards the validity of the Community model. He said that this model had 
enabled progress to be made but acknowledged that the machinery was complicated 
and was not becoming any clearer or more efficient. He believed that the political 
debate within the EU and vis-a- vis the outside world needed to be personalised. On 
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EMU, Mr Delors warned against the new imbalance now emerging between a mon-
etary pole and an economic pole, the first having a genuinely federal institution, the 
European Central Bank (although it if operated in a political vacuum it might become 
a scapegoat for critics of the integration process, thereby jeopardising this process 
as initially conceived). The initial political model should therefore be “purified” by 
raising the profiles of both Parliament and the Commission.
On the subject of enlargement and the chances of a Union of 25 or 30 countries 
maintaining the same level of ambition, the former President of the Commission 
voiced his doubts. He then put forward two hypotheses, one of enlargement resulting 
in an economic area with a few common policies, an area of peace, cooperation, etc., 
and one in which certain countries would seek to go further towards political union. 
In the former case, the rules of the game would have to be clearly defined by the Com-
mission and the Court of Justice, with scrutiny by Parliament, and working methods 
would have to be reviewed. Mr Delors regarded this hypothesis as equivalent to “a 
mass without faith”. Under the second hypothesis, two spheres, the political and the 
economic, would have to be differentiated. No country would be able to prevent the 
others from advancing or force them to follow. Within this political Europe, there 
would be two poles, Parliament and the Commission. The role of the Member States 
would have to evolve as well, with COREPER being replaced by meetings once a fort-
night between the deputy prime ministers of the Member States. Ultimately, however, 
the important point when examining these issues was to find out whether everyone 
agreed on what should be done together, rather than how it should be done, and 
this meant laying one’s cards on the table. It was better to progress via a crisis than 
through bouts of schizophrenia.
In the course of a discussion with MEPs and in response to the many questions 
asked, Mr Delors stressed the need to devise a simpler system of power sharing and 
put forward the idea of committees of experts to suggest possible paths towards 
reform. The Commission’s power of initiative was, he felt, a key element if progress 
was to be made and he called for the next European elections to introduce an ele-
ment of drama into politics, as a means of combating apathy and focusing on national 
problems. Mr Delors was also in favor of the Union taking fewer detailed decisions 
and instead having more of a political impact. He regarded the idea of a European 
constitution as premature but acknowledged that a constitution would be conducive 
to clarity, whereas treaties were conducive to complex compromises.
Source: Pro Europa
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The Credibility of the Construction of Europe
Jacques Delors
Address to the European Parliament, 18 February 1987.
Mr President of the European Parliament, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, ladies 
and gentlemen, in January 1985, in my statement of the guidelines of the newly ap-
pointed Commission as it started its mandate, I spoke to you of my great worry about 
Europe’s credibility. In January 1986, in the debate on the Commission’s programme, 
I stressed the two pitfalls to be avoided in the construction of Europe: impatience 
and inertia. I even spoke, at the risk of causing offence, of the temptation of nominal-
ism. You will therefore understand that, after two years in office, the Commission is 
anxious to join with you in measuring the gap between words and actions, between 
undertakings given and what has been done to follow them up, purpose of this as-
sessment being to improve our performance, to step up the rate of progress towards 
the European Union.
What have we done in the past two years to give fresh impetus to the construction 
of Europe? What must we do this year and next?
In 1985 we revived the idea of the large internal market, proposing that the Com-
munity should become an area without internal frontiers by 1992. Bearing past expe-
rience in mind, we proposed a method of attaining this objective, a method based on 
a timetable. The Commission felt then and still feels now that, at our current stage 
of development, the internal market is the real driving force for European economic 
integration. The pace at which this process of integration progresses will determine 
the outcome of the worldwide race against the clock in which Europe is competing 
for its very survival. That is why it was necessary to step up a gear, that is why it 
was necessary to get away from the obsession with unanimity, whose contaminating 
influence had gradually spread throughout the Community’s institutional system.
In 1986 we and you worked on the drafting of the Single Act, which was adopted. 
We and you hoped that this reform would not be confined to mere adjustment of 
procedures. We and you insisted on the explicit incorporation of new elements into 
the process of European integration: European policies on research and technology, 
on the environment, on working conditions. Even though some people—and I count 
myself among them—take the view that the Single Act does not go far enough, it is in 
reality much more demanding than it appears. It will be up to us, this year and next, 
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to translate it into proposals and actions and to ensure that the 12 Member States 
themselves appreciate all its implications. This will be difficult. Let us have no illu-
sions about that. The contract has been signed, or almost at any rate. But it is to be 
feared that the necessary political will is not going to be forthcoming. That is one 
of the impressions that I have received from the tour of capitals that we have made 
over the recent period at the request of the European Council. I reiterate the point 
before the House that the purpose of this tour of capitals was to listen to what the 
governments had to say during the period when the Commission was finalizing its 
proposals for what I have called the ‘grand rendez-vous’. So the object of the exercise 
was not to draw viewpoints closer together, nor to let the governments take over the 
Commission’s role of bringing forward initiatives. No. It was to explain what was at 
stake, to encourage people to come to grips with the problems, to help set in train 
a process of analysis and mature reflection, which experience has shown to be es-
sential whenever the threat of a crisis in the Community has appeared on the horizon.
We listened to the Member States. We listened to Parliament’s representatives, 
whom we met last week. The Commission has done its work, which it finished last 
Sunday. It has decided that this House should be the first to hear its proposals. This 
is because it has the feeling that getting these proposals adopted will necessitate 
mobilization of all the active supporters of the construction of Europe, especially 
those whom our citizens have directly elected to speak on their behalf, the Members 
of the European Parliament - you, ladies and gentlemen.
(Applause)
Naturally, we had our misgivings. Naturally, we had our discussions. But in the 
end we opted for clarity. Our job, of course, was to present the 12 governments with 
the decisions that have to be taken if the construction of Europe is to progress at 
the requisite pace. The approach proposed by the Commission rests on two simple 
ideas: more coherence and more discipline. Whether we are talking about the com-
mon agricultural policy, the structural policies or the financial regime, the choice is 
necessarily between a vague free-trade area topped off with a few financial transfers 
and a genuine common economic area, the prerequisite for a strong Europe, the 
prerequisite for the European Union, now formally enshrined in the preamble to the 
Single Act.
That is what is at stake, ladies and gentlemen.
The truth of this is stressed and demonstrated in the report forwarded to our 
governments. Such is the task to which the Commission has addressed itself.
This is the thrust of the proposals that I am going to present to you in some detail. 
Adoption of these proposals represents a vital pan of the work that the Community 
needs to carry through during 1987, but our task does not end there. We must also 
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strengthen the foundations laid in 1985 and 1986 in order to accelerate the construc-
tion of Europe. I shall then briefly outline the most important themes, the salient 
points of this aspect of our task.
The first thing is to make the Single Act work.
To put it in a nutshell, the Single Act means the obligation to proceed simulta-
neously with creating the frontierless single market, greater economic and social 
cohesion and a European research and technology policy, with strengthening the 
European Monetary System, making a start on creating a European social area, and 
carrying out significant environmental action. Yes, I did say simultaneously.
If it is to achieve these objectives, the Community must come to grips with difficult 
problems and fulfil four essential requirements, as indicated in the report submitted 
to Parliament and the Council:
• an agricultural policy geared to the new international context,
• Community policies making a real economic impact,
• stable, adequate and guaranteed own resources,
• really effective budgetary discipline.
Let us start with a common agricultural policy geared to the new international 
context. Agriculture, which provides direct employment for over 10 million people in 
the Community - and indirect employment for many more besides, incidentally - is 
the core of an extremely important family of agri-foodstuffs industries. Economically 
and strategically, it is vital to Europe’s interests.
During the 25 years of its life, the common agricultural policy has been a success. 
The principles on which it is founded remain valid: Community preference, unity of 
the market, and financial solidarity.
However, ladies and gentlemen, the general economic context and the situation 
on the world’s agricultural markets are such that a better balance must be found 
between supply, which has been boosted by technological progress, and demand, 
which is no longer expanding rapidly. Hence the action initiated by the Commission in 
1985, which it intends to consolidate by applying a restrictive pricing policy, building 
more flexibility into the guarantees and intervention machinery, and putting more 
emphasis on producers’ co-responsibility, including recourse to the quota system.
In general terms, this is a matter of gradually persuading farmers to adapt their 
production options to conditions on European and world markets, and to seek new 
outlets. The Community has embarked on this course, and must stick to it.
The reforms made to the common agricultural policy since 1984, coupled with the 
‘prices package’ for 1987, represent annual savings to the budget of about 6 billion ECU 
in constant dollar terms. That puts the courageous efforts made by our farmers into 
perspective and shows up the misguided criticisms made of the common agricultural 
policy for what they are worth.
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But there is clearly a possibility that this policy will adversely affect the earnings 
of farmers with the most precarious livings. This could change the face of rural Eu-
rope, which the family farming model has done so much to shape. But, both culturally 
and socially, this model of farming has proved its economic and ecological effective-
ness. It must therefore be preserved. There are ways and means of doing this. They 
consist in taking account of the special circumstances of certain farmers or certain 
regions by applying measures differentially. To give just a few examples, this was 
the reason for modulating the levy on milk products, introducing aid for cereal pro-
ducers, modulating the provisions on production quotas to take account of specific 
conditions in certain regions or countries, and introducing aid for cattle farmers.
If these measures prove to be insufficient, the Community cannot hold back from 
providing income support aid, since otherwise others will do so in its stead, bringing 
the danger of renationalization which we want to avoid at all costs.
(Applause)
The Commission is therefore proposing to contain these various forms of aid 
within specific limits defined in advance at Community level. The purpose of this 
will be to ensure that aid does not have the effect of distorting competition or cancel-
ling out the effects of action taken to limit production. The future of the agricultural 
common market depends on this. A further aim will be to avoid any widening of the 
existing disparities between regions.
Overall, the aim is to get a better balance and better articulation between market 
support and income support in action taken by the Community. We are also seeking 
to lay the foundations for rural development, which is essential to rational use of our 
territory, to establish a proper balance between nature and man and, most important 
of all, to preserve a way of life which is central to the character of many regions in 
northern as well as southern Europe.
Our farmers would not understand it, ladies and gentlemen, if the Community and 
no one else made this painful effort to adjust to the new international situation. Our 
fellow agricultural producers in the world are going to have to realize this. Only if 
there is concerted action will it be possible to check the harmful effects of erratic 
price movements on world markets that are being exacerbated by the disordered 
monetary situation which is provoking this damaging subsidies war.
Let us put our house in order. Let us be firm in our insistence that our partners 
do likewise. Then the common agricultural policy will resume its irreplaceable role 
in the development of stronger economic and social cohesion in the Community, 
alongside our other policies.
We must have a common agricultural policy geared to the new international situ-
ation, but we also need Community policies making a real economic impact.
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(Applause)
Ladies and gentlemen, the common agricultural policy cannot remain the only 
Community policy that makes a real economic impact. Today’s enlarged Community 
needs new horizons.
In the case of structural measures, there were respectable arguments for either of 
two concepts of what the Community should be doing.
The first of these, a purely macroeconomic concept, relies on the virtues of the in-
visible hand operating through financial flows; as long as they are on a large enough 
scale, transfers of resources between Member
States should bring about economic convergence.
The second, both microeconomic and structural, looks to speed up the spread 
of innovation, eliminate bottlenecks and encourage efforts to derive the benefits of 
scale. In other words, it is a matter of keeping structural policies ‘close to the ground’.
Encouraged by the success of the integrated Mediterranean programmes, the 
Commission came down in favour of the latter, a less extravagant and more effective 
course.
Reform of the structural funds thus finds expression in terms of real economic 
objectives. Just as with the framework technological research programme, the ben-
efits of the new policies on transport and the environment become fully apparent 
when seen in relation to the effect of the Community dimension creating a common 
economic area.
Five priority objectives were accordingly identified for the structural funds: 
helping the economically backward regions to catch up with the general level of 
development, redeveloping industrial regions affected by crisis, combating long-
term unemployment, helping young people to integrate into the world of work, and 
finally rural development, where an important factor—but not the only one—will be 
adaptation of farm production structures.
These are the five priority objectives which will make our policies intelligible and 
effective.
On the actual details of the reform, I should like to keep things simple by putting 
just two key ideas to you. First, preference will be given to multi-annual programmes, 
in support of efforts organized by Member States and regions themselves.
Secondly, administration of these programmes will be as decentralized as pos-
sible. Brussels must not be a further focus of centralization, but on the contrary a 
clearing house for ideas and initiatives.
(Applause)
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The Commission is therefore proposing that the Community provide itself with 
the means necessary for effective administration of its programmes where they add 
real value to action taken at national or regional level. It is against this background 
that it is proposing a twofold increase, in real terms, by 1992 in the financial resources 
set aside for the structural funds.
(Applause)
If the common agricultural policy is to be adapted, if the other policies are to have 
real economic impact, the Community must have a. system generating adequate, 
stable and guaranteed own resources.
We cannot lapse into crisis every two years, or every three years, and then have to 
go cap in hand to the national parliaments. It is for this reason that the Commission 
has deliberately taken a medium-term view.
Continuing with reform of the common agricultural policy and remodelling the 
operation of the structural funds are two objectives on which the political credibility 
of the Community can be rebuilt. They are, as I have just said, inseparable from re-
form of the financial system, which is absolutely essential.
The existing system of own resources, which goes back to the decision of 2 April 
1970 and the Fontainebleau European Council meeting, has had its day.
As everyone knows, 1987’s expenditure cannot be fully covered and the Commis-
sion is going to have to act accordingly. Everyone here is aware of the practices that 
have been used since 1983 to mask the real deficit in the Community budget. And I 
told the Heads of State in London, when I was given leave to speak, that I for my part 
was not prepared to use such expedients again in 1987 or future years.
As everyone here knows, the own resources base is being eroded, since its size is 
determined by aggregates which are not growing as fast as economic activity.
And yet the Community has recently entered into major political commitments, 
with the Single Act and the enlargement bringing two new Member States.
What is the broad outline of the Community budget going to look like by 1992? 
That is the question the Commission asked itself, that it had to ask itself, taking ac-
count of the measures to bring agricultural spending back into balance, the twofold 
increase, in real terms, in finance for the structural funds, the framework research 
programme, the programmes for transport and the environment, and also the neces-
sary increase, which I must add, in the scale of our development aid policy.
The Community cannot go on limping from one financial crisis to the next. Nor can 
it make do with expedients, which the Commission is not prepared to employ.
The Community is in need of budgetary stability for the future, and this calls for 
two major changes in the organization of its financial affairs.
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The first of these is to express the new own resources ceiling in relation to the 
Community GNP, which gives a better measure of Europe’s wealth, and to set it at 
1.4% of GNP by 1992. This political decision offers the guarantee that there will be a 
ceiling on the mandatory Community levy.
The second is to change the composition of Community resources within this ceil-
ing so as to establish a better relationship between countries’ contributions to the 
budget and their relative level of prosperity, and also to give the necessary flexibility. 
This is a basis for stable resources at an adequate level.
To summarize what we are proposing, the resources available up to the limit of 
1.4% of GNP would be derived from the following sources:
• first, customs duties;
• secondly, agricultural levies;
• thirdly, VAT revenues collected by levying 1% on amounts effectively subject to 
VAT, which would thus be more immediately associated with own resources;
• finally, a ‘corrective’ source of revenue derived from charges on a complementary 
basis of assessment defined as the difference between GNP—the advantages of 
which I have already outlined—and the basis for assessing VAT used for the 1% 
levy.
These would be the future constituents of own resources.
However, the Commission wishes to keep open the possibility of adding a fifth 
source of revenue between now and 1992, but I must make it clear that this would 
still be within the 1.4% ceiling. One possibility would be something in the nature of a 
stamp duty charged, at a very modest level, on financial transactions. But the Com-
mission is not making any proposal at this stage.
I must stress here that the proposed ceiling of 1.4% of GNP means that the growth 
rate in resources will not only not be faster than over the period 1980-1987, but will 
actually be slower. It will be slower if you bear in mind that we are going to have to 
meet our existing debts while keeping within this ceiling. To what am I referring? To 
disposal of the agricultural stocks, the legacy of the past—too many commitments 
and not enough payments—and finally the quite normal but increased impact of 
enlargement of the Community to include Spain and Portugal. These factors have to 
be stressed in order to show how modest the Commission has been in its financial 
proposals.
The last point in this area is the vexed question of redressing budget imbalances. 
Let us be frank: the Commission had a choice of four solutions.
First, it could refrain from making any proposal at all, since the existing mecha-
nism was not proposed by the Commission but by the Heads of Government at the 
European Council meeting in Fontainebleau. That would have been the only approach 
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compatible with communautaire logic and the Commission, in its concern to be real-
istic and to face all its responsibilities, has made a proposal in this area also.
Secondly, it could propose carrying on with the Fontainebleau mechanism, but 
the situation in the Community has changed since 1984, ladies and gentlemen, with 
the arrival of two new members with standards of living well below the Community 
average.
Thirdly, it could propose a smoothing mechanism to give similar net balances for 
everyone. There was a lot of talk about this before Fontainebleau, but it would be 
quite out of keeping with the communautaire spirit, and the Commission dismisses 
it out of hand. One cannot measure the advantages and disadvantages of belonging 
to the Community by the yardstick of budget balances. That would be unacceptable. 
At any event, this Commission is not going to be associated with anything of the sort.
(Applause)
Fourthly, it could propose a new and, I stress, temporary mechanism. We looked at 
this in order to keep faith with the undertakings given at the Fontainebleau European 
Council meeting, and the Commission took account of - to quote the Fontainebleau 
wording - ‘the excessive budgetary burden compared with the relative prosperity’ of 
a Member State. In order to allow for the United Kingdom’s special circumstances, we 
chose to base this corrective mechanism on the real cause of the imbalance, which 
lies in the fundamental difference between the United Kingdom and the other coun-
tries as far as the structural state of agriculture is concerned. Consequently, what we 
are proposing is a sort of ‘green’ scale of compensation, if I may use such Community 
jargon.
The last but by no means least important of the four requirements is more effec-
tive budgetary discipline and management of the budget. This, frankly, is probably 
the issue on which the European Parliament attracts most scepticism. What justifica-
tion can there be for additional resources if the Community does not show maturity 
in its conduct of financial affairs? What justification can there be for new resources 
if we behave like an international organization with commitments, not like a real 
community? If has to be admitted that the budgetary discipline applied following the 
Fontainebleau European Council has been a failure. Why is this?
One cannot have a situation in which, on the one hand, decisions are taken by the 
Agriculture Council or the Research Council and, on the other, a frame of reference is 
set by the Budget Council and then systematically breached. This piecemeal decision-
making just will not do.
(Applause)
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One cannot on the one hand unilaterally set a maximum rate of increase in non-
compulsory expenditure and on the other refuse to enter into any discussion with the 
European Parliament, this in defiance of the spirit of Article 203 of the Treaty.
(Applause)
Budgetary discipline, ladies and gentlemen, will remain a pipe-dream until such 
time as the European Parliament is involved from the outset of the procedure and 
until such time as the Council stops taking mutually contradictory decisions.
The Community cannot go on with this institutional skirmishing. Its decision-
making needs to be carried out with clarity and rigour. Clearly, budgetary discipline 
is essential, and it needs to be based on a consensus arrived at by the three institu-
tions together.
The Commission is therefore proposing the conclusion of an interinstitutional 
agreement, a pact entered into for five years by the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission under which the ceilings and main aggregates for the budget 
would be fixed in advance. The budgetary procedure would take place within this 
predetermined framework once the institutions had set a ceiling on resources for 
each of the years ‘88, ‘89, ‘90, ‘91 and ‘92, so that we would all know where we stood.
Precise criteria will have to be laid down for non-compulsory expenditure. But 
agricultural spending must at last be brought under control, by a combination of 
continued reform of the common agricultural policy and the setting-up of budgetary 
stabilizers whose operation would be binding, automatic even, within the existing 
framework of agricultural budgetary discipline. Of course, it is necessary to have ar-
rangements to deal with exceptional monetary circumstances, and the Commission 
is proposing setting up a special reserve alongside the amount earmarked each year 
for the CAP, to absorb the impact of fluctuations caused by the dollar’s volatility.
In a development that you have called for on many occasions, multiannual time-
spans will thus become important factors in management of the budget and adher-
ence to budgetary discipline. In addition, the Commission envisages changes in the 
methods and rules applied in managing the budget. Its proposals in this regard call, 
essentially, for observance of the principle of annuality, as in national budgets, by cir-
cumscribing the scope for over-budgeting and improving the transparency of avail-
able appropriations. This will entail substantial reform of the financial regulations.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is time the budgetary authorities equipped themselves 
with the wherewithal for prudent husbandry of Community resources. The citizens 
of Europe will settle for nothing less.
(Applause)
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These, then, are the broad lines of the proposals that the Commission has made for 
the grand rendez-vous. At the same time, we have to go on working and using every 
opportunity during 1987 to consolidate the platform for Europe’s further develop-
ment.
One of the most powerful contributions that we can make to the open debate on 
what is needed to make a success of the Single Act is a demonstration that it is already 
in operation, that progress is being made in some areas and is possible in others. 
Because going forward is the way to build up momentum, we must use 1987 to con-
solidate and strengthen the platform for Europe’s further development, by advancing 
towards completion of the internal market, applying the Community policies needed 
to this end, by breaking new ground with the European Monetary System, by involv-
ing ordinary citizens and the two sides of industry more fully in the movement under 
way; finally, we must use 1987 to put the Community institutions to the test, to see 
whether they cannot be made to work more effectively under the provisions of the 
Single Act.
Let me begin with the single market and the corresponding Community policies.
The single market is the all-important objective, as I have said. Of the various 
initiatives that the Commission will be bringing forward during 1987, it attaches 
particular importance to two.
The first is concerned with opening up public contracts in sectors where there is 
as yet still no competition: energy, transport, water and telecommunications. In this 
connection, we shall also be proposing a strengthening of our powers for monitoring 
the procedures under which contracts are awarded.
The second initiative is concerned with alignment of VAT and excise duty rates, 
and distribution of revenues according to these rates. This will mean that the single 
market can be established on a system of taxes compatible with true and fair com-
petition.
These will be the two new tests of Member States’ resolve to meet the 1992 dead-
line for completion of the single market rid of internal frontiers. I need scarcely add 
that there are other important dossiers, on such matters as air transport, exhaust 
emissions, the new approach to standardization and so on, which are on the Council’s 
table and demand decisions this year.
Also in this context, the Commission will be submitting its promised overall 
analysis of the implications of completion of the single market in terms of the need to 
strengthen the Community’s commercial policy.
This will be a response to wishes that you expressed, notably last month, when 
you adopted Mr Beazley’s excellent report on the motor industry.
The single market implies closer cooperation and modern, effective Community 
policies. You are familiar with the grounds on which this premise rests. You are also 
aware of the priority of priorities in this field: the absolute need to master new 
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technologies, which will provide the foundations for competitiveness and prosperity 
which, as long as we set the ball rolling, can be enhanced by the single market.
And yet, ladies and gentlemen, although the crucial importance of Community ac-
tion has been acknowledged by the highest political authorities and formally recog-
nized in the Single Act, the framework programme for 1987 to 1991 has still not been 
adopted. That is unacceptable. Are such highly important programmes as Esprit, 
RACE or Brite going to have to be wound up this year for lack of funding? I put the 
question, because here again our credibility, the Community’s credibility, is at stake.
(Applause)
With your support, particularly through the diligent work done by the Committee 
on Energy, Research and Technology, the Commission has already taken all necessary 
action to prepare the way for quick decision-making to resolve this matter at the 
Council meetings scheduled this month and next. And I take this opportunity to add 
my thanks to the Belgian Presidency, which has addressed itself to this dossier with 
a great sense of purpose.
But is this procrastination, especially where research is concerned, to be inter-
preted as indicating suspicion of the Community? That would be both unfair and 
misguided. Far from harbouring any ambition to set up in competition with Member 
States, we are actuated by the wish to lend support to desirable, essential coopera-
tion between players on the economic scene. Witness our open and vigilant attitude 
to Eureka.
This method, the framework programme approach, consists in lending assistance 
to others’ initiatives, not in seeking to replace them, as we have just demonstrated 
with the adoption of the integrated Mediterranean programmes. Ladies and gentle-
men, Parliament gave us a great deal of help on this, and I have to say that it has 
been a very heartening experience witnessing the birth of a new method of working: 
the setting-up of continuing dialogue and original forms of cooperation between the 
Community and the regions, which retain the responsibilities for identifying their 
needs and the ways and means of meeting them.
In a manner of speaking, the Commission is playing the role of rural development 
consulting engineer. We are far from deserving the image of an ethereal bureaucracy 
that some people are still trying to lumber us with.
The main point—and it is this that encouraged us to plump for wider use of this 
method in our proposals—is that, having received this stimulus, the regions have 
come to terms with their strengths and weaknesses, and shown their resolve to find 
imaginative new routes to development.
So we shall continue on the course towards completion of the internal market, 
we shall carry on with the work of bringing in these Community policies, but this 
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year - and there can be no putting this off - we are going to have to take a hard look 
at where the European Monetary System is going, since, as we have seen with events 
these past months of December and January, it is under threat, at a crossroads. In 
other words, fostering closer monetary cooperation between European countries is 
an integral part of broadening the base for renewed development.
It is fair to say that the first phase of the European Monetary System’s operation is 
now coming to an end. Today we find very moderate inflation, monetary stability and 
budgetary prudence in all the countries whose currencies are in the exchange-rate 
mechanism. During this phase, let it not be forgotten, the European Monetary System 
has played a very positive role in drawing most countries back into the ‘virtuous 
circle’, where inflation and imbalance are the arch enemies.
The European Monetary System must now become the core of a more efficient 
economic system, more efficient in terms of growth, competitiveness and job crea-
tion. The spectacular progress seen with the liberalization of capital flows within 
the Community now leave us with no option but to press forward by broadening the 
scope of concerted economic and monetary policies.
The unprecedented outbreaks of speculative fever seen on the capital markets 
suggest to some that exchange-rate discipline should be relaxed. That is not how we 
see things. Others are thinking, simultaneously, in terms of containing exchange-rate 
movements between the key currencies in the international monetary system.
That is another matter.
Closer financial integration of Europe’s economies cannot be bought at the price of 
uncertainty over exchange rates, which destroys the stability essential to the expan-
sion of trade. Let me add that it is inconceivable that we will keep an agricultural 
common market or have an operational internal market without frontiers unless, by 
1992, all our currencies are adhering to the same system of exchange-rate discipline.
The Commission will shortly be setting out the true requirements for complete 
liberalization of capital movements: a sustained, patient effort of monetary, budgetary 
and fiscal coordination, with parallel harmonization of prudential rules of management 
and basic regulations to be followed by banks and other financial institutions. At the 
request of the President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs and 
Finance, an initial discussion of these problems will be held next April.
Meanwhile, the Commission will be playing its part, as it has done since 1985, in 
the ongoing analysis of ways and means of strengthening the European Monetary 
System in a context of closer convergence of our economies. We have to establish 
which courses of action are going to yield the most positive results.
The first of these must be more effective coordination of policies on interest rates, 
which has been signally lacking in recent weeks. That at least is one of the lessons to 
be learnt from this experience.
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Secondly, there is the indicator of divergence envisaged at the Bremen Council, 
which ought to be put back on the agenda. This indicator of divergence has the potential 
to become a positive rule for coordinated, balanced intervention by the central banks. 
Finally, the European Monetary Cooperation Fund could be given a bigger pan in regu-
lating the system, and this, in our view, would also entail more extensive use of the ECU.
These are just the first steps along the path which should take us to the point 
of establishing the common financial area and, more generally, deriving full benefit 
from the positive effects of the single market with no internal frontiers.
This, ladies and gentlemen, is how Europe can acquire the ability to turn the ECU 
into a reserve currency, a currency of payment. Then, but only then, will it be able to 
play an effective role in restoring order to the international monetary system.
Our third aim is to continue our cooperation with the protagonists of economic 
and social life. For the past two years the Commission has been making efforts, not 
without success, to get dialogue going again between employers and unions. During 
the same period, it has secured the support of both sides of industry for the coopera-
tive strategy for growth.
These two points are worth recalling at a time like this, when there is a growing 
mood of disappointment in all our countries at the level of results achieved in eco-
nomic growth and job creation, despite the boost given by the combination of cheaper 
oil and the dollar’s slump.
The Belgian Presidency has shown great concern to get matters moving forward 
again both in the economic debate on growth and in the social debate on work or-
ganization, scheduling of hours of work, the introduction of new technologies, and 
operation of the labour market. At the Commission we have working panics, with 
management and union representation, considering all these topics.
The Commission will therefore be working with the Belgian Presidency to main-
tain social dialogue and to lend new urgency to discussion by the Council of ways 
and means of achieving more vigorous growth throughout the Community which will 
create more jobs, an objective which is attainable. As the Commission stresses in its 
report on the grand rendez-vous, this is an essential requirement if we are to make 
real progress towards completion of the internal market.
It would be quite wrong of me to conclude my presentation of the Commission’s 
programme without saying a few words about People’s Europe, despite the disap-
pointment that you must feel, ladies and gentlemen, as we do, at the course of events 
in this sphere.
It is essential, as we mount our effort to lend fresh impetus to the Community, for 
ordinary citizens to have the feeling that they are involved, directly concerned in this 
next thrust forward by Europe. Consider the many favourable reactions prompted by 
the free distribution of food surpluses to charitable organizations. ‘At last, Europe is 
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showing humanity’ was one of the comments heard following the tardy action that 
we took, which, incidentally, we shall be repeating.
People’s Europe should be more in the forefront of our minds. People’s Europe 
means freedom for all Europeans to travel and stay wherever they like, and to have 
their qualifications recognized everywhere in the Community.
(Applause)
We are told that Europe means bureaucracy. But as it happens, ladies and gentle-
men, quite the opposite is the case. What an amount of red tape and form-filling is 
going to be swept away once we have opened up our frontiers, once we have mutual 
recognition of standards and diplomas!
Within this frontierless area that we intend to create, we shall encourage mobility 
of young people. The Comett programme, which will allow thousands of students to 
spend a period gaining experience with a firm in a Member State other than their 
own, has now been adopted. The Erasmus programme will be adopted shortly; we 
received an undertaking on this from the Heads of State or Government at the last 
summit meeting, in London. This programme is going to enable tens of thousands 
of students to spend some part of their studies at a university establishment in a 
Member State other than their own. Finally, the YES programme will be following, 
again fostering exchange schemes for young people.
Europe, to its citizens, is to do with their lives, their health. Hence the initiatives 
in the campaign against cancer, where great efficiency and impressive cooperation 
have been shown, and we are going to do the same in the campaign against AIDS. 
European citizens should be secure in the belief that, through scientific cooperation, 
the exchange of information and experience, goodwill on the pan of all specialists and 
academics, the Community can turn the efforts of each individual to best possible 
account and multiply the effectiveness of what we are doing.
Europe, to its citizens, is also to do with changing the tenor of daily life by 
strengthening the feeling of belonging to the same community. Of course, this belong-
ing revolves to a very large extent around the diverse and variegated elements of our 
cultural heritage, which is enriched by the differences between us. Let me mention in 
this connection the conference that the Commission is organizing next month in Flor-
ence, which will be the starting-point for a collective effort of analysis and concerted 
action on the relations between culture, the economy and technology.
I must also add a few words, although we face a stiff task here, about television 
and other audiovisual media, to stress that the profusion, the plethora of sounds and 
images in prospect as a result of the development of new systems is going to put both 
our cultural identity and our capacity for technological development to the test.
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Without a joint effort, without a pooling of our resources, ladies and gentlemen, 
we are not going to be able to meet the much heavier demand for programmes that 
is going to come. Unless we put our heads together and lay down common standards, 
we are not going to be in command of the technology of production and transmission. 
As you know, the industrial and cultural stakes are enormous. Looking forward to 
completion of the internal market, the Commission has proposed an overall policy on 
audiovisual media, based notably on the directive on ‘television without frontiers’. 
It will be coming before you soon. It lays down the minimum rules needed for joint 
organization of television broadcasting, and it also makes provision for setting up, 
this year, the Media programme to bring the relevant specialists into the task of 
carrying out a diagnostic analysis of the audiovisual media in Europe, the produc-
tion and distribution of audiovisual works. I would again impress upon you that 
the stakes are enormous. Let us equip ourselves with the means necessary to make 
this industry, this activity, a real force for promoting our culture and developing its 
influence. European Cinema and Television year will be an important milestone in 
this respect. The stakes are therefore enormous for Europe, which does not live by 
economics alone. Let us make sure that we do not miss this appointment, which is of 
historic importance for our civilization, our culture and our creative talents.
Finally, 1987 is going to be a test of our ability to improve the functioning of our 
institutions.
Within the institutional triangle, three requirements, which I shall run through 
very briefly, need to be met: the Council of Ministers must improve its decision-mak-
ing, Parliament must be involved more fully in the legislative process, and it must be 
made possible for the Commission to carry out its executive duties more efficiently.
In order to speed up its decision-making, the Council at last decided in December 
1986 to change its rules of procedure. While the new formulation is not perfect, the 
important thing is that, in practice, there is a form of obligation to vote. The improve-
ment in this respect is beyond doubt. The Council voted about 100 times altogether in 
1986. Manifestly, this augurs well for the success of the cooperation procedure, which, 
as you know, calls upon Parliament and the Council to accept voting disciplines so as 
to avoid deadlocks or delays.
The cooperation procedure, well handled, can in point of fact prove much more 
promising than it seemed at first, much more promising as a means of bringing Par-
liament into the exercise of legislative power.
The first requirement for success here is more concertation between the Com-
mission and Parliament. This of course is what is proposed in Mr Prout’s report. The 
Commission for its part has tried to identify those proposals in its 1987 programme 
to which the cooperation procedure will be applicable. This provides a basis on which 
our two institutions will be able to draw up a work schedule together. The second 
requirement for the success of this procedure is for the Commission and Parliament 
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to maintain a constant dialogue, and in particular to endeavour to reach agreement 
in time for the first reading. This is the drift of your resolution on the report by Mr 
Planas Puchades. The Commission shares your concern.
The last of these points, about which I am much less optimistic, is the strengthen-
ing of the Commission’s executive powers. Where do matters stand? The fears that I 
voiced in this Chamber, ladies and gentlemen, at the time of the vote on the Hansen 
report have, I’m afraid, proved well-founded.
Despite the realism of our proposal, various Member States are digging in their 
heels against any change, bearing on the past or the future, in their resolve to per-
petuate the delights and drawbacks of a proliferation of committees which is detract-
ing from the efficiency of the work of the Community.
For all that, the Commission is not prepared to depart, in its day-to-day practice, 
from the principles of simplicity, transparency and efficiency which inspired its 
proposal.
I therefore repeat that Europe cannot duck this appointment with itself in 1987. 
The Single Act puts it under a political obligation to keep this appointment, and what 
the Commission is proposing is a complete and coherent package setting out the poli-
cies and means required in order to implement the Single Act, nothing but the Single 
Act, but the whole Single Act.
What is at issue is indeed the credibility of the construction of Europe. It is also 
the demonstration, through what is being done day by day, of the contribution that 
Europe can make as of now to our people’s lives. It is the moral obligation that our 
governments bear before citizens who are increasingly disenchanted, deprived as 
they are not only of a common ideal but of any vision of their collective future.
Europe must make its mark at home, ladies and gentlemen, by finding durable 
solutions to its problems, not short-term solutions. It must make its mark at home by 
putting stronger emphasis on the real link that exists between what the Community 
can do and what the Member States can do. But Europe must also make its mark 
abroad by taking coordinated action to defend its legitimate interests, and by making 
its proper contribution to the crucial issues of underdevelopment and peace. It must 
know when to say no on occasion and when to be generous to the most disinherited, 
hence the priority given in this programme to development aid, and it must secure 
the means of its own prosperity and competitiveness.
Yes, knowing when to say no, when to be generous, and how to be competitive, 
these are the keynotes in this constantly renewed campaign. The Commission has 
faced up to its responsibilities, it has not shied away from any difficulty, and it knows 
that it can count on the support of the European Parliament in making this grand 
rendez-vouz an important step forward in the construction of Europe.
Source: Pro Europa
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The Common European Home
Mikhail Gorbachev
Extract of speech to Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 July 1989.
For centuries Europe has been making an indispensable contribution to world 
politics, economy, culture and to the development of the entire civilization. Its world 
historic role is recognized and respected everywhere. Let us not forget, however, that 
the metastases of colonial slavery spread around the world from Europe. It was here 
that fascism came into being. It was here that the most destructive wars started.
At the same time Europe, which can take a legitimate pride in its accomplish-
ments, is far from having settled its debts to mankind. It is something that still has 
to be done.
And it should be done by seeking to transform international relations in the spirit 
of humanism, equality and justice and by setting an example of democracy and social 
achievements in its own countries. The Helsinki process has already commenced this 
important work of world-wide significance.
Vienna and Stockholm brought it to fundamentally new frontiers. The documents 
adopted there are today’s optimal expression of the political culture and moral tradi-
tions of European peoples. Now it is up to all of us, all the participants in the Euro-
pean process, to make the best possible use of the groundwork laid down through our 
common efforts. Our idea of a common European home serves the same purpose too.
It was born out of our realization of new realities, of our realization of the fact that 
the linear continuation of the path along which inter-European relations have devel-
oped until the last quarter of the twentieth century is no longer consonant with these 
realities. The idea is linked with our domestic, economic and political perestroika 
which called for new relations above all in that part of the world to which we, the So-
viet Union, belong, and with which we have been tied most closely over the centuries.
We also realized that the colossal burden of armaments and the atmosphere of 
confrontation did not just obstruct Europe’s normal development, but at the same 
time prevented our country—economically, politically and psychologically—from 
being integrated into the European process and had a deforming impact on our own 
development.
These were the motives which impelled us to decide to pursue much more vigor-
ously our European policy which, incidentally, has always been important to us in 
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and of itself. In our recent meetings with European leaders questions were raised 
about the architecture of our ‘common home’, on how it should be built and even on 
how it should be ‘furnished’.
Our discussions on this subject with President François Mitterrand in Moscow 
and in Paris were fruitful and fairly significant in scope. Yet even today, I do not claim 
to carry a finished blueprint of that home in my pocket. I just wish to tell you what I 
believe to be most important. In actual fact, what we have in mind is a restructuring 
of the international order existing in Europe that would put the European common 
values in the forefront and make it possible to replace the traditional balance of forces 
with a balance of interests...
If security is the foundation of a common European home, then all-round co-
operation is its bearing frame. What is symbolic about the new situation in Europe 
and throughout the world in recent years is an intensive inter-state dialogue, both 
bilateral and multilateral. The network of agreements, treaties and other accords has 
become considerably more extensive. Official consultations on various issues have 
become a rule.
For the first time contacts have been established between the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, between the European Community and 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA], not to mention many political 
and public organizations in both parts of Europe.
We are pleased with the decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe to grant the Soviet Union the status of a special guest state. We are prepared 
to co-operate. But we think that we can go further than that.
We could accede to some of the international conventions of the Council of Europe 
that are open to other states - on the environment, culture, education and television 
broadcasting. We are prepared to co-operate, with the specialized agencies of the 
Council of Europe.
The Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament 
are situated in Strasbourg. Should our ties be expanded in the future and be put on a 
regular basis, we would open here, with the French Government’s consent, of course, 
a Consulate General.
It goes without saying that interparliamentary ties have major significance for 
making the European process more dynamic. An important step has already been 
made: late last year a first meeting of the parliamentary heads of 35 countries was 
held in Warsaw.
We have duly appreciated the visit to the USSR of the delegation of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe headed by its President, Mr Björck. The 
delegation could, I hope, feel directly the potent and energetic pulse of the Soviet 
perestroika.
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We regard as particularly important the recently initiated contacts with the Eu-
ropean Parliament. Among other things, we took note of its resolutions on military-
political issues which are seen by the Parliament as the core of the western European 
consensus in the area of security...
As far as the economic content of the common European home is concerned, we 
regard as a realistic prospect—though not a close one—the emergence of a vast eco-
nomic space from the Atlantic to the Urals where eastern and western parts would 
be strongly interlocked.
In this sense, the Soviet Union’s transition to a more open economy is essential; 
and not only for ourselves, for a higher economic effectiveness and for meeting con-
sumer demands.
Such a transition will increase East-West economic interdependence and, thus, 
will tell favourably on the entire spectrum of European relations.
Source: Pro Europa
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Making Europe
Maurice Lambilliotte
Faire l’Europe!, Synthèses, Revue Mensuelle Internationale, vol.3, No 6, Sept. 1948. 
From W.Lipgens and W. Loth, Documents on the History of European Integration, De Gruyter, 1988
We must make Europe. But before setting about a task of which the size and complex-
ity are obvious to all, we must be clear as to exactly what we want, and formulate 
problems in precise terms.
We have had enough speeches. People have been talking of Europe for a long 
time. It is as ambiguous a term as any can be. One might almost say that there are 
as many Europes as there are people speaking or writing on the subject: politicians, 
commentators, journalists, lecturers. But the public at large, the mass of individuals 
confronted by unceasing material problems -jobs, wages, doubtful guarantees of the 
future; those who live in a constant state of anxiety and discouragement- these men 
and women are not yet truly alive to European problems.
Those who go hungry, who lack the necessities of life or a minimum of comfort, 
or simply fear that they may lose these things; all who dread another war, knowing 
that they will again be its victims, or a slump which will mean ruin, unemployment, 
chronic and tragic insecurity; all such as these, whether workmen, peasants, clerks, 
small traders, craftsmen and manufacturers, take little interest in the more or less 
sober accounts of Europe, the theme and its variations, to which they have been 
treated for the past two years.
The people, who are the stuff of which nations are made, have had enough of words 
and slogans that are personified as if they were divinities or at least real forces. There 
have been enough speeches, enough sighs, tears and entreaties, vehement and pa-
thetic appeals in the name of Europe, Christian civilization, the defence of the West, 
our common heritage and so forth. We must bring back the problem to its proper 
ground, and state the issue simply and clearly.
Peace, Employment, Welfare
Europe is not the expression of a learned political construction, or even the historical 
or geographical embodiment of a civilization or way of life. It is a much diversified 
area of our planet in which millions of human beings still live in uncertainty and 
gloomy despair, so deep-seated that one almost hopes it will lead to an outbreak of 
savage and righteous wrath.
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These men and women do not accept the implacable fatality of war; nor will they 
put up with blindly serving the interests of others, or ideologies that represent only 
pride, fanaticism, or the thirst of minorities for power. They do not aspire to some 
mythical form of liberty which cannot be achieved in practice. What they think it 
right to demand is a certain degree of freedom in life and especially in the realm 
of personal feeling; also freedom of thought, and hence a modicum of the right to 
criticize.
These people are neither foolish nor so dreamy as to realize that in our day the 
best support of freedom is a rational organization of the economy, that is to say the 
whole range of production, exchange, distribution and consumption. Liberty, in fact, 
is less than ever a synonym of anarchy: it depends in great measure on a sound collec-
tive organization, which must never be confused with totalitarianism.
This is what Europe must mean for us. It must be an organization of peoples and 
nations which can stand effectively against the risk of war and, having overcome that 
major threat, will provide jobs—or ‘employment’, to use the more modern term—for 
its people, whether as individuals, families or more or less organic communities. Work 
is the fundamental condition of acquiring a purchasing power that can be exercised 
in the dignity that comes from active participation in a common necessary effort. In 
addition the organization must place at the service of every individual the formidable 
resources of science and technology, making possible a better standard of living and 
better conditions for the development of the personality. (...)
A people’s Europe
To whom, then, does Europe address its appeal?—since for want of a better term we 
too shall speak of Europe, though the word is so ambiguous that one almost feels 
impelled to abandon it.
The appeal is addressed to plain, ordinary men and women, with their feelings, 
aspirations and urgent needs.
Although we speak in the most general terms, we wish above all to be realists 
and we therefore address ourselves to those peoples of the Old World who have not 
entrusted their fate or assigned their rights to either of the two great powers which, 
as a result of the war, have taken their stand on the ruins of Europe—ruins in the 
material, moral and political sense.
What is the task before us? To organize, by way of association, a system of con-
structive and unreserved cooperation among the different countries, whatever their 
past history, that occupy the geographical area of Europe.
Europe as an organized economic area
The first requirement is an economic measure, viz. to intensify intra-European ex-
changes so that the continent is less dependent on overseas countries for essential 
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supplies and also less dependent on exports. We in Europe are in growing danger 
of competition from countries that are better equipped because they suffered less 
devastation in the war.
Increased trade within Europe is moreover one of the objectives of the Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
It was by necessity rather than because of a conscious plan to ‘make Europe’ that 
the OEEC, born of the Marshall plan, emphasized the structural aspect of European 
reconstruction. Europe’s dollar purchases have to be restricted in every possible 
way, and this clearly means developing to the maximum the complementary features 
of the different European economies.
For our part, however, we consider the desirability and necessity of these changes 
from another point of view. If one’s object is to increase the stability of an economic 
standard and hence a given level of employment in Europe, then, as we have already 
said, the economy of the associated nations as a whole must be made less depend-
ent on exports and imports to and from overseas. Increased trade among European 
countries will best bring to light the complementary features of their economies and 
maximize European production, thus making possible a higher level of consumption 
of goods and services and a higher level of employment. To all who have known un-
employment and its dire consequences, social stability is the object of their dearest 
and profoundest wishes.
If the economy is in a state of balance, then of course employment will be also. It 
is thus of vital importance to stabilize the economy at a level below which it must not 
be allowed to sink, but above which it must continue to rise.
Only by thus intensifying all its economic activities can Europe find salvation; 
only thus can it be built at all.
Given superior equipment, which is essential in every domain, the peoples of Eu-
rope will in their turn apply the formidable possibilities of modern technology. Most 
of these, as no one will deny, are indeed based on research pioneered by scientists in 
the Old World.
Once the problem is stated in terms of individual wants—a minimum degree of 
welfare, economic stability and assurance of employment—the problem οf making 
Europe is simplified and its terms become more and more concrete. For the nations of 
Europe and for the vast majority of their citizens, the object is certainly to strengthen 
world peace but also, and at the same time, to provide one and all with effective guar-
antees of employment and access to consumer goods.
Given this fundamental need, the making of Europe must be based on a long-term 
programme aiming at the maximum consumption of goods and services.
Only a programme of improving the standard of living of European peoples can 
overcome the obstacles and particularism of economies that have in the past pro-
ceeded from a spirit of nationalism, often aggressive in character.
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A degree of equipment which may suffice to ensure a given level of consumption 
of goods and services, and may even seem excessive in relation to the apparatus of 
production and exchange in the various economies at thee present time, will soon 
prove insufficient to ensure a higher rate of consumption. The construction of ad-
ditional plant will provide employment in itself and will make it possible to organize 
the European economy as a whole in a manner more rational and adequate to needs. 
On account of its higher productivity, the new equipment will sooner or later call 
for redeployment and adaptation in the technical and economic fields. It can thus be 
said that by aiming at a maximum rise in the European standard of living, we shall 
be creating the most powerful and irresistible demand for economic organization 
and rationalization, and facilitating the necessary process of superseding national 
economic frontiers which are outdated by modern production methods.
Aims of this kind are better than theories; they will increasingly bring about a 
harmonization of European economies, the pooling of efforts and wealth that are at 
present dispersed and irrationally used.
To sum up, it may be said that the forces and incentives that will have to create 
Europe are first and foremost economic. The economy is simply a name for the total-
ity of means necessary to satisfy the legitimate requirements of human beings. In 
this way economic science is profoundly social and no less profoundly human. The 
demand for consumer goods and services is an authentic measure of individuals and 
groups, their behaviour and mutual relations. Every economy exists to meet these 
needs of production, distribution and consumption.
It may even be said that the essential planning of the economy must start from 
the viewpoint of consumer needs and be directed above all towards serving the 
consumer, if we want it to remain human and democratic -and democracy can be 
considered an essential condition of whatever is truly human.
Hence, in its most immediate and concrete aspects the building of Europe does not 
require and need not necessarily proceed from any ideology or doctrine, any abstruse 
idealism or mystery. It is simply a matter of seeing things aright and producing more 
in better conditions so as to give the masses a better life and more opportunities of 
employment, hence greater dignity and even greater freedom.
Time is short
However simple or simplified the main issue may thus seem to be, there is what we 
may call a historical urgency obliging those engaged on the task to arrange the prob-
lems in a certain order of priority.
Time presses; the threat of war hangs over our heads.
If the European peoples for whom there is no other salvation but to work closely 
together do not associate quickly, a third war might well destroy the last chance of 
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creating a strong and flexible economy which in itself, by the standard of living it will 
provide, will be one of the best guarantees of world peace.
The force of nationalism
Statesmen do not deny the need to make haste, but few of them follow out their ideas 
to the end.
Make Europe? - Yes, by all means. But when it comes to abdicating even a fraction 
of national sovereignty for the sake of Europe, we know all too well the hesitations 
that arise.
At present there is no doubt that nationalism is everywhere a far more active 
force than reason, which warns us of the imperious necessity of creating Europe on a 
supranational scale -though this does not mean doing away with nations or imposing 
a uniformity which would be contrary to the genius and diversity of each.
Awakening the masses
What is to be done to combat this spirit of the past, this resistance which is so con-
trary to peoples’ future interest?
Within each nation we must bring to life forces in favour of creating a European 
economy which can overcome private interests, the resistance of the timid and hide-
bound who cling to national positions at all costs.
Since it is on the political level that the most dangerous hesitations and weak-
nesses are preventing or delaying the creation of Europe, the peoples’ will must be 
expressed in political terms.
If the Europe we are to build must and can only consist in a stronger and more 
stable economy, better equipped and organized, must not the appeal be addressed 
first and foremost to all sections of the European population that are directly in-
terested in a higher level of production, employment, equipment and consumption? 
What we have to do, then, vis-a-vis all sections of the population of each country, is 
not to create any mystique or stir up consciences in favour of a crusade, however 
noble its mythology or intentions; but to make men feel the hard necessity and obvi-
ous urgency of creating an economy according to plans and programmes aimed at 
providing social security and a better life for each and everyone. Having done this, 
we must see to it that the peoples of Europe, and especially the broad masses in each 
country, demand a formal promise from their statesmen of whatever party that they 
will require governments to take the most vigorous action to prepare plans for pro-
duction, organization and equipment in the new European economy.
Every means and every argument should be used for this purpose: the fear of war, 
anxiety at the periodic return of economic crises and unemployment, but also the awak-
ening of constructive intentions, hopes that are no longer fanciful, in short the awaken-
ing of a large and powerful movement of enthusiasm, both individual and collective.
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Setting one’s sights on a higher standard of living is by no means synonymous with 
the materialism of the herd. In any great collective work there is something which exalts 
the individual and makes him rise above himself. And no one can deny that organizing 
the European economy and providing it with the necessary technical equipment is one 
of the greatest and finest collective works that can be conceived at the present day.
Human needs exist and will increase as to the quantity, diversity and quality of 
products. Europe as a whole possesses what it takes to meet them: management, 
labour, raw materials from the motherland or colonies, and the means of procuring 
such as it requires from elsewhere. It will no doubt be argued that he peoples of the 
old world are too selfish and individualistic to unite. There is some truth in this, 
but we should not let it discourage us. The cure is hope and the opportunity, which 
would soon be grasped, to take part in major programmes of organization and capital 
construction. Workers and young people in every country would, we are convinced, 
respond with enthusiasm.
There is a high moral potential in such plans as have been carried out in the USSR 
or the Tennessee Valley project in the US. Such plans are capable of eliciting the no-
blest individual and collective effort; those who take part in them become aware of 
social values not merely as a constraint but as a matter of real grandeur, a shining 
opportunity to be part of an enterprise that transcends the individual and elevates 
him in his own eyes. (...)
Old-style laissez-faire capitalism can no longer satisfy the modern world’s enor-
mous needs in the way of equipment and finance. It needs a shot in the arm, and at 
least a partial change in the system of management, where the workers are demand-
ing to be represented.
The trade union movement -and in our view this is not the least important art of its 
mission- is already on its guard against the growing threat of state control wielding 
governmental powers in matters of finance, the regulation of trade, production plan-
ning and so on. Trade unions are the best champions of democracy since they defend 
the workers and, in every worker, a human being. At the same time they understand 
democracy in the full sense—social, economic and of course political as well.
To provide a firmer basis for economic and social democracy and to confer greater 
economic responsibility on the workers, trade unions demand as a first stage the co-
management of enterprises and the creation of a collective system of capital, so that 
workers can by degrees become co-owners of enterprises and share in the work of 
re-equipment.
The struggle against state capitalism—or etatism, which amounts to the same 
thing—can only be effective if in future the ownership of the means of production 
and exchange is democratized and effectively distributed among the population in-
stead of being controlled exclusively by the state, which can ever genuinely embody 
or express the interests of a community or, above all, those of its members.
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Because trade unionism is truly democratic in spirit, it refuses and will always 
refuse to be totalitarian. Conscious though it may be of its strength, it will never use 
it to set up a dictatorship.
We are convinced that the unions will not contest our view that social diversity 
must be respected in the construction of a European economy. It will not be the least 
service rendered by the forces of labour to have worked to create this new Europe, 
not seeking to impose the dictatorship of its own ideals but only those of nobility and 
humanity.
Making Europe
What we want then is to create a Europe that is organized, better equipped and truly 
democratic; a Europe of hope and the joy of life, offering the best conditions for a 
renewed and regenerated civilization; a Europe open to every kind of exchange in 
the material, intellectual and moral sphere; welcoming future and turned towards it, 
but at the same time suited to man’s needs proportionate to whatever is simply and 
basically human.
If this is the kind of socialism that is to mark the structure of Europe, then we for 
our part are in favour of a federal, democratic and socialist Europe—a Europe that 
may one day, without error or exaggeration, be called a ‘land of men’ and a true ‘land 
of mankind’.
Let us then set about making Europe! But at the very outset the name of Europe 
should be changed or abolished, to mark more clearly our determination to rebuild 
on fresh foundations, in a new and truly active spirit.
Source: Pro Europa
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Memoirs
Jean Monnet
Extract
[...] I felt the need to define for myself the principles that had always guided me in my 
day-to-day work. I have kept the notes I made at that time, during the summer break 
in 1966; and I think that they are more expressive in their immediacy than a longer, 
more elaborate credo would be:
August 18
Liberty means civilization.
Civilization means rules+institutions.
And all that because the essential objective of all our efforts is to develop man-
kind, not to proclaim a fatherland, big or small.
1. It is a privilege to be born (humanity).
2. It is a privilege to be born into our civilization.
3. Are we to confine these privileges within the national barriers and laws that 
protect us?
4. Or are we going to try to extend privilege to others?
5. We must maintain our civilization, which is so much ahead of the rest of the world.
6. We must organize our civilization and our collective action for the sake of peace.
7. We must organize the collective action of our civilization. How can that be done? 
Only by uniting in collective action Europe and America, which together have the 
greatest resources in the world, which share the same civilization, and which 
conduct their public affairs in the same democratic manner.
8. This organization, while seeking a state of co-existence with the East, will create 
a new order in the world and at the same time make possible the necessary and 
unconditional aid and support that our civilization, which must be preserved, will 
bring to the rest of the world. Together they can do it; separately, they will oppose 
each other.
9. At their origin, at birth, people are the same. Later, drawn into a framework of 
rules, everyone wants to preserve the privileges he has acquired. The national 
framework supports this fleeting vision. We are unaware of the extraordinary 
privilege we enjoy. We must extend it to others. How can it be done? Only by free-
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dom on the one hand and collective effort on the other, so as gradually to enable 
the under-developed countries to share in our privileges. How can that be done 
without uniting, pooling our resources, etc.?
August 22
Nations were forged by successive additions. Brittany, Burgundy, etc., were prov-
inces, and centralizing kings brought them together in a unit -France- by arms or by 
treaty: the Comte of Nice, Savoy. All these changes, from ‘provincial’ into ‘national’, 
corresponded to the conditions prevailing at the time. The force of adaptation, which 
led the provinces of France to make France, still continues.
We are convinced that our epoch will have to see the creation of vast entities such 
as the United States and the USSR, and that between them there must be established 
co-operation and collective action by means of organization (that is what we mean by 
the organization of peace).
It cannot all be done at once: it is gradually that we shall achieve this organiza-
tion. But already it is essential to make a start. It is not a question of solving political 
problems which, as in the past. divide the forces that seek domination or superior-
ity. It is a question of inducing civilization to make fresh progress, by beginning to 
change the form of the relationship between countries and applying the principle of 
equality between peoples and between countries. People no longer want their future 
to depend on the skill or ambition of their Governments. They do not want ephemeral 
solutions, and, for that reason, they want there to be established in our countries an 
organization, procedure, that will make possible collective discussion and decision.
These reflections were not the subject for a book but the basis of my daily ac-
tion, The most practical men with whom I have worked also needed such guidance 
to believe in what they were doing and never become discouraged. With all of them 
-political leaders, trade unionists newspapermen- I like to sit around the fire and talk 
about our underlying motives. I had found that if those motives became obscure, to 
them or to myself, our ability to act successfully suffered. That is why we had to work 
to keep them alive, like the flames in the hearth we stared at as we tried to see our 
way through the problems. [...]
Source: Pro Europa
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Europe Unites
Denis de Rougemont
Taken one by one, the vital organs of our society appear to me to be in quite 
good condition. It remains to discover whether the subject of our inquiry, Eu-
rope, still possesses a sufficient will to live to be able to fulfil the new functions 
which from now on are allotted to it in the world. I shall now endeavour to show 
that in practice, Europe’s will to live means her will to unite.
From diversity to division
These two things are not necessarily identical. Indeed, there might seem to be a 
contradiction between giving Europe a clean bill of health and saying that she needs 
to unite. for if all is well, why do we need to unite? Nations feel this need only at times 
of crisis, as a reaction against internal ills or against a peril from outside. Union is 
not an end in itself; it is a means to the end of survival, or of attaining a better life. It 
is even, in practical terms, a cure. But to speak of a cure is to acknowledge a disease. 
So what is this illness which afflicts Europe despite her organic soundness: I believe 
that it is of psychic origin.
Its overall effect is to transform our living, vital diversities into rigid, morbid 
divisions; political in origin they spread to the economic field and finally attack the 
common basis of our diversities—the unity of our traditional, creative culture. The 
short name for this sickness is nationalism, which is the claim by states to absolute 
sovereignty, in which they enclose their economy and even their culture but not, alas, 
always their armies. The fact that Europe has come close to destroying herself twice 
within the present century must be laid at the door of extreme nationalism. And it is 
this very disease, which we have planted on many continents formerly colonised by 
us, that causes the fevers and the paroxysms of hate against Europe from which so 
many emergent countries in Africa, the Arab world and Asia have suffered during the 
last few years.
Thus I believe that if we can show that the will to unite exists it will prove that 
Europe once more has the will to live; for it would stem from the desire to overcome 
our nationalist divisions, and thereby restore that healthy play to our diversities 
which is the sign of normality. The will to unite will be a sign of renewed health in 
the body of Europe in so far as it aims at federating our differences, not ironing them 
out or making life uniform throughout the continent. That could be done by allowing 
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technology to proliferate without checking it . The will to unite will be healthy if it 
tends to eliminate the virus of nationalism, not to offer it greater scope by creating 
a continent transformed into a super-nation and saddled with a super-nationalism.
Three conceptions of union
I shall deal straight away with these definitions of unity, thus making clear my own 
position in the context of the discussion now going on about Europe. For there is 
a struggle between two extreme and opposite views on this matter. One has been 
known for some little time as “L’ Europe des patries”, or Europe made up of separate 
fatherlands (a fundamentally incorrect expression, by the way). This school would 
like to stick to an alliance of national states all keeping their sovereignty intact. It is 
the minimal position. The other, which can be broadly described as that of the Com-
mon Market, wishes to unify the nations on the basis of full economic integration. 
The former places its main emphasis on the points of difference, the latter on unity. 
My belief is that the only unity which is compatible with the genius of Europe itself, 
with its past, with its realities and its present vocation, is unity in diversity, a strong 
yet flexible union of which Switzerland has perfected the prototype: and that means 
federalism.
A discussion of the merits of these three schools of thought --that of alliances, that 
of integration and that of federation-- would be outside the scope of this book, which 
is not about politics. Nevertheless, I think it is essential to trace the origins of these 
three lines of thought, and to discover the source of the discussion about the union of 
Europe which has been in full spate for several years in the press and at meetings all 
over the continent. (It has even crossed the channel to Britain, and recently reached 
the United States).
For it is impossible to understand what is at stake in this great contemporary 
discussion, or its themes, without first seeing them against the background of our 
history. It is taking place at what seems to be the end of a long evolution which has 
shaped the thought, feelings and reflexes of Europeans, and which therefore deter-
mines whether they are instinctively repelled by, or enthusiastically support, the 
various solutions offered.
The idea of unifying or federating Europe was not born yesterday. To be exact, 
even on the evidence of existing documents, it goes back to the beginning of the four-
teenth century. Moreover, the small extent to which its themes have changed over the 
centuries is very striking.
What is happening before our eyes, very imperfectly as yet, it is true -is what 
was vainly advocated exactly six and a half centuries ago by visionary poets and 
great philosophers, as well as by some hard-headed politicians, from Dante through 
Goethe to Victor Hugo, from Sully through Montesquieu, Rousseau and Saint-Simon to 
Churchill, and from Leibnitz through Kant to Nietzsche.
Ideas of Europe | 579 
Id
ea
s 
of
 
 E
u
ro
p
e
Four themes of unity 
For all these men, and for hundreds of others whom I have quoted and about whom I have 
written in a recent work entitled Twenty-eight centuries of Europe1 there were ultimately 
four great, simple reasons why it was imperative for Europe to unite. These themes are 
nearly always all present, although one or another of them may be more dominant ac-
cording to the age and the school of thought. Here then are those four constant themes.
First of all, peace, which must be guaranteed to our peoples, torn by the inter-
necine wars in Europe; peace through an authority higher than nations and princes, 
an authority which suppresses any attempt at hegemony. This was the dominant 
theme throughout the Middle Ages.
Next. The re-establishment of a spiritual community supported by a common legal 
framework. Already present in Dante, this theme comes to the fore after the Reforma-
tion and is prominent all through the period of absolutism in which sovereign States 
were formed, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.
Lastly, the prosperity of all, which has to be organised on the continental scale, 
not at State level. This theme is characteristic of the modern period, from Saint-Simon 
and Bentham around 1800 up to the Common Market in our time.
The theme of a threat from outside, or of common defence, which many modern 
authors consider to be essential in awakening a sense of the need for unity, has often 
been invoked over the centuries. Until the eighteenth century the Turks filled the role of 
bogeyman; then in the nineteenth century it was the turn of the Russians and of the Yel-
low Peril; now it is the Two Super-Powers who have the Bomb. But in fact this fear motive 
is incidental, and has not been a driving force in our history. Whether the adversary be 
Turkish or Soviet it is a welcome pretext inasmuch as it allows the positive thesis which 
is being defended—peace, spiritual community or prosperity—to be dramatised. It is 
pre-eminently a means of persuading Princes, and later on public opinion, to act.
Broadly speaking, union is desired in order to overcome the permanent state of 
anarchy resulting from the claims of nations and states to absolute sovereignty, and 
their rejection of any common authority above their interests or ambitions, which 
they call their rights. As to the theme of imperialism—”Let us march out together 
and conquer the world”—I find no mention of it in any plan or thesis, with the sole 
exception of those of the Jacobins. Certainly it inspired first Napoleon and then Hitler 
in their brief and unsuccessful attempts to unify Europe by force, each of which 
lasted about a dozen years. But the prophets and advocates of federal union have 
always maintained that one of the outstanding effects of union would be to remove 
any temptation to imperialism or even colonialism.
1 D. de Rougemont, Vingt-Huit Siècles d’Europe Payot (Bibliothèque Historique), Paris 1961. 
The quotations from plans for Europe mentioned later on are taken from this book, where 
they will be found in their context.
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These four main themes (peace, spiritual community, prosperity, and defence), 
I repeat, are all to be found in the thinking of all the advocates of unity whom I shall 
name, but the emphasis differs according to the epoch: this points to an evolution of 
themes or motives observable over the centuries, which it is interesting to retrace. 
I shall therefore pass rapidly in review the great names which stand out as landmarks 
in this evolution, and the main schemes of unity which illustrate its various stages.
Dante
The first two date from the years 1306 and 1308. One is Dante’s De Monarchia, and 
the other was the work of Pierre DuBois, a counsellor of Philip the Fair. Both were 
reacting against the growing anarchy caused in Europe by the quarrels between the 
Empire and the Church, the princes, the communes and the innumerable regional or, 
in the case of the king of France, even national sovereignties (the latter entering the 
conflict between the Pope and the Emperor like a third robber robber baron).
Dante’s idea was a simple one; he wanted to see the establishment of a universal 
monarchy which, quite logically, would be sole judge in quarrels arising between 
princes who would be “independent and equal”, and hence without powers over one 
another. Each of these would be master in his own lands, and each kingdom or town 
would retain its own “different laws”, adapted to its customs; but on “common points 
affecting all men” the human species would be governed by a single monarch and 
“turned towards peace by a single law”. Thus peace would once more come to Europe, 
which Dante declared to be “sick in its two intellects and in its two intellects and in 
its sensibility”, and which he described as “a many-headed monster dissipating itself 
in conflicting efforts”. It would be an imperial peace, and Dante described it as the 
“fullness of times” predicted by St. Paul.2
Pierre DuBois
This sublime utopia of the poet, holding up the vision of a goal which though unat-
tainable, was to haunt men’s minds for centuries, had its counterpart in the down-
to-earth empiricism of the Norman lawyer Pierre Dubois. He asked the following 
practical question: “If cities and princes recognise no higher power in this world, 
and if they are in conflict, before whom are they to state their case?” And DuBois 
answered: not before the universal monarch, but before a European Tribunal. This 
tribunal of arbitration, composed of three “wise experienced” laymen, would be 
armed with sanctions. A country refusing to submit would be surrounded, isolated, 
and reduced by starvation; as for individual disturbers of the peace, they would be 
deported: they would be sent to fight against the Turks in the Holy Land, like a sort of 
2 Dante, De Monarchia, written in 1308 in Latin. Quotations are from the French translation 
by B. Landry, Alcan, Paris 1933.
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Foreign Legion, rather than being allowed to continue bringing fire and blood to the 
“Christian Republic” (for “Christian” read “European”).3
Needless to say, this plan received about as little attention as Dante’s utopia. Not 
that it lacked realism; on the contrary, as one commentator wrote: “He was too much 
of a realist for his generation, which had very little realism.”4
This was the refrain with which all proposals for peace, from that day to this, 
were to be met. It took the atomic bomb finally to convince the nations and their 
rulers that it might be more realistic to help one another than to kill one another, 
and that therefore those who put forward plans for peace are not necessarily all soft 
dreamers or dangerous lunatics.
King George Podiebrad
Nevertheless, Pierre DuBois’ idea was destined to survive. A hundred and fifty years 
later, in 1462, a poor Hussite of gentle birth, George Podiebrad, who had come to the 
throne of Bohemia, took up the torch. He put forward to the Christian princes and 
to the Pope a Treaty of Alliance which was, in fact, a plan for federation5; for, whilst 
guaranteeing the autonomy of the member states, it expressly limited their sover-
eignties. It involved the setting up of an Assembly, whose first meeting place was to 
have been Basle, of a Court of Justice, of a set of international rules for arbitration, of a 
common armed force and a common budget. All this is clearly much more progressive 
and modern than a plan which was to be proposed exactly five hundred years later 
called “ L’Europe des patries”, a plan that would be a reversion to a Europe composed 
of sovereign states, an alliance with a paradox at its heart and which it is to be feared, 
would be no easier to set up than a Friendly Society composed of misanthropists.
Podiebrad’s plan was turned down by Louis XI, King of France, and by Pope Pius 
II, and nothing further was done about it. And yet this pope was none other than the 
great Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, who at that very time was vainly trying to organise 
a new crusade, (for Byzantium had just fallen into the hands of the Turks), and who 
had been the first to speak of Europe as though it were a common fatherland, in his 
memorable letter to Mahomet II: “Now”, he wrote “it is in Europe itself, that is to say 
in our own fatherland, in our own house, that we are being attacked and killed.”6
3 Piere DuBois, De recuperatione Terra Sancte. composed in 1306 and sent as a circular letter 
to all Christian princes.
4 Christian L.Lange, Histoire de l’internationalisme, Christiania 1919, vol. I, chapter 4.
5 The Treaty of George Podiebrad (1420-1471) was written in Latin in the year 1463. The 
text is reproduced in the Mèmoires of Philippe de Comines, preceded by this title in French: 
Treaty of Alliance and Confederation between King Louis IX, George King of Bohemia and 
the Seigniory of Venice, to resist the Turk.
6 Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (1405-1464), De Contantinopolitana clade ac bello contra Turcos 
congregando. Podiebrad ascended the throne in 1462, the very year in which Aeneas Silvius 
became Pope Pius II. These two contemporaries were pursuing the same aim, but Pius II 
582 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
Two centuries passed, and the face of Europe had changed. The great Discoveries, 
the Reformation and the establishment of states in the modern meaning of the word 
had caused great upheavals, and in particular the Thirty Years War. The time had 
come to re-think the relations between nations, that is to say between princes.
Efforts to restore order 
Four plans on the grand scale contributed to this effort to restore order which was the 
keynote of the seventeenth century. All four vigorously emphasise Europe’s federal 
vocation and the deep anxiety felt by the men of that age about the absolutist claims of 
states, All four were the product of minds which were deeply religious and therefore 
“ecumenical” in to-day’s usage of the word, which implies the drawing closer together 
of the Christian confessions. Thus spiritual community, as well as peace, was one 
of the main inspirations of these plans. Lastly, all four passed unregarded by their 
contemporaries and yet survive in human memory long after the “realist” treaties of 
the period, which were soon effaced by history. To this day they have not ceased to 
influence the thinking of the creators of European institutions.
In chronological order, these four plans are: the Nouveau Cynée of Emeric Cruce, 
a Parisian monk, in 1623; Sully’s Grand Design in 1638 (he was a Huguenot minister of 
Henry IV); the Universal Dream of Amos Comenius, a Moravian bishop, in 1645; and 
the Essay on the present and future of Peace in Europe by William Pen, the English 
Quaker and founder of a state in America, in 1692. There was a fifth at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, the Project of Perpetual Peace, by the notorious Abbe de 
Saint-Pierre, in 1792.
To be frank, these plans were no great improvement on that of Podiebrad, though 
an examination of the facts compels their authors to repeat his main points. All of 
them propose a judicial tribunal which is above the states—or as we should say, 
supranational; they propose an Assembly, or Council of Europe; economic action on a 
continent-wide scale; and a common army in place of the armies of the Princes.
I shall therefore confine myself to mentioning any original or picturesque features 
of the various plans.
Emeric Cruce
Undoubtedly the most modern of these plans is the one which appeared first and of 
which first and of which least was heard, that of Emeric Cruce. All we know about him 
is that he was an obscure “teacher monk” in a college in Paris.7 Three of his distinc-
was forced by the antagonism between the Papacy and the Princes to condemn Podiebrad’s 
scheme, which was in fact anti-clerical.
7 Emeric Crucé (d. 1648): Le Nouveau Cynée ou discours d’Etat representant les occasions et 
moyens d’ établir une paix générale et la liberté du commerce par tout le monde. Published 
at Paris in 1623.
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tive proposals are most astonishing considering the time when they were made: first, 
to include the Turks in the federation of Europe, which is rather like asking Soviet 
Russia today [1965] to join the Common Market, or even NATO; secondly, to end the 
wars of religion on the ground that the object of all religions is the same, namely 
the worship of God, and that their ceremonies are therefore of equal worth; “Only a 
narrow-minded person” he wrote, “believes that everyone ought to live as he does, or 
imagines only his own customs to be right, like those naive Athenians who thought 
their moon was brighter than that in any other country”; and third, to replace mili-
tary training by educating the people in the sciences and manual skills, and to work 
out a scheme of great public works on the European scale, such as canals “joining the 
two seas”, the reclamation of waste land, standardisation of weights and measures, a 
common currency and the abolition of customs and tolls.
For all its astonishing richness, this plan was not followed up. But Leibnitz, another 
good European with an ecumenical outlook, was to read it later and make use of it.
Sully’s “Grand Design”
The “Grand Design” which the Duc de Sully pretends to ascribe to King Henry IV of 
France was less original but much more widely known. It is constantly quoted and 
never read, with good reason. In reality it started off as a purely political scheme for 
a supranational pact between Protestant and Catholic princes against the house of 
Habsburg; but its substance is thinly spread through the thousands of pages of the 
Memoires des sages et royales aeconomies8, written long after the king’s death by 
four secretaries who address the duke in the second person plural and thus recount 
his own life to him. In so far as it can be reconstituted, the plan
provides for provincial councils and a General Council of Europe, limiting state 
sovereignty and guaranteeing freedom of trade. Its historical merit is that of having 
linked the prestige of a king to a high sounding title, “the Grand Design”, which was to 
be repeated and invoked by innumerable advocates of unity, from William Penn and 
the abbe de Saint-Pierre to Churchill.
Comenius
Comenius9 was the founder of modern pedagogy, the visionary forerunner of the 
ecumenical movement and of the worldwide federation. We shall single out from 
his Universal Dream the imposing scheme for a triple tribunal placed above indi-
8 The Memoires of Maximilien de Bethune, Duke Sully (their full title takes up a dozen lines) 
were not published until 1662 although the first two parts were completed in 1638. In 1745 
the abbe of Sluys published a short version which was very widely read.
9 Amos Comenius (a latinized form of the name Komenski), 1592-1670 wrote his Panegersia 
or Universal Dream in 1645 and published 1666. The sentence quoted is taken from the 
“Praefatio ad Europeos”.
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vidual states, and composed of the learned ones or “Council of Light” ecclesiastics or 
“Consistory”, and politicians or statesmen the “Court of Justice”. And we quote this 
memorable sentence “The light must be taken to other peoples in the name of our 
fatherland of Europe; that is why we must first of all unite among ourselves; for we 
Europeans must be looked upon as travellers who have all embarked on one and the 
same vessel.” (May I remind you that this was written more than three hundred years 
ago).
William Penn
From the Essay by William Penn10, founder, governor and all but king of Pennsylvania, 
we shall single out his uncompromising pacifism, his practical sense and his concern 
with economy. Like Cruce, he too proposed that young people should be taught “me-
chanics, a knowledge of nature, to cultivate useful and pleasant arts, and to know 
the world into which they have been born” rather than how to use arms. He wanted 
a European passport, and he suggested that the meeting place of the European 
parliament should be circular, not rectangular, having as many doors as there were 
delegations, to prevent disputes about precedence...
The Abbe de Saint-Pierre
Lastly there is the Plan for Perpetual Peace of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre11, known 
chiefly for the derision it aroused throughout the eighteenth century. In six poorly 
written volumes it contains little that is really new, excepting the proposal that 
European union should begin with a congress meeting at the Hague -which actually 
took place 236 years later. This what Rousseau said about it: If the plan is not put into 
execution it will not be because it is fanciful; it is because men are senseless, and 
because it is a kind of folly to be wise in the midst of fools”.12
Some of these plans, like Sully’s became famous; others, like Saint-Pierre’s, were 
much read: but none of them had the slightest practical result.
The Jacobins
Let us turn the page of the cosmopolitan eighteenth century; Montesquieu, Voltaire 
and Wieland thought that Europe had already been built, because it existed in their 
minds and therefore must exist in reality. This brings us to the French Revolution. 
10 The Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe was written between 1692 and 
1694, during a break in William Penn’s career as a governor.
11 The Project of Perpetual Peace in Europe was first published at Cologne in 1712, then at 
Utrecht in 1713, anonymously. In 1729 the abbé de Saint-Pierre wrote a shorter version, this 
time over his signature.
12 The Extrait du Projet de paix perpetuelle de M. l’abbé de Saint-Pierre, par J.-J. Rousseau, 
citoyen de Genève, was published at Amsterdam in 1761.
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In 1792 one of its extreme left-wing orators, Anacharsis Cloots, put down at the bar 
of the Convention a plan for a Universal Republic, of which the municipality of Paris 
would be the all-powerful centre. It was a curious secular replica of Dante’s universal 
monarchy except that, at Cloots made clear, this utopia was to be imposed upon man-
kind by “war! war! the cry of all patriots scattered over the surface of Europe”. The 
answer to this crusade whose motto would have been “The Jacobins everywhere!” 
was the completely opposite one of the famous English economist Jeremy Bentham, 
who incidentally was given French citizenship by the same Convention. His plan was 
entitled: “A Plan for Perpetual Peace”.13 His demands included on the one hand that 
Europe should be neutral, armed and united, on the model of the “Helvetic League”, 
and on the other hand that France and Great Britain should give up their “costly 
overseas dependencies” as the colonies were then called. Needless to say, the plan 
was not adopted...
Saint-Simon
A little later Count Henri de Saint-Simon, a forerunner of Socialism and of large scale 
industrial enterprise (the Suez canal was built by his followers) also proposed, in his 
“Plan for the Organisation of European Society”14 that French and British interests 
should be merged and that a European Parliament elected by leaders in trade and the 
professions should be set up and “placed over all national governments”. Saint-Simon 
is the real ancestor of the Common Marked in that, for him, unity must be born of 
the “coactive power” of economic institutions, a power which “concerts movements, 
makes interests common and promises firm”.
But once again the age was not realistic enough to understand so clear a message, 
the message of a political engineer. The industrial age, inaugurated by the libertarian 
hopes of the democrats, was indeed to see the birth of popular nationalisms, propa-
gated and, above all, induced by the Napoleonic conquest. For the Holy Roman Empire 
and Metternich’s Holy Alliance (of kings) it substituted Béranger’s ideal of the “Holy 
Alliance of Peoples”. But it was the nation-states which ate the chestnuts pulled out of 
the fire by such men as Mazzini, Garibaldi, Fourier, Heine, Lamartine and Mickiewicz, 
all of whom fought for a United States of Europe based upon the will of the peoples 
-a vision which was hymned by far-sighted poets, and exploited by politicians with 
short-sighted tricks. The nineteenth century was filled with countless European 
congresses, and the sum total of their achievement was nothing. But amongst those 
13 It was in his Principles of International Law, completed in 1789 and published in 1843, some 
time after the author’s death, that Jeremy Bentham included A Plan for an Universal and 
Perpetual Peace, in which he dealt with the European question.
14 H. de Saint-Simon, De la réorganization de la Société européene ou de la necessité de 
rassembler les peuples de l’ Europe en un seul corps politique, en conservant à chacun son 
indépendence nationale, Paris 1814.
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who attended them was Victor Hugo, that poet who must be acclaimed as the greatest 
singer of the ideal of European union. He was even acclaimed during his lifetime.
The following is an extract from the report in the Journal Officiel of the speech 
which he made in the French legislative assembly in 1851:
M. Hugo: The first nation in the world has produced three revolutions, as the gods 
of Homer took three steps. These three revolutions are one, and it is not a local 
revolution but the revolution of humanity [... ] After long trials, this revolution 
gave birth in France to the Republic [...] The people of France have carved out of 
indestructible granite, and placed right in the centre of a continent full of mon-
archies, the foundation stone of the immense edifice of the future, which will be 
known one day as the United States of Europe. 
M. de Montalembert: The United States of Europe! That’s going too far. Hugo is 
mad. 
M.Mole: The United States of Europe! What an idea! What folly! 
M. Quentin-Bauchard: These poets!”15 
Hugo was not at all put out by these fatheads, whose reactions he had anticipated. 
He knew the real history of his nation better than many a nationalist. Two years 
before, at the Peace Congress which met in Paris, he had exclaimed: “There will come 
a day when all of you, France, Russia, Italy, Britain, Germany, all you nations of this 
continent, without losing your distinctive qualities or your glorious individuality, 
will merge closely into a higher unity and will form the fraternity of Europe, Just as 
Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, all our provinces, have merged to 
become France. The day will come when the only battlefields will be markets open to 
commerce and minds open to ideas. The day will come when bullets and bombs will 
be replaced by votes, by universal suffrage of the peoples and by the true judgment of 
a great sovereign senate which will be to Europe what Parliament is to England, what 
the Diet is to Germany and what the Legislative Assembly is to France! The day will 
come when two huge groups will be seen, the United States of America and the United 
States of Europe, holding out their hands to one another across the ocean, exchanging 
their products, their trade, their industry, their arts, their science, reclaiming the 
globe, colonising deserts and improving creation under the eye of the Creator [...]”16
Proudhon
In 1868 Proudhon’s great prediction appeared: “The twentieth century will see the 
beginning of the age of federations, in which humanity will begin another purgatory 
lasting a thousand years”.17 A year previously Hugo had written: “In the twentieth 
15 V.Hugo, Oeuvres complètes, Actes et Paroles, vol. I, pp. 425-427.
16 V. Hugo, op. cit.,I pp. 475-486.
17 P.-J Proudhon, Oeuvres complètes, vol. VIII, Du Principe Federatif, Paris 1868, p. 177.
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century, there will be an extraordinary nation. It will be a great nation, but at the same 
time a free one. It will be famous, rich, intelligent, peaceful and friendly towards the 
rest of humanity. It will have the gravity and charm of an elder [...] The capital of this 
nation will be Paris, but the nation will not be called France; its name will be Europe. 
It will be called Europe in the twentieth century, but in later centuries, transfigured 
still farther, it will be called Humanity. Humanity, the ultimate nation, is even now 
perceived by thinkers who can pierce the shadows; but what the nineteenth century 
is witnessing is the formation of Europe.”18
Nietzsche versus nationalism
Alas, Hugo was a hundred years ahead of history. For what the nineteenth century 
really witnessed was the triumph of the principle of nationality, as Mazzini said; and 
before long this was transformed into militant nationalism, backed by the state and 
striving for self-sufficiency. Towards the end of the century all percipient observ-
ers of these developments -Jakob Burkhardt as much as Dostoevsky, Ernest Renan 
as much as Nietzsche- were foretelling the worst. Nietzsche wrote in The Will to 
Power: “Let some fresh air in! This absurd state of affairs must not go on any longer 
in Europe! What sense is there in this bone-headed nationalism? Now that everything 
points to larger common interests, what is the purpose of encouraging this scurvy 
egoism?” He believed he could detect “among all the great and deep minds of this 
century, their common spiritual task consists in preparing for and anticipating this 
new synthesis: Europe united and the European man of the future.”19 But at the same 
time he denounced the “paralysis of the will”, a sickness threatening to prove fatal to 
Europe, and from which Russia alone seemed exempt, awaiting her hour...
Finally, George Sorel, in one of his Propos dated 1912, wrote: “Europe is a cemetery, 
peopled by nations who sing and then go out to kill one another. Soon the French and 
the Germans will be singing”.20
We know what happened. For this was not an empty prophesy! Just after the first 
world war, Paul Valéry was able to write: “All is not lost, but everything was touched 
by the wings of death [... ] Now we know that civilisation is mortal”.21
The European Movement 1924
Europe had touched bottom for the first time. It was then that plans for union began 
to appear again -there was Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan Europe, then Aristide 
18 V. Hugo, op. cit., vol.IV, p. 295. Article entitled: Il Avenir.
19 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 256, then a posthumous fragment (which we quote) 
on the same subject.
20 Jean Variot: Propos de Georges Sorel, Paris 1935.
21 Paul Valery, Variete I, La Crise de l’Esprit (written 1919) Paris 1924.
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Briand and Alexis Léger, between 1923 and 1932.22 And as the second world war 
finished a political, economic and cultural programme was organised with the firm 
intention of giving immediate effect to expectations which had been denied for more 
than six centuries.
The time for plans that went unheeded was over. Now things began to happen 
—many things. Each new step forward had to be cemented by yet another one. Here 
is the swift chronicle of events.
Resistance in Europe 1944
In the spring of 1944 resistance fighters from nine countries in Europe met four 
times in secret at a villa in Geneva. They worked out a common declaration giving 
expression to the united purpose animating those who were in the fight against Nazi 
oppression. They set out the moral, social, economic and political aims of a union of 
their countries and they declared: “These aims can be achieved only if the various 
countries of the world agree to supersede the dogma of absolute state sovereignty by 
joining together in a single federal organisation. Peace in Europe is the keystone of 
world peace. For in the space of a single generation Europe has been the epicentre of 
two world conflicts due primarily to the existence of thirty sovereign states on this 
continent. This anarchy must be ended by the creation of a federal Union among the 
peoples of Europe.”23
You will have recognised in the words of this declaration the main themes of the 
plans I have cited. There is nothing new save for one crucial difference: this time it is 
not isolated voices separated from one another by twenty or a hundred years, crying 
in the wilderness and speaking to the future; it is groups of combatants in the thick of 
the fight; and no longer do they desire: they will.
As soon as the war ended, these ides and wills were translated into action. In all 
our countries they gave birth to a multitude of movements, groups, associations and 
leagues committed to the idea of federation. The leaders of these movements met at 
Montreux in the autumn of 194724 and decided to convene a Parliament of Europe for 
22 It was in 1922 that Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi first launched in the Austrian and 
German press a first appeal for the creation of “Paneurope”. His Paneuropean Manifesto was 
published in 1924. Aristide Briand, convinced by the young Austrian, decided in 1928 to lay 
plan for a European Confederation before the League of Nations. And he entrusted his clos-
est collaborator, Alexis Léger, with the drafting of the Memorandum on the Organization of 
a Federal System for Europe, dated May 1st, 1930 (republished by the Cahiers de la Pleiade, 
special number in honour of Saint-John Perse -Alexis Léger’s pseudonym- Paris 1950).
23 See the full text of his declaration by the resistance movements in L’Europe de Demain, Edi-
tions de la Baconière, Neuchatel 1945, which gives a detailed account of the secret meetings 
at Geneva.
24 The documents of the Montreux Congress, 27-31 August 1947, organized by H. Brugmans, 
Raymond Silva and Alexandre Marc, were published in one volume entitled Rapport du 
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the following spring. Churchill had just made his famous speech at Zurich calling for 
a union of all the nations of the continent (except the British).25 He was offered the 
Presidency of this union.
The Hague Congress 1948
Thus there were brought together a score of federalist or unionist movements, some 
important statesmen and more than 800 members of parliament, trade union leaders, 
intellectuals and economists—an unlikely combination, very difficult to bring about, 
yet accomplished for all that in a few months by an extraordinary moving spirit, the 
Polish citizen Joseph Retinger.26 And this conjunction resulted in the Congress of 
Europe, which met at The Hague in May 1948.
It cannot be said too often that everything else flowed from that Congress. For 
the Hague Congress was the living synthesis of the four traditional themes of union, 
concretely expressed in its three commissions—political, economic and cultural— 
representing peace through federation, suppressing the anarchy of sovereign states; 
prosperity by means of an economy at once free and organised; and the spiritual 
community, gathering together the living forces of culture, beyond frontiers and na-
tionalisms. What is striking is that the fourth theme, that of common defence, which 
had nearly always figured in the argument up to that time, was quite absent from the 
discussions and from the final Manifesto.27
Everything began at the Hague, I repeat. For, from each of the three themes taken 
up and crystallised by the congress, in other words from each of the three commis-
sions of which it was made up, there emanated three great series of institutions 
which to-day are firmly established; three successes, in fact: whereas the theme of 
Premier Congrès annuel de l’ Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, Geneva 1947, now unob-
tainable.
25 In these words Mr. Churchill made it clear that Britain would not be a member of the Union 
he was proposing”[...] France and Germany should together take the lead in the urgent 
task. Great Britain, the British Empire, powerful America and, I am sure, Soviet Russia -for 
relations were good at that time- should be friends and guarantors of the new Europe and 
champions of her right to live.” (Cf. Généalogie des Grands Desseins européens, Bulletin of 
the EEC, No.6, 1960-61, p. 81).
26 On the career of J.-H. Retinger, see Hommage à un grand Européen J.-H. Retinger, by Prince 
Bernhard of the Netherlands, Ambassador P. Quaroni, the painter F. Topolski, K. Jelenski, D. 
de Rougemont, etc., Bulletin of the EEC, No. 5, 1960-61.
27 Text of the Manifesto in L’Europe en Jeu, by D. de Rougemont, Ed. de la Baconière, Neuchatel 
1948. 
 The Congress of Europe was held from the 7th to the 11th May at the Hague under the patron-
age of Winston Churchill, the Chairman being Duncan Sandys. Chairmen and rapporteurs 
of the three commissions were: political, Paul Ramadier, Rene Courtin and R.W.G. Mackay; 
economic, Paul van Zeeland, D. Serruys and Lord Layton; cultural, Salvador de Matariaga 
and D. Rougemont.
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defence, which was not taken up at The Hague, resulted only in the European Defence 
Community fiasco of 1954. (It may be remarked in passing that if, as is often said, fear 
of Stalin and of communist imperialism was the real reason why we came together, if 
we federated only under duress,, the first institution to be adopted by Europe would 
logically have been the E.D.C. whereas in fact it was the only one which was rejected.)
Now let us see what was achieved.
The political commission at The Hague called for the establishment of a Council 
of Europe endowed with a Court of human rights and a European Assembly. Nine 
months later the Council of Europe and the Court were set up. Then the Assembly 
(unfortunately only consultative) was inaugurated at Strasbourg.
The economic commission called for the establishment of common institutions 
enabling the essential interests of our countries—industrial production, social leg-
islation, customs tariffs, freedom of trade—to be merged. Two years later, Robert 
Schuman and Jean Monnet put forward their plan for the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) which was accepted, and from 1957 Euratom and the Common 
Market, both of which are forging ahead rapidly, were added.
Lastly, the cultural commission called for the setting up of a European Centre of 
Culture. This was duly created at Geneva in 1949, and during the last dozen years 
there have grown up around it, often with its help, sometimes without it, at times 
even in opposition to it (a characteristic result of European pluralism, which is the 
real foundation of our unity) more than a hundred institutes, associations, European 
Houses and Foundations28 all with the object of awakening and sustaining the sense 
of our common involvement in the spiritual adventure of Europe. In the economic 
sphere the movement towards unity seems to be irreversible; already industrialists 
of their own accord are going far beyond the cautious targets of the treaties. It looks 
as if this leap forward will soon find official blessing in the political sphere in some 
form of association, integration or federation. Finally, thanks to the combined efforts 
of some thirty “University Institutes of European Studies” and of large groups in the 
educational world, such as the “European Association of Teachers” which operates 
at primary and secondary school level in some dozen European countries, a feeling 
for union is taking root among the younger generation. Here indeed is progress! For 
only so can the building of Europe rest upon broad and firm foundations; only so can 
the essential transition be effected from the militant will of pioneer groups to the 
reasoned assent of the majority of citizens. Today, the leaders are making Europe, 
tomorrow the people will take over!
28 See Raymond Racine, Les Institutions Culturelles Européenes, invintaire de leurs activites 
dressé pour la “Fondation europénne de la Culture”, Geneva 1959 (duplicated, 100 copies). 
This describes sixty governmental and private organizations, university teaching and re-
search (institutions of) or international relations, Foundations, juries for “Prix europeens”, 
etc. Many more institutes have been set up since then.
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In just fifteen years
And all this happened in about fifteen years, during which the vanguard of the united 
Europe has complained ceaselessly of the indifference with which their appeals were 
received, and of the scandalous slowness of progress towards Federation! This impa-
tience is necessary. It is one of the essential prerequisites of action of the will to act. 
Another condition is to know where one is going, which entails establishing where 
one has come from. In my rapid survey of six and a half centuries of frustration I have 
tried to recall to you the distant origins and the constant themes of the movement 
towards union which is now active and gathering momentum before our eyes.
A Lecture on “The History of the Ideal for a United Europe”. From: The 
Meaning of Europe, translated by Alan Braley,F.I.L.; published by Sidgwick 
& Jackson, London 1965; © Denis de Rougemont
Source: media.aphelis.net/
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Memoirs: “Pour l’ Europe”
Robert Schuman
“The Europeans will be saved if they are aware of their solidarity in the face of a com-
mon danger ... the current fears will be the immediate cause of European unification, 
but not its raison d’ etre Depending on the circumstances surrounding its creation, 
Europe will be more or less complete. Will it ever be complete? No-one can say. This 
is not a reason for delaying the effort to achieve unification. Action is better than 
resignation and the desire for perfection is a poor excuse for inaction.”
“Let this idea of a reconciled, united and strong Europe now be the watchword for 
the young generations who wish to serve a human race which has finally thrown off 
the bonds of hate and fear and which is learning once again, after seemingly endless 
rifts, what Christian brotherhood means.”
“In our minds, European policy is in no way at odds with the patriotic ideal we all 
share ... the nation has a role to play vis-a-vis its own citizens, but also, and just as 
much, vis-a-vis other nations. It cannot therefore retreat into the first of those roles.”
‘The unity of Europe will not be achieved solely or principally by European insti-
tutions; their establishment will be an intellectual journey ... Europe cannot and must 
not remain an economic and technocratic undertaking. It must have a soul, aware-
ness of its historical affinities and its present and future responsibilities and political 
determination in the service of a single human ideal.’
Source: Pro Europa
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Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man
Edmund Husserl
I
In this lecture I will venture an attempt to awaken new interest in the oft-treated 
theme of the European crisis by developing the philosophico-historical idea (or the 
teleological sense) of European man.1 In so far as in thus developing the topic I bring 
out the essential function that philosophy and its ramifications in our sciences have 
to perform in this process, the European crisis will also be given added clarification.
We can illustrate this in terms of the well-known distinction between scientific 
medicine and “naturopathy’’. Just as in the common life of peoples the latter derives 
from naïve experience and tradition, so scientific medicine results from the utilization 
of insights belonging to purely theoretical sciences concerned with the human body, 
primarily anatomy and physiology. These in turn are based on those fundamental 
sciences that seek a universal explanation of nature as such, physics and chemistry.
Now let us turn our gaze from man’s body to his spirit, the theme of the so-called 
humanistic sciences.2 In these sciences theoretical interest is directed exclusively to 
human beings as persons, to their personal life and activity, as also correlatively to 
the concrete results of this activity. To live as a person is to live in a social framework, 
wherein I and we live together in community and have the community as a horizon.3 
Now, communities are structured in various simple or complex forms, such as fam-
ily, nation, or international community. Here the world “live’’ is not to be taken in a 
physiological sense but rather as signifying purposeful living, manifesting spiritual 
creativity - in the broadest sense, creating culture within historical continuity. It is 
this that forms the theme of various humanistic sciences. Now, there is an obvious 
difference between healthy growth and decline, or to put it another way, between 
health and sickness, even for societies, for peoples, for states. In consequence there 
arises the not so farfetched question: how is it that in this connection there has never 
arisen a medical science concerned with nations and with international communi-
ties? The European nations are sick; Europe itself, they say, is in critical condition. 
Nor in this situation are there lacking all sorts of nature therapies. We are, in fact, 
quite overwhelmed with a torrent of naÎne and extravagant suggestions for reform. 
But why is it that so luxuriantly developed humanistic sciences here fail to perform 
the service that in their own sphere the natural sciences perform so competently?
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Those who are familiar with the spirit of modern science will not be embarrassed 
for an answer. The greatness of the natural sciences consists in their refusal to be 
content with an observational empiricism, since for them all descriptions of nature 
are but methodical procedures for arriving at exact explanations, ultimately physico-
chemical explanations. They are of the opinion that “merely descriptive’’ sciences tie 
us to the finitudes of our earthly environing world.4 Mathematically exact natural 
science, however, embraces with its method the infinites contained in its actualities 
and real possibilities. It sees in the intuitively given a merely subjective appearance, 
and it teaches how to investigate intersubjective (“objective’’)5 nature itself with 
systematic approximation on the basis of elements and laws that are unconditionally 
universal. At the same time, such exact science teaches how to explain all intuitively 
pre-given concretions, whether men, or animals, or heavenly bodies, by an appeal to 
what is ultimate, i.e., how to induce from the appearances, which are the data in any 
factual case, future possibilities and probabilities, and to do this with a universality 
and exactitude that surpasses any empiricism limited to intuition.6 The consistent 
development of exact sciences in modern times has been a true revolution in the 
technical mastery of nature.
In the humanistic sciences the methodological situation (in the sense already 
quite intelligible to us) is unfortunately quite different, and this for internal reasons. 
Human spirituality7 is, it is true, based on the human physis, each individually hu-
man soul-life is founded on corporeality, and thus too each community on the bod-
ies of the individual human beings who are its members. If, then, as is done in the 
sphere of nature, a really exact explanation and consequently a similarly extensive 
scientific practical application is to become possible for the phenomena belonging 
to the humanistic sciences, then must the practitioners of the humanistic sciences 
consider not only the spirit as spirit but must also go back to its bodily foundations, 
and by employing the exact sciences of physics and chemistry, carry through their 
explanations. The attempt to do this, however, has been unsuccessful (and in the 
foreseeable future there is no remedy to be had) due to the complexity of the exact 
psycho-physical research needed in the case of individual human beings, to say 
nothing of the great historical communities. If the world were constructed of two, 
so to speak, equal spheres of reality - nature and spirit - neither with a preferential 
position methodologically and factually, the situation would be different. But only 
nature can be handled as a self-contained world; only natural science can with 
complete consistency abstract from all that is spirit and consider nature purely as 
nature. On the other side such a consistent abstraction from nature does not, for 
the practitioner of humanistic science who is interested purely in the spiritual, lead 
to a self-contained “world’’, a world whose interrelationships are purely spiritual, 
that could be the theme of a pure and universal humanistic science, parallel to pure 
natural science. Animal spirituality,8 that of the human and animal “souls’’, to which 
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all other spirituality is referred, is in each individual instance causally based on 
corporeality. It is thus understandable that the practitioner of humanistic science, 
interested solely in the spiritual as such, gets no further than the descriptive, than a 
historical record of spirit, and thus remains tied to intuitive finitudes. Every example 
manifests this. A historian, for example, cannot, after all, treat the history of ancient 
Greece without taking into consideration the physical geography of ancient Greece; 
he cannot treat its architecture without considering the materiality of its buildings, 
etc., etc. That seems clear enough.
What is to be said, then, if the whole mode of thought that reveals itself in this 
presentation rests on fatal prejudices and is in its results partly responsible for 
Europe’s sickness? I am convinced that this is the case, and in this way I hope to 
make understandable that herein lies an essential source for the conviction which 
the modern scientist has that the possibility of grounding a purely self-contained 
and universal science of the spirit is not even worth mentioning, with the result 
that he flatly rejects it.
It is in the interests of our Europe-problem to penetrate a bit more deeply into 
this question and to expose the above, at first glance lucidly clear, argumentation. 
The historian, the investigator of spirit, of culture, constantly has of course physi-
cal nature too among the phenomena with which he is concerned; in our example, 
nature in ancient Greece. But this is not nature in the sense understood by natural 
science; rather it is nature as it was for the ancient Greeks, natural reality present to 
their eyes in the world that surrounded them. To state it more fully; the historical 
environing world of the Greeks is not the objective world in our sense; rather it is 
their “representation of the world’’, i.e., their own subjective evaluation, with all the 
realities therein that were valid for them, for example the gods, the demons, etc.
Environing world is a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. 
That we live in our own particular environing world, to which all our concerns and 
efforts are directed, points to an event that takes place purely in the spiritual order. 
Our environing world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life.9 Here, then, 
there is no reason for one who makes his theme the spirit as spirit to demand for it any 
but a purely spiritual explanation. And this has general validity: to look upon environing 
nature as in itself alien to spirit, and consequently to desire to support humanistic sci-
ence with natural science and thus presumably to make the former exact, is nonsense.
Obviously, too, it is forgotten that natural science (like all sciences as such) is a 
title for spiritual activities, those of natural scientists in cooperation with each other; 
as such these activities belong, as do all spiritual occurrences, to the realm of what 
should be explained by means of a science of the spirit.10 Is it not, then, nonsensical 
and circular, to desire to explain by means of natural science the historical event 
“natural science’’, to explain it by invoking natural science and its laws of nature, both 
of which, as produced by spirit,11 are themselves part of the problem?
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Blinded by naturalism (no matter how much they themselves may verbally oppose 
it), the practitioners of humanistic science have completely neglected even to pose 
the problem of a universal and pure science of the spirit and to seek a theory of the 
essence of spirit as spirit, a theory that pursues what is unconditionally universal in 
the spiritual order with its own elements and its own laws. Yet this last should be 
done with a view to gaining thereby scientific explanations in an absolutely conclu-
sive sense.
The preceding reflections proper to a science of the spirit provide us with the 
right attitude for grasping and handling our theme of spiritual Europe as a problem 
belonging purely to science of the spirit, first of all from the point of view of spirit’s 
history. As has already been stated in the introductory remarks, in following this 
path we should reveal an extraordinary teleology, which is, so to speak, innate only 
in our Europe. This, moreover, is most intimately connected with the eruption (or 
the invasion) of philosophy and of its ramifications, the sciences, in the ancient Greek 
spirit. We already suspect that there will be question of clarifying the profoundest 
reasons for the origin of fatal naturalism, or—and this is of equal importance—of 
modern dualism in interpreting the world. Ultimately the proper sense of European 
man’s crisis should thereby come to light.
We may ask, “How is the spiritual image of Europe to be characterized?’’ This 
does not mean Europe geographically, as it appears on maps, as though European 
man were to be in this way confined to the circle of those who live together in this 
territory. In the spiritual sense it is clear that to Europe belong the English domin-
ions, the United States, etc., but not, however, the Eskimos or Indians of the country 
fairs, or the Gypsies, who are constantly wandering about Europe. Clearly the title 
Europe designates the unity of a spiritual life and a creative activity—with all its 
aims, interests, cares and troubles, with its plans, its establishments, its institutions. 
Therein individual human beings work in a variety of societies, on different levels, 
in families, races,12 nations, all intimately joined together in spirit and, as I said, in 
the unity of one spiritual image. This should stamp on persons, groups, and all their 
cultural accomplishments an all-unifying character.
“The spiritual image of Europe’’—what is it? It is exhibiting the philosophical idea 
immanent in the history of Europe (of spiritual Europe). To put it another way, it is 
its immanent teleology, which, if we consider mankind in general, manifests itself as 
a new human epoch emerging and beginning to grow, the epoch of a humanity that 
from now on will and can live only in the free fashioning of its being and its historical 
life out of rational ideas and infinite tasks.13
Every spiritual image has its place essentially in a universal historical space or 
in a particular unity of historical time in terms of coexistence or succession - it has 
its history. If, then, we follow historical connections, beginning as we must with our-
selves and our own nation, historical continuity leads us ever further away from our 
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own to neighboring nations, and so from nation to nation, from age to age. Ultimately 
we come to ancient times and go from the Romans to the Greeks, to the Egyptians, 
the Persians, etc., in this there is clearly no end. We go back to primeval times, and we 
must perforce turn to Menghin’s significant and genial work The History of the Stone 
Age.14 To an investigation of this type mankind manifests itself as a single life of men 
and of peoples, bound together by spiritual relationships alone, filled with all types 
of human beings and of cultures, but constantly flowing each into the other. It is like 
a sea in which human beings, peoples, are the waves constantly forming, changing, 
and disappearing, some more richly, more complexly involved, others more simply.
In this process consistent, penetrating observation reveals new, characteristic 
compositions and distinctions. No matter how inimical the European nations may 
be toward each other, still they have a special inner affinity of spirit that permeates 
all of them and transcends their national differences. It is a sort of fraternal relation-
ship that gives us the consciousness of being at home in this circle. This becomes 
immediately evident as soon as, for example, we penetrate sympathetically into the 
historical process of India, with its many peoples and cultural forms. In this circle 
there is again the unity of a family-like relationship, but one that is strange to us. On 
the other hand, Indians find us strangers and find only in each other their fellows. 
Still, this essential distinction between fellowship and strangeness, which is relativ-
ized on many levels and is a basic category of all historicity, cannot suffice. Historical 
humanity does not always divide itself in the same way according to this category. 
We get a hint of that right in our own Europe. Therein lies something unique, which 
all other human groups, too, feel with regard to us, something that apart from all 
considerations of expediency, becomes a motivation for them—despite their deter-
mination to retain their spiritual autonomy—constantly to Europeanize themselves, 
whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, for example, Indianize 
ourselves.15 I mean we feel (and with all its vagueness this feeling is correct) that 
in our European humanity there is an innate entelechy that thoroughly controls 
the changes in the European image and gives to it the sense of a development in the 
direction of an ideal image of life and of being, as moving toward an eternal pole. It 
is not as though there were question here of one of those known orientations that 
give to the physical realm of organic beings its character - not a question, therefore, 
of something like biological development in stages from seminal form up to maturity 
followed by ageing and dying out. There is essentially no zoology of peoples. They are 
spiritual unities. They have not, and above all the supernationality Europe has not, a 
mature from that has been or can be reached, no form of regular repetition. From the 
point of view of soul, humanity has never been a finished product, nor will it be, nor 
can it ever repeat itself.16 The spiritual telos of European Man, in which is included 
the particular telos of separate nations and of individual human beings, lies in infin-
ity; it is an infinite idea, toward which in secret the collective spiritual becoming, so 
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to speak, strives. Just as in the development it becomes a conscious telos, so too it 
becomes necessarily practical as a goal of the will, and thereby is introduced a new, a 
higher stage of development that is guided by norms, by normative ideas.
All of this, however, is not intended as a speculative interpretation of our historic-
ity but rather as the expression of a vital anticipation arising out of unprejudiced 
reflection. But this anticipation serves as intentional guidance17 toward seeing in 
European history extraordinarily significant connections, in the pursuit of which the 
anticipated becomes for us guaranteed certainty. Anticipation is the emotional guide 
to all discoveries.
Let us develop this. Spiritually Europe has a birthplace. By this I do not mean 
a geographical place, in some one land, though this too is true. I refer, rather, to a 
spiritual birthplace in a nation or in certain men or groups of men belonging to this 
nation. It is the ancient Greek nation18 in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. In it 
there grows up a new kind of attitude19 of individuals toward their environing world. 
Consequent upon this emerges a completely new type of spiritual structure, rapidly 
growing into a systematically rounded (geschlossen) cultural form that the Greeks 
called philosophy. Correctly translated, in its original sense, this bespeaks nothing 
but universal science, science of the world as a whole, of the universal unity of all 
being. Very soon the interest in the totality and, by the same token, the question 
regarding the all-embracing becoming and the resulting being begin to particularize 
themselves in accord with the general forms and regions of being.20 Thus philosophy, 
the one science, is ramified into the various particular sciences.
In the emergence of philosophy in this sense, a sense, that is, which includes all sci-
ences, I see—no matter how paradoxical this may seem—the original phenomenon of 
spiritual Europe. The elucidations that follow, however brief they must be kept, will 
soon eliminate the seeming paradox.
Philosophy-science21 is the title for a special class of cultural structures. The 
historical movement that has taken on the form of European supernationality goes 
back to an ideal image whose dimension is the infinite; not, however, to an image 
that could be recognized in a merely external morphological examination of chang-
ing forms. To have a norm constantly in view is something intimately a part of the 
intentional life of individual persons and consequently of nations and of particular 
societies within the latter, and ultimately of the organism formed by the nations 
united together as Europe. This, of course, is not true of all persons and, therefore, 
is not fully developed in the higher-level personalities constituted by intersubjective 
acts. Still, it is present in them in the form of a necessary progressive development 
and extension in the spirit of universally valid norms. This spirit, however, signifies 
at the same time the progressive transformations of collective humanity beginning 
with the effective formation of ideas in small and even in the smallest circles. Ideas, 
conceived within individual persons as sense-structures that in a wonderfully new 
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manner secrete within themselves intentional infinities, are not in space like real 
things, which latter, entering as they do into the field of human experiences, do not by 
that very fact as yet signify anything for the human being as a person. With the first 
conception of ideas man gradually becomes a new man. His spiritual being enters into 
the movement of a progressive reformation. This movement from the very beginning 
involves communication and awakens a new style of personal existence in its vital 
circle by a better understanding of a correspondingly new becoming. In this move-
ment first of all (and subsequently even beyond it) a special type of humanity spreads 
out, living in finitude but oriented toward poles of infinity. By the very same token 
there grows up a new mode of sociality and a new form of enduring society, whose 
spiritual life, cemented together by a common love of and creation of ideas and by the 
setting of ideal norms for life, carries within itself a horizon of infinity for the future - 
an infinity of generations finding constant spiritual renewal in ideas. This takes place 
first of all in the spiritual territory of a single nation, the Greeks, as a development 
of philosophy and of philosophical communities. Along with this there grows, first in 
this nation, a general cultural spirit that draws the whole of mankind under its sway 
and is therefore a progressive transformation in the shape of a new historicity.22
This rough sketch will gain in completeness and intelligibility as we examine more 
closely the historical origin of philosophical and scientific man and thereby clarify 
the sense of Europe and, consequently, the new type of historicity that through this 
sort of development distinguishes itself from history in general.23
First, let us elucidate the remarkable character of philosophy as it unfolds in 
ever-new special sciences. Let us contrast it with other forms of culture already 
present in prescientific man, in his artefacts, his agriculture, his architecture, etc. 
All manifest classes of cultural products along with the proper methods for insuring 
their successful production. Still, they have a transitory existence in their environing 
world. Scientific achievements, on the other hand, once the method of insuring their 
successful creation has been attained, have an entirely different mode of being, an 
entirely different temporality. They do not wear out, they are imperishable. Repeated 
creation does not produce something similar, at best something similarly useful. 
Rather, no matter how many times the same person or any number of persons repeat 
these achievements, they remain exactly identical, identical in sense and in value. 
Persons united together in actual mutual understanding can only experience what 
their respective fellows have produced in the same manner as identical with what 
they have produced themselves.24 In a word, what scientific activity achieves is not 
real but ideal.
What is more, however, whatever validity or truth has been gained in this way 
serves as material for the production of higher-level idealities; and this goes on and 
on. Now, in the developed theoretical interest, each interest receives ahead of time the 
sense of a merely relative goal; it becomes a transition to constantly new, higher-level 
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goals in an infinity preindicated as science’s universal field of endeavor, its “domain’’. 
Thus science designates the idea of an infinity of tasks, of which at any time a finite 
number have already been accomplished and are retained in their enduring validity. 
These constitute at the same time the fund of premises for an endless horizon of tasks 
united into one all-embracing task.
Here, however, an important supplementary remark should be made. In science 
the ideality of what is produced in any particular instance means more than the mere 
capacity for repetition based on a sense that has been guaranteed as identical; the idea 
of truth in the scientific sense is set apart (and of this we have still to speak) from the 
truth proper to pre-scientific life. Scientific truth claims to be unconditioned truth, 
which involves infinity, giving to each factually guaranteed truth a merely relative 
character, making it only an approach oriented, in fact, toward the infinite horizon, 
wherein the truth in itself is, so to speak, looked on as an infinitely distant point.25 
By the same token this infinity belongs also to what in the scientific sense “really is’’. 
A fortiori, there is infinity involved in “universal’’ validity for “everyone’’, as the 
subject of whatever rational foundations are to be secured; nor is this any longer 
everyone in the finite sense the term has in prescientific life.26
Having thus characterized the ideality peculiar to science, with the ideal infinities 
variously implied in the very sense of science, we are faced, as we survey the his-
torical situation, with a contrast that we express in the following proposition: no 
other cultural form in the pre-philosophical historical horizon is a culture of ideas 
in the above-mentioned sense; none knows any infinite tasks - none knows of such 
universes of idealities that as wholes and in all their details, as also in their methods 
of production, bear within themselves an essential infinity.
Extra-scientific culture, not yet touched by science, is a task accomplished by man 
in finitude. The openly endless horizon around him is not made available to him. His 
aims and activities, his commerce and his travel, his personal, social, national, mythi-
cal motivation—all this moves about in an environing world whose finite dimensions 
can be viewed. Here there are no infinite tasks, no ideal attainments whose very 
infinity is man’s field of endeavor—a field of endeavor such that those who work in it 
are conscious that it has the mode of being proper to such an infinite sphere of tasks.
With the appearance of Greek philosophy, however, and with its first definite 
formulation in a consistent idealizing of the new sense of infinity, there occurs, from 
this point of view, a progressive transformation that ultimately draws into its orbit 
all ideas proper to finitude and with them the entire spiritual culture of mankind. 
For us Europeans there are, consequently, even outside the philosophico-scientific 
sphere, any number of infinite ideas (if we may use the expression), but the analogous 
character of infinity that they have (infinite tasks, goals, verifications, truths, “true 
values’’, “genuine goods’’, “absolutely’’ valid norms) is due primarily to the transfor-
mation of man through philosophy and its idealities. Scientific culture in accord with 
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ideas of infinity means, then, a revolutionizing of all culture, a revolution that affects 
man’s whole manner of being as a creator of culture. It means also a revolutionizing of 
historicity, which is now the history of finite humanity’s disappearance, to the extent 
that it grows into a humanity with infinite tasks.
Here we meet the obvious objection that philosophy, the science of the Greeks, is 
not, after all, distinctive of them, something which with them first came into the world. 
They themselves tell of the wise Egyptians, Babylonians, etc.; and they did in fact learn 
much from these latter. Today we possess all sorts of studies on Indian, Chinese, and 
other philosophies, studies that place these philosophies on the same level with Greek 
philosophy, considering them merely as different historical formulations of one and the 
same cultural idea. Of course, there is not lacking something in common. Still, one must 
not allow intentional depths to be covered over by what is merely morphologically 
common and be blind to the most essential differences of principle.
Before anything else, the attitude of these two kinds of “philosophers’’, the overall 
orientation of their interests, is thoroughly different. Here and there one may observe a 
world-embracing interest that on both sides (including, therefore, the Indian, Chinese 
and other like “philosophies’’) leads to universal cognition of the world, everywhere 
developing after the manner of a sort of practical vocational interest and for quite 
intelligible reasons leading to vocational groups, in which from generation to gen-
eration common results are transmitted and even developed. Only with the Greeks, 
however, do we find a universal (“cosmological’’) vital interest in the essentially new 
form of a purely “theoretical’’ attitude.27 This is true, too, of the communal form in 
which the interest works itself out, the corresponding, essentially new attitude of the 
philosophers and the scientists (mathematicians, astronomers, etc.). These are the 
men who, not isolated but with each other and for each other, i.e., bound together in 
a common interpersonal endeavor, strive for and carry into effect theoria and only 
theoria. These are the ones whose growth and constant improvement ultimately, as 
the circle of cooperators extends and the generations of investigators succeed each 
other, become a will oriented in the direction of an infinite and completely universal 
task. The theoretical attitude has its historical origin in the Greeks.
Speaking generally, attitude bespeaks a habitually, determined manner of vital 
willing, wherein the will’s directions or interests, its aims and its cultural accomplish-
ments, are preindicated and thus the overall orientation determined. In this enduring 
orientation taken as a norm, the individual life is lived. The concrete cultural contents 
change in a relatively enclosed historicity. In its historical situation mankind (or the 
closed community, such as a nation, a race, etc.) always lives within the framework 
of some sort of attitude. Its life always has a normative orientation and within this a 
steady historicity or development.
Thus if the theoretical attitude in its newness is referred back to a previous, more 
primitive normative attitude, the theoretical is characterized as a transformed at-
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titude.28 Looking at the historicity of human existence universally in all its communal 
forms and in its historical stages, we find, then, that essentially a certain style of hu-
man existence (taken in formal universality) points to a primary historicity, within 
which the actual normative style of culture-creating existence at any time, no matter 
what its rise or fall or stagnation, remains formally the same. In this regard we are 
speaking of the natural, the native attitude, of originally natural life, of the first primi-
tively natural form of cultures—be they higher or lower, uninhibitedly developing or 
stagnating. All other attitudes, then, refer back to these natural ones as transforma-
tions of them.29 To put it more concretely, in an attitude natural to one of the actual 
human groups in history there must arise at a point in time motives that for the first 
time impel individual men and groups having this attitude to transform it.
How are we, then, to characterize the essentially primitive attitude, the funda-
mental historical mode of human existence?30 The answer: on the basis of generation 
men naturally live in communities - in a family, a race, a nation - and these communi-
ties are in themselves more or less abundantly subdivided into particular social units. 
Now, life on the level of nature is characterized as a naÎvely direct living immersed 
in the world, in the world that in a certain sense is constantly there consciously as a 
universal horizon but is not, merely by that fact, thematic. Thematic is that toward 
which man’s attention is turned. Being genuinely alive is always having one’s atten-
tion turned to this or that, turned to something as to an end or a means, as relevant 
or irrelevant, interesting or indifferent, private or public, to something that is in daily 
demand or to something that is startlingly new. All this belongs to the world horizon, 
but there is need of special motives if the one who is caught up in such a life in the 
world is to transform himself and is to come to the point where he somehow makes 
this world itself his theme, where he conceives an enduring interest in it.
But here more detailed explanations are needed. Individual human beings who 
change their attitudes as human beings belonging to their own general vital commu-
nity (their nation), have their particular natural interests (each his own). These they 
can by no change in attitude simply lose; that would mean for each ceasing to be the 
individual he is, the one he has been since birth. No matter what the circumstances, 
then, the transformed attitude can only be a temporary one. It can take on a lasting 
character that will endure as a habit throughout an entire life only in the form of an 
unconditional determination of will to take up again the selfsame attitudes in a series 
of periods that are temporary but intimately bound together. It will mean that by virtue 
of a continuity that bridges intentionally the discreteness involved, men will hold on to 
the new type of interests as worth being realized and will embody them in correspond-
ing cultural forms.31 We are familiar with this sort of thing in the occupations that 
make their appearance even in a naturally primitive form of cultural life, where there 
are temporary periods devoted to the occupation, periods that interrupt the rest of life 
with its concrete temporality (e.g., the working hours of a functionary, etc.).
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Now, there are two possibilities. On the one hand, the interests of the new attitude 
will be made subservient to the natural interests of life, or what is essentially the 
same, to natural practicality. In this case the new attitude is itself a practical one. 
This, then, can have a sense similar to the practical attitude of the politician, who as 
a state functionary is attentive to the common good and whose attitude, therefore, 
is to serve the practical interests of all (and incidentally his own). This sort of thing 
admittedly still belongs to the domain of the natural attitude, which is, of course, 
different for different types of community members and is in fact one thing for the 
leaders of the community and another for the “citizens’—both obviously understood 
in the broadest sense. In any event, the analogy makes it clear that the universality 
of a practical attitude, in this case one that embraces a whole world, need in no way 
signify being interested in and occupied with all the details and particularities of that 
world—it would obviously be unthinkable.
In contrast to the higher-level practical attitude there exists, however, still an-
other essential possibility of a change in the universal natural attitude (with which 
we shall soon become acquainted in its type, the mythical-religious attitude), which 
is to say, the theoretical attitude - a name being given to it, of course, only provision-
ally, because in this attitude philosophical theoria must undergo a development and 
so become its proper aim or field of interest. The theoretical attitude, even though it 
too is a professional attitude, is thoroughly unpractical. Thus it is based on a deliber-
ate epoche from all practical interests,32 and consequently even those of a higher 
level, that serve natural needs within the framework of a life’s occupation governed 
by such practical interests.
Still, it must at the same time be said that there is no question here of a defini-
tive “cutting off’’ of the theoretical life from the practical. We are not saying that the 
concrete life of the theoretical thinker falls into two disconnected vital continuities 
partitioned off from each other, which would mean, socially speaking, that two spir-
itually unconnected spheres would come into existence. For there is still a third form 
of universal attitude possible (in contrast both to the mythical-religious, which is 
based on the natural, and to the theoretical attitudes). It is the synthesis of opposing 
interests that occurs in the transition from the theoretical to the practical attitude. In 
this way thoeria (the universal science), whose growth has manifested a tight unity 
through an epoche from all practical considerations, is called upon (and even proves 
in a theoretical insight33 that it is called upon) to serve humanity in a new way, first 
of all in its concrete existence as it continues to live naturally. This takes place in the 
form of a new kind of practical outlook, a universal critique of all life and of its goals, 
of all the forms and systems of culture that have already grown up in the life of man-
kind. This brings with it a critique of mankind itself and of those values that explicitly 
or implicitly guide it. Carrying it to a further consequence, it is a practical outlook 
whose aim is to elevate mankind through universal scientific reason in accord with 
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norms of truth in every form, and thus to transform it into a radically new humanity 
made capable of an absolute responsibility to itself on the basis of absolute theoreti-
cal insights.34 Still, prior to this synthesis of theoretical universality and a practical 
outlook with universal interests, there is obviously another synthesis of theory and 
practice—the utilization of the limited results of theory, of those special sciences that 
are limited to the practical aspects of natural life, having relinquished by their very 
specialization the universality of theoretical interest. Here the primitively natural 
attitude and the theoretical are joined together in an orientation toward finite goals.
For a profounder understanding of Greco-European science (universally speak-
ing, this means philosophy) in its fundamental difference from the equally notable 
oriental “philosophies’’, it is now necessary to consider in more detail the practically 
universal attitude, and to explain it as mythical-religious, an attitude that, prior to 
European science, brings those other philosophies into being. It is a well-known fact, 
to say nothing of an essentially obvious necessity, that mythical-religious motives 
and a mythical-religious practice together belong to a humanity living naturally—
before Greek philosophy, and with it a scientific world view, entered on the scene 
and matured. A mythical-religious attitude is one that takes as its theme the world 
as a totality—a practical theme. The world in this case is, of course, one that has a 
concrete, traditional significance for the men in question (let us say, a nation) and is 
thus mythically apperceived. This sort of mythical-natural attitude embraces from 
the very first not only men and animals and other infrahuman and infra-animal be-
ings (Wesen) but also the suprahuman. The view that embraces them as a totality is 
a practical one; not, however, as though man, whose natural life, after all, is such that 
he is actually interested only in certain realities, could ever have come to the point 
where everything together would suddenly and in equal degree take on practical 
relevance. Rather, to the extent that the whole world is looked upon as dominated by 
mythical powers and to the extent that human destiny depends immediately or me-
diately on the way these powers rule in the world, a universally mythical world view 
may have its source in practicality and is, then, itself a world view, whose interests 
are practical. It is understandable that priests belonging to a priesthood in charge of 
both mythical-religious interests and of the traditions belonging to them should have 
motives for such a mythical-religious attitude. With this priesthood these arises and 
spreads the linguistically solidified “knowledge’’ of these mythical powers (in the 
broadest sense though of as personal). This knowledge quasi-automatically takes on 
the form of a mystical speculation which, by setting itself up as a naÎvely convincing 
interpretation, transforms the mythos itself. At the same time, obviously, attention is 
constantly directed also to the ordinary world ruled by these mythical powers and 
to the human and infrahuman beings belonging to it (these, incidentally, unsettled 
in their own essential being, are also open to the influence of mythical factors). This 
attention looks to the ways in which the powers control the events of this world, 
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the manner in which they themselves must be subject to a unified supreme order of 
power, the manner in which they with regard to individual functions and functioners 
intervene by initiating and carrying out, by handing down decrees of fate. All this 
speculative knowledge however, has as its purpose to serve man toward his human 
aims, to enable him to live the happiest possible life on earth, to protect that life from 
sickness, from misfortune, need and death. It is understandable that in this mythico-
practical approach to knowing the world there can arise not a little knowledge of the 
actual world, of the world known in a sort of scientific experience, a knowledge sub-
sequently to be subjected to a scientific evaluation. Still, this sort of knowledge is and 
remains mythico-practical in its logical connections, and it is a mistake for someone 
brought up in the scientific modes of thought initiated in Greece and progressively 
developed in modern times to speak of Indian and Chinese philosophy (astronomy, 
mathematics) and thus to interpret India, Babylonia, and China in a European way.35
There is a sharp cleavage, then, between the universal but mythico-practical at-
titude and the “theoretical”, which by every previous standard is unpractical, the at-
titude of thaumazein [Gr. = to wonder], to which the great men of Greek philosophy’s 
first culminating period, Plato and Aristotle, trace the origin of philosophy. Men are 
gripped by a passion for observing and knowing the world, a passion that turns from 
all practical interests and in the closed circle of its own knowing activities, in the 
time devoted to this sort of investigation, accomplishes and wants to accomplish only 
pure theoria36. In other words, man becomes the disinterested spectator, overseer 
of the world, he becomes a philosopher. More than that, from this point forward his 
life gains a sensitivity for motives which are possible only to this attitude, for novel 
goals and methods of thought, in the framework of which philosophy finally comes 
into being and man becomes philosopher.
Like everything that occurs in history, of course, the introduction of the theo-
retical attitude has its factual motivation in the concrete circumstances of historical 
events. Therefore it is worth-while to explain in this connection how, considering 
the manner of life and the horizon of Greek man in the seventh century B.C., in his 
intercourse with the great and already highly cultivated nations surrounding him, 
that thaumazein could introduce itself and at first become established in individuals. 
Regarding this we shall not enter into greater detail; it is more important for us to 
understand the path of motivation, with its sense-giving and sense-creating, which 
leads from mere conversion (or from mere thaumazein), to theoria - a historical fact, 
that nevertheless must have in it something essential. It is important to explain the 
change from original theoria, from the completely “disinterested” (consequent upon 
the epoche from all practical interests) world view (knowledge of the world based 
only on universal contemplation) to the theoria proper to science - both stages exem-
plifying the contrast between doxa [Gr. = opinion] and episteme [Gr. = knowledge]. 
The theoretical interest that comes on the scene as that thaumazein, is clearly a 
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modification of curiosity that has its original place in natural life as an interruption 
in the course of “earnest living”, as a working out of originally effected vital interests, 
or as a playful looking about when the specific needs of actual life have been satisfied 
or working hours are past. Curiosity, too (not in the sense of an habitual “vice”), is a 
modification, an interest raised above merely vital interests and prescinding from 
them.
With an attitude such as this, man observes first of all the variety of nations, his 
own and others, each with its own environing world, which with its traditions, its 
gods and demigods, with its mythical powers, constitutes for each nation the self-evi-
dent, real world. In the face of this extraordinary contrast there arises the distinction 
between the represented and the real world, and a new question is raised concerning 
the truth—not everyday truth bound as it is to tradition but a truth that for all those 
who are not blinded by attachment to tradition is identical and universally valid, a 
truth in itself. Thus it is proper to the theoretical attitude of the philosopher that 
he is more and more predetermined to devote his whole future life, in the sense of a 
universal life, to the task of theoria, to build theoretical knowledge upon theoretical 
knowledge in infinitum.37
In isolated personalities, like Thales, et al., there thus grows up a new humanity— 
men whose profession it is to create a philosophical life, philosophy as a novel form 
of culture. Understandably there grows up at the same time a correspondingly novel 
form of community living. These ideal forms are, as others understand them and 
make them their own, simply taken up and made part of life. In like manner they lead 
to cooperative endeavor and to mutual help through criticism. Even the outsiders, the 
non-philosophers, have their attention drawn to the unusual activity that is going on. 
As they come to understand, they either become philosophers themselves, or if they 
are too much taken up with their own work, they become pupils. Thus philosophy 
spreads in a twofold manner, as a widening community of professional philosophers 
and as a common educational movement growing along with the former. Here also, 
however, lies the origin of the subsequent, so unfortunate internal split in the unity of 
the people into educated and uneducated. Still, it is clear that this tendency to spread 
is not confined to the limits of the originating nation. Unlike all other cultural prod-
ucts, this is not a movement of interests bound to the soil of national traditions. Even 
foreigners learn in their turn to understand and in general to share in the gigantic 
cultural change which streams forth from philosophy. Now precisely this must be 
further characterized.
As philosophy spreads in the form of research and training, it produces a twofold 
effect. On the one hand, most essential to the theoretical attitude of philosophical 
man is the characteristic universality of the critical standpoint, which its determina-
tion not to accept without question any pregiven opinion, any tradition, and thus to 
seek out, with regard to the entire universe handed down in tradition, the true in 
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itself—which is ideal. Yet this is not merely a new way of looking at knowledge. By 
virtue of the demand to subject the whole of experience to ideal norms, i.e., those of 
unconditional truth, these results at the same time an allembracing change in the 
practical order of human existence and thus of cultural life in its entirety. The practi-
cal must no longer take its norms from naÎne everyday experience and from tradition 
but from the objective truth. In this way ideal truth becomes an absolute value that in 
the movement of education and in its constant application in the training of children 
carries with it a universal revision of practice. If we consider somewhat more in detail 
the manner of this transformation, we shall immediately understand the inevitable: if 
the general idea of truth in itself becomes the universal norm of all the relative truths 
that play a role in human life—actual and conjectural situation truths—then this fact 
affects all traditional norms, those of right, of beauty, of purpose, of dominant values 
in persons, values having a personal character, etc.
Thus there grows up a special type of man and a special vocation in life correlative 
to the attainment of a new culture. Philosophical knowledge of the world produces 
not only these special types of result but also a human conduct that immediately in-
fluences the rest of practical living with all its demands and its aims, aims of the his-
torical tradition according to which one is educated, thus giving these aims their own 
validity. A new and intimate community, we might say a community of ideal interests, 
is cultivated among men—men who life for philosophy, united in their dedication to 
ideas, which ideas are not only of use to all but are identically the property of all. 
Inevitably there develops a particular kind of cooperation whereby men work with 
each other and for each other, helping each other by mutual criticism, with the result 
that the pure and unconditioned validity of truth grows as a common possession. In 
addition there is the necessary tendency toward the promotion of interest, because 
others understand what is herein desired and accomplished; and this is a tendency 
to include more and more as yet unphilosophical persons in the community of those 
who philosophize. This occurs first of all among members of the same nation. Nor can 
this expansion be confined to professional scientific research; rather its success goes 
far beyond the professional circle, becoming an educational movement.
Now, if this educational movement spreads to ever wider circles of the people, 
and naturally to the superior, dominant types, to those who are less involved in the 
cares of life, the results are of what sort? Obviously it does not simply bring about a 
homogeneous change in the normal, on the whole satisfactory national life; rather 
in all probability it leads to great cleavages, wherein the national life and the entire 
national culture go into an upheaval. The conservatives, content with tradition, and 
the philosophical circle will struggle against each other, and without doubt the battle 
will carry over into the sphere of political power. At the very beginning of philosophy, 
persecution sets in. The men dedicated to those ideas are outlawed. And yet ideas are 
stronger than any forces rooted in experience.38
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A further point to be taken into consideration here is that philosophy, having 
grown out of a critical attitude to each and every traditional predisposition, is lim-
ited in its spread by no national boundaries. All that must be present is the capacity 
for a universal critical attitude, which too, of course, presupposes a certain level of 
prescientific culture. Thus can the upheaval in the national culture propagate itself, 
first of all because the progressing universal science becomes a common possession 
of nations that were at first strangers to each other, and then because a unified com-
munity, both scientific and educational, extends to the majority of nations.
Still another important point must be adduced; it concerns philosophy’s position in 
regard to traditions. There are in fact two possibilities to observe here. Either the tra-
ditionally accepted is completely rejected, or its content is taken over philosophically, 
and thereby it too is reformed in the spirit of philosophical ideality. An outstanding 
case in point is that of religion - from which I should like to exclude the “polytheistic 
religions”. Gods in the plural, mythical powers of every kind, are objects belonging 
to the environing world, on the same level of reality as animal or man. In the concept 
of God, the singular is essential.39 Looking at this from the side of man, moreover, it 
is proper that the reality of God, both as being and as value, should be experienced 
as binding man interiorly. These results, then, an understandable blending of this 
absoluteness with that of philosophical ideality. In the overall process of idealiza-
tion that philosophy undertakes, God is, so to speak, logicized and becomes even the 
bearer of the absolute logos. I should life, moreover, to see a logic in the very fact that 
theologically religion invokes faith itself as evidence and thus as a proper and most 
profound mode of grounding true being.40 National gods, however, are simply there 
as real facts of the environing world, without anyone confronting philosophy with 
questions stemming from a critique of cognition, with questions of evidence.
Substantially, though in a somewhat sketchy fashion, we have now described the 
historical movement that makes understandable how, beginning with a few Greek 
exceptions, a transformation of human existence and of man’s entire cultural life 
could be set in motion, beginning in Greece and its nearest neighbors. Moreover, now 
it is also discernible how, following upon this, a supernationality of a completely new 
kind could arise. I am referring, of course, to the spiritual form of Europe. It is now 
no longer a number of different nations bordering on each other, influencing each 
other only by commercial competition and war. Rather a new spirit stemming from 
philosophy and the sciences based on it, a spirit of free criticism providing norms 
for infinite tasks, dominates man, creating new, infinite ideals. These are ideals for 
individual men of each nation and for the nations themselves. Ultimately, however, 
the expanding synthesis of nations too has its infinite ideals, wherein each of these 
nations, by the very fact that it strives to accomplish its own ideal task in the spirit of 
infinity,41 contributes its best to the community of nations. In this give and take the 
supernational totality with its graded structure of societies grows apace, filled with 
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the spirit of one all-inclusive task, infinite in the variety of its branches yet unique in 
its infinity. In this total society with its ideal orientation, philosophy itself retains the 
role of guide, which is its special infinite task.42 Philosophy has the role of a free and 
universal theoretical disposition that embraces at once all ideals and the one overall 
ideal—in short, the universe of all norms. Philosophy has constantly to exercise 
through European man its role of leadership for the whole of mankind.
II
It is now time that there be voiced misunderstandings and doubts that are certainly 
very importunate and which, it seems to me, derive their suggestive force from the 
language of popular prejudice.
Is not what is here being advocated something rather out of place in our times 
- saving the honor of rationalism, of enlightenment, of an intellectualism that, lost 
in theory, is isolated from the world, with the necessarily bad result that the quest 
for learning becomes empty, becomes intellectual snobbishness? Does it not mean 
falling back into the fatal error of thinking that science makes men wise, that science 
is called upon the create a genuine humanity, superior to destiny and finding satisfac-
tion in itself? Who is going to take such thoughts seriously today?
This objection certainly is relatively justified in regard to the state of develop-
ment in Europe from the seventeenth up to the end of the nineteenth century. But 
it does not touch the precise sense of what I am saying. I should like to think that I, 
seemingly a reactionary, am far more revolutionary than those who today in word 
strike so radical a pose.
I, too, am quite sure that the European crisis has its roots in a mistaken rational-
ism.43 That, however, must not be interpreted as meaning that rationality as such 
is an evil or that in the totality of human existence it is of minor importance. The 
rationality of which alone we are speaking is rationality in that noble and genuine 
sense, the original Greek sense, that became an ideal in the classical period of Greek 
philosophy - though of course it still needed considerable clarification through self-
examination. It is its vocation, however, to serve as a guide to mature development. 
On the other hand, we readily grant (and in this regard German idealism has spoken 
long before us) that the form of development given to ratio in the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment was an aberration, but nevertheless an understandable aberration.
Reason is a broad title. According to the good old definition, man is the rational 
living being, a sense in which even the Papuan is man and not beast. He has his aims, 
and he acts with reflection, considering practical possibilities. As products and meth-
ods grow, they enter into a tradition that is ever intelligible in its rationality. Still, just 
as man (and even the Papuan) represents a new level of animality—in comparison 
with the beast—so with regard to humanity and its reason does philosophical reason 
represent a new level. The level of human existence with its ideal norms for infinite 
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tasks, the level of existence sub specie aeternitatis, is, however, possible only in the 
form of absolute universality, precisely that which is a priori included in the idea of 
philosophy. It is true that universal philosophy, along with all the particular sciences, 
constitutes only a partial manifestation of European culture. Contained, however, in 
the sense of my entire presentation is the claim that this part is, so to speak, the 
functioning brain upon whose normal functioning the genuine, healthy spirit of Eu-
rope depends. The humanity of higher man, of reason, demands, therefore, a genuine 
philosophy.
But at this very point there lurks a danger. “Philosophy” - in that we must certainly 
distinguish philosophy as a historical fact belonging to this or that time from philoso-
phy as idea, idea of an infinite task.44 The philosophy that at any particular time is his 
historically actual is the more or less successful attempt to realize the guiding idea 
of the infinity, and thereby the totality, of truths. Practical ideals, viewed as external 
poles from the line of which one cannot stray during the whole of life without regret, 
without being untrue to oneself and thus unhappy, are in this view by no means yet 
clear and determined; they are anticipated in an equivocal generality. Determination 
comes only with concrete pursuit and with at least relatively successful action. Here 
the constant danger is that of falling into one-sidedness and premature satisfaction, 
which are punished in subsequent contradictions. Thence the contrast between the 
grand claims of philosophical systems, that are all the while incompatible with each 
other. Added to this are the necessity and yet the danger of specialization.
In this way, of course, one-sided rationality can become an evil. It can also be said 
that it belongs to the very essence of reason that philosophers can at first understand 
and accomplish their infinite task only on the basis of an absolutely necessary onesid-
edness.45 In itself there is no absurdity here, no error. Rather, as has been remarked, 
the direct and necessary path for reason allows it initially to grasp only one aspect of 
the task, at first without recognizing that a thorough knowledge of the entire infinite 
task, the totality of being, involves still other aspects. When inadequacy reveals itself 
in obscurities and contradiction, then this becomes a motive to engage in a universal 
reflection. Thus the philosopher must always have as his purpose to master the true 
and full sense of philosophy, the totality of its infinite horizons. No one line of knowl-
edge, no individual truth must be absolutized. Only in such a supreme consciousness 
of self, which itself becomes a branch of the infinite task, can philosophy fulfill its 
function of putting itself, and therewith a genuine humanity, on the right track. To 
know that this is the case, however, also involves once more entering the field of 
knowledge proper to philosophy on the highest level of reflection upon itself. Only on 
the basis of this constant reflectiveness is a philosophy a universal knowledge.
I have said that the course of philosophy goes through a period of naÎvete. This, 
then, is the place for a critique of the so renowned irrationalism, or it is the place to un-
cover the naÎvete of that rationalism that passes as genuine philosophical rationality, 
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and that admittedly is characteristic of philosophy in the whole modern period since 
the Renaissance, looking upon itself as the real and hence universal rationalism. Now, 
as they begin, all the sciences, even those whose beginnings go back to ancient times, 
are unavoidably caught up in this naÎvete. To put it more exactly, the most general 
title for this naÎvete is objectivism, which is given a structure in the various types of 
naturalism, wherein the spirit is naturalized.46 Old and new philosophies were and 
remain naÎvely objectivistic. It is only right, however, to add that German idealism, 
beginning with Kant, was passionately concerned with overcoming the naÎvete that 
had already become very sensitive. Still, it was incapable of really attaining to the 
level of superior reflectiveness that is decisive for the new image of philosophy and 
of European man.
What I have just said I can make intelligible only by a few sketchy indications. 
Natural man (let us assume, in the pre-philosophical period) is oriented toward the 
world in all his concerns and activities. The area in which he lives and works is the en-
vironing world which in its spatiotemporal dimensions surrounds him and of which 
he considers himself a part. This continues to be true in the theoretical attitude, 
which at first can be nothing but that of the disinterested spectator of a world that 
is demythologized before his eyes. Philosophy sees in the world the universe of what 
is, and world becomes objective world over against representations of the world—
which latter change subjectively, whether on a national or an individual scale—and 
thus truth becomes objective truth. Thus philosophy begins as cosmology. At first, 
as is self-evident, it is oriented in its theoretical interest to corporeal nature, since 
in fact all spatiotemporal data do have, at least basically, the form of corporeality. 
Men and beasts are not merely bodies, but to the view oriented to the environing 
world they appear as some sort of corporeal being and thus as realities included in 
the universal spatiotemporality. In this way all psychic events, those of this or that 
ego, such as experience, thinking, willing, have a certain objectivity. Community life, 
that of families, of peoples, and the like, seems then to resolve itself into the life of 
particular individuals, who are psychophysical objects. In the light of psychophysical 
causality there is no purely spiritual continuity in spiritual grouping; physical nature 
envelops everything.
The historical process of development is definitively marked out through this 
focus on the environing world. Even the hastiest glance at the corporeality present 
in the environing world shows that nature is a homogeneous, unified totality, a world 
for itself, so to speak, surrounded by a homogeneous spatiotemporality and divided 
into individual things, all similar in being res extensae and each determining the 
other causally. Very quickly comes a first and greatest step in the process of discov-
ery: overcoming the finitude of nature that has been thought of as objective-in-itself, 
finitude in spite of the open infinity of it. Infinity is discovered, and first of all in form 
of idealized quantities, masses, numbers, figures, straight lines, poles, surfaces, etc. 
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Nature, space and time become capable of stretching ideally into infinity and also of 
being infinitely divided ideally. From the art of surveying develops geometry; from 
counting, arithmetic; from everyday mechanics, mathematical mechanics; etc. Now, 
without anyone forming a hypothesis in this regard, the world of perceived nature is 
changed into a mathematical world, the world of mathematical natural sciences. As 
ancient times moved forward, with the mathematics proper to that stage, the first 
discovery of infinite ideals and of infinite tasks was accomplished simultaneously. 
That discovery becomes for all subsequent times the guiding star of the sciences.
How, then, did the intoxicating success of this discovery of physical infinity affect 
the scientific mastery of the realm of spirit? In the focus on the environing world, a 
constantly objective attitude, everything spiritual appeared to be based on physical 
corporeality. Thus an application of the mode of thought proper to natural science 
was obvious. For this reason we already find in the early stages Democritean ma-
terialism and determinism.47 However, the greatest minds recoiled from this and 
also from any newer style of psychophysics. Since Socrates, man is made thematic 
precisely as human, man with his spiritual life in society. Man retains an orientation 
to the objective world, but with the advent of Plato and Aristotle this world becomes 
the great theme of investigations. At this point a remarkable cleavage makes itself 
felt: the human belongs to the universe of objective facts, but as persons, as egos, 
men have goals, aims. They have norms for tradition, truth norms - eternal norms. 
Though the development proceeded haltingly in ancient times, still it was not lost. Let 
us make the leap to so-called “modern” times. With glowing enthusiasm the infinite 
task of a mathematical knowledge of nature and in general of a world knowledge 
is undertaken. The extraordinary successes of natural knowledge are now to be 
extended to knowledge of the spirit. Reason had proved its power in nature. “As the 
sun is one all-illuminating and warming sun, so too is reason one” (Descartes).48 
The method of natural science must also embrace the mysteries of spirit. The spirit 
is real49 and objectively in the world, founded as such in corporeality. With this the 
interpretation of the world immediately takes on a predominantly dualistic, i.e., 
psychophysical, form. The same causality—only split in two—embraces the one 
world; the sense of rational explanation is everywhere the same, but in such a way 
that all explanation of spirit, in the only way in which it can be universal, involves 
the physical. There can be no pure, self-contained search for an explanation of the 
spiritual, no purely inneroriented psychology or theory of spirit beginning with the 
ego in psychical self-experience and extending to the other psyche.50 The way that 
must be traveled is the external one, the path of physics and chemistry. All the fond 
talk of common spirit, of the common will of a people, of nations’ ideal political goals, 
and the like, are romanticism and mythology, derived from an analogous application 
of concepts that have a proper sense only in the individual personal sphere. Spiritual 
being is fragmentary. To the question regarding the source of all these difficulties the 
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following answer is to be given: this objectivism or this psychophysical interpretation 
of the world, despite its seeming self-evidence, is a naÎve one-sidedness that never 
was understood to be such. To speak of the spirit as reality (Realitat), presumably a 
real (realen) annex to bodies and having its supposedly spatiotemporal being within 
nature, is an absurdity.
At this point, however, it is important for our problem of the crisis to show how 
it is that the “modern age”, that has for centuries been so proud of its successes in 
theory and practice, has itself finally fallen into a growing dissatisfaction and must 
even look upon its own situation as distressful. Want has invaded all the sciences, 
most recently as a want of method. Moreover, the want that grips us Europeans, even 
though it is not understood, involves very many persons.51
There are all sorts of problems that stem from naÎvete, according to which ob-
jectivistic science holds what it calls the objective world to be the totality of what 
is, without paying any attention to the fact that no objective science can do justice 
to the subjectivity that achieves science. One who has been trained in the natural 
sciences finds it self-evident that whatever is merely subjective must be eliminated 
and that the method of natural science, formulated according to a subjective mode 
of representation, is objectively determined. In the same manner he seeks what is 
objectively true for the psychic too. By the same token, it is taken for granted that the 
subjective, eliminated by the physical scientist, is, precisely as psychic, to be inves-
tigated in psychology and of course in psychophysical psychology. The investigator 
of nature, however, does not make it clear to himself that the constant foundation of 
his admittedly subjective thinking activity is the environing world of life. This latter 
is constantly presupposed as the basic working area, in which alone his questions 
and his methodology make sense. Where, at the present time, is that powerful bit of 
method that leads from the intuitive environing world to the idealizing of mathemat-
ics and its interpretation as objective being, subjected to criticism and clarification? 
Einstein’s revolutionary changes concern the formulas wherein idealized and naÎvely 
objectivized nature (physis) is treated. But regarding the question of how formulas 
or mathematical objectification in general are given a sense based on life and the 
intuitive environing world, of this we hear nothing. Thus Einstein does nothing to 
reformulate the space and time in which our actual life takes place.
Mathematical science of nature is a technical marvel for the purpose of accom-
plishing inductrions whose fruitfulness, probability, exactitude, and calculability 
could previously not even be suspected. As an accomplishment it is a triumph of the 
human spirit. With regard to the rationality of its methods and theories, however, it 
is a thoroughly relative science. It presupposes as data principles that are themselves 
thoroughly lacking in actual rationality. In so far as the intuitive environing world, 
purely subjective as it is, is forgotten in the scientific thematic, the working subject 
is also forgotten, and the scientist is not studied.52 (Thus from this point of view 
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the rationality of the exact sciences is on a level with the rationality of the Egyptian 
pyramids).
It is true, of course, that since Kant we have a special theory of knowledge, and 
on the other hand there is psychology, which with its claims to scientific exactitude 
wants to be the universal fundamental science of the spirit. Still, our hope for real 
rationality, i.e., for real insight,53 is disappointed here as elsewhere. The psycholo-
gists simply fail to see that they too study neither themselves nor the scientists who 
are doing the investigating nor their own vital environing world. They do not see 
that from the very beginning they necessarily presuppose themselves as a group 
of men belonging to their own environing world and historical period. By the same 
token, they do not see that in pursuing their aims they are seeking a truth in itself, 
universally valid for every-one. By its objectivism psychology simply cannot make a 
study of the sould in its properly essential sense, which is to say, the ego that acts and 
is acted upon. Though by determining the bodily function involved in an experience 
of evaluating or willing, it may objectify the experience and handle it inductively, 
can it do the same for purposes, values, norms? Can it study reason as some sort of 
“disposition”? Completely ignored is the fact that objectivism, as the genuine work of 
the investigator intent upon finding true norms, presupposes just such norms; that 
objectivism refuses to be inferred from facts, since in the process facts are already 
intended as truths and not as illusions. It is true, of course, that there exists a feeling 
for the difficulties present here, with the result that the dispute over psychologism is 
fanned into a flame. Nothing is accomplished, however, by rejecting a psychological 
grounding of norms, above all of norms for truth in itself. More and more perceptible 
becomes the overall need for a reform of modern psychology in its entirety. As yet, 
however, it is not understood that psychology through its objectivism has been found 
wanting; that it simply fails to get at the proper essence of spirit; that in isolating 
the soul and making it an object of thought, that in reinterpreting psychophysically 
being-in-community, it is being absurd. True, it has not labored in vain, and it has 
established many empirical rules, even practically worthwhile ones. Yet it is no more 
a real psychology than moral statistics with its no less worthwhile knowledge is a 
moral science.54
In our time we everywhere meet the burning need for an understanding of spirit, 
while the unclarity of the methodological and factual connection between the natural 
sciences and the sciences of the spirit has become almost unbearable. Dilthey, one of 
the greatest scientists of the spirit, has directed his whole vital energy to clarifying 
the connection between nature and spirit, to clarifying the role of psychophysical 
psychology, which he thinks is to be complemented by a new, descriptive and ana-
lytic psychology. Efforts by Windelband and Rickert have likewise, unfortunately, 
not brought the desired insight. Like everyone else, these men are still committed to 
objectivism. Worst of all are the new psychological reformers, who are of the opinion 
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that the entire fault lies in the long-dominant atomistic prejudice, that a new era 
has been introduced with wholistic psychology (Ganzheitspsychologie). There can, 
however, never be any improvement so long as an objectivism based on a naturalistic 
focusing on the environing world is not seen in all its naïveté, until men recognize 
thoroughly the absurdity of the dualistic interpretation of the world, according to 
which nature and spirit are to be looked upon as realities (Realitäten) in the same 
sense. In all seriousness my opinion is this: there never has nor ever will be an objec-
tive science of spirit, an objective theory of the soul, objective in the sense that it 
permits the attribution of an existence under the forms of spatio-temporality to souls 
or to communities of persons.
The spirit and in fact only the spirit is a being in itself and for itself; it is autono-
mous and is capable of being handled in a genuinely rational, genuinely and thor-
oughly scientific way only in this autonomy55. In regard to nature and scientific truth 
concerning it, however, the natural sciences give merely the appearance of having 
brought nature to a point where for itself it is rationally known. For true nature in 
its proper scientific sense is a product of the spirit that investigates nature, and thus 
the science of nature presupposes the science of the spirit. The spirit is essentially 
qualified to exercise self-knowledge, and as scientific spirit to exercise scientific self-
knowledge, and over and over again. Only in the kind of pure knowledge proper to 
science of the spirit is the scientist unaffected by objection that his accomplishment 
is delf-concealing56. As s consequence, it is absurd for the sciences of the spirit to 
dispute with the sciences of nature for equal rights. To the extent that the former con-
cede to the latter that their objectivity is an autonomy, they are themselves victims of 
objectivism. Moreover, in the way the sciences of the spirit are at present developed, 
with their manifold disciplines, they forfeit the unlimate, actual rationality which the 
spiritual Weltanschauung makes possible. Precisely this lack of genuine rationality 
on all sides is the source of what has become for man an unbearable unclarity regard-
ing his own existence and his infinite tasks. These last are inseparably united in one 
task: only if the spirit returns to itself from its naïve exteriorization, clinging to itself 
and purely to itself, can it be adequate to itself57.
Now, how did the beginning of such a self-examination come about? A beginning 
was impossible so long as sensualism, or better, a psychology of data, a tabula rasa 
psychology, held the field. Only when Brentano promoted psychology to being a science 
of vital intentional experiences was an impulse given that could lead further—though 
Brentano himself had not yet overcome objectivism and psychological naturalism58. 
The development of a real method of grasping the fundamental essence of spirit in its 
intentionalities and consequently of instituting an analysis of spirit with a consistency 
reaching to the infinite, led to transcendental phenomenology. It was this that over-
came naturalistic objectivism, and for that matter any form of objectivism, in the only 
possible way, by beginning one’s philosophizing from one’s own ego; and that purely 
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as the author of all one accepts, becoming in this regard a purely theoretical specta-
tor. This attitude brings about the successful institution of an absolutely autonomous 
science of spirit in the form of a consistent understanding of self and of the world as a 
spiritual accomplishment. Spirit is not looked upon here as part of nature or parallel 
to it; rather nature belongs to the sphere of spirit. Then, too, the ego is no longer an 
isolated thing alongside other such things in a pregiven world. The serious problem 
of personal egos external to or alongside of each other comes to an end in favor of an 
intimate relation of beings in each other and for each other.
Regarding this question of interpersonal relations, nothing can be said here; no 
one lecture could exhaust the topic. I do hope, however, to have shown that we are 
not renewing here the old rationalism, which was an absurd naturalism, utterly 
incapable of grasping the problems of spirit that concern us most. The ratio now in 
question is none other than spirit understanding itself in a really universal, really 
radical manner, in the form of a science whose scope is universal, wherein an entirely 
new scientific thinking is established in which every conceivable question, whether 
of being, of norm, or of so-called “existence”59, finds its place. It is my conviction 
that intentional phenomenology has for the first time made spirit as spirit the field 
of systematic, scientific experience, thus effecting a total transformation of the task 
of knowledge. The universality of the absolute spirit embraces all being in a absolute 
historicity, into which nature fits as a product of spirit. It is intentional, which is to 
say transcendental phenomenology that sheds light on the subject by virtue of its 
point of departure and its methods. Only when seen from the phenomenological point 
of view is naturalistic objectivism, along with the profoundest reasons for it, to be 
understood. Above all, phenomenology makes clear that, because of its naturalism, 
psychology simply could not come to terms with the activity and the properly radical 
problem of spirit’s life.
III
Let us summarize the fundamental notions of what we have sketched here. The 
“crisis of European existence”, which manifests itself in countless symptoms of a 
corrupted life, is no obscure fate, no impenetrable destiny. Instead, it becomes mani-
festly understandable against the background of the philosophically discoverable 
“teleology of European history”. As a presupposition of this understanding, however, 
the phenomenon “Europe” is to be grasped in its essential core. To get the concept 
of what is contra-essential in the present “crisis”, the concept “Europe” would have 
to be developed as the historical teleology of infinite goals of reason; it would have 
to be shown how the European “world” was born from ideas of reason, i.e., from the 
spirit of philosophy60. The “crisis” could then become clear as the “seeming collapse 
of rationalism”. Still, as we said, the reason for the downfall of a rational culture does 
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not lie in the essence of rationalism itself but only in its exteriorization, its absorption 
in “naturalism” and “objectivism”.
The crisis of European existence can end in only one of two ways: in the ruin of 
a Europe alienated from its rational sense of life, fallen into a barbarian hatred of 
spirit; or in the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy, through a heroism 
of reason that will definitively overcome naturalism. Europe’s greatest danger is 
weariness. Let us as “good Europeans” do battle with this danger of dangers with 
the sort of courage that does not shirk even the endless battle. If we do, then from the 
annihilating conflagration of disbelief, from the fiery torrent of despair regarding the 
West’s mission to humanity, from the ashes of the great weariness, the phoenix of a 
new inner life of the spirit will arise as the underpinning of a great and distant human 
future, for the spirit alone is immortal.
Notes
1 It is unquestionable that “Western man” would be a happier expression in the 
context. Husserl, however, speaks of europäischen Menschentums, which, as will 
be seen later, must be translated as “European man” if the rest of the text is to 
make sense.
2 Geisteswissenschaften: In certain contexts it will be necessary to translate this 
term more literally as “sciences of the spirit”. This will be particularly true where 
the term occurs in the singular. cf. p. 154 n. 1 and n. 10 infra.
3 The notion of “horizon”, which played such an important part in Husserl’s earlier 
writings, has here taken on a somewhat broader connotation. Formerly it signified 
primarily those concomitant elements in consciousness that are given, without 
being the direct object of the act of consciousness under consideration. In every 
act of consciousness there are aspects of the object that are not directly intended 
but which are recognized, either by recall or anticipation, as belonging to the 
object intended. These aspects constitute its horizon. In the present essay “the 
community as a horizon” signifies the framework in which experience occurs, 
conditioning that experience and supplying the diverse aspects of objectivity that 
are not directly intended in any one act of consciousness.
4 I am using an expression borrowed from Dewey to translate the Husserlian 
Umwelt, a term Husserl uses frequently only in his last period. In the light of the 
Cartesian Meditations we must remember that though such a world is subjectively 
“constituted”, it is still not a private world, since its constitution is ultimately 
“intersubjective”.
5 Like Kant, Husserl saw “necessity” and “universality” as the notes that character-
ize genuinely valid objectivity. Not until his later works (Ideen II and Cartesian 
Meditations), however, does he explicitly see “intersubjective constitution” as the 
ultimate concrete foundation for universal objectivity.
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6 Here Husserl is giving to the term “intuition” the limited meaning of sense intui-
tion that it has for Kant.
7 Geistigkeit: Following a decision to translate “Geist” as “spirit” rather than as 
“mind”, we are forced into a somewhat uncomfortable translation of the present 
abstraction. The embarrassment becomes acute when reference is made to the 
“spirituality” of animals (cf. n. 8 infra), but it is not likely that “mentality” would 
be any less embarrassing.
8 Where there is consciousness, there is spirit, and in animals there is conscious-
ness. For Husserl, self-consciousness is a mark of “personality” rather than “spir-
ituality”.
9 In this connection one should consult the Second Cartesian Meditation, where 
Husserl insists that the only reality that the world can have for one who would 
approach it scientifically is a phenomenal reality. If we are to understand it 
scientifically, our analysis of it must be purely phenomenological, i.e., it is the 
phenomenon “world” that we must analyze. “We shall direct our attention to the 
fact that phenomenological epoche lays open (to me, the meditating philosopher) 
an infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: 
transcendental experience” (Cartesian Meditations, p. 66). Cf. ibid., p. 69: “Now, 
however, we are envisaging a science that is, so to speak, absolutely subjective, 
whose thematic object exists whether of not the world exists”.
10 Because of the context here, it is imperative that “Geisteswissenschaft” not be 
translated as “humanistic science”.
11 From his earliest days Husserl never tired of insisting that there can be no “natu-
ral science” of science itself. It is the theme of Logische Untersuchungen and is 
perhaps most eloquently expressed in Formale und transzendentale Logik, whose 
purpose is to develop a “science of science”, which, Husserl holds, can be only a 
transcendental (constitutive) phenomenology.
12 Stämmen: Literally the term means “stocks”, but the English word could scarcely 
be unambiguous in the context.
13 Not only is Europe, according to Husserl, the birthplace of philosophy and the 
sciences, but it is philosophy and the sciences that more than anything else have 
made European culture unique, have given it its most distinguishing characteris-
tic.
14 Oswald Menghin, Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit (Vienna: A. Schroll, 1931).
15 The tacit beginning of all Husserl’s philosophizing is the value judgement that the 
rational life, in the sense in which he understands it, is the best life. But unlike 
Hegel, he has not excogitated a philosophy of history to justify this judgment.
16 Nature is precisely that which does repeat constantly (despite evolution). It is 
characteristic of natural species that their members follow each other in the same 
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identifiable form. Spirit, however, is an ongoing totality, never reaching maturity, 
never reproducing itself in the same form.
17 This notion of “intentional guide”, of “clue”, is developed in No 21 of the Second 
Cartesian Meditation. Husserl recognizes a subjective factor - here “anticipation” 
- as guiding the manner in which objects - here history itself - are intentionally 
“constituted”.
18 Husserl was never particularly concerned with historical accuracy, even in his 
choice of terminology. Apart from the anachronism involved in applying the term 
“nation” to the loose unities of the ancient world, “Greek” itself is a term that cov-
ers a somewhat heterogeneous grouping in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.
19 Despite the embarrassments involved in certain contexts, I have chosen to 
translate Einstellung for the most part by “attitude”. The German term indicates a 
focusing of attention in a particular way. There is no way in English of rendering 
the play on words involved in the opposition of Einstellung-Umstellung, which 
latter is more than a mere “change” of attitude; “reorientation” of attitude is more 
like it.
20 This is Husserl’s somewhat unwieldy way of indicating that the overall interest in 
being breaks down into particular interests in types or classes of being - which 
are the objects of particular sciences.
21 Here, near the end of his life, Husserl retains the theme he had developed so 
many years earlier in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”. The ideal of philosophy 
and the particular sciences is the same; differences are to be traced to the degree 
of universality involved in the one and the other. The entire book Die Krisis der 
europäischen Wissenschafften is devoted to developing this theme historically.
22 Under the verbiage of this extremely difficult paragraph is hidden a profound 
insight into the transformation that takes place in men when they begin to look 
beyond facts to ideas. The only way to describe the horizon thus opened is to call it 
“infinite”. Whether this began only with the Greeks is, of course, open to dispute. 
Still, the Greeks are the intellectual first parents of Western man.
23 With the advent of philosophical and scientific ideals history itself becomes 
historical in an new and more profound sense. It is unfortunate, however, that 
Husserl fails to see history as the progressive concretization of the ideal.
24 It would seem that in terms of ideas the world scientific community is far more 
closely knit than is the philosophical community. The type of unity, however, is 
analogous in both cases. Husserl would not like to admit that the differences are 
due to essential differences in the disciplines themselves. It is questionable that 
the sort of unity achieved in science is even desirable in philosophy.
25 For Husserl, truth is, so to speak, a Platonic Idea, in relation to which any particu-
lar truth is but a participation.
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26 If “everyone” simply includes the sum total of all existing subjects, it does not 
have the universal significance that Husserl demands. In the sense in which he 
understands it, “universal” is inseparable from “essential”. One is reminded of the 
critics who accuse Husserl of being “scholastic”. Cf. p. 82 supra.
27 The attitude that pursues “knowledge for its own sake”. It is precisely in this that 
the “infinity” of the horizon consists” there is no assignable practical goal in which 
its interests can terminate.
28 Here the play on words involved in Einstellung and Umstellung is impossible to 
render in English.
29 In Husserl’s view, the beginning of a philosophical (of scientific) focusing of at-
tention on the environing world—as opposed to a naïve, mythical, or poetic atti-
tude—represents the most important revolution in the history of human thought. 
At the same time, he sees this revolution as continuous with previous attitudes, 
since it is a transformation of them—not an elimination—something is common 
to the old and the new.
30 That man’s Einstellung in regard to the world about him should, for Husserl, be 
the most of human existence seems to imply some affinity between this position 
and that which Heidegger expresses by In-der-Welt-sein. Whether Husserl was 
influenced by his own student in this cannot be determined (cf. Spiegelberg, The 
Phenomenological Movement, I, p. 300). It may or may not be significant that this 
theme appears in Husserl’s writings only after the publication of Heidegger’s Sein 
und Zeit (19.... Time, New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
31 Neither philosophy nor science nor, for that matter, any professional interest can 
become the exclusive interest in any man’s life. But it is true that one is designated 
philosopher, scientist, etc., by the predominant interest which has an intentional 
continuity throughout all the occupations of his daily life.
32 In a somewhat different context the meaning of epoche here parallels its technical 
meaning as employed, for example, in Ideen I. It is neither an elimination of nor a 
prescinding from other interests. Rather, it simply “puts them in brackets”, thus 
retaining them, but allowing them in no way to influence theoretical considera-
tions.
33 I.e., in a phenomenological essential intuition.
34 Since Husserl’s philosophical life was devoted almost exclusively to the program-
matic aspects of phenomenology - getting it “off the ground”, so to speak - he found 
little time himself for the sort of thing he describes here. But many of his students 
did. Much of the contemporary interest in Husserl, manifested in a wide variety of 
areas, is due to a desire to learn how to do what Husserl suggests.
35 Aside from the fact that he knows little or nothing of Eastern thought, Husserl 
here repeats the arbitrariness of “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”, where he sim-
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ply decides what philosophy is (in an essential intuition, of course) and refuses to 
dignify with that name whatever does not measure up.
36 Despite Husserl’s insistence here and elsewhere that this is Plato’s attitude, there 
is little justification for his failing to recognize that Plato’s purpose, even in his 
most “theoretical” investigations, is eminently practical. In a somewhat different 
meaning, the same can be said for Aristotle.
37 To characterize “essentially” the “path of motivation” from mere curiosity about 
the world to a universal philosophical science of the world is, of course, extremely 
aprioristic. We are simply told how it must have been (the danger of all “essen-
tial” intuition). It remains true, however, that there is no better introduction to 
philosophy than a history of the pre-Socratic attempts to know the secrets of the 
world - without doing anything about it.
38 One is reminded of the contrast made by Aristotle between “men of experience” 
and “men of science” (Metaph. A 981a). In a more striking way Socrates met this in 
his conflict with the “practical” politicians of his day.
39 Again, a phenomenological essential intuition, that says nothing regarding the 
“existence” of God.
40 Nowhere, it seems, has Husserl developed this profound insight wherein he sees 
faith as a special kind of evidence, permitting theology, too, to be a science. In 
different ways this is developed by Scheler in his philosophy of religion, by Van der 
Leeuw and Hering in their phenomenology of religion, and by Otto in his investi-
gations of “the sacred”.
41 Im Geiste der Unendlichkeit: The expression, scarcely translatable into English, 
bespeaks a spirit that refuses to stop short of infinity in its pursuit of truth. In 
Husserl himself, one hesitates to see it as a plea for a metaphysics, but in a Scheler, 
a Heidegger, a Conrad-Martius, it becomes just that; cf. Peter Wust, Die Auferste-
hung der Metaphysik (Leipzig, 1920).
42 In Formale und transzendentale Logik Husserl calls philosophy the “science of 
all sciences”, which is to say, it provides the norms whereby any science can be 
worthy of the name.
43 Husserl’s constant plea has been for a return to the “rationalism” of Socrates and 
Plato (cf. “Philosophy as Regorous Science”, p. 76 supra), not to the rationalism of 
seventeenth - and eighteenth - century Europe. His own inspiration, however, is 
traceable far more to Descartes, Hume, and Kant than to Socrates and Plato.
44 The philosophia perennis that, like a Platonic Idea, is eternally changeless amid 
the varying participations that we can call “philosophies”.
45 One is reminded of Husserl’s insistence in the Cartesian Meditations (pp. 121-35) 
that a successful phenomenological philosophy must being as solipsism, moving 
on to an intersubjectivity only after it has been established on a solipsistic basis. 
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In this Husserl once more derives his inspiration from seventeenth—and eight-
eenth—century rationalism.
46 The theme is familiar from the whole first part of “Philosophy as Rigorous Sci-
ence”.
47 Democritus, who flourished two hundred years after Thales, was a contemporary 
of Socrates. Thus he belongs more properly to the “golden age” of Greek philoso-
phy than to the “early stages”.
48 Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Rele 1. The quotation is verbally inaccurate 
(probably from memory), but the sense is the same.
49 For Husserl, real has a distinctively different meaning from reell. The former is 
applied only to the material world of facts; the latter belongs to the ideal world of 
intentionality. Cf. Ideen I, pp. 218-20.
50 Cf. Husserl’s Encyclopaedia Britannica article, “Phenomenology”, where he devel-
ops the notion of a “pure” psychology independent of psychophysical considera-
tions.
51 The play upon the word Not is impossible to render here. The situation of mod-
ern science is described as a Notlage, which can be translated as a “situation of 
distress”. By itself Not can mean “need”, “want”, “suffering”, etc. The word is used 
three times, and there is a shade of difference in meaning each time it is used.
52 The work of Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr has shown how quantum mechan-
ics and nuclear physics have high-lighted precisely the problem Husserl brings out 
here.
53 It is axiomatic for Husserl that only insight can reveal “essences” and that only a 
knowledge of essences can be ultimately scientific. That this insight should be at 
once intuitive and constitutive is peculiar to the Husserlian theory of intentional-
ity; cf. my La phénoménologie de Husserl, pp. 31-34.
54 Husserl’s judgment of “phychologism” was no less severe at the end of his life than 
it was when he wrote “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”.
55 “Dualism” and “monism” are terms whose meanings are not easily determined. As 
a convinced “idealist” Husserl considered himself a monist, and he criticized Kant 
strongly for remaining a dualist. Hegel, on the other hand, criticizes Fichte (whom 
Husserl resembles closely in this) for not having escaped dualism. One might well 
make a case for designating as monism a theory that accepts only one kind of 
reality, to which both matter and spirit (of the “factual” and the “ideal”) belong. By 
this criterion Husserl’s distinction would be “dualistic”. Perhaps the best that can 
be said is that Husserl is, in intention at least, epistemologically a monist. Spirit 
alone is being in the full sense, because only of spirit can there be science in the 
full sense. One conclusion from all this, it would seem, is that the terminology 
involved bears revision.
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56 If the proper function of true science is to know “essences”, there seems little 
question that the sciences of nature neither perform nor pretend to perform this 
function. If, in addition, essences are, only insofar as they are “constituted” in 
consciousness (ultimately spirit), then only a science of spirit can legitimately lay 
claim to the title.
57 One is reminded of Hegel’s dictum that when reason is conscious to itself of being 
all reality, it is spirit. The difference in the paths by which Hegel and Husserl ar-
rive at this conclusion should be obvious.
58 For his part, Brentano complained that his theory of intentionality had been 
transformed by Husserl into an a priori idealism.
59 Existenz: Husserl was never particularly sympathetic to “existentialism”. To him 
it smacked too mach of irrationalism. A rational science of philosophy could only 
be an essentialism. In such a science, existence could be significant only as “pos-
sible existence”.
60 Though Husserl’s “historical erudition” frequently leaves much to be desired, 
there is a profound insight here. It is the spirit of philosophy conceived in ancient 
Greece that throughout the centuries has guided the intellectual life of the West.
Source: Pro Europa
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Jerusalem Address: Europe and the Novel
Milan Kundera
Speech delivered on the receipt of the Jerusalem Prize at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
in the spring of 1985
That Israel’s most important prize is awarded to international literature is not, to 
my mind, a matter of chance but of a long tradition. Indeed, exiled from their land 
of origin and thus lifted above nationalist passions, the great Jewish figures have 
always shown an exceptional feeling for a supranational Europe - a Europe conceived 
not as territory but as culture. If the Jews, even after Europe so tragically failed them, 
nonetheless kept faith with that European cosmopolitanism, Israel, their little home-
land finally regained, strikes me as the true heart of Europe - a peculiar heart located 
outside the body.
It is with profound emotion that I receive today the prize that bears the name 
of Jerusalem and the mark of that great cosmopolitan Jewish spirit. It is as a novel-
ist that I accept it. I say novelist, not writer. The novelist is one who, according to 
Flaubert, seeks to disappear behind his work. To disappear behind his work, that is, 
to renounce the role of public figure. This is not easy these days, when anything of the 
slightest importance must step into the intolerable glare of the mass media, which, 
contrary to Flaubert’s precept, cause the work to disappear behind the image of its 
author. In such a situation, which no one can entirely escape, Flaubert’s remark seems 
to me a kind of warning: in lending himself to the role of public figure, the novelist 
endangers his work; it risks being considered a mere appendage to his actions, to 
his declarations, to his statements of position. Now, not only is the novelist nobody’s 
spokesman, but I would go so far as to say he is not even the spokesman for his own 
ideas. When Tolstoy sketched the first draft of Anna Karenina, Anna was a most un-
sympathetic woman, and her tragic end was entirely deserved and justified. The final 
version of the novel is very different, but I do not believe that Tolstoy had revised his 
moral ideas in the meantime; I would say, rather, that in the course of writing, he was 
listening to another voice than that of his personal moral conviction. He was listening 
to what I would like to call the wisdom of the novel. Every true novelist listens for 
that suprapersonal wisdom, which explains why great novels are always a little more 
intelligent than their authors. Novelists who are more intelligent than their books 
should go into another line of work.
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But what is that wisdom, what is the novel? There is a fine Jewish proverb: Man 
thinks, God laughs. Inspired by that adage, I like to imagine that François Rabelais 
heard God’s laughter one day, and thus was born the idea of the first great European 
novel. It pleases me to think that the art of the novel came into the world as the echo 
of God’s laughter.
But why does God laugh at the sight of man thinking? Because man thinks and the 
truth escapes him. Because the more men think, the more one man’s thought diverges 
from another’s. And finally, because man is never what he thinks he is. The dawn of 
the Modern Era revealed this fundamental situation of man as he emerged from the 
Middle Ages: Don Quixote thinks, Sancho thinks, and not only the world’s truth but 
also the truth of their own selves slips away from them. The first European novelists 
saw, and grasped, that new situation of man, and on it they built the new art, the art 
of the novel.
François Rabelais invented a number of neologisms that have since entered 
the French and other languages, but one of his words has been forgotten, and this 
is regrettable. It is the word agélaste; it comes from the Greek and it means a man 
who does not laugh, who has no sense of humour. Rabelais detested the agélastes. 
He feared them. He complained that the agélastes treated him so atrociously that he 
nearly stopped writing forever.
No peace is possible between the novelist and the agélaste. Never having heard 
God’s laughter, the agélastes are convinced that the truth is obvious, that all men 
necessarily think the same thing, and that they themselves are exactly what they 
think they are. But it is precisely in losing the certainty of truth and the unanimous 
agreement of others that man becomes an individual. The novel is the imaginary 
paradise of individuals. It is the territory where no one possesses the truth, neither 
Anna nor Karenin, but where everyone has the right to be understood, both Anna and 
Karenin.
In the third book of Gargantua and Pantagruel, Panurge, the first great novelistic 
character that Europe beheld, is tormented by the question: Should he marry or not? 
He consults doctors, seers, professors, poets, philosophers, who each in turn quote 
Hippocrates, Aristotle, Homer, Heraclitus, Plato. But after all this enormous, erudite 
research, which takes up the whole book, Panurge still does not know whether he 
should marry or not. And we, the readers, do not know either - but on the other hand, 
we have explored from every possible angle the situation, as comical as it is elemen-
tal, of the person who does not know whether he should marry or not.
Rabelais’ erudition, great as it is, has another meaning than Descartes’. The novel’s 
wisdom is different from that of philosophy. The novel is born not of the theoretical 
spirit but of the spirit of humor. One of Europe’s major failures is that it never un-
derstood the most European of the arts—the novel; neither its spirit, nor its great 
knowledge and discoveries, nor the autonomy of its history. The art inspired by God’s 
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laughter does not by nature serve ideological certitudes, it contradicts them. Like 
Penelope, it undoes each night the tapestry that the theologians, philosophers, and 
learned men have woven the day before.
Lately, it has become a habit to speak ill of the eighteenth century, to the point that 
we hear this cliche: The misery that is Russian totalitari¬anism comes straight out of 
Europe, particularly out of the atheist rationalism of the Enlightenment, its belief in 
all-powerful reason. I do not feel qualified to debate those who blame Voltaire for the 
gulag. But I do feel qualified to say: The eighteenth century is not only the century 
of Rousseau, of Voltaire, of Holbach; it is also (perhaps above all!) the age of Fielding, 
Sterne, Goethe, Laclos.
Of all that period’s novels, it is Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy I love best. 
A curious novel. Sterne starts it by describing the night when Tristram was conceived, 
but he has barely begun to talk about that when another idea suddenly attracts him, 
and by free association that idea spurs him to some other thought, then a further 
anecdote, with one digression leading to another - and Tristram, the book’s hero, is 
forgotten for a good hundred pages. This extravagant way of composing the novel 
might seem no more than a formal game. But in art, the form is always more than a 
form. Every novel, like it or not, offers some answer to the question: What is human 
existence, and wherein does its poetry lie? Sterne’s contemporaries—Fielding, for 
instance—particularly savoured the extraordinary charm of action and adventure. 
The answer we sense in Sterne’s novel is a very different one: for him, the poetry lies 
not in the action but in the interruption of the action.
It may be that, indirectly, a grand dialogue took shape here between the novel and 
philosophy. Eighteenth-century rationalism is based on Leibniz’s famous declaration: 
Nihil est sine ratione - there is nothing without its reason. Stimulated by that convic-
tion, science energetically explores the why of everything, such that whatever exists 
seems explainable, thus predictable, calculable. The man who wants his life to have a 
meaning forgoes any action that hasn’t its cause and its purpose. All biographies are 
written this way. Life is shown as a luminous trajectory of causes, effects, failures, 
and successes, and man, setting his impatient gaze on the causal chain of his actions, 
further accelerates his mad race toward death.
Against that reduction of the world to the causal succession of events, Sterne’s 
novel, by its very form, affirms that poetry lies not in action but there where action 
stops; there where the bridge between a cause and an effect has collapsed and thought 
wanders off in sweet lazy liberty. The poetry of existence, says Sterne’s novel, is in 
digression. It is in the incalculable. It is on the other side of causality. It is sine ratione, 
without reason. It is on the other side of Leibniz’s statement.
Thus the spirit of an age cannot be judged exclusively by its ideas, its theoreti-
cal concepts, without considering its art, and particularly the novel. The nineteenth 
century invented the locomotive, and Hegel was convinced he had grasped the very 
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spirit of universal history. But Flaubert discovered stupidity. I daresay that is the 
greatest discovery of a century so proud of its scientific thought.
Of course, even before Flaubert, people knew stupidity existed, but they under-
stood it somewhat differently: it was considered a simple absence of knowledge, 
a defect correctable by education. In Flaubert’s novels, stupidity is an inseparable 
dimension of human existence. It accompanies poor Emma throughout her days, to 
her bed of love and to her deathbed, over which two deadly agelastes, Homais and 
Bournisien, go on endlessly trading their inanities like a kind of funeral oration. But 
the most shocking, the most scandalous thing about Flaubert’s vision of stupidity is 
this: Stupidity does not give way to science, technology, modernity, progress; on the 
contrary, it progresses right along with progress!
With a wicked passion, Flaubert used to collect the stereotyped formulations that 
people around him enunciated in order to seem intelligent and up-to-date. He put 
them into a celebrated Dictionnaire des idees regues. We can use this title to declare: 
Modern stupidity means not ignorance but the nonthought of received ideas. Flau-
bert’s discovery is more important for the future of the world than the most startling 
ideas of Marx or Freud. For we could imagine the world without the class struggle 
or without psychoanalysis, but not without the irresistible flood of received ideas 
that—programmed into computers, propagated by the mass media—threaten soon 
to become a force that will crush all original and individual thought and thus will 
smother the very essence of the European culture of the Modern Era.
Some eighty years after Flaubert imagined his Emma Bovary, during the thirties 
of our own century, another great novelist, Hermann Broch, wrote that however 
heroically the modern novel may struggle against the tide of kitsch, it ends up being 
overwhelmed by it. The word ‘kitsch’ describes the attitude of those who want to 
please the greatest number, at any cost. To please, one must confirm what everyone 
wants to hear, put oneself at the service of received ideas. Kitsch is the translation of 
the stupidity of received ideas into the language of beauty and feeling. It moves us to 
tears of compassion for ourselves, for the banality of what we think and feel. Today, 
fifty years later, Broch’s remark is becoming truer still. Given the imperative neces-
sity to please and thereby to gain the attention of the greatest number, the aesthetic 
of the mass media is inevitably that of kitsch; and as the mass media come to embrace 
and to infiltrate more and more of our life, kitsch becomes our everyday aesthetic and 
moral code. Up until recent times, modernism meant a nonconformist revolt against 
received ideas and kitsch. Today, modernity is fused with the enormous vitality of the 
mass media, and to be modern means a strenuous effort to be up-to-date, to conform, 
to conform even more thoroughly than the most conformist of all. Modernity has put 
on kitsch’s clothing.
The agélastes, the nonthought of received ideas, and kitsch are one and the same, 
the three-headed enemy of the art born as the echo of God’s laughter, the art that 
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created the fascinating imaginative realm where no one owns the truth and everyone 
has the right to be understood. That imaginative realm of tolerance was born with 
modern Europe, it is the very image of Europe—or at least our dream of Europe, a 
dream many times betrayed but nonetheless strong enough to unite us all in the fra-
ternity that stretches far beyond the little European continent. But we know that the 
world where the individual is respected (the imaginative world of the novel, and the 
real one of Europe) is fragile and perishable. On the horizon stand armies of agélastes 
watching our every move. And precisely in this time of undeclared and permanent 
war, and in this city with its dramatic and cruel destiny, I have determined to speak 
only of the novel. You may have understood that this is not some attempt on my part 
to avoid the questions considered grave. For if European culture seems under threat 
today, if the threat from within and without hangs over what is most precious about 
it - its respect for the individual, for his original thought, and for his right to an in-
violable private life - then, I believe, that precious essence of the European spirit is 
being held safe as in a treasure chest inside the history of the novel, the wisdom of the 
novel. It is that wisdom of the novel I wanted to honor in this speech of thanks. But 
it is time for me to stop. I was forgetting that God laughs when he sees me thinking.
Source: Pro Europa
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Further scholars – History of the Idea of Europe
Jacques Le Goff
The Birth of Europe
Click for review!
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The Recovery of the Holy Land
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Dante Alighieri
Monarchy
Click for the book!
Council of Constance 1415
Click for the text!
Otakar Odložilík
The Hussite King. Bohemia in European Affairs 1440–1471
Info about the book!
Erasmus of Rotterdam
The Complaint of Peace
Click for the text!
Emeric Crucé
The New Cyneas Of Emeric Cruce
Info about the book!
Maximilien de Béthune, first Duke of Sully
Sully’s Grand design of Henry IV
Click for the text!
John Amos Comenius
Click for Biography!
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Saint-Pierre (Charles-Irénée Castel)
The Plan for Perpetual Peace: From Saint-Pierre to Rousseau
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
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The Spirit of Laws
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Jeremy Bentham
The Principles of International Law
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Immanuel Kant
Perpetual Peace
Click for the text!
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters
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Claude-Henri Saint-Simon 
Saint-Simon, the utopian precursor of the league of nations. By Elliot H. Polinger
Click for the text! JStor registration needed!
Victor Hugo
Speeches of Victor Hugo
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Giuseppe Mazzini
The Duties of Man
Click for an extract!
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Altiero Spinelli
Manifesto
Click for the text!
David Mitrany
The functional theory of politics
Info about the book!

D
oc
u
m
en
ts
The Way to Unity
A Timetable
Extract from Pan Drakopoulos, The Biography of Europe
1915: Fr. Naumann: Mitteleuropa
Friedrich Naumann courageously publishes his book Mitteleuropa in time of war. 
Having the history of Zollverein (German integration) on his mind, he provides the 
vision of a federal Central European political unit. He advocates for a supra-national 
custom union as a starting point of a political unity. Later, Fr. Naumann will found the 
Liberal Democratic Party -still a German political power.
1923: Coudenhove-Kalergi:”Pan-Europa”
Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi publishes his book „Pan-Europa” in Vienna. 
The 29 years old Austrian Count, descendant of German and Byzantine nobles, having 
in his mind the dangerous strategic chaos in Central Europe which followed the fall 
of the Empire, argues that, „the unification of the nations of the European subcon-
tinent with its diminished importance will either come about voluntarily through 
the formation of a European federation or will be forced on Europe by a Russian 
conquest. Whether the European question will be solved by Europe or by Russia, in 
neither case can the European system of small states be maintained alongside the 
giant empires of the future.” It is significant that Russia and Britain were left out of 
Pan-Europa. Coudenhove changed his negative attitude towards Britain to facilitate 
Aristide Briand’s policy, and after the Second War, because of the British struggle 
against Nazism.
Salvator de Madariaga writes in his Morning without Noon: „Count Coudenhove-
Kalergi was the first active European who conceived and proposed a European fed-
eration. This idea was his brainchild and he is entitled to be considered as the father 
of Europe. His charm was so exceptional , his skill as a writer -one of the few who 
can lend spring, speed and sprightliness to the heavy German language- his gift for 
exposition and his ability to handle human beings -not by the thousand, but in small 
groups- were so remarkable that his ideas made considerable progress and in the end 
he was able to persuade Briand to do something.”
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1925: Alfred Weber on the End of State
The German sociologist Alfred Weber in his book The Crisis of the Modern State 
Idea in Europe shows how the idea of a national state collapsed as a result of the 
First World War. His argument is clearly summarized in his statement: „Nothing is 
so urgent as the creation of ideal, realistic and political conditions for a European 
federation”.
1926, October: The Founding Congress of Pan-Europa
The first Congress of „Pan-Europa” in Vienna. More than 2,000 European politicians, 
scholars, businessmen, professionals and journalists take part. „Pan-Europa” is the 
first multinational pro-European organization. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s pro-
gram demands „the political and economic unification of all states from Portugal to 
Poland”, the creation of „the United States of Europe on the model of the United States 
of America.”
1929: J.Ortega y Gasset:”The Revolt of the Masses”
The great Spaniard philosopher of history Jose Ortega y Gasset publishes his work 
The Revolt of the Masses . The book is translated in nearly all European languages, 
has a particular influence on the intellectuals, and inspires the supporters of the 
European movement. Ortega y Gasset writes: „The European cannot live unless 
embarked upon some great unifying enterprise. When this is lacking, he becomes 
degraded, grows slack, his soul is paralyzed. [...] Nationalism is nothing but a mania, 
a pretext to escape from the necessity of inventing something new, some great enter-
prise. Its primitive methods of action and the type of men it exalts reveal abundantly 
that it is the opposite of a historical creation. Only the determination to construct a 
great nation from the group of peoples of the Continent would give new life to the 
pulses of Europe. She would start to believe in herself again,and automatically to 
make demands on, to discipline, herself.”
Walter Lipgens, the historian of the European movement, regards The Revolt of the 
Masses as one of the five key-books which fully give one to understand „what Euro-
pean unity ought still to mean today.”
1929: Luchaire’s Plan for a Federation
Jean Luchaire publishes his research -sponsored by the Vienna Chamber of Com-
merce- under the title Towards the Federal States of Europe:. He rejects the participa-
tion of Britain in the federation and he suggests that Britain should participate in a 
future federation with the USA and Canada.
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1929, September 5: The Briand’s Plan
Aristide Briand, Prime Minister of France, speaking before the Assembly of the 
League of Nations argues in favor of a European federation.
“Now, with some slight misgiving -I might say, with a feeling of anxiety productive 
of a certain fear which you will forgive in me- I have to approach another problem. I 
have been associated of recent years with active propaganda in favor of an idea that 
is politely described as magnanimous perhaps in order to avoid terming it rash. This 
idea, which was first conceived many years ago, which has haunted the imagination 
of philosophers and poets and has won for them a certain succes d’estime- this idea 
has now forged ahead in virtue of its own intrinsic worth, and has been seen at last 
to supply the answer to a real need. Propagandists have united to spread it abroad, to 
establish it more firmly in the minds of the nations, and among these propagandists 
I stand confessed.
At the same time, I have never closed my eyes to the difficulties of such an under-
taking, nor failed to realize the doubtful expediency, for a statesman, of plunging into 
what might readily be termed such an adventure. But all man’s greatest and wisest 
acts, I think, contain some element of madness or temerity. So I absolved myself in 
advance and went on; but I proceeded cautiously. [...]
I think that between peoples constituting geographical groups, like the peoples of 
Europe, there should be some kind of federal bond; it should be possible for them to 
get into touch at any time, to confer about their interests, to agree on joint resolutions 
and to establish among themselves a bond of solidarity which will enable them, if 
need be, to meet any grave emergency that may arise. That is the link I wish to forge”.
The effect of Briand’s speech was to provoke certain reactions which still are 
very much alive. The German committee, in reply, introduced a memorandum where 
it was pointed out that: a) political entente was a necessary condition; b) economic 
cooperation would facilitate political cooperation and, consequently, a “European 
currency association” was a condition sine qua non as well as the consciousness of 
a community of interests and permanent destiny. The German press reacted nega-
tively, by contrast with the nowadays’ attitude, while theVossische Zeitung welcomed 
the idea pointing out that a lasting union of Europe required that a Franco-German 
entente be first organized. The British rejected the idea with a frigid manner; the 
British press strongly protested against any idea of European federation. Even the 
federalists of The Round Table rejected Briand’s plan asking for a federation of the 
English speaking states. However, G.M. Keynes welcomed the Memorandum in his 
weekly journal The Nation , and severely criticized The Round Table’s opposition. Ed-
ouard Benes, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, speaking at Prague 
welcomed the Briand’s Plan: “I do not hesitate to say that, impassioned Czechoslovac 
patriot that I am, and standing as I do for a concordance of the Slavonic nations, I am 
fervent advocate of Pan-European rapprochement and collaboration. The only issue 
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for us today, is this, either we work to form a sort of new union between European 
States and nations, as much from the moral point of view as from the economic and 
political, and we establish the closest and most permanent collaboration possible, or 
else we shall always be living in danger of difficulties, conflicts, and perpetual crises, 
ending in wars and catastrophes in which European culture will be submerged.”
1930, February 15: Churchill Supports Briand’s Plan
Winston Churchill publishes an article in the American journal The Saturday Evening 
Post supporting the Briand’s proposal for a European Federation: “The mass of 
Europe, once united, once federalized or partly federalized, once continentally self-
conscious, would constitute an organism beyond compare [...]. We see nothing but 
good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European commonality”. Churchill’s 
support of the European Unity will continue and his contribution will be decisive 
although he hardly managed to pursue an unswerving policy concerning Britain’s 
accession into it.
1930, March: Students in Favor of Federation
The Council of the International University Federation for the League of Nations 
discuss the question of the European Unity. The students declare their willingness to 
fight against the nationalistic ideas in their countries. “At the heart of the European 
question”, they declare, “there is the endless opposition between unity and diversity. 
Only one means of reconciliation exists: Federation!”
1930, March: H.G.Wells Advocates the Federal Europe
The English writer H.G.Wells writes a series of articles full of humour, irony, and en-
thusiasm in the French paper Le Quotidien , where he supports the idea of a European 
federation.
1930, 1 May: Briand Submits the Memorandum
Aristide Briand submits a “Memorandum from the French Government on the Organi-
zation of a Regime of European Federal Union” to the League of Nations. The actual 
author of the Memorandum is the great poet Saint-John Perse, then private secretary 
of A. Briand. The Memorandum met with a cold reception from the European govern-
ments -any momentum has been lost; nevertheless, the idea of the European unity 
remains an inspiring idea for the literati.
1931: E.Herriot: “The United States of Europe”
The French statesman and man of letters Edouard Herriot publishes his book The 
United States of Europe. He writes with his characteristic clarity: “Europe is not 
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threatening any other land. She wants only to live, and she cannot live without union. 
Political theories must bow to that primordial necessity”.
1933: The Europa Union
The Swiss group Jung Europa and the Swiss branch of Pan-Europa band together 
to found the Europa Union. The new association launches the monthly periodical 
Europa (still published without a break since May 1935). Leading figures of Europa 
Union are Hermann Aeppli (publisher), Hans Bauer (economist) and Heinrich Georg 
Ritzel (German politician and writer , immigrant in Switzerland).
1933, May: Night over Europe
In Germany the pro-European associations or groups are proscribed as “pacifists” by 
Hitler’s regime.
1938: A Gloomy Interval
A few months after the “reunification” of Austria with the German Reich, Count 
Coudenhove-Kalergi declares: “We prefer to postpone European unification to a later 
date rather than see it accomplished in the near future under Hitler’s tyranny ... . Pan 
Europa has room for monarchies as well as for republics... what it cannot accept is 
states which do not recognize human rights.” Two years later, Count landed in New 
York, a refugee from Hitler’s Europe.
1938, 6 November: The Federal Union
Federal Union is founded in London by Derk Rawnsley and Charles Kimber. Lord Lo-
thian (the founder of The Round Table ), the Archbishop of York, the biologist Julian 
Huxley, the historian Arnold Toynbee, the military historian Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, 
and others are among the members of its Advisory Board. Among its supporters there 
are figures as the apostle of Libertarianism Friedrich Hayek, the conductor Thomas 
Beecham, Lawrence Olivier, Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee and many others.
The Federal Union declares: “National sovereignty leads to competition in arma-
ments, economic self-sufficiency and internal regimentation, and thus inevitably to 
war, imperialism, poverty and loss of individual liberty, because where sovereign 
States fail to agree there is no remedy save resort to violence in the form of power 
politics or war. No international order based on co-operation between sovereign 
States will prove either efficient or durable, since all sovereign States in the last re-
sort seek their own national self-interest. Nothing less than a union of the peoples can 
end this anarchy and give peace, justice and freedom to all. Accordingly we advocate:
“A Federal Union of those nations which hold that the State exists for the freedom 
and responsibility of man, and that government must be contacted with the consent 
of the governed”.
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1939, 20 October: The Pope Calls for a Supra-national Community
Pope Pius XII in His Encyclical “Summit Pontificatus” (On the unity of human society) 
calls for a “supranational community” and declares that the “alleged absolute auton-
omy of the state is in clear contradiction to the natural order.” Moreover, the Pope’s 
Christmas messages between 1940 and 1944 urged, with mounting insistence, the 
creation of “supranational institutions whose authority must be real and effective 
vis-a-vis the member states”. This attitude of the Pope had, as a result, the active role 
of Catholic intellectuals to federal movements.
1940: The Federal Union Research Institute
Founded by the Federal Union, the FURI set up in Oxford under the direction of Sir 
William Beveridge, master of University College at Oxford University, and former 
director of the London School of Economics. In 1945 FURI gave way to the Federal 
Trust, which still works on the European Unity and the Britain’s role within it.
1940: Federalism v. Racism
The first conference of Federal Union in London adopts the aims of the movement. 
Among them:
1. To work for an Allied Statement of Peace Aims challenging the idea of race supe-
riority with a declaration of the rights of man, and the method of aggression with a 
declaration of readiness to federate with any people whose government is prepared 
to recognize these rights.
2. To welcome any steps towards such a federation of the Allies or any other groups of 
peoples, provided that at the time of its formation the federation is declared open to 
accession by other nations, including Germany.
1941, July: The “Ventotene Manifesto”
Being interned on the Ventotene islet, Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi write the 
“Ventotene Manifesto”. Its main declaration is: “The first problem to be solved, and 
without whose solution progress of any kind is just an illusion, is the final abolition 
of the division of Europe into nation States”. The Ventotene Manifesto, spread by the 
Italian resistance movement, will be a classic text of the European federalism.
1942: Studying Federalism
Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and Arnold J.Zurcher establish the first graduate seminar 
exclusively devoted to the European federalism at New York University.
1942, September: Silone Calls for the European Unity
The writer Ignazio Silone, as the acting Secretary of the Partito Socialista Italiano, 
publishes a statement in which he declares that “the unity of European society which 
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already exists must be buttressed by political union. The old and reactionary systems 
of national sovereignties must be abolished.”
1943: De Gasperi Favors the Unity of Europe
Alcide De Gasperi founds the Italian Christian-Democrat Party. Among the funda-
mentals of the new party is the establishment of a European federation.
1943, March 21: Churchill Proposes the Council of Europe
The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill speaks to BBC assuring that “we shall 
achieve the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible”. 
And he continues: “We must try -I am speaking of course only for ourselves [scr. the 
British Government]- to make the Council of Europe, or whatever it may be called, 
into a really effective League, with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its 
texture, with a High Court to adjust disputes, and with forces, national or interna-
tional, or both, held ready to enforce these decisions and prevent renewed aggression 
and the preparation of future wars.”
1943, August 28: The European Federalist Movement
A group of literati resistance fighters found the Movimento Federalista Europeo. 
Among them there are Eugenio Colorni (he has received a doctorate for a dissertation 
on the federalist political philosophy of Leibniz), Ernesto Rossi (Prof. of Economics), 
Ferrucio Parri (Prof. of political sciences, later Prime Minister of Italy) and Altiero 
Spinelli.
1943, October 19-30: The Moscow Meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers
The British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden proposed for debate the question of a 
Central European federation, but the American Secretary of State Cordell Hull and 
the Soviet Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov violently rejected the proposal. President 
Roosevelt himself had repeatedly explained his decision to hand over the whole of 
continental Europe to Stalin, for the sake of a US-Soviet cooperation.
1943, 25 November: J.Smuts Speaks for a European Federation
Jan C. Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, speaking in London advocates a Confed-
eration of the West European States. According to Smuts,” the fact is, the Germans are, 
have been, and will continue to be, the dominant factor on the Continent of Europe, and 
nor peace and prosperity neither freedom is possible which is not based on that fact.”
1944, March-July: The Secret Meetings
Spinelli and Rossi arrange four secret meetings of active resistance fighters in Ge-
neva (Swiss). They succeed in getting fighters from France, Holland, Italy, Norway, 
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Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and two members of the German underground 
movement. The non communist resistance movements plump for the federal union 
of Europe: “Resistance to Nazi oppression, which unites the peoples of Europe in a 
common struggle, has forged between them a solidarity and a community of aims 
and interests. [...] In the space of one generation Europe has been the epicenter of 
two world wars, whose origins lay in the existence on this Continent of some thirty 
sovereign states. What is needed is to put an end to this anarchy by creating a federal 
union among the European peoples.”
1944, June: The French Committee for the European Federation
Albert Camus, the Socialist editor of Lyon Libre , Francis Gerard,and other resist-
ance fighters found the Comite Francais pour la Federation Europeene (CFFE) in 
Lyon, declaring that Europe, “can only evolve along the path of economic progress, 
democracy, and peace if the nation states become a federation.”
1944, November 30: Italy: the Bulwark of Federalism
The Italian Socialist Party (Socialista Italiana), at its first Congress declares in favor 
of a federation of European nations. Now all Italian parties, except communist, sup-
port the plan for a federal Europe.
1945, January 29: The First European Movement in the Netherlands
Dr. Hans-Dieter Salinger, writer of the book The Rebirth of Europe, and the editor 
of a resistance newspaper Willelm Vergade found the “Action for Europe” (Europee-
sche Actie). Prof. Henri J Brugmans, a stalwart supporter of the French socialist P.J. 
Proudhon’s ideas for a federal Europe, takes over the Presidency. Brugmans will be 
principal of the College d’ Europe in Bruges.
1945, March 22-25: International Conference of Federalists
An International Conference of Federalists is organized in Paris by the French 
Committee for a European Federation. Albert Camus, then editor of the resistance 
newspaper Combat, opens the meeting. Among the participants there are: the great 
personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, editor of Esprit (the leading journal of 
the Christian Left until today),George Orwell , Altiero Spinelli, and a galaxy of intel-
lectuals, politicians, journalists, trade unionists etc. In their Manifesto, the resist-
ance fighters prodigiously refuse any kind of punishment on the Germans or any 
“annexation of German territory by other countries” and reject the ideal of the nation 
state: “the dogma that the nation state is the highest political form of organization for 
mankind must be swept away”.
Ideas of Europe | 645 
D
oc
u
m
en
ts
1945, July: Churchill advocates the United States of Europe
In an address to the bicameral Belgian Parliament Winston Churchill advocates “the 
United States of Europe, which will unify this Continent in a manner never known 
since the fall of the Roman Empire, and within all its peoples may dwell together in 
prosperity, in justice and in peace”.
1945, October: SPD for a United Europe
Kurt Schumacher, leader of SPD (German Social-Democrat Party) declares in the 
first Conference of the party at Wennigsen that “the Social-Democrats will fight for a 
social and economic unity of Europe. We want to see Germany not as a national and 
independent entity but as a part of a united Europe!”
1945, October 31: CDU for a United Europe
Konrad Adenauer, working for the formation of the German Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU), advocates a unity of the Western Europe. In a number of speeches made 
during the Occupation, Adenauer argued for the “organic solution” often using the 
term United States of Europe. Thus, after Italy, we see a consensus in favor to United 
Europe in Germany too.
1946, June: The European Parliamentary Union
Count Coudenhove-Kalergi returns to Europe from U.S.A. and organizes the Euro-
pean Parliamentary Union.
1946, September 19: Churchill’s Address in Zurich
Sir Winston Churchill addresses at a convocation at the University of Zurich. He 
declares: “We must build a kind of United States of Europe!” The speech had an 
enormous impact indeed, and is still counted as a cornerstone of the European unity, 
although Churchill clearly exempted Britain from the plan.
1946, December 15: The Federalists’ Union
The European Union of Federalists is founded. Its first Congress will take place in 
Amsterdam, in April of 1947.
1946-47: The Spring of Unionism
A bunch of associations for the European unity germinated in France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany. In England, Winston Churchill founds the 
United Europe Committee under his chairmanship by-passing the Laborites and 
Liberals of the Federal Union. The first Congress of the new organization will take 
place on May 14 of the same year at the Albert Hall, London.
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1947, January 17: J.F.Dulles Supports the European Unity
John Foster Dulles makes a speech on the American foreign policy in New York. 
Inspired by his close friend Jean Monnet, Dulles strongly supports the unity of the 
Western Europe:”Europe must federate or perish!” As Walter Lipgens points out: 
“the effect of his speech in the US was similar to that of Churchill’s Zurich speech in 
Europe!”
1947, March: “A Parliament for Europe”
Count Coudenhove-Kalergi makes a speech in the New York Herald Tribune Forum 
pointing out that the Unity of Europe is not a political utopia but a practical policy, 
otherwise the whole Continent will be swallowed by the Soviets. The speech had a 
strong impact: on April 22, Coudenhove announces the formation of the American 
Committee for a Free and United Europe under the chairmanship of Senator William 
Fulbright.
1947, 14 December: Unite the Unionists
Churchill brings the pro-integration movements together and forms the Joint Inter-
national Committee of the Movements for European Unity under the chairmanship of 
Duncan Sandys.
1948, March 17: The Treaty of Brussels
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Britain sign a pact for collabora-
tion in economic, social, and cultural affairs. The British government makes it clear 
that this is a pact for collaboration, not for union. The Dutch Parliament, however, 
urges on federal association of the state members.
1948, April 16: The Formation of OEEC
The Organization of European Economic Cooperation is formed to administer the 
Marshall Plan (The European Recovery Plan). OEEC will be the beginning of the end 
of national economies in Europe.
1948, 7-10 May: The Congress of Europe
The Congress of Europe, organized by the Joint Committee under Duncan Sandys, 
takes place in the Hague; more than 750 delegates from all over free Europe partici-
pate. Among them there are W.Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul 
Reynaud, Georges Bidault, Paul Ramadier, Robert Schuman, Leon Blum, Salvador de 
Matariaga, Paul-Henri Spaak, Jean Monnet, Denis de Rougemont, Henri Brugmans, 
Altiero Spinelli, Edouard Herriot, Gaston Riou.
The major resolution of the Congress declares as an immediate task the establish-
ment of a European Assembly which could advise measures that would bring about 
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economic and political integration of Europe. Before the Congress disbanded, the 
members of the Joint Committee had founded the European Movement, as an um-
brella organization.
1948, July: Towards a European Assembly
The Prime Minister of Belgium Paul-Henri Spaak, a committed Europeanist, an-
nounces to his nation’s Senate that he has asked the European Movement to submit 
a detailed plan for an Assembly of Europe. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign 
Minister, makes contact with all the members of the Brussels Treaty asking the es-
tablishment of a European Assembly. The European Movement responds submitting 
a memorandum on the issue.
1948, September: The European Parliamentary Union
The First Conference of the European Parliamentary Union, formed by Count 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, takes place in Interlaken, Switzerland. 500 members of Euro-
pean Parliaments approve the plan of the Federal Union of Europe drafted by the 
British federalist R.W.G. Mackay.
1949, May 5: Birth of the Council of Europe
Despite the hesitations of the (Labor) British government, the Westminster Treaty 
for the creation of the Council of Europe is signed by representatives of 10 states: “the 
new body,” Derek Urwin writes, “became Western Europe’s first postwar political 
organization, one which immediately and daringly claimed that it would work for an 
economic and political union”. The first session of the Assembly will hold, in August 
1949. Its first President will be Paul-Henri Spaak.
1949, May 23: Germany Returns to Europe
The Federal Republic of Germany is founded. The horizon of the European unity is 
now clear.
1950, May 9: The Shuman Declaration
The failure of federalists to create a new political reality through the Council of 
Europe, the stress of the Americans for a reinstatement of Germany, and the friction 
between Germany and France about Saar made once again the European unity to 
seem as a quixotism. At this juncture, Jean Monnet introduces his functional method: 
“It was now,” Richard Mayne writes, “ that Monnet saw the chance to make his key 
contribution to the development of postwar Europe. Essentially, it linked the immedi-
ate problem of Germany with the contemporary discussion of European unity; and it 
did so by focusing on a very specific and concrete idea”. Monnet submits a proposal to 
the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman; Schuman adopts it at once and on May 
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9 he announces what is thereafter known as the Schuman Declaration or Schuman 
Plan: “The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the 
setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the 
federation of Europe ... . By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High 
Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, 
this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European 
federation indispensable to the preservation of peace”. After the Schuman Declara-
tion “the word Europe would never quite sound the same again”, Monnet notices.
1950, October 12: The Centre for European Culture
Inauguration of the ‘Centre europeen de la culture’ in Geneva (Swiss). President is the 
Spaniard writer and diplomat Salvador de Matariaga; Director is Denis de Rougemont, 
a personalist teacher of the European idea.
1951, April 18: The European Coal and Steel Community
Representatives of France, W. Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Lux-
embourg sign the Treaty for the establishment of the ECSC in Paris. Jean Monnet, the 
first President of the High Authority explains the meaning of the new organization: 
“According to the methods of the past, even when the European states have been 
convinced of the necessity of a common action, even when they have set up an inter-
national organization, they have kept their full sovereignty. Thus the international 
organization can neither decide, nor execute, but only address recommendations 
to the States ... Today, on the contrary, six Parliaments have decided after mature 
deliberation and by massive majorities, to create the First European Community 
which merges a part of the national sovereignties and submits them to the common 
interest. Within the limits of competence confirmed by the treaty, the High Authority 
has received from the six states the mandate to take, in complete independence, deci-
sions which are immediately in force on the whole of their territory. It is in a direct 
relationship with all firms. It obtains financial resources, not by contributions from 
states, but from levies imposed directly or indirectly on production ... It is responsi-
ble, not to the states, but to a European Assembly ... The members of the Assembly are 
not bound by any national mandate ... The Assembly controls our action. It has the 
power to withdraw its confidence from us. It is the first European Assembly endowed 
with sovereign powers. The acts of the High Authority are changeable in the courts 
... not before national tribunals, but before a European tribunal, the Court of Justice”.
1952-54: The Failure of the European Defence Community
The war in Korea led the USA to propose West German rearmament within NATO. But 
the wounds from the war in Europe were not healed yet, and the European response 
was in the negative. Monnet discussed the idea of a European army with the French 
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Premier Rene Pleven. After two years of talks among the European states, the plan 
for the European Defence Community was buried; and the damage done to the cause 
of integration was severe.
1955, June 2: A deep breath in Messina
The Foreign Ministers of the six members of the Coal and Steel Community meet in 
Messina (Italy) and agree to create “a common market free from all customs duties 
and all quantitative restrictions”. The six charge an intergovernmental committee 
under Paul-Henri Spaak to work out a plan. The spindle of Europe is moving once 
again.
1955, October 13: Monnet relaunches Europe
After the defeat of the European Defence Community, Jean Monnet announces the 
formation of the “Action Committee for the United States of Europe” under his own 
chairmanship. His aim is clear: “the relaunching of Europe”.
1956, May 29: Europe in the Flesh
The Spaak Report for a common market, based on Jean Monnet suggestions , is ap-
proved by the Foreign Ministers of the six in their Conference in Venice. The road to 
Rome is now open.
1957, March 25: The Bells Rang out
The Treaties of Rome are signed. The European Economic Community is established . 
Paul-Henri Spaak notices: “The Bells of Rome rang out loud and clear to celebrate the 
birth of a new Europe”.
Source: Pro Europa
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When it all started – The Hague, 7 May 1948
Denis de Rougemont
Just as there was a ‘banquet campaign’ to prepare the ground for the Revolution 
of 1848, the European Revolution, 100 years later, came out of a campaign of a 
series of congresses held between 1947 and 1949. These meetings both dem-
onstrated and stirred up the spirit and the main trends of a movement which 
took many, contrasting forms, and was curiously inefficient in its tactics and 
simplistic when it came to its strategy. And yet, the Council of Europe owes its 
existence to that movement, and thanks to it the Communities of ‘the Six’ were 
able to take shape in the minds of a great many economists and win acceptance 
from public opinion, and thus from the parliaments and governments which 
depended on that opinion in our countries at the time.
Historians may maintain that none of these congresses did anything. Indeed, con-
gresses do not usually do anything, that is not what is generally expected of them. 
People in the same profession go to them to be bored during the sittings and make 
up for it by having fun afterwards. But there was a very specific kind of passionate 
commitment, now dead, which was the only motive for bringing the militants for 
Europe together and made them prefer the night-time sessions in the committees 
to receptions or visits to the opera. That is what has to be explained if we want to 
describe, in psychological and historical terms, what the campaign of congresses was 
really like, and to do justice to the work it did.
The congress period began in August 1947, in Montreux, and ended in December 
1949, in Lausanne. The history of that time has yet to be written, and unless someone 
sets about it fairly soon, there is a real fear that it will not be done adequately or 
truthfully.
As a small contribution to that great task, here are a few pages on the Hague Con-
gress. Incomplete and deliberately subjective as they are, they aspire only to bring 
back to life a little of the creative freshness which propelled the enterprise, and might 
perhaps have made a surprising success of it, if cautious ‘realist’ calculations had not 
crept in, like a maggot into an apple. Yes, it was the naivety of a few federalists which 
almost ‘made Europe’ in 1948, just as it was the manoeuvring by politicians, who 
embraced our cause so that they could stifle it more effectively, which reduced eve-
rything to the level of the ‘possible’, where you can be sure that there are no miracles.
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A memorable convergence
Before The Hague in 1948, there had been Montreux in 1947. But in the background 
to that first federalist congress there was a whole, rather complex history. Let me 
mention three major events: by a curious coincidence, in space as well as in time, they 
all took place in Switzerland, at the end of the summer of 1946.
First of all, in Hertenstein, near Lucerne, at the end of August, there was a sym-
posium which was organised by the Swiss movement Europa Union (founded in 1925) 
of representatives of federalist groups from France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany, Austria and several eastern 
European countries. From this symposium there sprang the Union of European Fed-
eralists, which went on to convene the Congress of Montreux, after two constitutive 
meetings in Luxembourg (in October 1946) and Amsterdam (in April 1947).
Not long before Hertenstein, though, there had been the resistance movements 
to Hitler and the various forms of totalitarian nationalism. The momentum that they 
had built up fed into this determination to take action for Europe, and several of their 
leaders, from Italy, Germany, France and the Benelux countries, were at Montreux.
Lastly, behind the thinking of most Resistance members, there was a common 
source: the personalist movement, first set up in Paris as early as 1932 (grouped 
around Esprit and the ‘Ordre nouveau’) and later spreading to the rest of Europe, 
including Germany (the ‘Gegner’ group with Harro Schulze-Boysen), though not to 
Italy, where federalism emerged independently in the camps of the Lipari islands (the 
Ventotene Manifesto of 1942, and the publication L’Unità europea). This personalist-
cum-resistance component was represented in Montreux by men such as Robert 
Aron and Alexandre Marc (who, like me, had been involved with Ordre nouveau and 
Esprit), by Eugen Kogon, and by Henri Brugmans, who said what had to be said to 
Mounier and Dandieu, among others.
After that, from 1 to 12 September 1946, there came the first International Meet-
ings, in Geneva. Over and above any political concern, in the strict sense of the word, 
these meetings memorably raised the question of the European Spirit in a world racked 
by the upheavals of the post-war period. Julien Benda, Georges Bernanos, Francisco 
Flora, Jean Guéhenno, Karl Jaspers, Georges Lukacs, J. R. de Salis, Stephen Spender and 
I were concerned, in nine lectures followed by public debates, with defining how aware 
Europe was of its fate and its cultural values in the face of the challenges posed by 
the (apparently) contradictory ambitions of the two ‘Great Powers’. With support from 
Jaspers, in particular, I had argued for a political union of Europe on federal lines. With 
a somewhat sceptical Jean Guéhenno, Stephen Spender and a few others, we had even 
attempted to draw up a sort of federative charter — I have unfortunately lost the rough 
drafts sketched out by Maurice Druon in the Café Landolt. These meetings drew atten-
tion to the European problem among a wide circle of influential people. They helped 
create a favourable climate of opinion and almost started an intellectual fashion.
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And then, a few days later in Zurich, on 16 September to be precise, there was a 
speech by Winston Churchill proposing, cautiously yet boldly, the setting up of ‘a kind 
of United States of Europe’, casually leaving out the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union, who were to be the well-disposed witnesses to a marriage of convenience be-
tween France and Germany. Shortly afterwards, Churchill set up the United Europe 
Movement, which his son-in-law Duncan Sandys represented at Montreux.
There was a fourth component which went in the same direction as all these 
developments. In London there had been regular contacts between the heads of the 
governments-in-exile of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Poland, the Baltic States, the successor-states to the Dual Monarchy and Greece, 
with preparatory studies for joint projects and even a number of agreements, offi-
cially signed, which looked towards a union of Europe in the future. The kingpin of 
this discreet operation was Dr Retinger, right-hand man to General Sikorski, the head 
of the Polish Government. At the age of 56, he had been parachuted into occupied 
Poland, an experience which had left him with a curious limp. With Paul van Zeeland, 
just after the war, he had set up the European League for Economic Cooperation, on 
whose behalf he came to Montreux.
I was to discover all this in dribs and drabs during the Congress and the ensuing 
months, but it is only now that I get a clear picture of it all, with the main lines firmly 
traced out. For me it was a plunge into a new environment, and I was keenly aware of 
its strangeness, its particular flavour, its consistency, the unforeseen currents which 
swept through it and the new impetus behind it. During that autumn of 20 years ago, 
I was not in the least concerned to find out about the extremely complicated origins 
of an organisation of which I was not yet an official member, or of a movement within 
which what I mainly perceived were opportunities for action to be taken as a matter 
of urgency.
I have talked elsewhere about Montreux, which saw a memorable convergence of 
the forces we have just identified. This Congress of the Union of European Federal-
ists, which I launched with a speech on ‘the federalist attitude’, was my first contact 
with the great movement I had always imagined during my six years in exile in the 
United States. Today, as I once again read the minutes of that gathering of militants, 
I see defined in them the framework and the objectives of everything that was done 
subsequently: ‘a united Europe in a united world’, organised on federal lines to pre-
serve the independence of all parties and the precious differences between them, not 
to reduce them to a uniform pattern. The determination to unite all the peoples of 
Europe, including those of eastern Europe, was affirmed as the only way of forestall-
ing the risk of colonisation by a party or a currency. The myth that a choice had to be 
made between the two Great Powers and that the world would be divided between 
them, and the myth of each country’s absolute national sovereignty, were condemned 
and stripped of their power to terrorise, as were the false notions of a contradiction 
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between freedom and planning, loyalty to one’s country and universalism, federal 
authority and local autonomy. To conclude, there was a remarkable report by Daniel 
Serruys proposing that the economy of the continent be organised in stages, as fol-
lows: a customs union must be the final expression of an economic union, i.e. of a 
common plan of production; complete freedom of trade should be achieved by suc-
cessive cuts in duties over 10 to 15 years; ‘there must be a European Monnet plan’, not 
just to secure a balance between French and German production (of coal and steel), 
but a balance in production over the entire union; there should be a pooling of energy 
resources derived from tidal energy and nuclear power; and lastly, a settlement of 
the ‘agricultural question in Europe’, examined from the point of view of a regional 
union, would be ‘constantly measured against the yardstick of developments in the 
world economy’. It has to be said that not much has been added to that programme 
since; on the contrary, some essential features have actually been removed from it — 
economic policy, for example.
From Montreux to The Hague
In the long view of history which is beginning to emerge now that 20 years have 
passed, the Congress of Montreux seems to me to hold a decisive place at the centre of 
events. It was there that most of the pro-Europe currents came together, having until 
then been unknown to one another. It was Montreux which gave birth to the idea of a 
coming together of these forces in a spectacular display, which was to happen a few 
months later in The Hague.
In Montreux, the UEF devised a plan to convene a Convention of Europe, which 
it expected to give birth to federal politics and form the nucleus of a European gov-
ernment. But the Liaison Committee of the Movements for European Unity, set up in 
Paris on 11 November 1947 by representatives from Churchill’s British Movement, its 
French counterpart (Paul Reynaud and Dautry), the Economic League (F. van Zeeland 
and D. Serruys) and the UEF (Brugmans, Silva and Voisin), was dominated three to 
one by the ‘unionists’ (or minimalists), and at its meeting of 14 December it set the 
following targets for the Hague Congress:
1. to give a striking demonstration of the power and scope of the support which the 
European ideal already enjoyed;
2. to supply material for discussion, information and technical research;
3. to deliver a new and powerful impetus to pro-Europe campaigns in all countries.
The difference in level between the federalists’ ambitions and the objectives of the 
unionists was obvious. Shall we say that the Liaison Committee was tacking towards 
what was ‘possible’, i.e. what the political parties and their leaders could be expected 
to agree to? That would mean admitting that the federalists had, by the same token, 
abandoned the idea of creating what was possible, which is the fundamental act of 
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any political or spiritual revolution. I think the UEF actually still hoped that it could 
turn the Hague Congress into something more than just a congress.
When Duncan Sandys, in January 1948, and then Joseph Retinger, on 25 February, 
came to see me in Geneva and in Ferney to ask me to commit myself wholeheart-
edly to the movement (I promised to devote two years of my life to it, and here I still 
am after 20 years), I laid down the following conditions under which I would take 
responsibility for the cultural side of the planned congress:
1. the Cultural Committee, far from being just an ornamental adjunct to the ‘serious’ 
committees (the Political and Economic Committees), would adopt the decisive 
role of stating the point of the whole enterprise and of the steps that were ex-
pected to follow on from it;
2. to prove that it shared this view, the Liaison Committee would make the Cultural 
Committee responsible for drawing up the Preamble defining the long- and short-
term objectives of the Congress and of the movements which were to carry its 
work on through joint action;
3. this Preamble must also contribute to codifying the terminology used in the 
Resolutions; it was therefore vital that the content of it, drawn up by the cultural 
section, should be discussed before the Congress by the leading lights in the politi-
cal and economic sections.
Retinger gave me his agreement and undertook to secure that of the Liaison Com-
mittee and the Movements.
By the end of February, I had been given promises of collaboration by some 50 phi-
losophers, scholars, writers and educators to whom I had submitted a first sketch of 
the report to be discussed by the cultural section at The Hague. These included Nicolas 
Berdiaev, Étienne Gilson, Jules Romains, Ignazio Silone, bishops, academics, trade union 
leaders and Ministers for Education (both former Ministers and some still in office). 
T. S. Eliot wrote to me: ‘I feel that at the present time, one ought to do what one can to 
support a movement of this kind, however desperate the attempt.’ And from Salvador 
de Madariaga I had this: ‘I will be happy to devote some time (to the committee), though 
I have to say, I am short of it.’ Retinger had found a very clever way of supporting me. On 
29 March he wrote me a letter (with ‘copies to some of our colleagues’) speaking of the 
Preamble in terms which gave it its full value, just as I had wished. 
‘I think that this declaration should be taken as the starting point for our joint 
action after the Congress and must become the manifesto for the whole European 
Movement. We must try to gather millions of signatures from Europeans and thereby 
create a sort of powerful people’s movement. That could only have the effect of 
putting extra pressure on timid and recalcitrant governments.
‘The launching of a manifesto of this kind must be one of the main and immediate 
objectives of the Congress and our movement. The collecting of signatures should 
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keep our ideas constantly alive in the eyes of ordinary people. Every meeting held by 
one of our affiliated groups should end with a collection of signatures (and perhaps of 
a small amount of money from each person who signs, to keep our campaign going).’
At the committee meeting in Paris on 8 April, it was suddenly decided that ‘the text 
known up to now as the Preamble’ would be a Message to Europeans to be adopted 
by acclamation and would therefore be read at the closing session. Representatives 
of the three sections would consider it before the Congress ‘to make sure that the 
reports by the three committees were on the same lines’. That was what I wanted 
more than anything else.
The Hague Congress (7 to 11 May 1948)
Extract from my diary
That architecture of great beams, rafters and carved cross pieces supporting a huge 
roof, high above, I had a momentary vision of us as children leaping from one beam 
to another without looking down at the yawning chasm beneath us … I felt suddenly 
dizzy. I lowered my gaze to look along the bare, white walls, as far as that line of 
shields with the lions lying down in threes. Lower still there were hanging carpets. 
Above us was a wide, square canopy, draped with red and gold silk. I leant my head 
against the folds of a heavy purple velvet curtain. Who were these people all around 
me, their faces lit by the beams of the film projectors? I was sitting on the platform, 
behind two rows of fascinating backs and necks which extended above the backs of 
the chairs. That very wide, red neck — that was Ramadier; the placid, fair-skinned 
neck, that was van Zeeland, and that non-neck was Paul Reynaud. A white, puffy neck 
rising out of the collar of a Victorian frock coat, that was Winston Churchill. To left 
and right of me were several friends in profile; that young man was a former Dutch 
Socialist Minister, another young man was a former British Conservative Minister, the 
slit eyes of Coudenhove, Lord Layton’s Voltaire-like smile, a man in black wearing a 
long chain round his neck. Where was I? When was this happening? Was it a dream? 
What was going on?
Very near to me, Churchill was talking into a microphone, and his voice came back to 
me from the hall: ‘The task before us, at this Congress, is not only to raise the voice of 
Europe as a united home … We must here and now resolve that a European Assembly 
shall be constituted …’
Yes, it was a dream which had come true, and which I had been having for 20 years.
In front of us, all round us, in that great Knights’ Hall, which was the meeting place 
of a very ancient parliament, there were a thousand people, a thousand Europeans. 
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I recognised a few faces in the crowd: Anthony Eden’s moustache, Daladier’s sunken 
face, the profile of the Mad Hatter from Alice in Wonderland (it could only be Bertrand 
Russell), Prieto’s shiny skull, the white curls of William Rappard, a larger-thanlife 
Englishman: Charles Morgan, an archbishop representing the Vatican, a Lord Bishop 
representing the see of Canterbury, some Labour members of the UK Parliament, a 
smiling Italian anarchist, German Ministers in rimless glasses … But why that deafen-
ing applause? ‘Europe,’ someone had just said into the microphone, ‘is the civilisation 
of non-conformists!’ I looked at the text that I had been handed. ‘Europe is the land of 
people in constant struggle with themselves, a place where no certainty is accepted 
as the truth unless it is constantly being rediscovered. Other continents pride them-
selves on their efficiency, but the atmosphere in Europe is the only one which makes 
life dangerous, adventurous, magnificent and tragic—and therefore worth living.’ 
(It was my friend Brugmans, a Dutch Labour man, who was speaking before 12 former 
Council presidents and 600 other representatives who had come from 25 countries. 
But I said to myself that, after all, our Congress was doubly non-conformist: it had 
managed to bring the conformists and the non-conformists together to work on a 
common project.)
On 8 May, the delegates to the Congress split up into three sections. I could only 
take part in one, of which I was in charge.
The discussions on my report (the establishment of a European Cultural Centre 
and the drafting of a Charter of Human Rights) took place in the type of confusion 
that is usual at congresses. In the end, all the positive content of the report went into 
the Resolution which was adopted unanimously—the Cultural Centre, the Human 
Rights Charter and the Supreme Court, a body ‘with supra-state jurisdiction to which 
citizens and groups can appeal’. All of this came into being in 1950, as laid down in the 
Resolutions adopted at The Hague.
Although federalism managed to have its effect on the wording of the reports and 
Resolutions, however, it was only victorious on the page. Unionism, the doctrine (or 
deliberate lack of doctrine) of those who hoped to make Europe without breaking 
any eggs, was the only winner when it came to exploiting the consequences of the 
dazzling show we put on at The Hague. Firstly, its partisans managed to prevent 
the Congress leading to the emergence of a wide-ranging people’s movement and, 
secondly, the federalists were unable to make their tactics stick: they let themselves 
be lulled with promises of ‘modest, but specific, results’.
The federalists, as I have shown, hoped that the Convention would give birth—
though how?—to the nucleus of a European government, whose powers were not 
described. Churchill had talked of a ‘Council of Europe’, though nobody knew exactly 
whether it was more or better than an alliance of countries retaining absolute national 
sovereignty. The political report (unionist in inspiration) proposed an extraordinary 
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council with a permanent secretariat, and a deliberative assembly appointed by the 
national parliaments. But the Political Resolution (also adopted by the federalists) 
only talked about an assembly ‘chosen by the Parliaments of the participating na-
tions, from among their members or others’. The message to Europeans, lastly, called 
for the establishment of ‘[an] Assembly where the live forces of all our nations shall 
be represented’, the position adopted by the integral federalists. The European Move-
ments, consisting of the six organisations which met at The Hague, very quickly, in 
fact, achieved a ‘modest, but specific, result’: the establishment within nine months 
of a Council of Europe, devoid of all powers and given a purely consultative assembly 
consisting of members appointed by the national parliaments.
From that moment on, the federalist content not only of the results achieved but 
also of the Movement’s actual demands shrank from year to year. Everyone knows 
that, but what people are less aware of is the tiny, but decisive, incident which throt-
tled all hope of ‘revolutionary’ action by the Movement.
The Message to Europeans, having been discussed for two months, and having had 
the finishing touches put to it by the Liaison Committee just before the Congress, had 
been printed at the top of a long roll of strong parchment paper. It had been agreed 
that at the end of the closing session, when I would read the text, all the delegates, 
headed by Churchill, would sign the document, which would then circulate through-
out Europe to gather millions of signatures and become the instrument of a powerful 
campaign of agitation for a united Europe.
Now, while I was doing a radio interview in a corridor, 10 minutes before the time 
fixed for the closing session, someone was sent to get me: Duncan Sandys urgently 
wanted to see me in the Knights’ Hall where the plenary sitting of the economic sec-
tion was drawing to a close. I saw Churchill standing at the microphone, his hands 
grasping the lapels of his frock coat. Every now and then, all the lights dimmed, and, 
for a few seconds, were extinguished, by a violent storm which was raging outside. 
At the back of the hall, near the main entrance, I saw Duncan and his brother-in-law 
Randolph Churchill, who said to me: ‘I believe you want a unanimous vote of the 
Congress on the text of commitment at the end of your message. Now, I know at least 
30 delegates who will oppose it, because of the sentence: “We want a common defence 
system”’. Sandys added: ‘That sentence wasn’t debated by the Congress. I am sorry, 
but we must forget about the Message’.
My interviewer, Alec Plaut, had followed me, microphone in hand, trailing wires. 
I signalled to him and, speaking into the microphone, I repeated what had just been 
said and concluded by saying: ‘OK! At the next European Congress, Stalin, who is 
stronger than you, will be sending 50 delegates! And there won’t be a united Europe!’ 
I shouted a bit, a think. The ushers asked us to leave. I sent for Retinger and Paul van 
Zeeland, who were on the platform. In a small room next to the entrance, six or seven 
of us sat down and, after ten minutes of stormy discussion, Paul van Zeeland, who 
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was to chair the closing session of the Congress, convinced people to agree to a com-
promise: I would read the Message, but leave out the little sentence that they objected 
to. That seemed a reasonable, mild way of proceeding. What it actually meant was 
that we now could not get people to sign the Message as already printed, since that 
little sentence was in it.
I was still very pale, apparently, when van Zeeland gave me the floor to present 
the Message to Europeans. Just as I, pausing briefly, was about to get onto the final 
undertaking in five articles, Sandys gave an imperious sign to the effect that no one 
in the hall was to rise. I had a paltry revenge (though only in terms of my own self-
respect) while Senator Kerstens was reading the Message in English. I had gone back 
to my seat on the platform, just behind Churchill, who was rocking backwards and 
forwards on his chair, and I heard him say out loud: ‘But why? We should stand up at 
that! We should all stand up!’ No one moved, however. And the Congress ended amid 
general enthusiasm, but it had just nipped in the bud all hope of a people’s campaign 
which would have extended its impact throughout Europe.
Source: cvce.eu
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Conference on the establishment 
of a Council of Europe (London, 3-5 May 1949)
Minutes of the Conference held at St. James’s Palace, 
beginning at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, 3rd May
[…]
19. Article 20
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) referred to the United Kingdom Delegation’s proposal 
set out in C.E. (MIX) P.3 which had been seen by the Legal and Drafting Committee 
and was in a form which could be adopted by the Conference if the Conference were 
prepared to accept the principle of the United Kingdom proposals. These proposals 
were designed to make the draft simpler, shorter and more flexible; it was important 
to remember that they should not lay down too many positive rules in advance. In any 
event sub-paragraph (a) (vi) empowered the Committee of Ministers to decide that 
any particularly important question should be settled by unanimous vote.
M. Unden (Sweden) emphasised that Article 20 was one of the fundamental provi-
sions of the whole Statute, since it regulated the principles for taking decisions in the 
Committee of Ministers which was the decisive organ of the Council. In the statement 
of principles sent out by the Brussels Treaty Powers with the original invitation to 
the Conference, it was stated that the Committee of Ministers should work on the 
principle of unanimity. Subsequently this principle of unanimity had not been chal-
lenged, although it had been found possible to make exceptions to it, which had been 
transferred to an Annex. In this situation he understood the motives behind the United 
Kingdom proposal which in effect turned the Article inside out, thus making the guid-
ing principle that of majority vote. He felt, however, that this went very much too far. 
Even amendments to the Statute itself could be carried by two-thirds majority, and 
this would lead to the paradoxical situation that a Government would sign the Statute 
and submit it to its parliament for ratification; that Government could not, however, 
be sure that the Statute would not be subsequently changed by a majority vote which 
would become valid, under the present proposals, without ever being submitted to that 
particular parliament again. It was, therefore, an important point for his Delegation 
that Article 20 should remain as drafted by the Preparatory Conference.
As regards the three alternatives for the calculation of the vote, he recognised 
that on the one hand it was desirable for members of the Committee of Ministers 
not to be forced against their will to cast a vote, and on the other hand that it was 
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important that decisions should not be taken by a very small number of votes. This 
could be overcome, he thought, by taking alternative A, “representatives casting a 
vote,” with the addition “provided that the number of votes cast was one more than 
half of the number of members entitled to sit on the Committee.”
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) pointed out that the first point made by M. Unden 
would mean that any amendment of the Statute would require the unanimous vote of 
the Committee of Ministers and that therefore it was a reaffirmation of the principle 
of the veto in a form even worse than at the United Nations. There was such opposi-
tion in the United Kingdom Parliament to the principle of the veto that he could never 
get this Statute accepted if it contained this provision. He was also most anxious not 
to reaffirm the principle of the veto in the Council of Europe on the question of the 
admission of new members. His Majesty’s Government and other Governments had 
stated at the United Nations that they would not use their power of veto on the admis-
sion of new members, but would regard as accepted any country which got seven 
favourable votes. He could not now agree to introduce into this new organisation a 
principle which His Majesty’s Government had been combating at the United Nations.
M. Lange (Norway) did not think that the parallel with the United Nations was 
accurate, since the United Nations was a universal organisation, whereas the Council 
of Europe was limited to a geographically determined group of nations. He did not 
think that the phrase “not more than two votes against” was unreasonable. It was 
on the basis of the original invitation, which had stated the principle of unanimity, 
that his Government had discussed the Statute with their parliament. If it were to be 
changed now, it would cause him considerable difficulty, particularly as Norwegian 
public opinion was not prepared to go so far as the United Kingdom proposals made 
necessary. He though, however, that a satisfactory compromise could be found.
The meeting adjourned at 1:15 p.m.
The Conference reassembled at St. James’s Palace at 2:45 p.m. on Tuesday, 3rd May
20. Article 20 (Continuation of the Discussion)
The Conference considered a proposal put forward by the Danish, Norwegian and 
Swedish Delegations (C.E. (MIN) P.5).
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) thought that, on the question of additional members, 
if they could get rid of the formula “not more than two cast negative votes” and ac-
cent a two-thirds majority decision for point 2 in the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish 
proposal, a compromise might be found.
M. Unden (Sweden) thought that it was quite unreasonable to have a two-thirds 
majority decision for amendments which might change the whole structure of the 
organisation and its voting procedure, &c. The only possible form of compromise 
would be to say that all important questions should be decided by a unanimous vote.
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Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) said that it would always be open to a country to with-
draw if it felt so strongly that it would not agree to being overruled, but that he could 
not really see ten responsible Foreign Ministers bringing matters to such a pass. They 
all knew that unless they remained united, the future for Europe was dark. In three 
or four years the Council of Europe would have to take a step forward when Marshall 
Aid came to an end and Europe had to recast her economic structure. That would 
mean that amendments would have to be made to the Statute and it would really not 
be possible to allow one, perhaps small, country to veto such legitimate changes. If, 
on the other hand, a decision by a two-thirds majority could be accepted for amend-
ments, he thought that the Council would not disregard, without the most serious 
thought, any fundamental objection to an amendment put forward by a particular 
country. They must not put into the Statute a clause showing that Europe did not 
trust itself. As the United Kingdom representative, he wanted to emphasise that his 
task of bringing the United Kingdom effectively into true co-operation in European 
affairs was not easy; he must move step by step. If the veto were now to be accepted, 
feeling in the United Kingdom would be affronted. After all the majority vote was the 
traditional way of settling questions in all the countries represented, and the proce-
dure outlined in the United Kingdom draft provided for very serious debate, then for 
a vote, and then for ratification by two-thirds of the parliaments concerned. If it were 
not accepted, he would be accused of playing Big Power politics; whereas he thought 
it was the contribution which each country could make to the common cause rather 
than the size of that country which was of importance, and the United Kingdom draft 
favoured smaller countries.
M. Unden (Sweden) expressed his surprise at this change at the last moment in a 
fundamental provision of the original draft Statute. He had told his Government, and 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of his parliament, of the line taken by the final report 
of the Preparatory Conference which was the same as that proposed by the Brussels 
Treaty Powers, and he had been authorised to agree to that line. He could not defend 
so radical a change as the new proposals represented on such an important question.
Vicomte Obert de Thieusies (Belgium) said that the Brussels Powers had never had 
the intention of laying down a set of rigid proposals which could not be amended. 
His Foreign Minister felt that they were setting up a new organisation which would 
inevitably be imperfect in certain respects and that therefore it would be very dif-
ficult to agree to the power of veto of an amendment by one State out of what might 
possibly become fifteen or twenty States. He would revert later to the question of 
calculating the majority vote. 
M. Schuman (France) supported the United Kingdom amendment, although slight 
modifications might be necessary. The Security Council could wield sanctions and 
therefore the power of veto was provided, whereas in the Assembly, where there 
were no sanctions, the vote was by two-thirds majority; there were no sanctions 
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in the Council of Europe and it therefore followed that the vote on most questions 
should be by two-thirds majority. It was certain that, without violating the basic prin-
ciples, it would be necessary to adjust the text of the Statute in the light of experience, 
otherwise there would be a risk of the Council’s work being paralysed.
M. Stikker (Netherlands) well understood the Swedish difficulty and that some of 
the Delegations might be hesitant and reluctant to go too far. Thought had, however, 
been developing in Europe since the discussions had begun, and by 1952 he agreed that 
minor alterations might well be necessary. He could agree with the United Kingdom 
proposals, but suggested that in order to meet the difficulties of the Scandinavian 
Delegations, provision should be made that certain fundamental Articles, such as, 
for instance, Articles 15 (a) and 22, could not be amended except by unanimous vote. 
Admissions should be settled by three-fourths majority, thus avoiding the veto.
M. Lange (Norway) said he could accept the formula suggested by M. Stikker. He 
could also accept the three-fourths majority for new admissions.
M. Rasmussen (Denmark) said that he had been impressed by the remarks of Mr. 
Bevin, M. Schuman and Vicomte Obert de Thieusies, and that, with M. Lange, he could 
support M. Stikker’s proposals.
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) agreed to accept amendment by unanimous vote for 
Articles 15 (a) and 22, but could not accept three-fourths majority for new admissions.
M. Unden (Sweden) thought M. Stikker’s suggestion would be acceptable to him, 
but before deciding, it was necessary to go very carefully through the Statute to see 
whether any other Articles should be listed as requiring a unanimous vote for amend-
ment, for instance, Article 1.
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) said that it would be very difficult for him to include 
Articles in addition to Articles 15 (a) and 22 in this way. He could not accept that all 
Articles of the Statute should be so treated, or even many of them, and the matter 
must be faced immediately, since the whole establishment of the Council of Europe 
was at stake.
Signor Sforza (Italy) said that he could agree with M. Schuman and Mr. Bevin; the 
agreement of the Statute was an important task before them, but still more important 
was the necessity for avoiding anything which might detract from the tremendous 
moral wave of optimism throughout Europe, which had resulted from the signature 
of the Atlantic pact.
M. Unden (Sweden) asked whether the British proposals meant that Article 1 (d) 
(the exclusion of matters relating to national defence from the scope of the Council of 
Europe) could be amended by two-thirds majority.
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) agreed that unanimity might be required for amend-
ment to Article 1 (d).
M. Schuman (France) said he would like to emphasise with the same gravity as had 
Mr. Bevin that they were building for the future; and although he did not want to see 
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the Statute made too weak, they were at present running the risk of being retrograde. 
He was prepared to accept the suggestion that amendments to Articles 1 (d) and 22 
should be by unanimous decision, but that unanimity was not required for all the 
other questions. The main thing was that the sovereignty of each State should be 
safeguarded; and they would be showing excessive anxiety if they went further than 
that. The phrase “questions under article 15 (a)”included, of course, amendments to 
Article 15 (a), but he suggested that the point might be more clearly drafted.
Mr. MacBride (Irish Republic) agreed with much of what M. Unden had said because 
he had the same difficulties. He felt, however, that it was necessary to give way, es-
pecially on the veto question, in order to reach agreement and to avoid shaking the 
public confidence. If a decision were taken which would make it impossible for any 
country to continue in the organisation, then, of course, that country would have to 
withdraw; but it should be emphasised that the other countries would not allow this 
to happen unless the decision was of fundamental importance, and it would be given 
the most serious thought. He therefore did not think that the danger foreseen by M. 
Unden was so very serious.
It was agreed—
(a) that the Legal and Drafting Committee should prepare a redraft of Article 20 to take 
into account the points made in discussion, basing this on the acceptance by the 
Conference of the principle that there should be some differentiation between those 
Articles which were fundamental and the amendment of which therefore required 
a unanimous vote in the Committee of Ministers, and those others the amendment 
of which could be recommended by two-thirds majority of the Committee;
(b) that decisions on the admission of new members should be taken by two-thirds 
majority;
(c) that as regards the method for determining a majority, the Legal and Drafting 
Committee should prepare a redraft on the lines of the proposal of the Danish, 
Norwegian and Swedish Delegations.
[…]
37. Article 20 as redrafted by the Legal and Drafting Committee 
(see Items 19 and 20 above)
M. Unden (Sweden) thought that the Conference had agreed the previous day to 
include in sub-paragraph (a) (vi) a reference to Articles 15 (a) and 20, thus making an 
unanimous vote necessary for their amendment. He certainly thought this desirable. 
He also emphasised his opinion, referring to Article 20 (a) (i), that real recommenda-
tions under Article 15 (a) should be taken by unanimous vote.
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) referring to Article 20 (a) (i), expressed his regret at 
having put forward on the previous day the proposal that questions under Article 15 
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(a) must be decided by unanimous vote. The United Kingdom Cabinet held the view very 
strongly that it would be entirely wrong for the Statute to contain a clause which would 
enable one Member to prevent a recommendation of the Committee of Ministers going 
forward to Governments, thus preventing Governments from even considering such 
recommendations. This point had played a prominent part in recent United Kingdom 
debates on the subject, and it would not be possible for him to sign the Statute if it could 
not be met. It was necessary to instil the spirit of co-operation into governmental policy 
and to convince Governments that without co-operation the future of Europe would be 
dark. For the same reasons, he could not agree that amendments to Article 15 (a) should 
require an unanimous vote, although he would be prepared to allow this procedure for 
amendments to Article 20 (a). He begged his Swedish colleague not to insist upon his 
point and thus prevent agreement being reached.
Mr. MacBride (Irish Republic) thought that Article 15 could well be redrafted so 
that it would be possible for the Committee of Ministers to present its conclusions 
either in the form of definite Recommendations, which in Article 20 could be shown 
to require unanimous vote, or alternatively as expressions of opinion, which could be 
by two-thirds majority vote.
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) recalled that in the International Labour Office there 
were three forms of expressing the I.L.O.’s opinion : first, there were Conventions 
which were binding; then there were Recommendations, which had considerable 
strength but were not binding; and then there were Resolutions, which were less 
strong. In the Council of Europe, it might be possible to make a similar distinction 
between Recommendations and Resolutions.
M. Schuman (France) pointed out that Article 15 (a) assured the advisory charac-
ter of the Committee of Ministers as did Article 22 for the Assembly; that was the 
indispensable point which should only be amended by unanimity. He could therefore 
agree to the suppression of Article 20 (a) (i), retaining, however, the reference to 
Article 15 (a) in Article 20 (a) (vi). He agreed with Mr. MacBride (Irish Republic.) and 
with Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) that it might be possible to distinguish between 
the various methods by which the Committee of Ministers could present its conclu-
sions, and suggested that one such method might be to use the word “ voeux.” As an 
additional safeguard there was in any case sub-paragraph (a) (vii) in the redrafted 
Article which enabled the Committee of Ministers to decide that a particular question 
should be subject to an unanimous vote.
M. Schuman (France), Signor Sforza (Italy) and Mr. MacBride (Irish Republic) agreed, 
however, that if a distinction were to be made, the Committee of Ministers would tend 
to adopt the easier course of presenting their conclusions by the method which did 
not require an unanimous vote.
M. Rasmussen (Denmark), emphasising that the question under discussion, con-
cerned the rules for the Committee of Ministers and not the Assembly, thought that 
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it would be too rigid to require unanimity in every case laid down in sub-paragraph 
(a) of the redraft. He agreed with the suggestion put forward by M. Schuman (France) 
that it might be possible to delete the reference to Article 15 (a) in Article 20 (a) (i) but 
to maintain it in Article 20 (a) (vi), thus making proposals for amending Article 15 (a) 
subject to unanimous vote.
M. Lange (Norway) reminded the Conference that the Members of the Committee 
of Ministers would be responsible Ministers who would recognise that, if their views 
were to carry real moral weight, they should be expressed unanimously; they should 
be able to trust one another sufficiently to take the small risk involved.
M. Unden (Sweden) thought that it might be possible to reach some compromise 
on the proposals made by Mr. MacBride (Irish Republic) and M. Lange (Norway) or 
to take the expression “voeux” as suggested by M. Schuman (France) for which there 
was, he thought, a League of Nations precedent. He would be prepared to agree to the 
understanding that even those expressions of opinion by the Committee of Ministers 
which would only require a two-thirds majority vote might be forwarded, as such, by 
the Secretary-General to Governments. If the questions requiring unanimous vote, 
or the Articles for the amendment of which an unanimous vote was required, were 
to be whittled away as proposed by Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom) he was forced to ask 
what remained of the principle of unanimity. He could, however, agree that decisions 
on questions under Article 34 (Extraordinary Sessions of the Consultative Assembly) 
need not be unanimous.
It was agreed—
(a) that, subject to (c) below, questions under Articles 19, 21 (a) (i) and (b) and 33 
should require unanimous vote;
(b) that, subject to (c) below, proposals for the amendment of Articles 1 (d), 7, 15, 20 
and 22 should require an unanimous vote;
(c) that the Legal and Drafting Committee should redraft, Article 15 so as to differ-
entiate between the methods by which the Committee of Ministers could present 
its conclusions, inserting in Article 20 (when redrafted to conform to (a) and (b) 
above) the reference to that part of Article 15 which would require unanimous 
vote; and
(d) that the Legal and Drafting Committee should meet for this purpose forthwith.
[…]
Source: cvce.eu
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The establishment of the Council of Europe
Archive movie
This archive film portrays the origins and the early days of the Council of Europe 
in 1949 following the Congress of Europe held in The Hague in May 1948.
Click on the picture to start video
Source: cvce.eu
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Organisation and operation of the Council of Europe 
(5 May 1949)
Graph
Diagram showing the organisation and operation of the Council of Europe 
according to the provisions of the Statute of the Council of Europe of 5 May 1949.
Source: cvce.eu
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European Conventions
By signing the Statute of the Council of Europe on 5th May 1949, ten European 
Governments entered into an association to achieve a precise aim : to bring 
about a greater unity between their countries in order to safeguard and realise 
the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and to facilitate 
their economic and social progress. Since that time, five further countries have 
associated themselves with the pursuit of this aim.
To achieve it, various methods are possible, of which perhaps the most important 
is the conclusion of agreements.
The adoption of agreements through the combined action of the Committee of 
Ministers and of the Consultative Assembly, has been sought by the Council since 
1949. It may indeed be said that in this respect the two organs of the Council have 
acted after the manner of a true legislative body.
Machinery and procedure
The Consultative Assembly is the deliberative organ of the Council. By two-thirds 
majority vote it may adopt Recommendations which the Committee of Ministers may, 
in its turn, approve, reformulate and address to Governments.
At its First Session the Assembly recommended the conclusion of a European 
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
suggested the principles on which such a Convention might be based. The Committee 
of Ministers accepted the idea and decided that the actual text should be drawn up 
by committees of experts and senior officials. Very soon it became apparent however 
that the drafting could only be done in agreement with the Assembly. The text 
was shuttled back and forth between the two organs of the Council much as may 
happen in a bicameral legislature ; in the interval between adoption of the original 
Recommendation by the Assembly and the signature of the Convention the Assembly 
was consulted four times. The Convention was discussed at both the First and Second 
Sessions of the Assembly, and at each of the first six sessions of the Ministers. Finally, 
even after the Convention had been signed, the shuttle service continued and led 
eventually to the signature of the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention.
In the case of other Conventions and Agreements the procedure has been different. 
Sometimes it is the Ministers who have taken the initiative; on other occasions, the 
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Assembly has adopted a Recommendation conceived in general terms and requesting 
the conclusion of a Convention in a particular field and with this or that precise aim. 
If the Committee of Ministers approves the suggestion it convenes a Committee of 
Experts to prepare a draft. This draft then goes back to the Committee, meeting 
either at the level of Foreign Ministers or at deputy level, and is either adopted on 
first reading or sent back to the Experts. Following its adoption it then goes to the 
Consultative Assembly for an Opinion. The text as finally approved by the Ministers 
takes account of any amendments proposed by the Assembly.
Putting the Convention into force
Council of Europe procedure is not more lengthy then that current in national parlia-
ments. Nonetheless, this procedure entails several stages, some of which give the 
impression that one and the same decision is being taken several times over. In fact, 
however, it will be seen that each of these stages is necessary and has a different 
significance.
(a) Assembly Recommendation. The members of the Consultative Assembly are 
completely free and do not speak or act under instructions from their Governments. 
They sit in alphabetical order, not as national delegations. Their sole responsibility is 
towards their own consciences — and, it may be, towards their electors. Since they are 
appointed by their national parliaments or according to a procedure decided by the 
latter it is obvious that in practice Representatives bear also a certain responsibility 
towards the national assemblies of which they are members, but the fact remains that 
the position taken by a member of the Assembly can never be regarded as committing 
his fellow countrymen or even any section of them.
A Recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the European Assembly 
may be regarded as the expression of a wish by European public opinion. The debate 
and the vote may throw light on the various national positions but even if the 
Representatives of all the Government parties from each Member country vote in 
favour of a measure, those Governments are not automatically committed thereby.
(b) Adoption by the Committee of Ministers and Reference to Experts. The recep-
tion given by the Committee of Ministers to an Assembly Recommendation is no 
indication of the position and commitments which the various Governments will 
finally assume. The reservations and objections made by the representative of one 
or another Government when the draft first comes up for examination are not made 
public. Generally the communiqué issued by the Ministers announces merely that 
the principle of the Convention proposed by the Assembly has been approved and 
that a Committee of Experts will be convened to draft the text. To date there is no 
instance of the Ministers purely and simply rejecting the proposal. In the event of an 
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absolute difference of opinion between the two organs the Ministers’ comments and 
objections may for example be transmitted to the Representatives of the Assembly in 
the Joint Committee where an exchange of views allows positions to be clarified and, 
in all probability, agreement to be reached.
(c) Adoption of a draft by Experts. The Experts work behind closed doors and the posi-
tions assumed by the various delegations are not published. In principle the outcome 
of their work is a draft adopted unanimously. In practice it is possible that reservations 
have been made in regard to certain points, various political decisions have yet to be 
taken or that certain delegations maintain their opposition to certain clauses. All the 
public hears is that the text has been adopted, together with a very general indication 
of the more important clauses on which unanimity has been reached. And even at this 
stage there is no final commitment. It should be added however that this description 
of the decision followed has purposely been simplified and very often there will have 
been contacts and exchanges of views between the Experts, the Ministers’ Deputies 
and the appropriate Committees or working parties of the Assembly.
(d) Vote in the Committee of Ministers. After the draft has been prepared by the Ex-
perts and, possibly, amended by the Ministers’ Deputies, it is finally adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers. This vote is not legally binding on Member countries. Rather 
is it a recommendation to Governments that they should sign the text adopted. The 
Statute of the Council provides that any Resolution by the Ministers which entails 
approval of a draft Convention and its submission for signature, must be approved 
by « the unanimous vote of the representatives casting a vote and of a majority of the 
representatives entitled to sit on the Committee ».
(e) Signature by Plenipotentiaries. Council of Europe Conventions, Agreements and 
Protocols must be signed by representatives of the Governments concerned on whom 
appropriate powers have been conferred. These plenipotentiaries are generally the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs themselves and signature takes place on the occasion of 
a session of the Committee of Ministers. The original of the Convention (drawn up in 
French and English, the two official languages of the Council, both texts being equally 
authentic) is signed on behalf of the Governments and then deposited in the Council 
Archives, the Secretary-General sending a certified copy to each signatory Government. 
It may happen that certain Governments decide not to sign a particular text or postpone 
signature for one or another reason. All Conventions are open for signature by all 
Member countries and some of them may be adhered to by non-Members also.
The signature of the Convention does not entail its entry into force. Despite the 
solemnity of the occasion a country is not bound by its representative’s signature 
until ratification has taken place according to constitutional practice.
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(f) Ratification. The constitutional law of the various Member countries of the Council 
lays down the procedure governing the ratification of international Conventions and 
Agreements. As a general rule Governments are required to submit to Parliament 
a ratification bill. In Great Britain however a Treaty is considered adopted if it « 
lies on the table » for three weeks without any objection being raised thereto. As a 
general rule again the instrument of ratification is signed by the Head of the State and 
countersigned by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(g) Deposit of the Instrument of Ratification. From the Council of Europe’s point of view 
it is not ratification that counts so much as deposit of the Instrument of Ratification 
with the Secretary-General. The deposit is attested by a procès-verbal and it is the 
date borne by this document which determines the date of ratification and thus the 
date of the Convention’s entry into force.
The deposit of an Instrument of Ratification is binding on the ratifying country 
but has no practical effect until the Convention comes into force.
(h) Entry into force. In each Convention or Agreement there is a clause specifying 
the number of ratifications necessary before the instrument takes effect. For the 
Convention on Human Rights the deposit of ten instruments of ratification was 
necessary : for the European Convention on Social and Medical assistance, on the 
other hand, two only. Thus the deposit of an instrument of ratification may have one 
of three consequences.
1. The necessary number of ratifications not having been attained, the depositing 
country will be bound only when the Convention takes effect ;
2. The deposit brings the number of ratifications to that required under the Conven-
tion. The Convention enters into effect both for the depositing country and for all 
countries which have previously deposited Instruments of Ratification ;
3.  The Convention having already taken effect, the depositing country is bound im-
mediately.
Thus as regards the Convention on Human Rights the deposit of Instruments of 
Ratification by the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, the German Federal Republic, 
the Saar, Ireland, Greece, Denmark and Iceland had no immediate consequences. When 
however Luxembourg deposited its Instrument of Ratification on 3rd September 1953, 
bringing the number to ten, all these countries became bound by the Convention. 
Turkey, the Netherlands and Belgium, which ratified subsequently, were bound the 
moment they deposited their Instruments.
Certain Conventions prescribe entry into force not on the day when the requisite 
number of deposits has been made but on the first day of the month following.
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(i) Reservations. States which feel they cannot accept, wholly or in part, certain 
clauses of the Convention may make reservations at the moment either of signature 
or of the deposit of their Instruments of Ratification. In some cases reservations are 
expressly sanctioned by the Convention itself. In all cases a country which has entered 
a reservation on a particular clause can insist on the application of this clause by 
another contracting party only to the extent that itself accepts the clause in question.
(j) Optional clauses. Some Conventions contain clauses which require express ac-
ceptance by means of a declaration to that effect. Furthermore, it may be laid down 
that a certain number of acceptances are necessary before an optional clause comes 
into force as regards those contracting parties which accept it. As an example : by 
virtue of the European Convention on Human Rights the European Commission of 
Human Rights cannot be seized of a petition by private persons or non-governmental 
organizations unless and until six signatories have expressly recognized the 
Commission’s competence to receive such petitions.
Source: cvce.eu
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Resolution (74) 33 of the Committee of Ministers on 
the planning and programming 
of the intergovernmental activities 
of the Council of Europe (20 November 1974)
On 20 November 1974, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
resolves to adopt a medium-term plan specifying the sectors and objectives of 
its activities. 
The Committee of Ministers,
1. Having regard to Resolution (74) 4 on the future role of the Council of Europe ;
2. Having regard to the report of the working party of Ministers’ Deputies set up to 
study the implementation of Section I, paragraph e, of Resolution (74) 4 concerning 
the establishment of general criteria for the selection of the various activities in each 
sector of the draft Work Programme and for the attribution of priority degrees to 
each of those activities (Doc. CM (74) 167),
Resolves as follows :
3. The Intergovernmental Work Programme shall be drawn up on the basis of a 
medium-term plan ;
4. The plan shall cover a period of five years and shall be reviewed every two years 
in the light of political developments, progress in European co-operation and 
achievements within the framework of the Council of Europe during the intervening 
period ;
5. The first medium-term plan shall be based on the eight spheres of activity speci-
fied in Section I, paragraph a of Resolution (74) 4, viz. :
• safeguard and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms ;
• social and socio-economic problems, such as those concerning migrant workers ;
• educational and cultural co-operation ;
• youth questions ;
• protection and promotion of public health ;
682 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
• protection of nature and the management of natural resources, the man-made 
environment and regional planning ;
• local authorities, matters relating to regional and municipal co-operation ;
• co-operation in the legal field, including the harmonisation of national legislation 
and practice in specific legal sectors, the prevention of crime and treatment of 
offenders ;
6. Within the medium-term plan, and in accordance with Section I, paragraph b, of 
Resolution (74) 4, precise sectors and objectives shall be defined according to the 
procedure and criteria specified in this resolution ;
7. For the purpose of achieving the objectives specified in the plan, the Committee of 
Ministers shall, at the Secretary General’s proposals, adopt an annual programme of 
activities within a previously determined budgetary ceiling ;
8. With regard to the general criteria governing the choice of sectors and objectives 
within the medium-term plan and the selection of activities from the draft annual 
programmes, the Committee of Ministers adopts the guidelines set forth in the ap-
pendix to this resolution and invites the member states, the Consultative Assembly, 
the Secretary General, the committees set up under Article 17 of the Statute and such 
other bodies as may be concerned, to bear them in mind when formulating proposals 
concerning the Intergovernmental Work Programme ;
9. As regards the attribution of priority degrees within the annual programme of ac-
tivities, the Committee of Ministers considers that one effective means of indicating 
the relative importance and priority of any field, sector, objective or activity lies in 
the apportionment of available resources ;
Decides :
10. to adopt at the 57th Session of the Committee of Ministers in November 1975 a 
medium-term plan for the period 1976-80;
11. to request the opinion of the Consultative Assembly in good time before the adop-
tion of the plan ;
12. to review the activities currently entered in the Work Programme in the light of 
the general criteria set out in the appendix to this resolution and to discontinue those 
that no longer conform to those criteria, in accordance with Section I, paragraph d, of 
Resolution (74) 4 ;
Council of Europe | 683 
D
oc
u
m
en
ts
13. to specify priorities at the level of the medium-term plan by indicating the relative 
scale of resources to be allocated to the different fields and sectors ;
14. to specify degrees of priority at the level of the annual programme of activities by 
giving particulars concerning :
1. the permissible growth rate of the annual budget ;
2. general directives regarding the rate of programme increase or decrease ;
3. the overall indicative apportionment of the budgetary resources available for 
major sectors of activity ;
4. prior establishment of a rate of increase or decrease within each sector of 
activities ;
Instructs the Secretary General :
15. to prepare for submission to the Ministers’ Deputies during the first half of 1975 a 
preliminary draft medium-term plan for the period 1976-80, taking account inter alia 
of the views which the main intergovernmental committees will have the opportunity 
to express for this purpose ;
16. to keep in mind that the preliminary draft medium-term plan does not necessarily 
have to reflect the present administrative structure of the Secretariat or the commit-
tees set up in virtue of Article 17 of the Statute, nor those of the current programmes ;
17. to prepare, in due course, for the Committee of Ministers, an annual programme 
of activities for 1976 for the purpose of achieving the objectives specified in the 
medium-term plan, within a previously determined budgetary ceiling, in accordance 
with paragraph 14 of this resolution ;
18. to submit henceforth a progress report at the same time as the draft annual 
programme of activities and the draft budget. The progress report shall specify all 
relevant information concerning the progress of activities, the results already ob-
tained or expected and the difficulties encountered ;
Invites the governments of member states :
19. to state in writing, in good time before discussion of the draft medium-term plan 
and the draft programme of activities, the order of priority they wish to assign to the 
various proposals contained in those two drafts.
Source: cvce.eu
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Political groups of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe
(1956–2012)
In April 1956 the Assembly recognised political groups for the first time, when 
it formally gave the Bureau and the Secretariat responsibility for taking the 
requisite steps to ensure their normal operation during its sessions. In January 
1964 the Assembly officially acknowledged the existence of political groups in 
Article 41 of its Rules of Procedure.
Official name Acronym
Previous 
name
Original Nname
Date of 
founda-
tion
Date of 
dissolu-
tion
Group of the 
European People’s 
Party
EPP/CD
Christian 
Democrat Group
1956
Socialist Group SOC Socialist Group 1956
Alliance of Liber-
als and Democrats 
for Europe
ALDE
Liberal, 
Democratic 
and Reform-
ers’ Group 
(LDR)
Liberal Group 1956
European Demo-
crat Group
EDG
Group of 
Independent 
Representatives
1958
Group of the Unified 
European Left
UEL
Communist 
Group
1977
Joint Group of 
Democrats
1977 1983
(Representatives 
not belonging to a 
political group of 
the Assembly
(Representatives 
not belonging to 
a political group 
of the Assembly
Table showing the political groups of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
in their historical context.
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European Convention on Human Rights: 
Past, present and future
Two years after his election as Swiss judge and president of the European Court 
of Human Rights, Luzius Wildhaber views the future.
Fifty years after the opening for signature of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and two years after a major reform, the system of protection of human rights 
set up by the Convention enters the new century facing great challenges. Some 800 
million European citizens in over forty states now have the possibility to bring their 
complaints of violations of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention directly 
to the European Court of Human Rights, once they have exhausted their domestic 
remedies. As we celebrate the undoubted achievements of the last fifty years, we 
need to reflect on how those achievements can be preserved and built upon so as to 
be able to withstand new pressures.
Additional responsibilities
The sheer number of cases is one aspect; the last seven years have seen a 500 % 
increase in the applications brought to Strasbourg. At the same time, the Convention 
now applies in many states in which democratic principles have only recently been 
introduced or restored. The sensitivity and complexity of cases coming from some of 
these states places an additional responsibility on the Convention machinery. In this 
context the importance of the Convention’s role in the protection of human rights 
and above all in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law has never been 
greater.
There are three main tests by which the success of Convention system will be 
gauged in the years to come. These are the length of time it takes the European Court 
to deal with cases, the quality of the Court’s judgments and the effectiveness with 
which those judgments are executed. For the Convention system to satisfy these 
tests, it will need to enjoy the full support of the Contracting States.
There are five areas in which states are in a position to help the Court succeed in 
its task. Firstly it remains fundamental to the system that the domestic authorities 
secure the guarantees laid down in the Convention themselves, that states ensure 
not only that their legislation is in conformity with the Convention, but also that indi-
vidual citizens are in a position to assert their Convention rights before the national 
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authorities. Secondly, the member states of the Council of Europe must be prepared 
to provide the Strasbourg Court with adequate resources for it to be able to cope with 
its growing caseload. Thirdly, states must continue to allow the Court to operate in 
full independence and to propose candidates of the highest calibre for election to the 
Court. Fourthly, Contracting States must take the necessary steps in good faith to 
execute the judgments delivered by the Court. Fifthly and finally, the states must be 
prepared, if it becomes necessary, to engage in further, possibly radical, reform of the 
Convention.
Lasting legacy
Fifty years ago neither the drafters of the Convention nor the original signatories can 
have imagined the place that the Convention would come to hold not only in Europe, 
but beyond. It remains by far the most successful manifestation of the aspirations 
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a lasting legacy from the 
generation that had experienced the horrors of the thirties and forties and of their 
determination that future generations would not undergo the same suffering. We 
owe it to those who went before and those who are to come to preserve that heritage 
as an effective and credible system of human rights protection.
Source: cvce.eu
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Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe
The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe is a 
pan-European political assembly, the 636 members of which hold elective office 
(they may be regional or municipal councillors, mayors or presidents of regional 
authorities) representing over 200,000 authorities in 47 European states.
Its role is to promote local and regional democracy, improve local and regional 
governance and strengthen authorities’ self-government. It pays particular attention 
to application of the principles laid down in the European Charter of Local Self-
Government. It encourages the devolution and regionalisation processes, as well as 
transfrontier co-operation between cities and regions. 
On the ground, the Congress gauges the situation of local democracy. The Con-
gress conducts regular monitoring visits to all member states to appraise their 
implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. After these visits 
the Congress sets out conclusions in its monitoring reports and adopts recommenda-
tions which the governments are required to follow, as well as resolutions with a 
view to improving the governance of local and regional authorities. 
The Congress periodically observes local and regional elections in the Council 
of Europe’s 47 member states. Its observation duties extend to the whole election 
process and go hand in hand with its monitoring of the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government. 
Since it was set up, the Congress has drawn up a number of international treaties, 
including the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which has become the 
international benchmark in this field, laying down common European standards to 
protect local authorities’ rights.
The Congress plays an active part in projects to strengthen local democracy 
and transfrontier co-operation in Europe and encourages the setting up of national 
associations of local and regional authorities, Local Democracy Agencies and the new 
kind of Euroregion.
Source: coe.int
690 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
Resolution (6l) 20 of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe (13 September 1961) 1
Charter of the European Conference of Local Authorities
Recommendation 262
The Committee of Ministers,
Having regard to Recommendation 262 of the Consultative Assembly on the Char-
ter of the European Conference of Local Authorities;
Having regard to Resolution (57) 28;
Paying tribute to the results achieved by the ad hoc European Conferences of Lo-
cal Authorities held so far;
Whereas local government authorities can make a substantial contribution 
towards achieving the aims of the Council of Europe, as laid down in Article 1 of its 
Statute,
Resolves:
1. to set up the European Conference of Local Authorities on a biennial basis within 
the scope of Article 17 of the Statute of the Council of Europe;
2. to adopt the Charter of the European Conference of Local Authorities appended to 
this Resolution.
Appendix
Charter of the European Conference of Local Authorities
Article 1
Establishment, objectives and powers of the Conference
(a) Within the scope of Article 17 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, there is 
hereby established a European Conference of Local Authorities (hereinafter referred 
to as “the Conference”).
The Conference shall ensure the participation of local authorities in the achieve-
ment of the aims of the Council of Europe as defined in Article 1 of the Statute of the 
Council.
The primary aim of the Conference shall be to inform the Committee of Ministers 
and the Consultative Assembly of its views on measures which are likely to have 
repercussions on local authorities or to involve the responsibility of local authorities 
towards the population and towards the Governments.
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It shall also keep the local authorities informed about the progress of European 
integration and seek their support for the ideal of European unity.
(b) The Conference may discuss any matters within its competence, as defined in the 
preceding subparagraphs, and any other matters referred to it for an opinion by the 
Committee of Ministers or the Consultative Assembly.
It may adopt resolutions and draw up opinions on ail matters mentioned in the 
preceding sub-paragraphs. Such resolutions and opinions shall be submitted to the 
Consultative Assembly for an opinion and to the Committee of Ministers for action.
(c) Resolutions and opinions of the Conference shall be adopted by a two-thirds ma-
jority of the votes cast representing at least a majority of its members.
Article 2
Membership
(a) The delegates to the Conference shall be chosen by each member Government or in 
such manner as the Government may decide from among representatives of national 
associations of local authorities and they may include representatives of national 
branches, or representatives of international associations of local authorities holding 
consultative status with the Council of Europe.
(b) Each country shall have the right to appoint to the Conference a number of 
delegates equal to the number of representatives it appoints to the Consultative As-
sembly.
(c) Each country may appoint a number of substitute delegates equal to the number 
of full delegates.
(d) Full delegates and substitutes shall be appointed for the period of one session of 
the Conference and remain in that capacity until the opening of the following session.
(e) Where delegates are not appointed by the Government but by organisations em-
powered to do so in a manner prescribed by the Government, the seats assigned to a 
particular country may, in the event of difficulty arising among the organisations of 
that country, be allocated by the Conference, unless that
country’s Government itself decides as to the allocation of seats.
(f) Lists of delegates appointed to the Conference shall be sent to the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe at least one month before the opening date of each 
session.
692 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
(g) The international associations of local authorities holding consultative status 
with the Council of Europe shall be entitled to appoint observers to attend the debates 
of the Conference; with the leave of the Conference, they may speak in the course of 
such debates.
(h) The Standing Committee may authorise other organisations, that so request, to 
send observers, without the right to vote, to meetings of the Conference. The rights 
and privileges of such observers shall be laid down by the Standing Committee.
Article 3
Sessions
(a) The Conference shall meet in ordinary session every second year. The proposals 
of the Standing Committee of the Conference regarding the dates and draft Agenda of 
sessions shall be submitted to the Committee of Ministers through the Consultative 
Assembly at latest two months before the opening of the Conference.
(b) Sessions of the Conference shall be held at the headquarters of the Council of 
Europe, unless both the Standing Committee and the Committee of Ministers agree 
that the session shall be held elsewhere.
Article 4
Committees
(a) At the beginning of each session, the Conference shall appoint the following Com-
mittees:
1. General Committee,
2. Economic and Social Committee,
3. Committee on Local Finance,
4. Cultural Committee,
5. Housing and Town and Country Planning Committee.
In addition, the Conference may appoint ad hoc Committees for specific purposes. 
The mandate of ad hoc Committees shall terminate after the discussion of their Re-
ports by the Conference.
(b) The Committees shall examine all matters referred to them by the Conference or 
by the Standing Committee.
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Article 5
Standing Committee
(a) The Standing Committee shall be responsible for assuring the continuity of ac-
tion of the Conference. For this purpose, it may act on behalf of the Conference when 
necessary.
(b) The Standing Committee shall consist of the President-in-office, the seven Vice-
Presidents of the Conference, the Chairmen of the Committees and such other mem-
bers as shall be elected by the Conference, one per country, in order to ensure that 
each member State is represented.
Article 6
Finance
The expenditure entailed by sessions of the Conference and meetings of its organs, as 
well as any other expenditure connected with the activities of the Conference, shall 
be borne by the Budget of the Council of Europe.
Such of the items of expenditure as can be clearly specified shall be entered in a 
special section of the Budget.
Article 7
Secretariat of the Conference
Within the limits of the appropriations made for the Conference, the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe shall provide such secretarial and other assistance 
as may be required by the Conference and its organs.
Article 8
Rules of Procedure of the Conference and Revision of the Charter
(a) The Conference shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure.
(b) Without prejudice to the respective rights of the Committee of Ministers and the 
Consultative Assembly, the Conference may submit proposals to amend the Charter 
to the Consultative Assembly for an opinion and to the Committee of Ministers for 
decision.
The conditions in which such amendments may be proposed to the Conference 
shall be laid down in its Rules of Procedure.
Source: cvce.eu
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Resolution (15) 4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe amending the Charter of the European Conference of Local 
Authorities (19 February 1975)
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 February 1975 
of the 242nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies)
The Committee of Ministers,
Having regard to Resolution (61) 20 by which it set up the European Conference of 
Local Authorities within the scope of the provisions of Article 17 of the Statute of the 
Council of Europe;
Noting that the European Conference of Local Authorities represents the local 
and regional authorities of the member states of the Council of Europe within the 
organisation;
Considering that in the light of experience and following the adoption of Resolution 
(74) 4 certain amendments should be made to the Charter with a view to strengthen-
ing the role of the conference within the Council of Europe;
Having considered Resolutions 74 (1972) and 76 (1974) and Opinion No. 18 of the 
conference as well as Recommendations 694 (1973) and 755 (1975) of (1974) of the 
Consultative Assembly,
Decides :
I. to amend the Charter of the conference as follows :
1. Ad Article 1, paragraph a
sub-paragraph 1
To replace the words “a European Conference of Local Authorities” by the words “a 
Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe”.
sub-paragraph 2
To word this sub-paragraph as follows :
“The conference shall ensure the participation of local and regional authorities in the 
achievement of the aims of the Council of Europe as defined in Article 1 of the Statute 
of the Council. It represents the local and regional authorities of the member states 
within the organisation.”
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new sub-paragraph 5
To insert a new sub-paragraph 5 to read :
“The conference contributes, within the limits of its functions and in the manner 
determined by the Committee of Ministers, to establishing closer relations between 
the Council of Europe and the European Communities.”
2. Ad Article 2, paragraph a
To insert, following the existing sub-paragraph, two new sub-paragraphs to read :
“The delegates to the conference shall be chosen in such a way that the delegations 
consist of representatives of the various types of local or regional government units 
in each member state ; the delegates to the conference shall be designated from 
among holders of an electoral mandate or a mandate as a person responsible either 
to an elected assembly or to a representative association of local authorities. The 
membership of the national delegations should, as far as possible, assure for each 
member state a balanced geographical distribution.”
new paragraph g
(The former paragraphs g and h become respectively paragraphs h and i.)
“The rules governing the choice of delegates to the conference, the period of their 
mandate and the procedure for their nomination shall apply equally to substitutes,”
paragraph i
To insert a second sub-paragraph to read :
“The rights and privileges granted to this category of observer may not exceed those 
granted to the observers referred to in the above paragraph h.”
3. Ad Article 3, paragraph a
To read the first sentence of paragraph a as follows :
“The conference shall meet in ordinary session every year.”
4. Ad Article 4, paragraph a, first sub-paragraph
To read this sub-paragraph as follows :
“At the beginning of each session, the conference shall appoint a Standing Committee 
and the following four specialised committees :
- Committee on Regional Planning and Regional Problems;
- Committee on Local Structures and Finances;
- Environment and Town Planning Committee;
- Cultural Committee.”
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Ad Article 4
To insert a new paragraph c to read :
“The committees shall consist, as a general rule, of one delegate and one substitute 
for each member state.”
5. Ad Article 5, paragraph b
To read this provision as follows :
“The Standing Committee shall consist of the President in office, the three Vice-
Presidents of the conference, the Chairmen of the four committees, a Vice-Chairman 
of each of the four committees and ten other members elected by the conference in 
order to ensure that each member state is represented on the Standing Committee.”
new Article 5 bis
To insert a new Article 5 bis to read : 
“Bureau
a. The Bureau of the conference shall consist of the President and the three Vice-
Presidents ;
b. It shall establish the programmes and timetables of committee meetings after 
consultation with the Chairmen of the committees concerned.”
II. to arrange to be represented by its Chairman or another representative at all 
the proceedings of the conference in plenary session.
Source: cvce.eu
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The Community
The Founding Fathers of the EU
The following visionary leaders inspired the creation of the European Union we live 
in today. Without their energy and motivation we would not be living in the sphere of 
peace and stability that we take for granted. From resistance fighters to lawyers, the 
founding fathers were a diverse group of people who held the same ideals: a peaceful, 
united and prosperous Europe. Beyond the founding fathers described below, many 
others have worked tirelessly towards and inspired the European project. This 
section on the founding fathers is therefore a work in progress.
Konrad Adenauer: 
a pragmatic democrat and tireless unifier
The first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
who stood at the head of the newly-formed state from 
1949-63, changed the face of post-war German and Eu-
ropean history more than any other individual.
A cornerstone of Adenauer’s foreign policy was rec-
onciliation with France. Together with French President 
Charles de Gaulle a historic turning point was achieved: 
in 1963 the one-time arch-enemies Germany and France 
signed a treaty of friendship, which became one of the 
milestones on the road to European integration.
Click for more about Konrad Adenauer
Joseph Bech: how a small country can play a crucial 
role in European integration
Joseph Bech was the Luxembourgish politician that 
helped set up the European Coal and Steel Community in 
the early 1950s and a leading architect behind European 
integration in the later 1950s.
It was a joint memorandum from the Benelux coun-
tries that led to the convening of the Messina Conference 
in June 1955, paving the way for the European Economic 
Community.
Click for more about Joseph Bech
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Johan Willem Beyen: a plan for a common market
The international banker, businessman and politician 
Johan Willem Beyen was a Dutch politician who, with 
his ‘Beyen Plan’, breathed new life into the process of 
European integration in the mid-1950s.
Beyen is one of the lesser-known members of the 
group of Founding Fathers of the EU. Amongst the people 
who knew him he was admired for his charm, interna-
tional orientation and social ease.
Click for more about Johan Willem Beyen
Winston Churchill: calling for a United States of Europe
Winston Churchill, a former army officer, war reporter 
and British Prime Minister (1940-45 and 1951-55), was 
one of the first to call for the creation of a ‘United States 
of Europe’. Following the Second World War, he was con-
vinced that only a united Europe could guarantee peace. 
His aim was to eliminate the European ills of national-
ism and war-mongering once and for all.
Click for more about Winston Churchill
Alcide De Gasperi: an inspired mediator for democ-
racy and freedom in Europe
From 1945 to 1953, in his roles as Italian Prime Minister 
and Foreign Affairs Minister, Alcide De Gasperi forged 
the path of the country’s destiny in the post-war years.
Time and time again he promoted initiatives aimed at 
the fusion of Western Europe, working on the realisation 
of the Marshall Plan and creating close economic ties 
with other European countries, in particular France.
Click for more about Alcide De Gasperi
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Walter Hallstein: a diplomatic force propelling swift 
European integration
Walter Hallstein was the first President of the European 
Commission from 1958 to 1967, a committed European 
and a decisive proponent of European integration.
As President of the European Commission, Hallstein 
worked towards a rapid realisation of the Common 
Market. His energetic enthusiasm and powers of persua-
sion furthered the cause of integration even beyond 
the period of his presidency. During his mandate, the 
integration advanced significantly.
Click for more about Walter Hallstein
Sicco Mansholt: 
farmer, resistance fighter and a true European
Sicco Mansholt was a farmer, a member of the Dutch 
resistance during the Second World War, a national poli-
tician and the first European Commissioner responsible 
for Agriculture. Mansholt’s ideas laid the basis for the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union, one 
of the most prominent policies since its founding days.
Having witnessed the horrors of the Dutch famine at the 
end of the Second World War, Mansholt was convinced that 
Europe needed to become self-sufficient and that a stable 
supply of affordable food should be guaranteed for all.
Click for more about Sicco Mansholt
Jean Monnet: the unifying force behind the birth of 
the European Union
The French political and economic adviser Jean Monnet 
dedicated himself to the cause of European integration. 
He was the inspiration behind the ‘Schuman Plan’, which 
foresaw the merger of west European heavy industry.
Monnet was from the Cognac region of France. 
When he left school at 16 he travelled internationally 
as a cognac dealer, later also as a banker. During both 
world wars he held high-level positions relating to the 
coordination of industrial production in France and the 
United Kingdom.
Click for more about Jean Monnet
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Robert Schuman: the architect of the European inte-
gration project
The statesman Robert Schuman, a qualified lawyer and 
French foreign minister between 1948 and 1952, is re-
garded as one of the founding fathers of European unity.
In cooperation with Jean Monnet he drew up the interna-
tionally renowned Schuman Plan, which he published on 9 
May 1950, the date now regarded as the birth of the European 
Union. He proposed joint control of coal and steel production, 
the most important materials for the armaments industry. 
The basic idea was that whoever did not have control over 
coal and steel production would not be able to fight a war.
Click for more about Robert Schuman
Paul-Henri Spaak: a European visionary and tal-
ented persuader
‘A European statesman’ – Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak’s 
long political career fully merits this title.
Spaak was a leading figure in formulating the content 
of the Treaty of Rome. At the ‘Messina Conference’ in 
1955, the six participating governments appointed him 
president of the working committee that prepared the 
Treaty.
Click for more about Paul-Henri Spaak
Altiero Spinelli: an unrelenting federalist
The Italian politician Altiero Spinelli was one of the 
fathers of the European Union. He was the leading figure 
behind the European Parliament’s proposal for a Treaty 
on a federal European Union - the so-called ‘Spinelli 
Plan’. This was adopted in 1984 by an overwhelming 
majority in the Parliament and provided an important 
inspiration for the strengthening of the EU Treaties in 
the 1980s and ‘90s.
Click for more about Altiero Spinelli
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History of the Community
1945 - 1959
A peaceful Europe – the beginnings of cooperation
The European Union is set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars 
between neighbours, which culminated in the Second World War. As of 1950, the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community begins to unite European countries economically 
and politically in order to secure lasting peace. The six founders are Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The 1950s are dominated by a cold 
war between east and west. Protests in Hungary against the Communist regime are 
put down by Soviet tanks in 1956; while the following year, 1957, the Soviet Union 
takes the lead in the space race, when it launches the first man-made space satellite, 
Sputnik 1. Also in 1957, the Treaty of Rome creates the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), or ‘Common Market’.
Read more about the decade 1945–1959
1960 - 1969
The ‘Swinging Sixties’ – a period of economic growth
The 1960s sees the emergence of ‘youth culture’, with groups such as The Beatles 
attracting huge crowds of teenage fans wherever they appear, helping to stimulate 
a cultural revolution and widening the generation gap. It is a good period for the 
economy, helped by the fact that EU countries stop charging custom duties when 
they trade with each other. They also agree joint control over food production, so 
that everybody now has enough to eat - and soon there is even surplus agricultural 
produce. May 1968 becomes famous for student riots in Paris, and many changes in 
society and behaviour become associated with the so-called ‘68 generation’.
Read more about the decade 1960–1969
1970 - 1979
A growing Community – the first Enlargement
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom join the European Union on 1 January 
1973, raising the number of member states to nine. The short, yet brutal, Arab-Israeli 
war of October 1973 result in an energy crisis and economic problems in Europe. The 
last right-wing dictatorships in Europe come to an end with the overthrow of the 
Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974 and the death of General Franco of Spain in 1975. 
The EU regional policy starts to transfer huge sums to create jobs and infrastructure 
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in poorer areas. The European Parliament increases its influence in EU affairs and in 
1979 all citizens can, for the first time, elect their members directly.
Read more about the decade 1970–1979
1980 - 1989
The changing face of Europe - the fall of the Berlin Wall
The Polish trade union, Solidarność, and its leader Lech Walesa, become household 
names across Europe and the world following the Gdansk shipyard strikes in the 
summer of 1980. In 1981, Greece becomes the 10th member of the EU and Spain and 
Portugal follow five years later. In 1986 the Single European Act is signed. This is a 
treaty which provides the basis for a vast six-year programme aimed at sorting out 
the problems with the free-flow of trade across EU borders and thus creates the ‘Sin-
gle Market’. There is major political upheaval when, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin 
Wall is pulled down and the border between East and West Germany is opened for the 
first time in 28 years, this leads to the reunification of Germany when both East and 
West Germany are united in October 1990.
Read more about the decade 1980–1989
1990 - 1999
A Europe without frontiers
With the collapse of communism across central and eastern Europe, Europeans become 
closer neighbours. In 1993 the Single Market is completed with the the ‘four freedoms’ 
of: movement of goods, services, people and money. The 1990s is also the decade of 
two treaties, the ‘Maastricht’ Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1999. People are concerned about how to protect the environment and 
also how Europeans can act together when it comes to security and defence matters. 
In 1995 the EU gains three more new members, Austria, Finland and Sweden. A small 
village in Luxembourg gives its name to the ‘Schengen’ agreements that gradually al-
low people to travel without having their passports checked at the borders. Millions of 
young people study in other countries with EU support. Communication is made easier 
as more and more people start using mobile phones and the internet.
Read more about the decade 1990–1999
2000 – 2009
Further expansion
The euro is the new currency for many Europeans. 11 September 2001 becomes syn-
onymous with the ‘War on Terror’ after hijacked airliners are flown into buildings in 
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New York and Washington. EU countries begin to work much more closely together to 
fight crime. The political divisions between east and west Europe are finally declared 
healed when no fewer than 10 new countries join the EU in 2004, followed by two 
more in 2007. A financial crisis hits the global economy in September 2008, leading to 
closer economic cooperation between EU countries. The Treaty of Lisbon is ratified 
by all EU countries before entering into force on 1 December 2009. It provides the EU 
with modern institutions and more efficient working methods.
Read more about the decade 2000–2009
2010 – today
A decade of opportunities and challenges
The new decade starts with a severe economic crisis, but also with the hope that 
investments in new green and climate-friendly technologies and closer European 
cooperation will bring lasting growth and welfare.
Read more about the decade 2010–today
Source: europa.eu
706 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950
The Schuman Declaration was presented by French foreign minister Robert 
Schuman on 9 May 1950. It proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel 
Community, whose members would pool coal and steel production.
The ECSC (founding members: France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg) was the first of a series of supranational European 
institutions that would ultimately become today’s „European Union”.
World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts propor-
tionate to the dangers which threaten it.
The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is 
indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more 
than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her 
essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built 
through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming 
together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition 
of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two 
countries.
With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken im-
mediately on one limited but decisive point.
It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed 
under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open 
to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel 
production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations 
for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change 
the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of 
munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war 
between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially im-
possible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing 
to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic 
elements of industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for 
their economic unification.
This production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or 
exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting 
peaceful achievements. With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the 
achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African con-
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tinent. In this way, there will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest 
which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be 
the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries 
long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.
By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose deci-
sions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead 
to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispen-
sable to the preservation of peace.
To promote the realization of the objectives defined, the French Government is 
ready to open negotiations on the following bases.
The task with which this common High Authority will be charged will be that of 
securing in the shortest possible time the modernization of production and the im-
provement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on identical terms to the French 
and German markets, as well as to the markets of other member countries; the devel-
opment in common of exports to other countries; the equalization and improvement 
of the living conditions of workers in these industries.
To achieve these objectives, starting from the very different conditions in which 
the production of member countries is at present situated, it is proposed that certain 
transitional measures should be instituted, such as the application of a production 
and investment plan, the establishment of compensating machinery for equating 
prices, and the creation of a restructuring fund to facilitate the rationalization of 
production. The movement of coal and steel between member countries will immedi-
ately be freed from all customs duty, and will not be affected by differential transport 
rates. Conditions will gradually be created which will spontaneously provide for the 
more rational distribution of production at the highest level of productivity.
In contrast to international cartels, which tend to impose restrictive practices on 
distribution and the exploitation of national markets, and to maintain high profits, 
the organization will ensure the fusion of markets and the expansion of production.
The essential principles and undertakings defined above will be the subject of a 
treaty signed between the States and submitted for the ratification of their parlia-
ments. The negotiations required to settle details of applications will be undertaken 
with the help of an arbitrator appointed by common agreement. He will be entrusted 
with the task of seeing that the agreements reached conform with the principles laid 
down, and, in the event of a deadlock, he will decide what solution is to be adopted.
The common High Authority entrusted with the management of the scheme will 
be composed of independent persons appointed by the governments, giving equal 
representation. A chairman will be chosen by common agreement between the 
governments. The Authority’s decisions will be enforceable in France, Germany and 
other member countries. Appropriate measures will be provided for means of appeal 
against the decisions of the Authority.
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A representative of the United Nations will be accredited to the Authority, and 
will be instructed to make a public report to the United Nations twice yearly, giv-
ing an account of the working of the new organization, particularly as concerns the 
safeguarding of its objectives.
The institution of the High Authority will in no way prejudge the methods of own-
ership of enterprises. In the exercise of its functions, the common High Authority will 
take into account the powers conferred upon the International Ruhr Authority and 
the obligations of all kinds imposed upon Germany, so long as these remain in force.
Source: europa.eu
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Paul-Henri Spaak elected President 
of the Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community
Le Monde (12 September 1952)
On 12 September 1952, the French daily newspaper Le Monde comments on the 
appointment of Paul-Henri Spaak as President of the Common Assembly of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in Strasbourg.
Strasbourg, 11 September — The first session of the Common Assembly of the 
European Coal and Steel Community opened yesterday evening, Wednesday, at 
the headquarters of the Council of Europe, with an address by the oldest member, 
Boggiano Pico. The rest of the evening was devoted to procedural matters.
It was only at 10 o’clock this Thursday morning that the Assembly got down to the 
business of electing a President. Fierce competition for the post had been announced 
yesterday. But, contrary to expectations, the Belgian Socialist leader, Paul-Henri 
Spaak, won on the first ballot, polling 38 votes against 30 for Heinrich von Brentano, 
leader of the West German Christian Democratic group.
Yesterday evening, the new President had declared he was not a candidate, 
explaining to us personally that he would accept the presidency only as a means of 
resolving a deadlock.
In the end, Mr de Menthon, whose name had also been mentioned, did not stand. 
He is already President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. Mr Spaak said yes-
terday that it was not a good idea for the same man to chair both bodies, and many 
people agreed with him. Mr Monnet, who is eager to preserve the independence and 
autonomy of the new Assembly, was himself probably not in favour of a dual mandate.
Mr von Brentano was supported by Italy and several other delegations keen to 
counterbalance French influence, which is very strong owing to the presence of 
Mr Monnet as President of the High Authority. But Mr von Brentano was decisively 
defeated.
The considerable public interest in the election of the President of the Assembly is 
very understandable.
The first meeting of the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community is more 
than just the third decisive step in the Schuman Plan, following the establishment of 
the High Authority and the recent meeting of the Council of Ministers of the pool in 
Luxembourg. It is also a red-letter day in European politics, since the Assembly is the 
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first European parliament responsible for directly and democratically controlling a 
supranational power. As the six foreign Ministers have given it the task of drawing 
up a plan for a European political authority by 10 March 1953, it will act as a kind of 
European constituent assembly.
In these circumstances, it is easy to understand the highly-charged atmosphere in 
the corridors of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, especially among the Members 
of the Consultative Assembly. Speaking only yesterday, Paul Reynaud again said the 
Consultative Assembly was now nothing more than a talkingshop doomed to gradual 
disappearance. All Members’ eyes are turned to the new Assembly, which seems 
destined to play the truly European role that should have fallen to the Council of 
Europe.
All the delegates of the six ECSC countries, as well as European federalists from 
the fifteen member nations of the Council of Europe, are eager to play a part in the 
new Assembly.
Source: cvce.eu
The European Community | 711 
D
oc
u
m
en
ts
Jean Monnet appointed as President of the High Authority
The High Authority was at the core of the idea of the ECSC. It was to be an independ-
ent, supranational executive checked by a Common Assembly. There were concerns 
about this power, leading to a Council (of governments) and Parliament (of MPs) to 
be created to act as a counterweight. The inaugural sitting of the Authority was held 
in Luxembourg’s city hall on 10 August 1952. Jean Monnet, the architect of the ECSC, 
was elected as its first President.
The supranational power exercised by the Authority did prompt suspicion by some, 
for example the government of France who ensured that in the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) more power 
would be in the hands of the Council. In 1967 the Merger Treaty came into force, which 
combined the independent institutions of the ECSC and Euratom with those of the 
EEC. From then on, the High Authority ceased to exist and its duties were taken on by 
the Commission of the European Communities. The administration of Rinaldo Del Bo 
ended before the merger so an interim President was appointed to oversee the merger, 
Albert Coppé. The Authority met for the last time on the 28 June 1967. The Authority’s 
principle innovation was its supranational character. It had a broad area of competence 
to ensure the objectives of the treaty were met and that the common market functioned 
smoothly. The High Authority could issue three types of legal instruments: Decisions, 
which were entirely binding laws; Recommendations, which had binding aims but the 
methods were left to member states; and Opinions, which had no legal force.
President
The President was elected by the other appointed members, rather than directly by 
member states (as is the case of the current Commission President). The first presi-
dent was Jean Monnet.
President State Took office Left office
Jean Monnet France 10 August 1953 3 June 1955
René Mayer France 3 June 1955 13 January 1958
Paul Finet Belgium 13 January 1958 15 September 1959
Piero Malvestiti Italy 15 September 1959 22 October 1963
Rinaldo Del Bo Italy 22 October 1963 6 July 1967
Albert Coppé Belgium interim
Source: wikipedia.org
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Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
EEC Treaty
The EEC Treaty, signed in Rome in 1957, brings together France, Germany, Italy 
and the Benelux countries in a community whose aim is to achieve integration 
via trade with a view to economic expansion. After the Treaty of Maastricht 
the EEC became the European Community, reflecting the determination of the 
Member States to expand the Community’s powers to non-economic domains.
CREATION
The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in July 1952 
was the first step towards a supranational Europe. For the first time the six Member 
States of this organisation relinquished part of their sovereignty, albeit in a limited 
domain, in favour of the Community.
This first drive towards integration soon came to a halt with the failure of the 
European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954.
Although there was reason to fear that the effort undertaken by the ECSC was 
doomed to fail, the Messina Conference of June 1955 endeavoured to add a new impe-
tus to European construction. It was followed by a series of meetings of ministers or 
experts. A preparatory committee responsible for drafting a report on the creation of 
a European common market was created at the beginning of 1956. It met in Brussels 
under the Presidency of P.H. Spaak, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 
time. In April 1956 this Committee submitted two drafts, which corresponded to the 
two options selected by the Member States:
• the creation of a general common market;
• the creation of an atomic energy community.
It was in Rome that the famous „Treaties of Rome” were signed in March 1957.
The first Treaty established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
second the European Atomic Energy Community, better known as Euratom.
Since ratification at national level did not pose any problems, these two Treaties 
entered into force on 1 January 1958.
OBJECTIVES
After the failure of the EDC, the economy, which was less subject to national resistance 
than other areas, became the focus of consensus in the field of supranational 
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cooperation. The establishment of the EEC and the creation of the Common 
Market had two objectives. The first was to transform the conditions of trade and 
manufacture on the territory of the Community. The second, more political, saw the 
EEC as a contribution towards the functional construction of a political Europe and 
constituted a step towards the closer unification of Europe.
In the preamble, the signatories of the Treaty declare that:
„- determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe,
resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by 
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,
affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvements 
of the living and working conditions of their peoples,
- recognising that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action 
in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition;
- anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their 
harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the 
various regions and the backwardness of the less-favoured regions;
- desiring to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
- intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas 
countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace 
and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal 
to join in their efforts...”.
These intentions were fleshed out by creating a common market and a customs 
union and by developing common policies.
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TREATY
The EEC Treaty provided for the establishment of a common market, a customs union 
and common policies. Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty directly address these three 
issues. They state that the Community’s primary mission is to create a common 
market and specify the measures that it must undertake to achieve this objective.
The establishment of a common market
Article 2 of the EEC Treaty specifies that „The Community shall have as its task, by 
establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies 
of member states, to promote throughout the community a harmonious development 
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of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, 
an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the 
states belonging to it”.
This common market is founded on the famous „four freedoms”, namely the free 
movement of persons, services, goods and capital. It creates a single economic area 
establishing free competition between undertakings. It lays the basis for approxi-
mating the conditions governing trade in products and services over and above those 
already covered by the other treaties (ECSC and Euratom).
Article 8 of the EEC Treaty states that the Common Market will be progressively 
established during a transitional period of 12 years, divided into three stages of four 
years each. To each stage there is assigned a set of actions to be initiated and carried 
through concurrently. Subject to the exceptions and procedures provided for in the 
Treaty, the expiry of the transitional period constitutes the latest date by which all 
the rules laid down must enter into force.
The market being based on the principle of free competition, the Treaty prohibits 
restrictive agreements and state aids (except for the derogations provided for in the 
Treaty) which can affect trade between Member States and whose objective is to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition.
Finally, the overseas countries and territories are associated with the Common 
Market and the customs union with a view to fostering trade and promoting jointly 
economic and social development.
The establishment of a customs union
The EEC Treaty abolishes quotas and customs duties between the Member States. It 
establishes a common external tariff, a sort of external frontier for Member States’ 
products, replacing the preceding tariffs of the different states. This customs union is 
accompanied by a common trade policy. This policy, managed at Community level and 
no longer at state level, totally dissociates the customs union from a mere free-trade 
association.
The effects of dismantling customs barriers and eliminating quantitative restric-
tions to trade during the transitional period were very positive, allowing intra-
Community trade and trade between the EEC and third countries to develop rapidly.
The development of common policies
Certain policies are formally enshrined in the Treaty, such as the common agricultural 
policy (Articles 38 to 47), common trade policy (Articles 110 to 116) and transport 
policy (Articles 74 to 84).
Others may be launched depending on needs, as specified in Article 235, which 
stipulates that: „If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Commu-
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nity and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, 
take the appropriate measures.”
After the Paris Summit of October 1972, recourse to this Article enabled the Com-
munity to develop actions in the field of environmental, regional, social and industrial 
policy.
The development of these policies was accompanied by the creation of a European 
Social Fund whose aim is to improve job opportunities for workers and to raise their 
standard of living as well as to establish a European Investment Bank in order to 
facilitate the Community’s economic expansion by creating new resources.
STRUCTURE
• The EEC Treaty consists of 240 articles in six separate parts, preceded by a 
preamble.
• the first part is devoted to the principles which underline the establishment of the 
EC via the common market, the customs union and the common policies;
• the second part concerns the foundations of the Community. It comprises four 
titles devoted respectively to the free movement of goods; agriculture; the free 
movement of persons, services and capital; and finally transport;
• the third part concerns Community policy and includes four titles relating to 
common rules, economic policy, social policy and the European Investment Bank;
• the fourth part is devoted to the association of overseas countries and territories;
• the fifth part is devoted to the Community institutions, with one title on the 
institutional provisions and another on the financial provisions;
• the final part of the Treaty concerns general and final provisions.
The Treaty also includes four annexes relating to certain tariff positions, agricul-
tural products, invisible transactions and overseas countries and territories.
A total of twelve protocols were annexed to the Treaty. The first concerns the 
status of the European Investment Bank and the following concern various problems 
linked to specific countries (Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands) or to a product such as mineral oil, bananas, green coffee.
Finally, nine declarations were annexed to the final Act.
INSTITUTIONS
The EEC Treaty establishes institutions and decision-making mechanisms which 
make it possible to express both national interests and a Community vision. The 
institutional balance is based on a triangle consisting of the Council, the Commission 
and the European Parliament, all three of which are called upon to work together. 
The Council prepares the standards, the Commission drafts the proposals and the 
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Parliament plays an advisory role. Another body is also involved in the decision-
making procedure in an advisory capacity, namely the Economic and Social Committee. 
The Commission, an independent college of the governments of the Member States; 
appointed by common agreement, represents the common interest. It has a monopoly 
on initiating legislation and proposes Community acts to the Council of Ministers. As 
guardian of the treaties, it monitors the implementation of the treaties and secondary 
law. In this connection it has a wide assortment of measures to police the Member 
States and the business community. In the framework of its mission the Commission 
has the executive power to implement Community policies.
The Council of Ministers is made up of representatives of the governments of the 
Member States and is vested with decision-making powers. It is assisted by the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which prepares the Council’s work 
and carries out the tasks conferred on it by the Council.
The Parliamentary Assembly originally had only an advisory role and its members 
were not yet elected by direct universal suffrage.
The Treaty also provides for the creation of the Court of Justice.
In compliance with the Convention on certain common institutions, which was 
signed and entered into force at the same time as the Treaty of Rome, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly and the Court of Justice are common to the EEC Treaties and the 
Euratom Treaty.
With the entry into force of the Merger Treaty in 1967, the Council and the Commis-
sion become institutions shared by the three Communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) 
and the principle of budgetary unity was imposed.
AMENDMENTS MADE TO THE TREATY
This Treaty was amended by the following treaties:
• Treaty of Brussels, known as the „Merger Treaty” (1965) 
This Treaty replaced the three Councils of Ministers (EEC, ECSC and Euratom) on the 
one hand and the two Commissions (EEC, Euratom) and the High Authority (ECSC) 
on the other hand with a single Council and a single Commission. This administra-
tive merger was supplemented by the institution of a single operative budget.
• Treaty amending Certain Budgetary Provisions (1970) 
This Treaty replaced the system whereby the Communities were funded by con-
tributions from Member States with that of own resources. It also put in place a 
single budget for the Communities..
• Treaty amending Certain Financial Provisions (1975) 
This Treaty gave the European Parliament the right to reject the budget and to 
grant a discharge to the Commission for the implementation of the budget. It 
established a single Court of Auditors for the three Communities to monitor their 
accounts and financial management.
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• Treaty on Greenland (1984) 
This Treaty meant that the Treaties would no longer apply to Greenland and 
established special relations between the European Community and Greenland 
modelled on the rules which applied to overseas territories.
• Single European Act (1986) 
The Single European Act was the first major reform of the Treaties. It extended 
the areas of qualified majority voting in the Council, increased the role of the 
European Parliament (cooperation procedure) and widened Community powers. 
It set the objective of achieving the internal market by 1992.
• Treaty on European Union, known as the „Maastricht Treaty” (1992) 
The Maastricht Treaty brought the three Communities (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) and 
institutionalised cooperation in the fields of foreign policy, defence, police and 
justice together under one umbrella, the European Union. The EEC was renamed, 
becoming the EC. Furthermore, this Treaty created economic and monetary union, 
put in place new Community policies (education, culture) and increased the powers 
of the European Parliament (codecision procedure).Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
• Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
The Treaty of Amsterdam increased the powers of the Union by creating a 
Community employment policy, transferring to the Communities some of the areas 
which were previously subject to intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs, introducing measures aimed at bringing the Union closer 
to its citizens and enabling closer cooperation between certain Member States 
(enhanced cooperation). It also extended the codecision procedure and qualified 
majority voting and simplified and renumbered the articles of the Treaties.
• Treaty of Nice (2001) 
The Treaty of Nice was essentially devoted to the „leftovers” of Amsterdam, i.e. the 
institutional problems linked to enlargement which were not resolved in 1997. It dealt 
with the make-up of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and the 
extension of the areas of qualified majority voting. It simplified the rules on use of the 
enhanced cooperation procedure and made the judicial system more effective.
• Treaty of Lisbon (2007)
The Treaty of Lisbon makes sweeping reforms. It brings an end to the European 
Community, abolishes the former EU architecture and makes a new allocation 
of competencies between the EU and the Member States. The way in which the 
European institutions function and the decision-making process are also subject 
to modifications. The aim is to improve the way in which decisions are made in an 
enlarged Union of 27 Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon also reforms several of 
the EU’s internal and external policies. In particular, it enables the institutions to 
legislate and take measures in new policy areas.
Source: europa.eu EEC Treaty
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Luxembourg compromise
The Luxembourg Compromise, signed on 30 January 1966, provides that „Where, 
in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the 
Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the 
Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions 
which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual 
interests and those of the Community”.
It ended the crisis between France and its five Community partners and the 
European Commission, caused by the gradual transition from unanimous voting to 
qualified-majority voting as provided for in the Treaty of Rome with effect from 1966. 
The French Government, which gave precedence to the intergovernmental approach, 
expressed its disapproval by applying the „empty chair” policy, i.e. abstaining from 
Council proceedings for seven months from 30 June 1965 onwards.
However, the Compromise, which is only a political declaration by Foreign 
Ministers and cannot amend the Treaty, did not prevent the Council from taking 
decisions in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
which provided for a series of situations in which qualified-majority voting applied. 
Moreover, qualified-majority voting has been gradually extended to many areas and 
has now become normal procedure, unanimity being the exception. The Luxembourg 
Compromise remains in force even though, in practice, it may simply be evoked 
without actually having the power to block the decision-making process.
Source: europa.eu
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From the Schuman Plan to the Paris Treaty 
(1950–1952)
Marco Gabellini – Étienne Deschamps, CVCE
Foreword
The research corpus ‘From the Schuman Plan to the Paris Treaty’, developed to 
mark the 60th anniversary of the declaration made by Robert Schuman on 9 May 
1950, provides a series of resources concerning the origins and repercussions of the 
French Foreign Minister’s address. In his declaration, he proposed that coal and steel 
resources in France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) be pooled within an 
organisation open to the other countries of Europe. This almost revolutionary decla-
ration by Robert Schuman—a Luxembourger by birth and today considered as one of 
the ‘Fathers of Europe’—set off a shock wave that launched the European unification 
process.
More than 1 000 documents trace the origins and implications of this founding 
event in the history of European integration, which led to the signing of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the Foreign Minis-
ters of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands on 18 April 1951.
The corpus was compiled by means of a methodical selection from the numerous 
documents held in the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence, the 
National Archives of Luxembourg, the Federal Archives of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in Berlin, as well as from the papers and image archives on Robert Schuman 
housed in the Moselle Departmental Archives in Metz and at the Robert Schuman 
House in Scy-Chazelles. Moreover, Jean Monnet’s papers, held at the Jean Monnet 
Foundation for Europe in Lausanne, shed light on the origins of the Schuman Plan 
and the role played by Jean Monnet in the declaration of 9 May 1950.
Primary sources were also collected from other archives such as the National Ar-
chives at Kew, London; this material particularly highlights the British Government’s 
initial caution and eventual rejection of any participation by the United Kingdom in 
the Schuman Plan.
The corpus contains a wide range of material including press articles, extracts 
from memoirs, photos and cartoons. Original audiovisual material dating from the 
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time the declaration was made corroborates the historic significance of Schuman’s 
proposal and illustrates the various stages in the establishment of the ECSC.
Personal accounts provided by key figures interviewed by the CVCE are a source 
of further audiovisual material, and contribute to the CVCE’s oral history project:
• Paul Collowald, who was a journalist for the daily newspaper Le Monde before 
becoming Director in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Press 
and Information
• Georges Berthoin, former Head of the Private Office of the President of the ECSC 
High Authority, Jean Monnet, then Representative of the European Commission in 
the United Kingdom
• Hubert Ehring, former legal adviser for the coal and steel pool in the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), then director of the 
legal service at the Secretariat of the ECSC Special Council of Ministers
• Archduke Otto von Habsburg, former President of the Paneuropean Union and 
former Member of the European Parliament
• Max Kohnstamm, former official in the Netherlands Foreign Ministry and former 
Secretary of the ECSC High Authority
• Jacques-René Rabier, former Head of the Private Office of the President of the 
ECSC High Authority, Jean Monnet, and former Director-General of the Press and 
Information Service of the European Communities
• Henri Rieben, Founder and Director of the Centre for European Research in 
Lausanne and former President of the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe in 
Lausanne
• Leo Tindemans, former Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for External Rela-
tions
The corpus, primarily aimed at the academic community, is introduced by a 
detailed bibliography on the subject as well as by biographical information about 
Robert Schuman, and each themed section is introduced by an explanatory text.
This corpus was coordinated by Marco Gabellini and Étienne Deschamps, re-
searchers in contemporary history at the CVCE.
It was originally published as a ‘Special File’ in European NAvigator in February 
2010.
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Introduction
In 1945, Europe was on its knees, bled dry. The United Kingdom and France may 
well have emerged as victors in the conflict with Hitler’s Germany, annihilated and 
forced to surrender, but Britain, despite the laurels won by resisting the Nazis, was 
exhausted and in ruins as a result of the war, while France, having been occupied and 
then partly destroyed by the violence of the fighting, was no longer capable of defend-
ing and rebuilding itself without considerable Allied help. As the Cold War dawned, 
and for the first time in its history, a divided Europe had become dependent on the 
two undisputed victors in the World War: the United States and the Soviet Union.
Europe, nevertheless, sought to rise again from the ashes and build a future that 
depended on a peaceful and sustainable solution. Germany and France, hereditary 
enemies, were at the heart of the plans to establish a new order in Europe. Aware that 
Britain would oppose a federal Europe, France turned towards its German neighbour. 
The issue of the coalfields of the Saar and the Ruhr was, however, poisoning rela-
tions between the two countries. France was still haunted by the threat posed by 
Germany. The Ruhr, a stronghold that symbolised Germany’s industrial and military 
might, quickly became a strategic issue of major importance. It was, therefore, placed 
under the control of the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR), which, starting 
from the spring of 1949, controlled the production, export and distribution of the coal, 
coke and steel from the region. Despite ever-louder protests from Germany, France 
gained special access to these coal and steel resources that were essential for its own 
reconstruction.
Determined to find a way out of the deadlock by turning these divisive factors 
into the ingredients for unity, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, made a 
momentous declaration to the press on 9 May 1950. Inspired by the European plans 
of another Frenchman, Jean Monnet, General Commissioner of the National Planning 
Board, he proposed that the joint output of coal and steel in the two countries be 
placed within the framework of a strong, supranational structure, the High Author-
ity. Designed mainly as a bulwark against a future remilitarisation of Germany and as 
an effective means of avoiding a steel surplus in Western Europe, this plan for secto-
ral economic integration created mutual interests that automatically linked the two 
countries. In practice, it made another Franco-German war impossible. The Schuman 
Plan also had the advantage of ensuring that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
became firmly anchored in the free, Western world. The plan, which was immediately 
welcomed enthusiastically by the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and then by 
Italy and the three Benelux countries, led to the signing, on 18 April 1951, of the Paris 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
The Schuman Declaration is, indeed, a major milestone in the history European 
unification. It may be seen as the ‘birth certificate’ of the community of Europe. In 
essence, the Schuman Plan sought to end centuries of Franco-German hostility, to 
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remedy the shortcomings of the European organisations then in existence and to 
open the way towards a federation. Just five years after the end of the Second World 
War, there were great hopes for peace and prosperity in Europe.
The origins of the Schuman Plan
In economic terms, coal and steel were vital raw materials. Coal was still the principal 
source of energy, and the French Government, wanting to modernise its heavy indus-
try, realised how much the steel industry in eastern France depended on substantial 
supplies of coal. But, at a time when the liberated countries were having difficulty 
in satisfying domestic demand, the only available coal deposits were to be found 
precisely in the Ruhr (since the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands had 
temporarily withdrawn from international trade). The creation of a European ‘pool’ 
for coal and steel would, therefore, allow France to counter the threat of a short-
age in Europe and, at the same time, meet its own needs for raw materials, despite 
the foreseeable dissolution of the International Authority for the Ruhr. In a broader 
sense, the Schuman Plan also sought to increase European coal and steel output in 
order to boost economic growth overall. In addition, it hinted at a major reduction in 
producer and consumer prices.
From the political point of view, the Schuman Plan was based on the assumption 
that the integration of Germany into a permanent European structure was the best 
way to prevent it from being a threat to its neighbours and, at the same time, guar-
antee peace in Europe. It allowed for an improvement in Franco-German relations on 
the basis of mutual interests, while creating a climate of cooperation in Europe, since 
it put Germany on an equal footing, something which was of great symbolic signifi-
cance. The independence of the High Authority, the supranational body responsible 
for the operation of the European coal and steel pool, was also devised as a new way 
of counteracting the pursuit of narrow, national self-interests. Moreover, the United 
States, eager to see Western Europe rebuilt economically and militarily, urged France 
to take decisive steps, since the British had clearly expressed their aversion to a Eu-
ropean customs union or to any supranational approach.
France also felt that those European institutions that did exist at the end of the 
1940s were not functioning properly. On the basis of these considerations, France 
decided to go it alone by putting forward an original and practical proposal based on 
the pooling of coal and steel production in Europe.
The inadequacy of the international organisations
Since it favoured greater European integration, the French Government considered 
that the European organisations that did exist in 1950, namely the Council of Europe 
and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), were not up to 
the task. Despite the tireless efforts of many pro-European movements to establish 
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a genuinely supranational body, these international institutions provided for little 
more than intergovernmental cooperation.
The Council of Europe, with vaguely defined powers in almost every area of 
public life, soon disappointed those militant pro-Europeans who had invested all 
their hopes in it. The Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg quickly proved to be just 
a parliamentary platform and a forum for dialogue between distinguished national 
delegates who had no responsibilities whatsoever towards an electorate. While it did 
debate and launch many projects, it had very little success in having them adopted 
by the governments which, de facto, retained all decision-making powers through 
the Committee of Ministers. Sidelined from the real economic, political and defence 
issues, the Council of Europe was mainly active in the areas of social policy, health 
and culture.
Created in April 1948, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
was an intergovernmental organisation with a Council consisting of representatives 
from each member state and in which all decisions had to be taken unanimously. 
The OEEC was responsible for implementing the Marshall Plan, through which the 
United States provided massive aid to all European countries for the rebuilding of 
their economies, provided that they prepared a thorough inventory of their resources 
and jointly drew up an ambitious reconstruction programme. In response to the 
American offer, 16 Western European countries (the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Free Territory of Trieste joined in 1949) reached agreement on how to allocate 
the aid under the Marshall Plan. However, they failed to implement effectively a joint 
programme of investment and reconstruction for their still very compartmentalised, 
national economies. The OEEC limited itself to drafting vague directives, without 
ever achieving a genuine integration of European markets. It was therefore a disap-
pointment to those who supported the idea of a single European body. Nevertheless, 
the OEEC did play a role in liberalising intra-European trade on a multilateral basis 
and in currency stabilisation through the creation, between 1950 and 1958, of a Euro-
pean Payments Union (EPU). At the same time, it encouraged the modernisation of 
Europe’s manufacturing base.
In 1947, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) also set up an 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) with a mandate to promote economic coop-
eration in Europe. It was the UN’s first regional body, and its members included all 
European countries, as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. It amalgamated 
a number of organisations that the European governments had set up since 1945: the 
European Coal Organisation, the European Land Transport Organisation and the 
Emergency Economic Commission for Europe. But the Cold War soon paralysed the 
operation of the ECE. Apart from a few initiatives relating to coal distribution and 
the exchange of rolling stock, its activities were limited and of a confidential nature.
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The international context
After the Second World War, France faced a dilemma with regard to its large German 
neighbour. Even though it dreaded the prospect of Germany’s rearmament and the 
revival of its militarist tendencies, it could plainly see that Western Europe was at risk 
from external attack. Europe was increasingly divided into two opposing blocs and 
was undoubtedly in danger of once again becoming the theatre of operations in the 
event of an East-West conflict. The warning signs increased in number. In July 1947, 
the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan for economic aid to Europe, as did the 
satellite states in its wake; together they rapidly established the Communist Infor-
mation Bureau (Cominform), followed by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA or Comecon). In April 1948, after the Western Allies took the unilateral deci-
sion to implement a monetary reform in their occupation zones in Berlin, the Soviets 
imposed a blockade on the access routes to the city. But this measure met with failure 
one year later thanks to the establishment of a vast airlift by the Americans, which 
enabled supplies to be brought to Berlin. On either side of the iron curtain, positions 
became increasingly entrenched, as demonstrated by the Treaty of Brussels of 17 
March 1948, the establishment of Western Union, and the signing of the North At-
lantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic 
bomb in Kazakhstan was also a sign of this deepening division. It marked the end of 
the US nuclear monopoly and therefore had considerable psychological and strategic 
implications. Finally, the start of the Korean War in June 1950 raised fears of a Third 
World War. Fear once again reigned in Europe. The intensification of the Cold War 
and the Communist threat gave the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) particular 
geopolitical importance. In this context, the question of defence in Western Europe 
became more urgent with every day that passed. The United States and the British 
who, with the French, occupied the German zones — which officially became the FRG 
on 23 May 1949 and enjoyed full democratic powers — were determined to make use 
of Germany’s industrial potential and to make it a key part of their defensive strategy.
But for the French Foreign Ministry, Germany’s rearmament was only conceiv-
able if it took place within a European defence structure that would provide a solid 
framework. For its part, the United States was in favour of German rearmament, but 
through its integration into NATO. The aim on all sides was to secure the FRG’s posi-
tion in the Western camp. Realising that it had an increasingly important role to play, 
Germany began to express its own views. In Bonn, criticism of the international su-
pervisory measures still imposed on the country became more and more prevalent. 
People protested against the continued dismantling of factories by the victors and 
the Allies’ monitoring of Germany’s foreign policy and foreign trade. The question 
of the Saar, which was economically attached to France in March 1950, remained a 
bone of contention between Paris and Bonn. Konrad Adenauer, elected Chancellor 
in September 1949, endeavoured to secure his country’s membership of the Interna-
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tional Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) on an equal footing. One month later, Germany 
joined the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which had been 
established by the convention signed in London on 16 April 1948. In November, the 
Petersberg Agreement between the Three and the FRG enabled consular and trade 
relations to be re-established, slowed down the dismantling of factories and officially 
demonstrated the desire to welcome the FRG into the community of Europe. Efforts 
were also made for the accession of Federal Germany as an associate member to the 
Council of Europe, an organisation established by the statute signed in London on 5 
May 1949.
France, keen to normalise its political and economic relations with Germany, 
sought an original diplomatic solution. For Jean Monnet, Commissioner-General of 
the French National Planning Commission, and for French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman, it was imperative that German heavy industry be integrated within an 
economic organisation that would provide an effective but not overly heavy-handed 
means of control. They believed that the solution was the establishment of a supra-
national authority responsible for governing coal and steel production in the two 
countries, with the possibility of extending it to other interested European countries. 
This was to be the main thrust of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. For Ger-
many, this was a guarantee that they would see the end of the IAR, an organisation 
they considered discriminatory. The invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops, 
an event which occurred less than a week after the opening of negotiations in Paris 
on the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between the 
Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), profoundly 
altered the international order. At a European level, the risk of war increased the 
demand for steel, temporarily removed the fear of overproduction and, in so doing, 
lifted the threat of closure for less profitable plants. This was a positive factor for the 
negotiations on the Schuman Plan, in which a large number of workers’ and employ-
ers’ trade unions were involved.
Franco-German problems
At the end of the war, France was seriously concerned about its own security and 
economic prosperity. At the same time, it realised the extent to which its future 
depended upon the domestic situation in Germany. The German regions of the Saar 
and the Ruhr, occupied by France under the war reparations scheme, were amongst 
the richest and most productive coalfields in Europe. Their strategic significance also 
derived from the fact that the coal and steel produced in the Benelux countries was 
still being used first and foremost to meet domestic demand.
The situation was not made easier by the existence of cartels. Despite Allied 
bombing and destruction on a large scale, Germany’s industry was able to sustain 
levels of production that were almost equal to pre-war levels. Furthermore, the 
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considerable economic assistance that West Germany received under the Marshall 
Plan allowed it to reduce its trade deficit and establish a new monetary system. For 
the Western Powers, the rebirth of capitalism in Germany was seen as an effective 
bulwark against Communism. This period witnessed a gradual revival of the cartels, 
consisting of groupings of the biggest German companies that sought, through the 
use of single sales agencies, to control the domestic market and undermine competi-
tion. But the Allies viewed these coal and steel cartels as the relics of the Konzerne 
which, during the inter-war period, had helped to generate the Third Reich’s capacity 
for destruction. France also realised that its industries could not compete on an equal 
footing with the German cartels. Accordingly, control of the coalfields and the break-
up of monopolies in heavy industry became a critical factor in post-war Franco-
German relations and an unavoidable precondition of European integration. If peace 
and prosperity were to be guaranteed across the continent, the question of the Ruhr 
and the Saar could be resolved only by peaceful means. A solution at European level 
was the only way to ensure lasting peace.
At the same time, Konrad Adenauer, the German Chancellor, wanted West Germany 
to regain complete territorial sovereignty, and he made repeated public statements 
in favour of a Franco-German union. In November 1949, he went so far as to propose 
a plan for a merger of Franco-German heavy industry and gave his support to the 
creation of an international body to control the mining and industrial regions of 
Germany, Belgium and France. The Chancellor hoped that this would serve as a lever 
with which to resolve the problem of the Saar and the Ruhr in a peaceful way, placing 
them in a broader European framework based on the recognition of Germany’s equal 
rights alongside all its partners.
Because of its position of political and military weakness, the Federal Republic of 
Germany had everything to gain from a form of European unity that aroused hopes 
of sanctions being relaxed and equal rights established. The establishment of a High 
Authority for coal and steel would therefore put an end to Germany’s inferior status, 
since it meant that the other partner countries also accepted a system of control that 
was supranational in character.
The International Authority for the Ruhr
The limits of the quadripartite occupation regime in Germany, established in 1945 
after the fall of the Third Reich, soon became clear. Each occupying power tried to 
impose its own system in its occupation zone, with little concern for what was hap-
pening elsewhere. As far as the Ruhr, the most industrialised region of Europe, was 
concerned, France also made demands which soon proved unacceptable for the other 
occupying powers. The French Foreign Ministry called for France’s security to be 
guaranteed by means of the internationalisation of ownership of Germany’s mines and 
steel industry. From February 1947 onwards, France therefore proposed to its US and 
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British partners the establishment of an international organisation responsible for 
the management of the Ruhr’s industries and the distribution of output. For Paris, the 
plan was driven by both security and economic concerns. The French were of course 
aiming to prevent the resources of the Ruhr from being used for military purposes, as 
had been the case under Hitler, but they also wanted to prevent the re-establishment 
of major trusts that would enable Germany to regain its industrial might.
Despite these urgent requests, in November 1947 the British and Americans estab-
lished a German administration in the Bizone, the Deutsche Kohlenbergbauleitung 
(DKBL), which was given the task of managing the Ruhr mines. As might have been 
expected, France immediately expressed its dissatisfaction, and there were growing 
protests from Paris. But in March 1948, the French Foreign Ministry finally obtained 
US agreement for the establishment of a regulatory authority for the Ruhr on the con-
dition that it would aid the implementation of the Marshall Plan, in which the Ruhr 
was a key part of the supply base of the Western European economy. But this did not 
make the dissensions between the Allied partners disappear, particularly because 
the Americans and the British could not accept that France was contemplating re-
placing Germany as the only great continental power able to secure the economic and 
industrial development of Western Europe. On 10 November 1948, the Anglo-American 
authorities of the Bizone issued a decree — Law No 75 — on the reorganisation and 
deconcentration of the Ruhr’s steel and mining industries. But France, which was 
once again unhappy at being presented with a fait accompli, reiterated its belief that 
a future German government could not be given the right to regulate the question of 
ownership. It therefore suggested the establishment of an Allied regulatory body for 
coal and steel.
After difficult diplomatic negotiations, the representatives of the United States, 
France, the United Kingdom and the three Benelux countries, meeting in spring 
1949 in London, managed to reach agreement on a policy for the organisation of 
Germany. The agreement between the Six provided for the following measures: the 
establishment of an International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) to regulate steel and 
coal production and trade practice; the development by the three Western powers of 
security measures; the drafting of an Occupation Statute determining the respective 
powers and responsibilities of the occupation authorities and of the German Federal 
Government that was to be formed; and the preparing by a Constituent Assembly 
of a Constitution for West Germany. The aim of the three powers with these vari-
ous measures was threefold: to guarantee the disarmament and demilitarisation of 
Germany; to support the revival of the countries of Europe; and to promote the close 
association between the economic systems of these countries so as to guarantee 
peace and prosperity in Europe.
The London Agreement, signed on 28 April 1949 by the representatives of the 
Six, provided for the coordination of production activities in the Ruhr with those of 
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the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). In the same way, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe sometimes adopted initiatives in 
areas that, in Germany, came under the authority of the IAR. Finally, the IAR’s role 
was not strictly speaking one of security; this was the task of the Military Security 
Board, set up on 17 January 1949 to oversee German disarmament. In practice, even 
though its powers and financial resources were very limited, the Authority’s role can 
be considered in two ways. From a positive angle, it was responsible for dividing the 
output of the Ruhr (coal, coke and steel) between German consumption and export. 
From a negative angle, it was responsible for ensuring that no discriminatory trans-
port and pricing practices affecting trade in the Ruhr’s steel and solid combustibles 
might conflict with the equal status of the countries involved and, in general, that no 
foreign interests in the Ruhr might be affected negatively.
The IAR, based in Düsseldorf, became operational in September 1949. It was 
composed of a Council, comprising the representatives of the signatory states and 
of the occupying authorities, which had a decision-making role and was responsible 
for the determining the policy of the organisation; secondly, a Secretariat, which, 
under the leadership of the Belgian Georges Kaeckenbeeck, took the form of a per-
manent organisation that carried out all administrative tasks. Within the IAR, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France each had three votes, and the Benelux 
countries a single vote. Germany was officially represented by a British officer. The 
IAR’s decisions were taken on a majority of eight votes. However, the operation of 
the Authority, despite its apparent good intentions, rapidly met with obstacles. Even 
though the Six were sometimes quick to point to the IAR as a first step towards a 
European coal and steel consortium, rifts often occurred between them over the 
issue of the mutual relations that the IAR had to maintain with the Allied High Com-
mission, formed in spring 1949 to supervise the German Federal Government and the 
Länder in accordance with the Occupation Statute, or over the conditions for Federal 
Germany’s accession to the London Agreement.
Most Germans were opposed to this new Allied organisation, which had the effect 
of limiting their freedom of action and maintained the country in a state of political in-
feriority. Many considered the IAR as an accessory of the inter-Allied occupation struc-
tures and as a thinly disguised regulatory body. They could no longer accept Germany’s 
submission to the occupying power and France’s exploitation of the riches of the Ruhr 
for its own gain and its continued dismantling of the competing industries in the region. 
From November 1949 onwards, the Germans admittedly had the right to send delegates 
to the IAR, after the Petersberg Agreement put an end to German reparations. But they 
did not feel that they were represented on an equal basis. The Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) were particularly irritated. For Konrad 
Adenauer, former Christian Democrat Mayor of Cologne and future German Chancellor, 
the only reason for the IAR’s existence was as the launch pad for a European federation. 
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He even called for the rapid extension of the IAR to other European industrial regions, 
in particular the French, Belgian and Luxembourg basins, and made this a condition 
for Germany’s recognition of the Authority. In his view, the IAR should be transformed 
into an organisation responsible for the cooperative exploitation of Western Europe’s 
essential resources. He therefore recommended the investment of foreign capital in 
German companies. In November 1949, he called for the Federal Republic of Germany’s 
accession as a full and equal member of the IAR.
It was not long before a number of observers concluded that it would be logical 
for the IAR to be replaced by a European federation. Germany’s calls for the dis-
banding of the Authority became more and more insistent. The shortage of primary 
products in Western Europe gradually came to an end, and this, coupled with the 
overlapping roles of the IAR and the Allied High Commission, also made its existence 
increasingly problematic. The British preferred to refer any important questions to 
the OEEC, where the unanimity rule made their vote essential. The IAR, on the other 
hand, where each State was represented by a government delegate, took decisions 
by a majority. France was also not entirely satisfied with the results obtained by the 
IAR, an organisation in which the Anglo-Americans were clearly dominant, but it was 
nevertheless unable to envisage bringing to an end the international regulation of 
Germany’s industrial basins through the simple removal of the IAR.
Keen to accede to German demands, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, 
promised Konrad Adenauer that the IAR would be dissolved once a common market 
in coal and steel was established at the latest. Despite its structural weaknesses, 
the IAR therefore played a significant political role, in the middle of the Cold War, in 
the transition between the post-war occupation of Germany and the beginnings of 
European sectoral integration. The work of the IAR was abandoned to an increas-
ing extent by France’s leaders, who sought new political and economic solutions for 
Germany’s integration into Western camp; this was particularly the case of Jean 
Monnet at the French National Planning Commission. A policy whose overriding goal 
had been to weaken Germany economically thus gave way to a new approach based 
on the development of Franco-German cooperation.
The impact of the Schuman Plan from spring 1950 onwards should therefore be 
considered in the context of a normalisation of relations between Paris and Bonn. In 
such conditions, the signing of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) on 18 April 1951 in Paris sounded the death knell of the IAR. The 
planned establishment by the Six of a common European market in coal and steel 
rendered the IAR’s regulatory activities obsolete; they were officially brought to an 
end on 27 May 1952. The International Statute of the Ruhr consequently also came 
to an end on 21 December 1951, even if it was only in the spring of 1953 that the Deut-
scher Kohlenverkauf (DKV), the sole selling agency for Ruhr coal, was permanently 
replaced by a new system of distribution via smaller, independent companies.
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The Saar question
From 1947 onwards, the Saar was detached from the French occupied zone in Ger-
many and became part of a customs, economic and monetary union with France. 
Although the Saar Regional Government did enjoy political autonomy, it remained 
under the authority of the High Commissioner, Gilbert Grandval, who represented the 
French Government. There was, therefore, a real economic frontier between the Saar 
and the rest of Germany. The Americans and the British were prompt in their efforts 
to prevent France from integrating the Saar into France more closely.
For its part, the German Government called openly for an end to the special sta-
tus granted to the Saar and for its reunification with the remainder of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG). It was Chancellor Adenauer’s intention to use the ECSC 
negotiations to have his way on this issue. He also made use of the platform provided 
by the Council of Europe to try to bring pressure to bear on France on the issue of 
making the Saar once more part of Germany. Because of its own political, economic 
and military interests, France refused to consider these requests. Finally, although 
Adenauer was not prepared to abandon Germany’s territorial claims, France signed 
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on behalf 
of the Saarbrücken Government, which it also represented in the ECSC Council of 
Ministers, although the Landtag of the Saar appointed its own representatives to the 
Common Assembly. Notwithstanding these compromise agreements, the status of 
the Saar continued to be a bone of contention between the two countries.
In the autumn of 1953, the Council of Europe resumed talks aimed at finding a 
solution to the Saar question. In the Assembly, the Dutch delegate, Marinus van  der 
Goes van  Naters, proposed that the Saar be given the status of a European territory. 
Increasing international pressure and the failure of the European Defence Commu-
nity (EDC) in August 1953 forced France to soften its position. On 23  October 1954, the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and France signed the Paris Agreements which 
put an end to the occupation of West Germany and set out the terms for settling the 
Saar issue. In particular, it was agreed that the region would be given the status of 
a European territory within the enlarged framework of Western European Union 
(WEU). However, the agreement still had to be ratified by the inhabitants of the Saar, 
who were unhappy with the French presence.
In the referendum of 23  October 1955, 67.7  % of the electorate in the Saar re-
jected the European territory status proposed in the Paris Agreements. France was 
therefore obliged to come to terms with the return of the Saar to Germany. On 27 
October 1956, the Luxembourg Agreements, signed by France and the Federal Repub-
lic, provided for the political reintegration of the Saar into Germany on 1  January 
1957. The signing of this Agreement finally put an end to a long-running dispute in 
Franco-German relations, and it served to further negotiations with a view to the 
canalisation of the Moselle River from France, through Luxembourg to Germany.
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The Monnet Plan
Jean Monnet, Commissioner-General of the French National Planning Board, consid-
ered that prosperity and social progress depended absolutely upon closer economic 
ties between European States. This conviction was drawn from his considerable 
international experience, from the lessons learned from the War, and from his close 
ties with American businessmen and diplomats. In particular, he was the French 
Provisional Government’s representative in the European Coal Organisation (ECO) 
and was responsible for negotiating, with the Americans, the allocation of Marshall 
Plan funds for the modernisation of France.
At the end of the war, he drafted the first revival and modernisation plan for 
France. He considered that economic cooperation with Germany was essential, par-
ticularly given its central position in Europe and its industrial potential, which the 
War had left largely unscathed. It was, without doubt, still too early to move towards 
total economic union at European level because of the vast discrepancies in prices, 
wages and tax regimes. Nor was the general public ready for it. At the end of the 1940s, 
several plans for limited customs unions, which could have helped generate economic 
integration in Western Europe, proved to be failures. Therefore, what was required 
was a new approach that would enable gradual progress to be made.
The idea of a European industrial pool began to appear regularly in the French 
press at that time, and from then on it was openly discussed in diplomatic circles. 
Monnet was very open to those ideas, since he was also seeking a way to alleviate 
Franco-German tension, and he was concerned by the threats arising from the Cold 
War. He believed that it would be extremely difficult to build a European edifice from 
the top down, a method which was often called for by the federalist movements. He 
foresaw, instead, a Europe that was built on a functional basis by integrating key 
sectors of the economy in order to create genuine solidarity between the partners. 
For this reason, from the spring of 1950 onwards, he began to consider the establish-
ment of a common market based on the coal and steel sectors, which were vital for 
both civil and military industries. However, his plan differed from most of the inter-
national cooperation plans under consideration in the steel sector, since, from the 
outset, Monnet presented the coal and steel pool as an indispensible but transitional 
stage on the way to creating a European federation.
Putting coal and steel under international control also made it possible to envisage 
the end of Allied control over the Ruhr with confidence, and it eliminated all risk of 
industrial cartels being created in the German coalfields. On this basis, both France 
and Germany would agree to submit to international controls, in order to ensure that 
the common market in coal and steel ran smoothly.
Jean Monnet also knew that he could count on the support of the US High Commis-
sioner in Germany, John McCloy, who also called for closer Franco-German ties and 
hoped that France would soon take steps in this direction.
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The pooling of coal and steel
There were two main reasons why Jean Monnet proposed the pooling of coal and 
steel in 1950. The six Member States of the future ECSC used coal more than any other 
fuel, and the Ruhr was the principal region for coal deposits. At that time, coal alone 
accounted for nearly 70 % of fuel consumption in Western Europe. Although the Six 
together with Great Britain accounted for only 20 % of total world coal production, 
they had an almost total monopoly over supplies in Western Europe. Coal from East-
ern Europe was becoming more and more scarce, while American coal was still very 
expensive and could be bought only with dollars, which were exactly what Europe 
lacked. French steel companies imported most of their coal, and the pooling of Franco-
German resources provided a guarantee of free access to coal from the Ruhr, even if 
the International Authority for the Ruhr, in which France was actively involved, were 
to be abolished. The creation of a European pool made it impossible for Germany to 
sell its coal at high prices and, in so doing, cause difficulties for French industry.
Steel was the most important raw material for weapons manufacture and for 
industry in general. In the absence of any effective coordination of European plans 
for economic recovery, each country developed its own steel capacity in relative 
isolation, and this carried the risk of over-production. A more fundamental French 
concern was that steel production in Germany would be controlled by strong indus-
trial cartels and that the steel would be used for weapons production, which was 
what the French feared most of all. The pooling of steel was therefore seen as a means 
of destroying the cartels’ potential influence and preventing future rearmament. 
Finally, from a symbolic point of view, the pooling of steel necessarily meant that a 
new Franco-German war would be out of the question.
In terms of how to proceed, Jean Monnet, who, in 1947, had initiated the planning 
process in France, could not envisage a common market for coal and steel that op-
erated properly and was accessible to other interested countries without a certain 
degree of central control in order to guarantee a more coherent industrial policy in 
Europe. The coal and steel pool affected 150 million consumers.
The European institutions
Jean Monnet believed that effective institutions were needed to exercise control over 
the planned Common Market. The sectors that were to be pooled were to be managed 
by an independent institution that would guarantee free competition, combat the 
creation of cartels, eliminate discriminatory practices, guarantee consumers equal 
access to supplies and coordinate investment. The supranational authority would 
have its own financial resources and would be responsible for managing the common 
market. It would facilitate the opening up of markets through flexible methods of 
support and control. To fulfil these tasks, it would operate as a collegial body with in-
dependent members, with a view to becoming the embryo of a European government.
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The declaration of 9 May 1950
On 9 May 1950 — in a speech inspired by Jean Monnet — the French Foreign Minister, 
Robert Schuman, proposed the pooling of the coal and steel resources of France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) within an organisation that would be open for 
membership to other European countries.
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet sought to use this almost revolutionary dec-
laration to generate a shock wave that would launch the process of European unifi-
cation. Drafted in conditions of utmost secrecy, the Schuman Declaration aimed to 
bring about a profound change in mentalities that would help win over the people 
of Europe. But Schuman needed first of all to secure the agreement of his own Gov-
ernment, whilst ensuring that he also had the support of Konrad Adenauer and the 
United States.
Political endorsement of the Plan
The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, was convinced that Jean Monnet’s idea 
of pooling European coal and steel output was the right approach, and he therefore 
decided to assume political responsibility for the Plan. Schuman, a politician from 
Lorraine (he was MP for the Moselle, a major steel-producing region), could see quite 
a number of advantages in Monnet’s plan:
• it promoted Franco-German reconciliation;
• coal and steel would be managed for peaceful ends;
• it provided a starting point for European integration.
Initially, a high level of secrecy surrounded the issue so that it could not be sabo-
taged by pressure from employers’ and union lobbies, by party political disagree-
ments or the dead weight of the civil service. Outside Monnet’s own team, only a small 
number of dedicated supporters of European integration, including the Ministers 
René Pleven and René Mayer, knew all the details set out in the proposal. Everything 
then happened very quickly.
Robert Schuman’s first task was to win over the French Government. He submit-
ted a vague outline of his Plan at the end of a cabinet meeting on 3 May 1950. More 
details, particularly those concerning the institutional implications, were revealed 
on the morning of 9 May, and this led immediately to a heated debate. Although the 
Prime Minister, Georges Bidault, had been informed earlier by Robert Schuman, he 
was reluctant to surrender a degree of national sovereignty. Several Ministers de-
manded more details. Nevertheless, Schuman finally succeeded in securing Cabinet 
approval for the Plan. However, he made sure that the French Parliament was not 
party to the diplomatic efforts for fear of a premature, public debate.
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Discretion is the order of the day
Business circles, and coal and steel producers in particular, were deliberately not 
involved in the planning stage. Had the Plan been disclosed, it would probably have 
given rise to numerous objections from French business leaders and awakened the 
mistrust of their German counterparts.
Similarly, Robert Schuman decided to leave French MPs in the dark, fearing that 
they would be more interested in the institutional implications than in the project 
itself.
Very few people outside France were aware of the Plan. Bypassing diplomatic chan-
nels, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was informed personally of the Plan, 
and he immediately assured Schuman of his interest and support. On 8 May, Schuman 
himself presented his plan to the five Ministers for Economic Affairs from the United 
Kingdom, the three Benelux countries and Italy at a highly secret meeting in Paris. 
On the evening of 8 May, all the working documents were destroyed. Strengthened by 
an endorsement from France’s allies, Schuman dispatched his personal envoy, Robert 
Mischlich, to Bonn in order to inform Konrad Adenauer. Early that year, Adenauer had 
already had an opportunity to discuss with Schuman whether the time was ripe for 
a Europe-wide agreement. On the morning of 9 May, Mischlich handed to the German 
Chancellor and to his Private Secretary, Herbert Blankenhorn, the official text of the 
French proposal for a joint High Authority as well as a confidential letter that referred 
to the extremely political nature of the Plan. Adenauer was delighted, and he immedi-
ately assured Mischlich of his support. As soon as Schuman was notified by telephone, 
he was able to inform the French Cabinet late on the morning of 9 May. Everything was 
then ready for a press conference at the Quai d’Orsay at 6 p.m. the same day.
Press conference held by Robert Schuman
The press conference was held at 6 p.m. on 9 May 1950 in the Salon de l’Horloge at the 
Quai d’Orsay (the French Foreign Ministry). More than 200 journalists from France 
and abroad were invited to witness the declaration by the French Foreign Minister, 
Robert Schuman, concerning the pooling of coal and steel resources. But, having been 
informed of the press conference at the last minute, few were actually able to attend. 
Only journalists based in Paris witnessed the event. There were no photographers 
in attendance, nor radio or television to record proceedings. As a matter of interest, 
Schuman was obliged to record his famous address shortly afterwards for posterity.
The declaration underlined the role played by France in the construction of a 
strong, prosperous and peaceful Europe, resting on a Franco-German foundation. 
The declaration did not simply set out the objectives. It also proposed opening ne-
gotiations on clearly defined principles. It set out the purpose of the High Authority, 
which was referred to for the first time in the international arena. In a preliminary 
statement, René Mayer, the French Minister for Justice and Member of Parliament 
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for Constantine, insisted that France should also invite the other European nations 
to work jointly to support development in Africa, since France was no longer able to 
meet the costs of developing its overseas territories alone.
Reactions to the declaration
The Schuman Plan was approved by the French Government late in the morning of 9 
May 1950. On the same day, it was officially submitted to the governments of Belgium, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, as 
well as to the German Chancellor who had not been consulted previously. There were 
mixed reactions to the French proposals. Some sceptics saw in them a new cartel 
between steel-mill owners, while others believed that they represented American 
control over Europe, particularly given the open support for the Plan expressed by 
the US High Commissioner for Germany, John McCloy. The Communists even saw it as 
the first step towards a new declaration of war against the Soviet bloc.
In general, however, the public was favourable towards Robert Schuman’s declara-
tion, even if the full significance of the Plan was difficult to grasp. At diplomatic level, 
despite some technical problems, the European countries that had been approached 
had no wish to be left on the sidelines of the European integration process.
Reactions in France
Political circles in France, from the Christian Democrats to the Socialists, were 
broadly in support of the Foreign Minister’s initiative. Notwithstanding some res-
ervations, the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) and the French Section of the 
Workers’ International (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) (SFIO) sup-
ported Robert Schuman’s proposal. The Socialists, while fearing that Europe would 
bear the stamp of the Christian Democrats, recognised the economic advantages that 
the Schuman Plan appeared to offer. Right-wing nationalists, however, rejected any 
agreement with Germany, as did the Communist opposition. The Communist Party 
saw the establishment of a Western European entity as being hostile to the Soviet Un-
ion and of benefit only to the American economy. The steel lobby, who feared foreign 
competition and central planning, also engaged in a virulent campaign against the 
plan to establish a High Authority. As for public opinion in France, it showed broad 
support for the French Foreign Minister’s initiative.
Reactions in Germany
Robert Schuman’s declaration took Germany by surprise since it represented a 
total reversal of French policy towards its neighbour. The proposal that Germany 
should be offered equal treatment could not fail to be welcomed since it satisfied a 
long-standing German demand and made possible the irreversible integration of the 
Federal Republic of Germany into Western Europe.
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The reaction of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who was personally informed of 
the Plan by Schuman only on the morning of 9 May 1950, was shown in his gratitude 
towards France. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal Party (FDP), 
like most business leaders and even German trade unions, were almost unreservedly 
in favour of the French Plan.
The Social Democratic Party (SPD), which strongly supported a united Germany, 
feared a deepening of the division between the part of Germany that was under West-
ern influence and the other part, which was under Soviet influence. The SPD’s pacifist 
and anti-capitalist orientation made it all the more mistrustful of the Schuman Plan 
since the Plan did not include the nationalisation of heavy industry in the Ruhr basin, 
a measure for which the Social Democrats had been calling for some time. German 
public opinion, although aware of the Plan’s symbolic value, was for the most part 
undecided and even, at times, hostile and ill-informed.
Reactions in the Benelux countries
Reactions to the Schuman Plan in official circles were lukewarm in the Benelux 
countries since Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had already learnt, to 
their cost, the difficulties that the creation of an economic union could bring in its 
wake. They also feared that the High Authority would be invested with too many 
discretionary powers. Nevertheless, they supported the idea of a plan for the sector 
and were particularly convinced of the merits of its political objectives, even if they 
were traditionally wary of Franco-German hegemony.
The Netherlands Government, relatively unaffected by the problems facing the 
coal and steel heavy industries, agreed to the Plan while maintaining the right to 
withdraw if it found that the supranational aspect had become, in its view, unwork-
able.
Business circles in Belgium were divided on the issue. Although the steel compa-
nies that had modernised their plants tended to welcome the Plan, the owners of the 
coal mines in Wallonia were above all worried about central planning by the High 
Authority and about international competition, since their mines were proving to be 
less and less economically viable. They also feared an end to the monopolistic protec-
tion of the mines afforded by the State in order to keep them running artificially. The 
Government, however, was pleased to find a European programme that would allow 
it to close down loss-making mining companies that it knew were bound to disappear 
anyway.
Luxembourg generally supported the Schuman Plan. The steel industry accounted 
for almost 90 % of its exports, and the country welcomed a Plan that could open up 
large export markets. The country had all the more need for new markets given that 
wage levels were higher than in neighbouring countries, a factor which adversely 
affected profitability. Professional associations did express some concerns about the 
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High Authority, which they considered too powerful, but they nevertheless resigned 
themselves to going along with the Plan.
Reactions in Italy
Reaction in Italy to the Schuman Plan was generally favourable. Alcide De Gasperi, 
the Prime Minister, even displayed overt enthusiasm. The Plan did indeed provide 
Italy with the opportunity to return at last to the international scene on an equal 
footing with those countries which had defeated it in war.
At economic level, however, Italy’s weak heavy industry sector still required pro-
tectionist policies. On the other hand, the processing industry, and the car industry 
in particular, was convinced of the benefit of a plan that could make it easier to obtain 
raw materials. The nationalised steel industry also saw the Plan as a means to ensure 
the necessary modernisation of its machinery. Italy even negotiated a separate plan 
with France for the supply of iron ore from the overseas territories in North Africa 
that France did not want to include in the ECSC. Public opinion shared this trust in 
the Plan and understood the political and economic advantages that the Italian State 
could derive from the implementation of the Schuman Plan. However, Italy requested, 
and was accorded, a transitional period to allow it to adapt to new levels of interna-
tional competition.
Reactions in the United States
In the United States, the declaration by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minis-
ter, met with unanimous approval. The Schuman Plan appeared to be the first step 
towards a European Federation and a single European market. The United States 
could only approve of closer ties between France and Germany and the break-up of 
the cartels in German heavy industry, since the creation of a united, Western Europe 
was one of its key foreign policy objectives.
Some American business circles feared that the creation of a European steel cartel 
would constitute an obstacle for American exports of steel to Europe and for free 
trade in general. However, this did not prevent the United States from trying, in vain, 
to bring pressure to bear on the British to accept the principle behind the Schuman 
Plan.
Reactions in the Soviet Union
The Schuman Plan, just like the Marshall Plan three years earlier, was unequivocally 
condemned by the Soviet Union. Robert Schuman’s assurances that the new Commu-
nity was peaceful in nature did not ease the hostility of the Soviet Union and its neigh-
bours. The USSR actually saw the plan to pool resources as a new gambit by the United 
States to strengthen the grip of American big business on Europe to the detriment of 
the European working class. The Soviets saw the ECSC as merely NATO’s arsenal in 
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Europe. They also condemned the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Germany 
into the Western bloc, which they accused of gearing up for a Third World War.
The Schuman Plan and Franco-British relations
The Schuman proposal took the British authorities completely by surprise. It must 
be said that at no point during the preparation of the plan did Jean Monnet or Robert 
Schuman deem it appropriate to approach the British, who they sensed would have 
reservations over the matter. The secret was so well kept that even René Massigli, 
French Ambassador to London, was not let in on the plan. However, Massigli was en-
trusted with the difficult job of outlining the scope of the Schuman Plan to his British 
interlocutors and, if possible, persuading them to take part. The British reaction was 
not slow in coming. The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin—doubtless aggrieved 
at not having been consulted, while the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and 
the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had already given their go-ahead—imme-
diately expressed his discontent to his close colleagues. He lamented the attitude of 
the Quai d’Orsay all the more because the United Kingdom, the occupying power in 
the Ruhr region, was France’s primary partner in Western Union, the Organisation 
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe. Furthermore, 
Britain, a country whose Labour governments had launched a process of nationalisa-
tion of the coal, iron and steel industries following the end of the war, was also one of 
Europe’s major industrial powers. In 1949, the United Kingdom alone provided 37 % 
of the output of the main producing countries in Europe.
The reservations of Bevin, who was already weakened by the disease from which 
he would die one year later, did not, however, prevent the Prime Minister, Clement At-
tlee, from welcoming the French declaration in the House of Commons on 11 May 1950. 
For Attlee, the proposal offered a possible solution to the German question and repre-
sented a significant contribution to the establishment of Franco-German relations in 
the future. He saw the Schuman Plan as a way of resolving some of Western Europe’s 
economic problems. In London, an interministerial committee on the Franco-German 
Authority was established in order to study the possible implications of the French 
plan, in cooperation with employers’ associations and trade unions. However, even 
though the initial British stance on the Schuman Plan was notionally favourable, 
there were considerable reservations at the prospect of the United Kingdom’s partici-
pation in a common, supranational authority. The main arguments are well known. 
The British were primarily opposed to the prospect of a technocratic organisation 
with restricting powers which would be liable to intervene in the country’s economic 
policy. They believed that delegating part of the country’s sovereignty represented a 
dangerous point of no return along the European road.
Clearly Schuman and Monnet were determined to break this deadlock, but they 
were not willing to compromise on the potential supranational nature of the High 
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Authority. And they had no intention of allowing the British to impede the negotia-
tions on the planned coal and steel pool. On 15 May and the days that followed, on the 
margins of the tripartite London conference on the Occupation Statute of Germany, 
they held several unofficial conversations with British economic and political lead-
ers, who were keen to find out what the real implications of the Schuman Plan were. 
But this was not enough to overcome the opposition to the plan, or to dispel the 
misapprehensions regarding national independence and the methods to be used for 
the forthcoming negotiations.
There followed a prolonged exchange of notes and memorandums between Paris 
and London to try to clarify the intentions of the two governments and find a solu-
tion to this disagreement. Massigli, who would soon come to side with the British 
position, and Sir Oliver Harvey, British Ambassador to Paris, were actively involved 
but despite their efforts were unable to soften the positions or change the attitudes 
of either side. On 25 May 1950, the French Government sent an official memorandum 
to the British Government inviting the United Kingdom to join its diplomatic initia-
tive as soon as possible, on the condition that it accepted the basic principles of the 
Schuman proposal. This memorandum was accompanied by a draft communiqué 
already accepted by Adenauer and submitted at the same time to the Belgian, Dutch, 
Luxembourg and Italian Governments. The same day, Monnet sent a personal letter 
to his friend Lord Plowden, Chairman of the Economic Planning Board in London, in 
which he described at length the role and powers of the future High Authority.
The British reply came immediately, crossing the memorandum from the Quai 
d’Orsay. In this first British note of 25 May, Bevin explained that a more thorough 
analysis of the French Foreign Minister’s proposals was needed in order for him to 
take a stance. He also rejected the idea of a major international conference in which 
the United Kingdom would take part from the outset. He called for the immediate 
opening between France and Germany of bilateral discussions in which the United 
Kingdom could participate at a later stage in order to obtain further information. 
On 27 May, after receiving the French memorandum, the British Government stated 
clearly that it would be unable to take part in discussions which set as a precondition 
the aim to pool coal and steel resources and establish a High Authority with sov-
ereign powers. Three days later, the French Government, still keen to persuade the 
British to support its initiative, stressed the reasons why it regarded participation 
by the British Government in the proposed negotiations—but on the same basis as 
the other governments—as important. The French Foreign Ministry, emphasising the 
need to create a community of interests in a limited but decisive field for the promo-
tion of peace and the general improvement of living standards in Europe, was at pains 
to reassure the British authorities on the subject of the missions and powers of the 
planned High Authority. But it was to no avail. On 31 May, the British Government 
repeated that it was impossible for it to commit to a supranational institution before 
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knowing where this would lead in practice. The British therefore indicated their wish 
for guarantees and a special position in the negotiations on the Schuman Plan.
For Monnet this was too much, and he immediately expressed his views to the 
French Government, explaining that giving the British a special status from the start 
would represent a direct threat for the supranational dimension of the coal and steel 
pool as envisaged in the declaration of 9 May. He believed that the negotiations would 
have no chance of success if they did not take place between countries which had 
demonstrated their unity from the outset regarding the aims of these negotiations. 
The time for prevarication was over. The following day, the Quai d’Orsay asked all 
the interested governments to give their agreement to a new communiqué which 
called for the establishment of a treaty that would be submitted for ratification by 
the parliaments, and which put forward as an immediate objective the pooling of coal 
and steel output and the establishment of a High Authority. However, with an eye to 
the future and keen keep the door open, the French Government stated that it would 
keep the British Government informed of the progress of the discussions, giving it the 
opportunity to take part when it deemed it possible to do so.
The British, who saw this communiqué as a sort of ultimatum, still had no inten-
tion of letting the matter drop. On 2 June, noting the ongoing ‘difference of approach’ 
regarding the basis of the negotiations, the British Government repeated its idea of 
holding a meeting at ministerial level for the countries concerned. But a few hours 
later, convinced that the notes exchanged between Paris and London had provided 
a clear picture of the views of the two governments, the Quai d’Orsay rejected the 
British proposal, believing that a meeting of this sort would offer little chance of pro-
viding further clarification. On the contrary, it considered that such a meeting would 
postpone the opening of the negotiations without offering any serious possibilities 
of a convergence of views. Each party held to its position. It was in these conditions 
that the governments of the six countries which had accepted the Schuman proposal 
published a joint communiqué on 3 June 1950 in which they gave themselves the ‘im-
mediate objective’ of pooling coal and steel output and establishing a new High 
Authority whose decisions would be binding for the Member States. The Quai d’Orsay 
simultaneously published a communiqué explaining that even though the British 
Government considered itself unable to join the Six, it would nonetheless be kept 
informed of the progress of the forthcoming negotiations. But the same day, a British 
communiqué confirmed for anyone still in doubt that, even though it did not want to 
reject them in advance, the United Kingdom did not feel able to accept the underlying 
principles of the Schuman Declaration as they stood.
Believing that a detailed discussion aimed at shedding light on the nature of the 
plan and all its political and economic consequences was an essential prerequisite 
to the conclusion of a treaty, the Foreign Office put an end to the diplomatic pre-
varications by stating that it was impossible, given its responsibilities to the British 
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Parliament and people, for it to be involved in the negotiations due to open shortly 
between the Six in the conditions put forward by France. The matter was raised again 
on 13 June 1950 with the publication of the ‘European Unity’ manifesto under the aegis 
of the Labour Party’s Executive Committee, to which several government members 
belonged. The manifesto clearly set out the official British views on the question 
of European unity. The British position was essentially based on three main ideas: 
Labour did not want to join a Europe that was not socialist; the interests of the Com-
monwealth and the Atlantic community took precedence over European matters; and 
international organisation could only be achieved through the voluntary cooperation 
of sovereign nations and governments. The brochure, written before 9 May, clearly 
did not set out to define the British position on the Schuman Plan as such. However, 
given the controversy that the French initiative had stirred up in the country, the 
brochure’s authors hastily added a passage in which they expressed the need for the 
European governments to coordinate basic industries to promote the unity of the 
continent. When asked about this publication, Attlee was quickly obliged to recognise 
in the House of Commons that he was partly responsible for its production, though he 
added that he had not known when it would be published.
On 14 June, commenting in Parliament on the publication that day of a collection 
of documents recording the exchanges between the British executive and the French 
Government, Attlee restated the same explanations given by his government in the 
official communiqué of 3 June. The Prime Minister concluded his address by emphasis-
ing the progress already made in Europe and the role played by his country in this 
development, and promised not to do or say anything that might hinder the forthcom-
ing negotiations between the Six. On 26 and 27 June, in a debate in the Commons on the 
attitude adopted by the British Government on the Schuman Plan, the Conservative 
Opposition filed a motion signed by eminent leaders including Winston Churchill, 
Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan. This called on the government to take part in 
the negotiations on the Schuman Plan. But the government proposed an amendment 
to this motion stating that even if it was unable to accept the early stages of the French 
plan, it remained ready to play a constructive role in discussions on a joint effort. Put 
to the vote, the Opposition motion was defeated and that of the Attlee government 
approved. Any hopes of seeing the United Kingdom take part in the conference on the 
Schuman Plan due to open on 20 June in Paris were definitively dashed.
Two months later, however, something resembling a last stand took place in the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Following the address given by Robert 
Schuman on 10 August in the Hemicycle in Strasbourg, in which he gave his views on 
the Supranational Authority on behalf of the French Government, the British delegates 
Harold Macmillan and David Eccles immediately put forward a counter-proposal that 
was distinctly intergovernmental in nature. In this plan, the High Authority would 
be practically eliminated, its powers given to a ministerial committee appointed by 
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the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Another important point was 
the establishment of a provisional and limited right of veto within this committee: 
during the first five years, any member country could, acting solely on its own behalf, 
oppose any decisions that it deemed harmful to basic economic, social and strategic 
policy. A lively debate began in the Consultative Assembly between mainly British 
and Scandinavian delegates, in favour of intergovernmental options, and delegates 
from continental countries who tended to advocate federalist positions. On 15 August, 
the Consultative Assembly decided to close the general discussion on the Schuman 
Plan, sending the various proposals to the Economic Affairs Committee and asking 
it to present its conclusions as quickly as possible. These conclusions came on 26 
August in the form of two recommendations. The first concerned the procedure for 
appointing the delegates of the future Parliamentary Assembly of the coal and steel 
pool from among the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
The second recommendation called for reports to be submitted at regular intervals 
from the parliamentary body of the future coal and steel pool to the Assembly in 
Strasbourg. Even if the desire to see the Schuman Plan extended to all the Member 
States of the Council of Europe was expressed, the discussions on the French proposal 
were therefore closed with a relatively superficial twofold recommendation, and the 
heart of the question would not be addressed until the High Authority for coal and 
steel was actually established.
The creation of the ECSC
France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries reacted positively to Robert 
Schuman’s statement. The Foreign Ministers of those six countries entered into 
negotiations based on the principles set out therein. Institutional issues were the 
first to be addressed. The Benelux countries did not want to be dominated by the 
Franco-German axis and therefore demanded a truly independent High Authority. 
The delegates then went on to tackle economic issues—often highly technical in 
nature—particularly the dismantling of the heavy industry cartels in the Ruhr. The 
Ministers ultimately resolved the last remaining political questions such as the seat 
of the High Authority and its composition.
Negotiations on the ECSC Treaty
The beginning of the negotiations
The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, knew that he had to act quickly if he 
were to take advantage of the pro-European fervour triggered by his declaration of 9 
May 1950. On 20 June 1950, he organised a conference in Paris instructed to draw up 
a draft treaty establishing a coal and steel community.
Schuman was adamant that the concept of a single supranational organisation – 
the only institution referred to in the declaration – must be included in the draft 
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treaty just as it stood. Before opening the negotiations on technical procedures, he 
therefore called on the countries involved to declare their support for a supranational 
authority called ‘The High Authority’.
The German, Italian, Belgian, Netherlands and Luxembourg Governments ac-
cepted this recommendation, although the Netherlands Government did express cer-
tain reservations about the role of the High Authority, at least as it was envisaged by 
Jean Monnet. The British political powers still resolutely rejected the supranational 
principle, thereby ruling out Great Britain’s direct participation for the time being.
Multilateral negotiations
On 20 June 1950, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
opened negotiations in Paris. The French Government negotiated the organisation 
and operation of the future European Coal and Steel Community with its partners. 
The negotiators, chaired by Jean Monnet, began by addressing institutional questions 
and appeals procedures. The delegates from the three Benelux countries demanded 
a treaty that clearly spelled out the technical powers to be entrusted—for a fixed 
time period—to the High Authority, as some of them feared that it would interfere 
in sensitive national areas. They subsequently suggested that political institutions 
should be created to counterbalance the High Authority’s powers. The concept of an 
intergovernmental body – the Special Council of Ministers – was adopted. A Common 
Assembly was established to represent the peoples of the Member States. Proposals 
were also put forward for the establishment of a Court of Justice to settle disputes.
Economic considerations were largely taken into account during the talks on the 
future Community’s powers and responsibilities. The negotiators therefore aimed 
to ensure that the Community was properly equipped to dismantle the heavy indus-
try cartels in Germany. These discussions once again involved a debate about the 
Community’s degree of supranationality. Once the bulk of the problems had been 
resolved, the Treaty establishing the ECSC was initialled by the six delegations on 19 
March 1951.
All that remained now was for the ministers to solve some practical, yet extremely 
delicate, questions concerning the seat of the High Authority, the appointment pro-
cedure for the Members of the High Authority, the allocation of seats in the Common 
Assembly and the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers. The High Authority 
consisted of nine Members, one of whom was co-opted—selected by common accord 
by the governments for a period of six years. The Assembly, which exercised supervi-
sory powers, was made up of 78 delegates from the national parliaments, while each 
Member State had a representative in the Council of Ministers. The Court of Justice 
consisted of 7 judges appointed by the governments to ensure the compliance with 
and application of the Treaty. The Six signed the Treaty in Paris on 18 April 1951 for a 
period of fifty years.
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The signing of the ECSC Treaty
On 18 April 1951, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was signed in Paris by Robert Schuman for France, Konrad Adenauer for the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Paul van Zeeland and Joseph Meurice for Bel-
gium, Count Carlo Sforza for Italy, Joseph Bech for Luxembourg and Dirk Stikker and 
Jan van den Brink for the Netherlands.
The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created 
several institutions responsible for the pooling of Europe’s coal and steel resources 
and, in addition, for maintaining peace in Europe:
• a High Authority assisted by a Consultative Committee;
• a Common Assembly;
• a Court of Justice;
• a Special Council of Ministers.
The High Authority’s supranational character was a major breakthrough. The 
Members of the High Authority did not actually represent their own country’s inter-
ests but were under oath to defend the general interest of the Member States. They 
enjoyed wide-ranging powers to help them achieve this aim. For example, they were 
able to intervene in national coal and steel markets but without being able to replace 
the existing businesses as such. The High Authority’s financial autonomy, which was 
guaranteed by a ‘tax’ based on a maximum 1 % levy on the turnover of coal and steel 
companies, reinforced its independence vis-à-vis the six governments.
Ratification of the ECSC Treaty
The ratification of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was completed without any major problems in most of the six signatory states. 
On the whole, only the Communist MPs were fiercely opposed to the Schuman Plan, 
which they denounced as being an American imperialist, warmongering instrument 
directed against both the social interests of the workers and the Eastern Bloc countries.
In Belgium, the text was ratified in the Senate on 5 February 1952 by 102 votes to 
4, with 58 abstentions. The abstentions included the entire Socialist Group who were 
concerned about the repercussions that the ECSC would have on the country’s mining 
industry. On 12 June 1952, the Chamber of Deputies in turn adopted the agreements 
creating the ECSC by 191 votes to 13, with 13 abstentions. In Germany, the Bundestag 
adopted the bill ratifying the Treaty on 11 January 1952 by 378 to 143. The opposing 
forces included the Communists and Social Democrats. The Bundesrat followed suit 
on 1 February 1952 and adopted a supplementary resolution on 1 July 1952 which called 
on the Federal Government to ensure that the Allied High Commission abolished all 
the restraints on iron and steel production in Germany and that West Berlin was 
expressly included in the territory covered by the ECSC. In Italy, on 15 March 1952, the 
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Senate adopted the bill by a sitting and standing vote, while the Chamber of Deputies 
adopted the bill by 265 to 98 on 16 June 1952. In Luxembourg, the Chamber of Deputies 
adopted the bill approving the Schuman Plan on 13 May 1952 by 47 votes to 4, the four 
being cast by the Communist Group. In the Netherlands, the Second Chamber of the 
States-General adopted the bill on 31 October 1951 by 62 votes to 6, the six cast by the 
Communist Group, while on 19 February 1952, the First Chamber of the States-General 
adopted the bill by 36 votes to 2.
In France, however, ratification proved to be a far more delicate issue. The Com-
munist MPs were opposed to any idea of a European Community, which they deemed 
to be hostile to the Soviet Union, while the Gaullists had many reservations about 
the supranational character of the High Authority. In the National Assembly on 13 
December 1951, 377 MPs voted for the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community and 233 against. The government was even forced to move a vote of confi-
dence twice during the public debates. The MPs also adopted two amendments to the 
original text of the bill authorising the President of the Republic to ratify the Treaty 
establishing the ECSC. The amendments principally sought continued investment to 
support the French coal mining and iron and steel industries as well as to canalise 
the River Moselle. In the Council of the Republic, the plan was threatened with failure 
when MPs from the conservative right wing joined forces with the Gaullists and Com-
munists. Accordingly, the French Government had to make a number of promises to 
the Councillors as regards the supply of coke to the French iron and steel industry 
before it secured ratification, on 1 April 1952, by 182 votes to 32.
The question of the seat of the institutions
The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) set up a 
number of institutions to carry out its activities (Article 7 of the Treaty):
• a High Authority, assisted by a Consultative Committee;
• a Common Assembly;
• a Special Council of Ministers;
• a Court of Justice.
After the signing of the ECSC Treaty on 18 April 1951, the ministers needed to 
resolve some tricky practical questions to do with the seat of the institutions. Under 
the Schuman Plan, an interim committee was instructed to submit proposals con-
cerning seats of the institutions, but it was unable to reach agreement. Some Belgians 
wanted the seat to be in Liège. However, there was disagreement on this issue, both 
in Belgium itself and in the five other Member States of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). Other cities were suggested, such as Luxembourg, Strasbourg 
and Turin. Saarbrücken was also proposed, and yet, despite its status as a European 
city, it was not chosen because of the problem of the status of the Saar.
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To break the deadlock in the negotiations, during the night of 24 to 25 July 1952 the 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Joseph Bech, made the proposal that the ECSC High 
Authority be provisionally located in Luxembourg. ‘Provisional’ became ‘definitive’, 
and the seat of the High Authority remained in Luxembourg until the Merger Treaty 
combined the executive bodies in 1965.
So, in July 1952, it was Luxembourg that was chosen, at least initially, as the home 
of the High Authority, along with the Special Council of Ministers and the ECSC Court 
of Justice, while the Common Assembly had its seat in Strasbourg, as did the Con-
sultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.
The various institutions began their work in 1952. On 10 August 1952, the inaugural 
session of the High Authority was held in Luxembourg, although the question of the 
seat had not yet been finally resolved. On 8 September 1952, the first session of the 
Special Council of Ministers, chaired by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, was 
held. Four months later, on 10 December 1952, Jean Monnet, President of the ECSC 
High Authority, opened the first working session of the ECSC Court of Justice.
The beginnings of the ECSC
The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) provided for 
the following institutions:
• a High Authority, assisted by a Consultative Committee;
• a Common Assembly;
• a Special Council of Ministers;
• a Court of Justice.
The various institutions began work in 1952. On 10 August 1952, the inaugural 
session of the High Authority took place in Luxembourg, although the issue of the 
seat had still not been conclusively settled. The first session of the Special Council 
of Ministers took place in Luxembourg on 8 September 1952, chaired by the German 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.
By 1953, the common market was operating to general satisfaction. The success 
was as much economic as political in nature. The common market was a factor for 
the growth of intra-European production and trade. On a political level, it promoted 
Franco-German reconciliation just a few years after the defeat of Hitler’s Reich.
The ECSC’s economic and social role
Jean Monnet, the founding father of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
became the first President of the High Authority (1952-1954). Mr Monnet and his 
French successor, René Mayer (1955-1957), implemented ECSC policy during the 
transitional period. They initially increased trade between the Six. In order to achieve 
this, they abolished customs duties and quotas as well as export taxes in transport 
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tariffs, while at the same time introducing direct international tariffs. Trade in coal 
and steel between partners increased substantially. Finally, the coal shortage, which 
had almost killed off the European iron and steel industry after the war, was largely 
overcome. The regular supply of iron ore, scrap metal and coal made it possible to 
regulate industrial growth within the Six.
The transitional period
The High Authority was established in Luxembourg on 10 August 1952. The common 
market in coal, iron ore and scrap metal was subsequently set up in February 1953 
and was extended to iron and steel products in May 1953. On 1 January 1953 the first 
European tax—the ECSC levy—was introduced.
Steel producers had a five-year period to adapt to the new conditions of competi-
tion. Thanks to State aid, Italy successfully modernised its iron and steel industry. 
It also hoped that European integration would help to resolve the unemployment 
problem, which was to some extent linked to the mobility of its workforce. Belgium, 
on the other hand, was unable to modernise fully its coalmines in Wallonia.
Conditions of competition
The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) stated that 
the High Authority was responsible for establishing the best conditions of competi-
tion among the various producers. It was also to prevent the restoration of producer 
cartels by requiring businesses to advertise their prices openly and by monitoring 
mergers. However, in practice, iron and steel manufacturers, by virtue of their mu-
tual contacts, continued to fix prices on the basis of the state of the market and their 
funding requirements.
Regulating the market
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) failed to attain the targets set by 
the Treaty as regards the dismantling of the cartels. Increased productivity actually 
encouraged businesses to form increasingly powerful groups. This prevented the 
total dissolution of the Ruhr’s coal-selling cartel, an objective which had been high 
on France’s agenda.
However, fears concerning the German cartels proved to be largely unfounded. 
France ensured that it had access to coke from the Ruhr, Italy benefited from the free 
movement of scrap metal, and Luxembourg profited from the expansion of its market.
Social policy
During the negotiations which led to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), the trade unions drew the attention of the negotiators to 
the danger of a downward social trend triggered by the establishment of the common 
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market. What they feared was having to confront dumping tariff practices resulting 
from the different social conditions in the six Member States.
Despite these fears, the ECSC played an important role in the social field. It en-
couraged improvements in health and safety at work and improvements in vocational 
training. The Treaty of Paris, which aimed, inter alia, to improve the standard of liv-
ing of the ECSC’s workforce, provided for Community financial aid for the retraining 
of dismissed workers and banned the practice of lowering wages as a competitive 
device. The High Authority also launched an ambitious house-building programme 
especially for miners and steelworkers in order to resolve the shortage of council 
housing from which Europe had been suffering since the end of the war. The ECSC 
financed and built more than 150 000 council houses between 1952 and 1979 through-
out the whole Community. The High Authority also made great efforts to conclude 
a European Convention on Social Security for migrant workers, as well as working 
towards the introduction of the five-day week.
Moreover, thanks to the privileged relationship which Mr Monnet maintained 
with the Americans, the ECSC was able to raise loans—100 million dollars in 1954—
from the United States, although the American capital market remained virtually 
closed to European businesses. The United States actually recognised the ECSC as 
an independent and sovereign body, one authorised to sign a tariff agreement with 
the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This 
highly symbolic political recognition also enabled the High Authority to grant loans 
to European businesses and to finance social adjustment programmes.
The ECSC’s political role
The greatest achievement of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was 
that it laid down the foundations for reconciliation between France and Germany, 
despite significant economic conflicts of interest. At the same time, a new Community 
spirit was developing, and unique institutional instruments were being set up within 
the Community. The trade unions, employers and various pressure groups also began 
to cooperate. As for the High Authority, it demonstrated its ability to work with the 
national governments without reducing them to mere onlookers.
The success of the ECSC led its founders to consider extending the scope of coop-
eration, firstly to other industrial sectors and then to the entire economy. However, 
significant problems soon emerged when Europe tried to organise a common defence 
strategy.
The ECSC in difficulties
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the motor of European unification 
at the beginning of the 1950s, experienced serious difficulties towards the end of the 
decade.
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Primarily because of the change in France’s political environment from 1958 on-
wards, the supranational power of the ECSC, as embodied by the High Authority, was 
no longer accepted. Furthermore, the effects of the cyclical and structural crises in 
the coal sector greatly increased the difficulties faced by the ECSC. To these were to 
be added difficulties on the steel market. In an unfavourable political and economic 
climate, the High Authority sought to assert itself against the new European Com-
munities (EEC and Euratom) which threatened to compete with it. However, at the 
same time, the lack of cohesion between the members of the ECSC Commission and 
the internal administrative reorganisation which followed the departure of several 
senior officials for the EEC and Euratom Commissions in Brussels, weakened the 
powers of the High Authority. The coal crisis that affected the Europe of the Six forced 
the High Authority to take precautionary measures, which affected its relations with 
certain third countries, particularly the United States.
The crisis of the European coal market
he idea of a common policy in the coal sector had emerged in the 1940s. However, 
at the end of the 1950s, i.e. at the end of the ECSC’s ten-year transitional period, the 
economic environment had changed considerably: the shortage of coal that Europe 
had experienced after the war was replaced by an overproduction of coal. Coal stocks 
increased mainly because of stiff competition from American coal and from oil and 
gas on the international energy market.
Therefore, between 1950 and 1970, both domestic and industrial coal consumption 
continued to decrease, to be replaced by hydrocarbons which were much easier to 
use. The overabundance of oil and mass imports—because of a reduction in trans-
atlantic freight costs—of low-cost American coal led to a slump in sales of European 
coal. As a result, even the most competitive European coal, i.e. from the Ruhr, did not 
sell and remained in storage.
Coal markets were thrown into disarray: mine closures and redundancies were 
the most tragic consequences. Miners were either condemned to seek training for a 
different job or to unemployment.
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had to tackle this crisis, both 
structural and cyclical. The High Authority, faced by Member States which were 
increasingly resorting to national measures – in the tax, customs or trade fields – 
and rejecting what were held to be interventionist measures, endeavoured to use the 
means to act which it had at its disposal.
The manifest crisis
In order to tackle the coal crisis, the High Authority had to use the means provided 
for in the Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Towards 
the end of the 1950s, the High Authority wanted to declare a state of ‘manifest crisis’ 
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for coal which, under the Treaty, would allow it to set production quotas and intro-
duce restrictions on third-country imports in order to stabilise prices. To achieve this 
aim, every undertaking would have to comply with a production ceiling. However, the 
High Authority needed the approval of the Special Council of Ministers before it could 
apply this kind of Community measure. What is more, it was clear that the Council 
of Ministers would refuse to give its assent. The High Authority therefore had to be 
content with drawing up a series of general recommendations to the Member States 
on production, terms of sale, consumption and coal imports.
The rejection of the High Authority
After long negotiations, the Special Council of Ministers of 14 May 1959 refused to 
allow the High Authority to declare a state of manifest crisis because governments 
were in disagreement about how to resolve the coal crisis. The Six were against any 
form of direct intervention by the High Authority and rejected its anti-crisis plan.
• France did not want the measures taken to be the same for each Member State 
because of their different economic cycles;
• Germany feared a move towards a centrally controlled economy;
• the Benelux countries and Italy held different views on the quota system for Com-
munity production.
Accordingly, the High Authority was unable to impose one single common meas-
ure in response to the coal crisis and had to limit itself to case-by-case intervention. 
In particular, it regulated the Belgian market, heavily weakened because its mines 
in Wallonia were becoming outdated. The High Authority resorted to an adaptation 
fund to assist miners hit by unemployment, and it authorised the Belgian authorities 
to grant subsidies with a view to lowering prices. A stabilisation programme was to 
help the country close the least profitable pits and reduce output. It also gave indi-
vidual grants to the Netherlands and France.
However, this restrictive and unpopular policy harmed the image and the influence 
of the High Authority. From then on, it no longer promoted production growth but 
encouraged its reduction instead. Now, it simply ensured that its initiatives complied 
with the Treaty. It was the only way of stabilising prices and avoiding social disaster. 
However, the persistent difficulties in Europe’s coal sector prompted the High Au-
thority to devise a Community energy policy. From 1960, it defined the harmonisation 
of the conditions for the production, import and marketing of the various sources of 
energy. It advocated, above all, the introduction of a common energy market designed 
to secure supplies at lower prices, but did not have the means to put this into effect.
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The difficulties of the European steel market
During the 1950s, steel production and imports continued to increase, creating excess 
supply on the market of the Six. The market deteriorated, and selling prices continued 
to drop as a result of competition from low-cost imports from eastern countries. The 
European steel industry was actually placed at a disadvantage because its cost prices 
were higher than those of its competitors. The High Authority therefore proposed 
limiting steel imports from third countries and increasing customs tariffs by 14 %. 
This suggestion worried European governments and industry, who feared that their 
trading partners would take retaliatory measures. In the autumn of 1963, the High 
Authority, whose President was the Italian Dino Del Bo, proposed a common com-
mercial policy. However, the governments disagreed where the level of protection 
afforded by a common external tariff was concerned.
The High Authority therefore used its powers to adopt two recommendations 
(obligatory where their aims were concerned, but optional regarding the means to 
achieve them) inviting the governments to establish peripheral protection at the 
minimum level of 9 % which was, at that time, demanded by Italy. The French Govern-
ment deplored that recourse had been made to the supranational method. This was, 
however, the only resort available, given the disagreement among the governments. 
In the end, the role of the High Authority, already challenged by several governments, 
was called into question once again.
Source and notes, resources: CVCE.eu
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Enlargement of the European Union
‘The EU’s enlargement policy makes  Europe a safer and a more stable place; 
it allows us to grow stronger and to promote our values, and enables us 
to assume our role as a global player on the world stage.’ 
Štefan Füle, 
European Commissioner for Enlargement
Why the EU is enlarging?
The European Union was created in the 1950s to foster peace, prosperity and Euro-
pean values on the continent. Its purpose is as relevant today as it was then.
The EU is open to all democratic European countries that wish to join. The EU’s 
enlargement policy accompanies this process.
Having grown from 6 to 28 members, stretching from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, 
the EU has become home to over 500 million people. 
Benefits for all 
Enlargement serves the interests of Member States as well as acceding countries. It 
makes Europe a safer and more prosperous place, in particular through its promo-
tion of democracy and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the single market.
The benefits of the single market are considerable: economic growth entailing 
higher living standards, safer consumer goods, lower prices and greater choice in 
sectors such as telecommunications, banking and air travel, to name but a few. These 
benefits have been shared among an increasing number of people as the EU has 
grown in size.
The EU is above all a community of values. We are a family of democratic European 
countries committed to working together for peace and freedom, prosperity and 
social justice, and we defend these values. We seek to deepen the solidarity between 
the peoples of Europe, while respecting and preserving our diversity.
Article 2, Treaty on European Union
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States …’
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The European Economic Community, founded in the 1950s and now 
known as the European Union, originally had six members: Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom became Member 
States. Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal followed in 
1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in 1995.
In 2004, in the EU’s biggest-ever enlargement, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia became Member States. Three years later, in 2007, 
Bulgaria and Romania joined. 
Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013, bringing the total number of 
Member States to 28.
Article 49, Treaty on European Union
‘Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 
and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member 
of the Union.’
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How the enlargement process works
Starting in 1950, leaders of six countries which were still recovering from the ravages 
of war started what we today call the European Union. 
It was an unprecedented step, one that required much courage and vision: coun-
tries that had fought each other for centuries agreed to act together on essential 
questions concerning their common future.
They also agreed to transfer some of their powers to a new level, to what we now 
simply refer to as the European Union.
The EU has been a historic success. It has brought the longest period of peace and 
an unparalleled level of prosperity to its peoples. What began as a club of six now 
encompasses 28 countries with a population of more than 500 million. Integrating 
new members was part of the plan from the very beginning. The founding fathers had 
an inclusive vision of Europe, leaving the door open for other democratic European 
countries to join. Helping countries that have the vocation to become members has 
been a constant task of the EU in the past five decades, promoting economic growth 
and solidarity and supporting democratic forces in countries emerging from dicta-
torship.
Who can join? 
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union states that any European country may 
apply for membership if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed 
to promoting them.
A country can only become a member if it fulfils the criteria and conditions for 
accession as defined by the EU leaders at their summit in Copenhagen in 1993, and by 
a number of subsequent EU decisions. The so-called Copenhagen criteria are:
1. political: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. economic: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces in the EU;
3. the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
In addition, the EU must be able to integrate new members, so it reserves the right 
to decide when it is ready to accept them.
For the western Balkans, additional conditions apply, mostly related to regional 
cooperation and good relations with neighbouring countries (the so-called ‘Stabilisa-
tion and association process conditionality’).
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The European Union enlargement agenda presently covers the western Balkans, Turkey 
and Iceland. Each country is at a different stage of the enlargement process.
Montenegro, Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey are 
candidate countries. Accession negotiations are ongoing with Montenegro and Turkey; 
Serbia will follow suit by January 2014 at the latest. The Commission has also recom-
mended the opening of accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. 
Accession negotiations with Iceland were put on hold in 2013 at the request of the coun-
try itself.
Albania , Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidates. The Commission 
has recommended to the Council that candidate status be granted to Albania, subject to 
a number of conditions. 
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Who decides? 
New members are admitted with the unanimous consent of the EU Member States. 
When a country applies to join the EU, the Member States’ governments, rep-
resented in the Council, first decide whether or not to accept the application. The 
Member States then decide, on the basis of an opinion from the European Commis-
sion, whether to grant candidate status to the applicant as well as to open accession 
negotiations. Similarly, the Member States decide when and on what terms to open 
and to close negotiations with the candidate on each policy area, in the light of recom-
mendations from the Commission.
When accession negotiations have been satisfactorily completed, an accession 
treaty is drafted and signed by the Member States and the candidate concerned. The 
European Parliament, whose members are elected directly by the EU’s citizens, also 
has to give its consent. The treaty then has to be ratified by all the Member States 
and the acceding country, in accordance with their constitutionally established 
procedures.
To ensure that enlargement brings maximum benefits to both the EU and the 
countries in the process of joining it, the accession process needs to be carefully man-
aged. Candidates have to demonstrate that they will be able to fully play their part as 
members—something that requires support among their citizens, as well as political 
and technical compliance with the EU’s standards and norms. Throughout the proc-
ess, the EU sets conditions for the countries to move from one stage to the next. 
Accession negotiations 
Accession negotiations concern the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership. They focus on the conditions and timing of the candidate’s adoption, 
implementation and application of the existing EU laws and rules — some 100 000 
pages of them. The rules as such (also known as the acquis, French for ‘that which has 
been adopted’) are not negotiable. Negotiations are essentially a matter of agreeing 
on how and when the candidate will adopt and effectively implement EU rules and 
procedures. 
Negotiations are conducted between the EU Member States and the candidate 
country; their pace mostly depends on the candidate’s progress in meeting the require-
ments. Candidates consequently have an incentive to implement the necessary reforms 
rapidly and effectively. Some of these reforms require considerable and sometimes dif-
ficult transformations of a country’s political and economic structures. It is therefore 
important that governments clearly and convincingly communicate the reasons for 
these reforms to their citizens. Support from civil society is essential in this process. 
The opening of accession negotiations is decided on by the European Council upon 
a recommendation of the Commission, once the candidate country sufficiently meets 
the Copenhagen political criteria and possible other conditions.
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Accession treaty
When negotiations on all the chapters have been completed to the satisfaction of both 
sides, the results are incorporated into a draft accession treaty. The Commission is 
then consulted and the European Parliament has to give its consent. Then the treaty 
is signed and ratified by the candidate country and all the Member States.
From signing the accession treaty to accession
Once the accession treaty is signed, the acceding state is entitled to certain provi-
sional privileges. It acquires ‘active observer status’ in most EU bodies and agencies, 
where it is entitled to speak, but not to vote; it can comment on draft EU proposals, 
communications, recommendations or initiatives. Once the ratification process is 
complete, the accession treaty enters into force on its scheduled date, and the acced-
ing state becomes an EU Member State.
THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED: ENLARGEMENT
European Commission
Directorate-General for Communication
Publications
1049 Brussels
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Actual Developments
Speech by President Barroso at the European Parliament 
plenary debate on the European Council, 24-25 October 2013
José Manuel Durão Barroso
President of the European Commission
European Parliament plenary debate/Strasbourg
23 October 2013
President,
Honourable members,
Ladies and gentlemen,
This week’s European Council will discuss a range of very important topics: the dig-
ital economy, innovation, services, youth unemployment, financing of the economy, 
regulatory fitness, EMU and economic governance, EMU and the social dimension, 
the Banking Union, Eastern Partnership and migration.
My main message to the European Council tomorrow is that over the next weeks 
and months, the European Union can, and must, achieve concrete results in all these 
areas. Many of our initiatives can be brought to a successful conclusion even before 
this House rises ahead of next May’s elections. But I will make it clear that we can only 
deliver if there is the necessary political will also among our Member States.
Just yesterday, as you know, the Commission approved a very substantive Work 
Programme for 2014. So there is a lot to do.
Honourable Members,
The thematic focus of tomorrow’s European Council will be on innovation and the 
digital agenda.
Digital services, telecommunications, e-government and skills are the drivers 
of tomorrow’s growth and productivity. Even in the crisis this is a sector that has 
continued to show growth potential; and we predict there will be nearly one million 
ICT job vacancies unfilled in the coming years, which is unacceptable given the extent 
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of youth unemployment we face. This is why the Commission has launched the Grand 
Coalition for Digital Jobs, a multi-stakeholder partnership to exploit the employment 
potential of ICT.
We need a thriving digital sector to drive all other parts of our economy, and the 
internal market for telecoms has to be at the heart of this problem. We must urgently 
address the underlying shortcomings and create the right environment for invest-
ment. There is now a major reform package for the telecoms sector on the table. Let 
us all make maximum progress on this file by the end of this legislature.
This package complements a number of important recent proposals on the comple-
tion of the Digital Single Market, for example on reducing the cost of deploying high-
speed broadband networks, on е-invoicing in public procurement, on cyber-security 
and on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions. These 
too are in your hands, and in the Council’s hands, and I hope the European Council 
will throw its weight behind the call to finalise them in the months to come.
Honourable Members,
We need to build this Digital Single Market in a manner that is consistent with our 
European values. That includes making sure that those who operate in the online 
world do not escape from fair taxation. The Commission is actively working on a se-
ries of measures to fight against tax evasion in general, working with the G8, G20 and 
OECD. But there are some specific challenges which are posed by new digital business 
models which existing tax policies may not yet fully address. This is why yesterday 
the Commission decided to set up an expert group on taxation in the digital economy, 
which will report by next summer.
Core European values, namely the respect of fundamental rights, including the 
right to privacy and security, also matter just as much on-line as off-line. Recent 
disclosures concerning surveillance activities have cast a shadow in European Union 
citizens trust in digital services. We need to combine the digital agenda with a better 
framework for protection of data and privacy rights. Trust in the data-driven econ-
omy has to be restored not only for the needed confidence but also for its potential 
impact on growth. I therefore strongly welcome this week’s vote in the Committee 
for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of this Parliament, lending its strong 
support to the Commission’s proposals. I want to thank Parliament for the priority 
which it attaches to this file. We should do all we can to conclude this much-needed 
modernisation and strengthening of the EU data protection rules before the end of 
this legislature.
The other thematic priority for this European Council will be research and inno-
vation. The evidence is there: Member States that have continued to invest in innova-
tion have fared better in the current crisis than those that have not. We will need to 
increase our efforts – public and private - to keep up with international competition.
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International investors are now finding their way to Europe but business research 
and development expenditure in the EU is far below that of our main competitors. 
The crisis has also taken its toll with a decrease in public spending on R&D in 2011.
Europe is lagging behind, in particular in fast-growing markets and high tech. If 
no action is taken, the EU may miss out again on fast growing markets linked to the 
technologies which tackle societal challenges.
The Commission has recently launched an Indicator of Innovation Output to focus 
attention on the right R&D policies. But additional investment in R&D makes no sense 
without critical structural reforms of national research and innovation systems. The 
Commission will continue to push for reforms to create a true European Research 
Area. We must enable the mobility of researchers and provide open access to publicly 
funded research results and transnational access to research infrastructures.
Creating the right business environment is also key to stimulating growth. That 
is why this Commission is removing unnecessary burdens on business across all 
policy areas. The Commission has since 2005 repealed 5590 legal acts and reduced 
the administrative burden by 32.3 billion euros.
And we are determined to go further. In our Communication on Regulatory Fit-
ness, REFIT, we have just launched a programme to further simplify legislation. We 
plan to withdraw some pending proposals and repeal existing laws which no longer 
serve their purpose. We act where action is needed at European level. We should not 
act where it can be done better at national or sub-national level.
At the European Council tomorrow, I will be looking for a strong endorsement of 
the REFIT programme. But let me be clear. This is neither about calling into question 
established policy goals. Nor should it be a battle of competencies between Brussels 
and national capitals. This is about the right dose in using existing competencies in 
full respect of subsidiarity and proportionality. I also expect Member States to cut 
red tape at their level and avoid “gold plating” EU legislation by adding new national 
burdens to European rules.
This brings us, Honourable Members, to another issue I have repeatedly stressed 
in this House, as well as in the European Council, financing the economy. This re-
mains one of the biggest bottlenecks in the European economy. Even with growth 
returning, confidence and pre-crisis lending patterns will not return quickly. We 
need to unblock the flow of credit and help businesses, especially SMEs. Frankly I am 
disappointed that the Member States are not more ambitious here. And I will tell this 
tomorrow to the European Council.
Honourable Members, in some countries, the EU budget will be by far the most 
important source of public investment over the next few years. These funds will help 
kick-start private funding as well, which is key to future growth.
The preparations for the next MFF come a very long way but we are not yet there. 
We need a final push from all concerned in order to conclude. This is of utmost im-
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portance and urgency for many of our Member States and for many of our regions. 
Without the budget of the European Union they will simply not be able to invest, 
because they have no fiscal space to do it. I can assure you that the Commission will 
continue to do its utmost to facilitate a fair and balanced outcome between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council. An outcome as close as possible to the Commission’s 
level of ambition, something I know the Parliament shares.
Honourable Members, you know that, together with the EIB, we have also looked 
into other, alternative instruments of financing the economy, including forms of risk-
sharing by pooling and leveraging parts of the EU funds and EIB loans. I will call upon 
Member States to bring forward concrete pledges, and go beyond the status quo. We 
are not asking Governments to renounce part of their funds. We are asking Member 
States to increase the effect of the funds, notably for the benefit of SMEs - who suffer 
the most from the fragmentation of Europe’s credit markets.
Equally important in our comprehensive crisis response is that we move forward 
on the road to a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union. In this sense the Eu-
ropean Council is an intermediate step towards decisions in December, but every step 
is necessary. Completing the Banking Union in particular is the one most significant 
and important advance we can make to end the unfair distortions of lending conditions 
in financial markets. So it must remain our absolute priority for the euro area.
I congratulate the co-legislators on the final approval of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism. Now we have to find a final agreement on the directive on bank recovery 
and resolution and a political agreement in Council on the Single Resolution Mecha-
nism by the end of the year. Our goal must be to conclude negotiations with this 
House in the spring. I want to thank the European Parliament for its efforts and the 
hard work that has been done to prepare its position for these discussions.
We also need to pay attention to the balance sheet assessment and forthcoming 
stress test exercise in the banking sector. The Commission will support the European 
Central Bank and European Banking Authority in any way possible in that important 
work. We also expect Member States to do their homework in terms of ensuring the 
availability of any necessary backstops – in line with state aid rules – should private 
solutions not be adequate, and in terms of the full cooperation of national supervisors 
to bring this exercise to fruition.
Honourable members,
We have made significant progress as regards economic governance in the EU, in 
particular as regards the country-specific recommendations which are the end-point 
of the European Semester. But we must continue our efforts to strengthen eco-
nomic policy coordination, in particular within the euro area. We must make further 
progress on identifying the policy areas which require coordination, including ex-
ante coordination. On the other hand, the implementation of the country-specific rec-
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ommendations is not yet optimal, which is also due to insufficient ownership by each 
Member State of the recommendations which are addressed to them. The widening 
of these to the social and employment dimensions will surely contribute to enhance 
ownership.
As you know the Commission has presented a Communication on the social di-
mension of the Economic and Monetary Union. One of the core proposals is stronger 
surveillance of employment and social challenges and policy coordination. The role 
of the European Parliament is crucial in this regard. The Commission will cooperate 
with the European Parliament to select the indicators to the Alert Mechanism Report 
and will discuss with European Parliament the new scoreboard of key social and 
employment indicators. The Commission intends to make use of those indicators in 
the forthcoming Alert Mechanism Report. Moreover in the Annual Growth Survey – 
to be adopted by mid next month - the Commission will present a first overview of 
the implementation of the country-specific recommendations. We will not reduce our 
efforts in making the European Semester the real tool for economic coordination in 
the European Union.
We must also step up our efforts to fight against youth unemployment. In June the 
Commission proposed the frontloading of the social funds so that the initial 6 billion 
euro is invested in the first two years. Adopting the necessary regulations is a matter 
of urgency and of concern. We are approaching the programming period. Member 
States with the support of the Commission are in the process of finalising the design 
of the Youth Guarantee Implementation plans and Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) 
programmes.
Honourable Members,
While moving forward on our internal priorities we should not lose sight of our ex-
ternal responsibilities, in particular our close neighbourhood. This European Council 
will prepare the Eastern Partnership Summit which will take place in Vilnius later in 
November.
The European Commission launched this initiative back in 2009. Four years later 
we are now in a position to deliver on our common objective of political association 
and economic integration with our Eastern partners. Our common goal is to conclude 
Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas. The 
free will of these countries must be respected by everyone. Of course, we also expect 
our partners to keep and deliver on their commitment to the reforms and to the values 
that underpin these partnerships. I therefore launch from here an appeal to Ukraine 
to fulfil the remaining benchmarks and seize the opportunity of the extension of 
the Cox-Kwasniewski mission. I believe the next weeks are critically important for 
Ukraine and I make a strong appeal for us and for Ukraine to reach progress in that 
process.
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Honourable Members,
Last of all, and importantly, after the awful and all too frequent tragedies in the 
Mediterranean, migration policy too will feature heavily at this European Council.
As you know, I was in Lampedusa two weeks ago, accepting an invitation from 
the Italian authorities, and of course I was profoundly touched by what I saw. The 
images will remain impressed on me for ever. I was there to express the European 
Commission’s understanding and solidarity to the local and national authorities and 
to the people of Lampedusa and also to offer concrete aid to the Italian authorities, 
which we have done.
We must all do more to prevent tragedies like this. I hope the European Council 
will pave the way for a new chapter in the common management, common respon-
sibility and cooperative management at European Union level of migration policies.
There are no magic or immediate solutions, and we need to be realistic. But the 
character and the scale of the problem calls for stronger measures to organise search 
and rescue operations to save lives in danger, to better protect our borders and effec-
tively tackle the criminal networks behind the migration flows and to protect those 
in need. In this sense, and knowing well that most responsibilities and competences 
lie at national level, more has to be done in terms of cooperation with countries of 
origin and transit and of Member States’ efforts on resettlement. It’s quite clear that 
Europe cannot turn its back when seeing this kind of humanitarian tragedy.
These elements form part of the solution, but first and foremost we need the 
political will. The Commission is doing its part, and, for example, was now requested 
by governments to lead a Task Force with Member States and EU Agencies such as 
Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and EUROPOL. We must not 
allow the momentum on such vital issues to be fuelled by tragedies alone.
Concluding, Honourable Members,
In all these files, we need to get the solutions where they can be found, working 
together to make them really produce results. I think there are no excuses, and the 
opportunity to go forward before the elections is there.
There are efforts directly aimed at the welfare of our citizens. But there are also 
efforts which are critically important for the credibility of our institutions, to show 
that in fact we bring solutions to the problems of our citizens.
So I am convinced we can continue to work in this together, with this spirit of 
achieving results.
I thank you for your attention.
Source: europe.eu
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EU Response to the Crisis
From the deepest economic crisis the world economy has seen since the great depres-
sion, Europe is emerging with new common institutions and a greater commitment 
to shared responsibility and solidarity.
Why did the crisis happen?
Europe’s debt crisis was initially triggered by events in the American banking sector.
When a slowdown in the US economy caused over-extended American homeown-
ers to default on their mortgages, banks all over the world with investments linked to 
those mortgages started losing money.
America’s fourth largest investment bank, Lehman brothers, collapsed under the 
weight of its bad investments, scaring other banks and investors with which it did 
business. The fear that more banks could fail caused investors and banks to take 
extreme precautions. Banks stopped lending to each other, pushing those reliant on 
such loans close to the edge. 
European banks that had invested heavily in the American mortgage market were 
hit hard. In an attempt to stop some banks from failing, governments came to the 
rescue in many EU countries like Germany, France, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. But the cost of bailing out the banks proved very high. In 
Ireland, it almost bankrupted the government until fellow EU countries stepped in 
with financial assistance. 
As Europe slipped into recession in 2009, a problem that started in the banks 
began to affect governments more and more, as markets worried that some countries 
could not afford to rescue banks in trouble.
Investors began to look more closely at the finances of governments. Greece came 
under particular scrutiny because its economy was in very bad shape and successive 
governments had racked up debts nearly twice the size of the economy.
The threat of bank failures meant that the health of government finances became 
more important than ever. 
Governments that had grown accustomed to borrowing large amounts each year 
to finance their budgets and that had accumulated massive debts in the process, sud-
denly found markets less willing to keep lending to them.
What started as a banking crisis became a sovereign debt crisis.
Why did the crisis spread?
In several countries, governments became ensnared by the problems of the banking 
sector when troubled banks started turning to them for help. The high cost of bank 
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rescues led financial markets to question whether governments could really afford to 
support the banking sector. And as recession began to bite across Europe, the focus 
on the health of government finances threw a spotlight on the fact that a number of 
governments in the euro area had for some years been borrowing heavily to finance 
their budgets, accumulating huge debts in the process.  Easy money was available 
because investors had turned a blind eye to warning signs about the health of the 
economy and were not paying enough attention to the risks involved in lending more 
and more.
Part of the reason some governments had become dependent on debt was that 
their economies had been losing competitiveness for a long time, as they failed to 
keep up with economic reforms in other countries.
In some countries, governments had allowed property bubbles and other unhealthy 
economic imbalances to develop.  Finally, some governments had ignored the rules 
designed to make the euro work and had not done more to coordinate their economic 
policies since agreeing to share a common currency with a single monetary policy.
In an increasing number of countries a vicious cycle developed. Financial insta-
bility stifled economic growth, which in turn lowered tax revenues and increased 
governments’ debts. Higher debts then raised the cost of borrowing for governments, 
feeding financial instability. All of this prompted questions as to whether the insti-
tutional set-up of the Economic and Monetary Union and the euro was adequate in 
times of crisis.
The crisis exposed several shortcomings in the EU’s system of economic governance:
• Too much focus on deficits: monitoring of countries’ public finances had focused 
on annual budget deficits and not sufficiently on the level of government debt. Yet 
a number of countries that had kept to EU rules by running low annual deficits or 
even surpluses nevertheless found themselves in financial difficulties during the 
global financial crisis because of high levels of debt. Therefore, stricter monitor-
ing of this indicator was needed.
• Lack of surveillance of competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances: surveil-
lance of EU economies failed to pay enough attention to unsustainable develop-
ments in competitiveness and credit growth leading to accumulated private 
sector debt, weakened financial institutions, and inflated housing markets.
• Weak enforcement: for euro area countries that did not play by the rules, enforcement 
was not strong enough; a firmer, more credible mechanism of sanctions was needed.
• Slow decision-making capacity: too often, institutional weaknesses meant that 
tough decisions on worrying macroeconomic developments were postponed. This 
also meant that insufficient account was taken of the economic situation from the 
perspective of the euro area as a whole.
• Emergency financing: when the crisis struck there was no mechanism to provide 
financial support to euro area countries that suddenly found themselves in 
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financial difficulties. Financial support was needed not only to address country-
specific problems but also to provide a ‘firewall’ to prevent problems spreading to 
other countries that were at risk.
As a consequence, Greece, and subsequently Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, 
were eventually unable to borrow on financial markets at reasonable interest rates. 
The EU was requested to step in, which resulted in the creation of a crisis resolu-
tion mechanism and financial backstops i.e. large funds on stand-by to be used in an 
emergency by euro area countries in financial difficulty.
Responding to the financial crisis
To prevent a complete collapse of the banking system, European governments came 
to the rescue of their banks with urgent support of an unprecedented scale. 1.6 tril-
lion euros, the equivalent of 13 % of the EU’s annual GDP were committed between 
2008 and 2011.
The EU also launched a Europe-wide recovery programme to safeguard jobs and 
social protection levels and to support economic investment. In this way, bank runs 
were avoided and European savings were protected.
The euro broadly maintained its value and successfully shielded euro zone coun-
tries from the worst effect of the economic crisis by providing EU companies with a 
stable playing field for international trade and investment. But this effort took its toll, 
especially because most of this money had to be borrowed.
The economic and financial crisis has demonstrated that the EU’s banking system 
is vulnerable to shocks. A problem at one bank can spread quickly to others, affecting 
depositors, investment and the overall economy. In response, the EU and its member 
countries have been strengthening financial sector supervision.
As part of the reforms, 3 European supervisory bodies were set up to help coor-
dinate the work of national regulators and ensure EU-level rules are applied consist-
ently.
• The European Banking Authority (EBA), which deals with bank supervision, 
including the supervision of the recapitalisation of banks;
• the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which deals with the 
supervision of capital markets and carries out direct supervision with regard to 
credit rating agencies and trade repositories,
• and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which 
deals with insurance supervision.
European financial supervision is being stepped up to ensure that banks are 
better capitalised, behave responsibly and are able to lend money to households 
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and businesses. This paves the ways for Banking Union to make sure that people’s 
deposits are protected and taxpayers are not forced to pay for the failure of banks.
The Banking Union is a natural complement to the Economic and Monetary Union. It 
addresses the weaknesses that were revealed by the crisis. Soon banks in every coun-
try that uses the euro will report to a common supervisor, the European Central Bank. 
Moreover, decisions on how to handle a failing bank will be taken centrally, according 
to a common set of rules that have been designed to minimise the cost to tax payers.
Depositors across Europe will also be better protected. Through these measures 
nearly 30 more, the EU is working to build a more effective financial sector based on 
stronger, more resilient banks and sounder regulation and supervision.
As the euro area’s independent monetary policy authority, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) played an important role in containing the crisis with innovative policies. 
The institution’s decision to lend banks as much as they needed at low rates and for 
as long as three years, helped to calm markets by ensuring that banks would be able 
to cover their short term needs.
When financial markets became so dysfunctional that they were demanding 
unreasonably high returns for lending to governments, the ECB devised the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, under which it promised to buy the 
bonds of struggling government to ensure a reasonable rate, provided that they also 
commit to a programme of economic reforms with the euro area’s assistance fund, 
the European Stability Mechanism.
Although no country has ever requested the OMT programme to be used, its mere 
fact of its existence helped to calm financial markets.
Responding to the debt crisis
From late 2009 and early 2010, certain euro area countries were beginning to have 
problems financing their debts. Market uncertainty led to normal government bor-
rowing operations becoming costly and eventually impossible.
At the time, EU countries reacted quickly by putting in place so-called ‘firewall’ 
confidence-building measures to help to finance the debts of countries facing tempo-
rary difficulties in borrowing money from financial markets.
In parallel the EU also set to work on resolving the root causes of its weaknesses. 
A twin track approach was followed. Temporary assistance mechanisms were estab-
lished to cope with the immediate crisis, and long-term measures to create perma-
nent support facilities and to help prevent a reoccurrence of future crises were set in 
motion.
Immediate response
The financing facilities for euro area countries experiencing severe financing prob-
lems were set up with considerable speed. When Greece lost access to affordable mar-
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ket financing, the EU moved quickly to help by pooling bilateral loans from European 
governments with the European Commission. It then set up two temporary funds, 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) with a total lending capacity of E500 billion. The creation of 
these instruments is testament to the willing of euro area and EU countries to show 
solidarity.
As these two financial backstops were constructed as temporary measures, the 
euro area countries in the autumn of 2012 created a new and permanent financial 
backstop — the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). It is now the cornerstone of 
the European firewall and an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive strategy to 
ensure financial stability in the euro area. Its lending capacity is currently set at € 
500 billion and conditional financial assistance will be available to those countries 
that have ratified the treaty on stability, coordination and governance. The ESM thus 
complements the reinforced surveillance by giving the possibility to offer conditional 
financial assistance to euro area countries when needed.
These ‘firewall’ facilities have not only resolved the immediate difficulties 
experienced by some countries in repaying their debts, but have also boosted the 
confidence of financial markets and helped to ensure financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole.
Help from the EU is also available for non-euro area countries that are faced with 
serious difficulties or problems attaining international financing. Countries that use 
the EU’s EUR 50 billion Balance of Payments Assistance fund must also agree to make 
reforms to fix their economic problems.
Long-term response
The EU introduced new stronger rules to keep a tighter check on public debt and 
deficits to make sure countries don’t spend beyond their means. A new fiscal treaty 
was also signed to further strengthen confidence limiting yearly structural deficits 
to 0.5 % of the GDP. This crisis clearly shows that a debt filled economy is not sustain-
able. European Commission will now make sure that the limits on debts and deficits 
are applied and that national budgets do not put at risk other European economies.
Ensuring sound public finances
The euro offers many potential benefits, but only if participating countries run sound 
economic policies. This is why membership of the euro, since the outset, has come 
with a firm obligation to avoid large and excessive budget deficits and to keep public 
debt at sustainable levels. This commitment to run sound fiscal policies is monitored 
through a framework known as the Stability and Growth Pact.
This Pact has been considerably reinforced as a result of the economic crisis. 
Governments must now submit their draft budget plans for scrutiny by the Commis-
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sion and other euro area countries. Rigorous surveillance mechanisms are in place 
to check that countries indeed will meet the budget targets which all euro area coun-
tries have committed themselves to achieve, and sanctions can be imposed if needed.
Ensuring competitiveness and promoting growth
Sound public finances are not the only key to having a thriving economy in the euro 
area. The crisis also revealed the need for a new approach to the regulation of financial 
services and for closely monitoring financial market developments. New surveillance 
instruments have also been established to make sure that euro area countries adopt 
economies policies that ensure competitiveness and promote growth as well as jobs. 
Prevention is better than cure, and these new surveillance instruments also aim to 
avoiding damaging bubbles in housing markets.
… on the macroeconomic side
In addition to strengthening the fiscal rules, the EU has introduced a new framework 
for the surveillance and timely correction of macroeconomic imbalances. The aim is 
to address risky developments, e. g. related to asset bubbles and weakening competi-
tiveness, before they become a threat to the stability of an EU country, the euro area, 
or the EU as a whole.
Therefore, the Commission regularly monitors for potential macroeconomic im-
balances (in areas such as labour cost, house prices or unemployment). EU countries 
that show potentially worrying trends are analysed in-depth. If an imbalance is 
found to exist, the country concerned is asked to take action to prevent the situation 
worsening. If an imbalance is deemed excessive, the country has to take action to 
correct the situation. For euro area countries enforcement of the rules is backed up 
by a sanctions mechanism.
... on the growth side
Europe 2020 is the EU’s growth strategy for this decade with the aim of fostering 
a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. With these three mutually reinforcing 
priorities, EU countries aim to establish high levels of employment, productivity and 
social cohesion. To measure progress towards these goals the EU has set five ambi-
tious targets to be reached by 2020 on: employment, innovation, education, social 
inclusion and climate/energy policy. Each country has adopted its own national 
targets in each of these areas. Actions at the EU and national levels and Structural 
Funds for EU countries will help implement these goals.
… on economic reforms
The European Semester is an annual cycle of policy coordination at EU level (the first 
half of the year) during which EU countries have the chance to review each other’s 
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economic and fiscal policies before they are implemented. At the end of the cycle, the 
EU addresses specific reform recommendations to each country. Implementation is 
monitored throughout the year. In addition, euro area countries have to publish their 
draft budgets for the following year by 15 October for the Commission to assess their 
conformity with agreed requirements.
Assisting countries in trouble
European countries have pulled together to create the world’s biggest financial as-
sistance funds. By working together, the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, help governments in need to devise 
assistance programmes to stabilise fragile economies and address deep-rooted eco-
nomic problems.
Source and further information: 
European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs
Multiannual financial framework 2014-2020 
and EU budget 2014 
The figures
Intergovernmental Support Mechanisms
Economic Governance
The crisis exposed fundamental problems and unsustainable trends in many 
European countries. It also made clear just how interdependent the EU’s econo-
mies are. Greater economic policy coordination across the EU will help us to 
address these problems and boost growth and job creation in future.
Emerging stronger from the crisis: the European vision 
More united than ever: how the EU has found solutions to tackle the financial crisis, 
how it is reinforcing its economic and monetary union and how this is paving the way 
towards a strong political union.
The new EU economic governance is based on three main blocks:
• A reinforced economic agenda with closer EU surveillance. This includes agreed 
policy priorities and targets as part of the Europe 2020 strategy; additional com-
mitments taken by Member States participating in the Euro Plus Pact; tighter EU 
surveillance of economic and fiscal policies as part of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and through new tools to tackle macro-economic imbalances; and a new 
working method – the European semester – to discuss economic and budgetary 
priorities at the same time every year.
• Action to safeguard the stability of the euro area. In 2010, the EU responded to 
the sovereign debt crisis by setting up temporary support mechanisms for its 
Member States, which will be replaced by the permanent European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) in 2013. These support measures are conditional on rigorous 
fiscal consolidation and reform programmes, and are developed in close coopera-
tion with the IMF.
• Action to repair the financial sector, as presented below.
The following focuses on some key aspects of this new EU economic governance.
The European Semester
The European semester is a six-month period each year when Member States’ budg-
etary, macro-economic and structural policies are coordinated effectively so as to 
allow Member States to take EU considerations into account at an early stage of their 
national budgetary processes and in other aspects of economic policymaking.
The key stages in the European semester are as follows:
• In January, the Commission issues its Annual Growth Survey, which sets out EU 
priorities for the coming year to boost growth and job creation.
• In March, EU Heads of State and Government issue EU guidance for national poli-
cies on the basis of the Annual Growth Survey.
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• In April, Member States submit their plans for sound public finances (Stability or 
Convergence Programmes) and reforms and measures to make progress towards 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (National Reform Programmes).
• In June, the Commission assesses these programmes and provides country-spe-
cific recommendations as appropriate. The Council discusses and the European 
Council endorses the recommendations.
• Finally, end of June or in early July, the Council formally adopts the country-specific 
recommendations.
The Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a set of rules that encourages Member States 
to maintain sound public finances.
The SGP has two ‚arms’:
• The Preventive Arm calls for Member States to submit an annual Stability (for euro 
area countries) or Convergence (for other Member States) Programme, which is 
submitted along with the National Reform Programme. This programme sets out 
how the Member State intends to achieve and maintain sound public finances in 
the medium term. The Commission can then offer policy recommendations (in 
June, as part of the European Semester), or, if necessary, make a proposal to the 
Council to issue an early warning of an excessive deficit
• The Corrective Arm governs the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). Under the 
EDP, if a Member State breaches the 3% budget deficit as described in the Treaty, 
the Council will issue recommendations on how to address this problem. Non-
compliance with these recommendations may lead to sanctions for euro area 
Member States.
The SGP is currently being reinforced with a range of proposed changes designed to:
• Allow the corrective arm of the SGP to take greater account of the interplay 
between debt and deficit, specifically in high debt countries (where public debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP)
• Speed up the EDP and make the imposition of sanctions on Member States semi-
automatic, by requiring a qualified majority in the Council to reject a sanctions 
proposal from the Commission, rather than to approve it
• Improve national budgetary frameworks, addressing accounting and statistical 
issues as well as forecasting practices
Addressing macro-economic imbalances
Over the past decade, Member States have experienced divergent economic trends, 
which have, exacerbated competitiveness gaps and led to macro-economic imbal-
ances within the EU. To avoid this happening in the future, the Commission has pro-
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posed a new surveillance mechanism to identify and correct such issues much earlier. 
Through this mechanism, Member States’ economies will be monitored for emerging 
macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. property bubbles, growing current account deficits 
or surpluses or falls in competitiveness). Where Member States breach the „alert 
thresholds”, the Commission will carry out in-depth studies to analyse whether the 
imbalances are harmful and if necessary it will issue recommendations.
The Euro Plus Pact
A complementary agenda with additional reforms – called the Euro Plus Pact – has 
been agreed among euro area Member States, as a reflection of their deeper interde-
pendence, as well as six non euro area countries that have chosen to sign up: Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. It focuses on four areas: competi-
tiveness, employment, sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial 
stability.
The Pact was endorsed by EU leaders in March 2011. All 23 signatories are com-
mitted to implementing the reforms in details. The remaining four Member States 
are free to sign up if they wish. It is fully embedded in the new economic governance 
framework and the commitments taken therein are included in the National Reform 
Programmes of the concerned Member States.
Repairing the financial sector
The EU has established new rules and agencies to prevent any problems earlier and 
make sure all financial players are properly regulated and supervised. Further work 
is underway, in particular to ensure Europe’s banks have sufficient capital reserves 
to enable them to withstand any future shocks to the financial system, so that they 
can continue functioning and providing credit to households and businesses.
Source: europe.eu
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EU Budget in a Nutshell
Click on the picture for the publication
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A Budget for Europe 2020
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Click on the picture for the publication
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The European Parliament
Fathers with Foresight showed the Way
Pat Cox
Extract from a contribution by Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament, 
to a joint publication produced by the European Commission in 2002 on the 
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). In his text, Mr Cox looks back on the institutional development of the 
ECSC Common Assembly, as precursor of the European Parliament, from its 
inception to the signing of the Rome Treaties in 1957.
[…]
The early years of the ECSC’s Common Assembly
Let us now turn our attention to the role of the ECSC’s Common Assembly in pre-
paring the way for the subsequent European Parliament. The structure and functions 
of the Common Assembly were set out in Articles 20 to 25 of the ECSC Treaty. Article 
20 specified that the assembly was to be made up of ‘representatives of the peoples 
of the States’—actually appointed by national parliaments on an annual basis. (More 
radically, however, a Member State could choose to select its membership by ‘direct 
universal suffrage’ if it so wished—though none did.) The number of representatives 
reflected the populations of the Member States: 18 for Germany, France and Italy; 10 
for Belgium and the Netherlands; and four for Luxembourg. Article 22 provided for 
the holding of an annual session of the assembly, and there also existed the possibility 
of holding extraordinary sessions if the Council of Ministers or the High Authority 
requested it, or if the assembly needed to deliver an opinion on an issue presented 
to it by the Council of Ministers. The High Authority was required to answer oral or 
written questions put to it by the assembly, though the Council of Ministers was not 
required to do so. Indeed no obvious mechanism of accountability of the Council of 
Ministers to the Common Assembly was provided for, which inevitably became the 
focus of much assembly attention over subsequent years.
The assembly was provided with the ‘nuclear weapon’ of a two-thirds majority 
censure motion against the High Authority, but given no role in the nomination of 
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a replacement: this would still be in the hands of the Member States. Moreover the 
assembly was given no role in subsequent Treaty modification. It could, however, 
adopt its own rules of procedure, which was actually to prove more significant than 
might appear at first sight. The Common Assembly met for the first time in an audi-
torium in Strasbourg University, even though its secretariat was based in Brussels, 
and was later to meet for many years in the chamber of the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, also in Strasbourg. This arrangement was supposed to be 
temporary, pending a decision by the Member States on the seat of the assembly. The 
assembly also rapidly came to the conclusion that its one annual session should be 
broken down into a series of part-sessions, which gradually increased in frequency.
At first, the assembly seated its members in alphabetical order, as in the Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe, but right from the start members began to 
collaborate on the creation of pan-European political groups, and in June 1953 the 
assembly adopted a modification to its rules of procedure which explicitly provided 
for the creation of such ‘supranational’ political groups. A minimum of nine members 
was required for the creation of a group, and such groups were allocated financial and 
staff resources. Seating by group membership then quickly replaced the alphabetical 
system. The assembly also quickly established an internal structure of standing com-
mittees in the areas of political affairs and foreign relations; the common market; 
investments, finance and production; labour policy; transportation, accounting and 
finance; and legal questions. Within these committees, responsibility for particular 
reports was allocated to individual ‘rapporteurs’, with little regard for their national-
ity. This concept has proved a successful one, still practised by the present Parliament.
The assembly was ever eager to increase its limited powers. On 2 December 1954 
it adopted a resolution (based on the Teitgen Report) calling on the assembly itself to 
examine how it might extend ‘political
control’ over the High Authority, as well as examining the possible modalities 
for direct elections to the assembly. In May 1955 a special working committee was 
established to investigate ways and means by which the assembly could exercise more 
power. The same plenary part-session also called for the strengthening of the ECSC’s 
institutions. In November of the same year, during an extraordinary partsession,
the special working party on European integration presented its report which, inter 
alia, called for the assembly to strengthen its position by ‘establishing direct contact’ 
with the Council of Ministers, and proposed further measures to increase such 
contacts. Finally the Member States should consult the assembly before appointing 
the President and Vice-President of the High Authority. The rest, as they say, is 
history. The signing of the Treaties of Rome, the merger of the Communities in the 
mid-1960s, and the subsequent amendment of the EEC Treaty by the Single European 
Act, and the Maastricht, Amsterdam and (hopefully) Nice Treaties, have their origins 
in the provisions of the ECSC Treaty.
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Thus we can also see quite clearly that the Common Assembly of the ECSC was very 
much the forerunner of the current European Parliament, and that the procedural 
and political innovations adopted by the Common Assembly have had a major impact 
on the current structure and organisation of the parliament. This means, of course, 
that the expiry of the ECSC is not a tragedy: the incorporation of coal and steel policy 
into the EC Treaty, with its codecision provisions, simply ensures the most effective 
use of those parliamentary powers which have their very origins in the political and 
institutional ambitions of the Common Assembly of the ECSC.
[…]
Source: cvce.eu
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The new European Parliament
Elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage: the background
Since the 1950s, members of the European Coal and Steel Community’s Common As-
sembly had regularly  been calling for its successor, the European Parliament, to be 
elected by universal suffrage. Since it was primarily a consultative body, none of the 
Member States took any action on the ECSC Treaty provision which, nevertheless, 
empowered the Member States to hold direct elections to the Common Assembly. Nor 
was Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome, which provided for the election of Members of 
the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, taken into consideration by the 
Council. However, the Federalists strongly urged a strengthening of the institution’s 
democratic legitimacy. During the 1960s, the Members of the European Parliament 
took up the baton, implementing increasing numbers of initiatives and resolutions in 
order to obtain satisfaction and transform the Assembly into an open forum for the 
will of the people in Europe. France, however, objected to this for many years. Mem-
bers of the Assembly therefore continued to be appointed by national parliaments.
In General de Gaulle’s opinion, the European Parliament, which initially had no 
budgetary or legislative powers to speak of, should not be elected by universal suf-
frage. He believed that the Council of Ministers was the only authorised legislative 
body in the European Economic Community (EEC). He also felt that there was little 
point in seeking support from the electorate for an insignificant institution bereft 
of real political power. France finally warned that a low electoral turnout would be 
detrimental to the institution and contrary to the objectives sought. Yet, in reality, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the legislative and supervisory powers of Parliament 
were extended in the usual way. The problems relating to the increase in the powers 
of the European Parliament thus became the subject of several studies such as the 
Vedel Report.
In March 1971, the European Commission set up a working party chaired by 
Georges Vedel, Honorary Dean of Paris University’s Law and Economics Faculty, with 
the aim of considering all the implications of a strengthening of Parliament’s insti-
tutional and budgetary powers. On 25 March 1972, the ad hoc Group of Independent 
Experts published a detailed report. It especially recommended the gradual increase 
of the European Parliament’s legislative powers with a view to its securing genuine 
powers of codecision. The report also proposed that the President of the Commis-
sion, appointed by the Council, should subsequently be invested by Parliament 
before the other Commissioners were appointed. The working party also called for 
the implementation of a system of consultation between the national parliaments 
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and the European Parliament. The Vedel Report came down in favour of elections 
to Parliament by direct universal suffrage yet did not lay down any guidelines for a 
uniform electoral procedure.
It was only in 1974 that the French President Giscard d’Estaing accepted the idea of 
direct elections to Parliament, which he nevertheless associated with the establish-
ment of the European Council, intended to create a genuine European government. At 
the summits held in Brussels on 12–13 July and 20 September 1976, a series of decisions 
were taken to finalise elections by universal suffrage. This option was ratified by all 
the Member States of the Community by a large majority even though, in France, the 
Gaullists and the Communists were radically opposed. The Act of 20 September main-
tained the possibility of a person holding a mandate in the European Parliament as 
well as in a national parliament. It also entrusted Parliament with the task of drawing 
up a draft uniform electoral procedure. The holding of direct elections, originally 
scheduled for May–June 1978, had to be postponed until the requisite authorising 
legislation had been adopted in each of the Member States. On 13 December 1977, for 
example, the House of Commons rejected the system of proportional representation 
by region proposed by the British Government. The first elections to the European 
Parliament by universal suffrage were held on 7 and 10 June 1979. As a result, the 
number of Members of the European Parliament increased from 198 to 410.
The powers of the European Parliament
Unlike national parliaments, the European Parliament, despite being elected by 
universal suffrage, still had no legislative powers. Although the exercise of political 
power had been laid down in the Paris and Rome Treaties and the European Parlia-
ment had enjoyed a certain amount of budgetary power since 1970, the Council of 
Ministers was still the only legislative body of the Community. Parliament therefore 
undertook an in-depth analysis of the Treaty in order to acquire for itself new pow-
ers which were later consolidated in interinstitutional agreements and frequently 
incorporated in the Treaty as formal procedures.
Strengthened by its new democratic legitimacy, the European Parliament hoped 
to extend its role in legislative and even constitutional affairs. These claims were 
voiced at every possible opportunity. In order to draw attention thereto, Members 
increased the number of written and oral parliamentary questions which they tabled 
to the other institutions. The European Parliament ultimately increased its supervi-
sory powers. In this respect, it enjoys a genuine power over the Commission, which 
it has the right to censure, but it does not actually use this potentially destabilising 
instrument. On the other hand, as a corollary of its right to censure, Parliament also 
secured a right of investiture. In practice, the newly appointed Commission therefore 
sets out its programme to Parliament. This procedure was partly enshrined in the 
Solemn Declaration on 
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European Union adopted by the Stuttgart European Council on 19 June 1983. This 
provided for the consultation of the Bureau of the European Parliament before the 
appointment of the President of the Commission. The consultative power of Parlia-
ment was also extended to areas other than those provided for in the Treaties. In a 
communication dated 30 May 1973, the Commission undertook to consult Parliament 
on any draft legislation and on any other non-legislative texts such as programmes 
or declarations.
In budgetary affairs, MEPs are seeking to redesign the budget with a view to 
reducing expenditure on agriculture and increasing the structural funds. The Eu-
ropean Parliament has the power to reject the annual budget and supplementary 
budgets and gives discharge to the Commission with respect to its implementation of 
the budget. It also has an informal power to propose budgetary legislation enabling it 
to launch Community programmes for the benefit of European citizens.
Source: cvce.eu
The European Union | 789 
D
oc
u
m
en
ts
Speech by Peter Kirk to the European Parliament 
(16 January 1973)
In a speech to the European Parliamentary Assembly on 16 January 1973, Brit-
ish Conservative MP Peter Kirk presents a memorandum comprising a number 
of proposals aimed at improving the operation of the Assembly.
It is with a great sense of pride that I speak today as the first citizen of my country 
ever to address this Parliament as a member. My own feelings are necessarily those 
of profound emotion, for it was the European cause more than any other which has 
influenced me throughout 18 years of British parliamentary life, nearly half of them 
spent in our sister assemblies, the Council of Europe and Western European Union.
To me the realisation of Europe has always been a necessity for my country, for 
Europe and for the world. It is, therefore, a matter of great excitement that I should 
have been asked to lead the members of my party here in this Parliament and make 
what contribution I can to the great work which we have to do.
I must warn you, however, Mr President, that not all my colleagues in the British 
Conservative delegation share to the full the enthusiasm which I have just expressed 
for this work. We have thought it right, in submitting the names which both houses 
of our Parliament have unanimously approved, to produce a team which is as repre-
sentative as possible, and we have given due weight, therefore, not only to the various 
regions of our country but also to those sections of opinion in the party who have yet 
to be convinced of the wisdom of the step which we have taken or, indeed, who are 
flatly opposed to it, at least in its present form.
That the British team is not even more fully representative is something which 
I naturally regret, though there is not very much that I or any other Conservative 
can do about it. I do not think it is a gap which will remain unfilled for very long; 
but until it is filled, I fear that quite a large section of British opinion will remain 
unrepresented in this Parliament.
That is itself a pity, for the decisions we shall take here in the immediate future 
are ones which will affect to the full the daily lives of every one of the 50 million 
citizens of our islands. As the legislation flows out from the Commission, not only 
in its normal course of business but in pursuance of the decisions taken at the Sum-
mit Conference last October, the shape of our Community for the next ten years at 
least will begin to form and it is vital that the voice of all our peoples, through their 
representatives here, should be fully heard.
We shall have much to say, particularly on such matters as the Common Agricul-
tural Policy—which still, rightly or wrongly, causes much concern in my country—
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the proposed regional policy from which so many of our people have great expecta-
tions, and the monetary and economic policy which, if it is successful, cannot fail to 
transform our own economic position in the world even more drastically than the 
Community in its present form.
We shall have much to say, too, about the workings of the Parliament, for the health 
of this Parliament is essential to the health of the Community as a whole. The Com-
munity cannot function unless it has a base in the hearts and minds of the peoples, 
and Parliament is the only body which can provide that base. Without an effective 
Parliament our Community is in danger of strangling in bureaucracy or drowning in 
apathy.
Parliament must be made to work for the good not only of ourselves but of the two 
other institutions as well, for if one part of the body is sick it is bound to infect the 
whole.
We have thought long and hard about this, and we realise the inevitable tendency 
of new members to try to change everything to their own liking. That we must resist.
Our Parliament, if it is to have true life, will acquire its own procedures based, we 
hope, on the best that each of our nine constituent Parliaments can provide. Insofar 
as we can contribute to that task we shall do so. It may well be that there are methods 
and procedures in use at Westminster which will be highly relevant and useful here. 
To that end we have drawn up a memorandum, attached to a draft resolution, which I 
have today tabled on behalf of the Conservative group.
We believe from the study we have been able to make that this Parliament should 
seize the opportunity created by enlargement to take a thorough but quick look at 
itself and its relations to the other institutions.
We have therefore proposed that a special committee of 13 members should be 
constituted, charged with this investigation. It would be able to hear evidence from 
anyone it likes, members of national Parliaments as well as this one, parliamentary 
officers, academics and the journalists who report our proceedings. It should report 
back with the minimum of delay, and its report should then be subjected to the fullest 
scrutiny and debate by us before the changes are made. Only in this way, we believe, 
shall we get the type of broad perspective which is so essential. But procedural re-
form, important though it is, is not, and must not be, an end in itself. It can be a real 
snare, giving the illusion of action without the reality. We also wish to press ahead 
with those things which Parliament can do now without any changes in the Treaty.
The more we have examined the situation the more astonished we are at the 
latent power which this Parliament could have if only it would use it. We hope to play 
our part in this, through things like questions, budgetary control and other measures 
some of which we have indicated in the document to which I have referred.
We have given many examples of how we can assume power even if it is not explicit 
in the Treaty. We take as our motto “Silence gives consent” and that we are entitled 
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to do anything which is not expressly prohibited. Let us do that in every area that we 
can find it. The power we have may be a negative one. This has always been so in the 
formative years of parliaments. But it is a real power just the same, and it is there for 
the taking.
If anyone says, “You have not been given the right of initiative”, the answer is 
simple and clear. Initiatives are not there to be given; they are there to be seized. We 
can, and must, seize them.
It is in this spirit that we shall act and it is for this that we have come. Our policy is 
a simple one—power to the Parliament. Our rules must be shaped with that and that 
alone in mind. There must be power over the Commission first because that is implied 
in the Treaty. But we must examine our relations with the Council as well. Here we 
shall need to proceed in closest cooperation with our national Parliaments. The close 
accord between us here and those remaining in Parliaments at home is something 
which needs to be developed with the utmost urgency. By this means this Parliament 
will live and the peoples will clamour to be directly represented in it.
May I end, as I began, on a personal note. As I have said, this day is for me the 
culmination of all of my political life. A quarter of a century ago, as a young student, I 
observed the great congress at The Hague from which all this sprang. It was the dead 
who called us then - the dead of countless battlefields through the ages and particu-
larly those of the two suicidal civil wars which Europe has fought in this century.
They call us still. The voice may be fainter now, the call obscured by the bureauc-
racy, power politics, the sheer frustration which has intervened since that time. But 
the call is still there, and it is for us even more than for the other institutions of the 
Community.
What we then set out to do was penance for their death by the creation of a system 
which would make such madness impossible ever again, a system which would be for 
us, the Europeans, but which we hoped would be an inspiration for the world. Despite 
all of the detours which have taken place, that is still our goal and it is only in and 
through this Parliament that it can be achieved. This is because it is this Parliament 
which gives the Community its uniqueness in the world. There is not, there never has 
been, anything like it. It stands for free discussion and solution by consent, for the 
willingness of the minority to bow to the will of the majority and of the majority to 
allow the minority to be heard to the fullest possible extent.
Only in this way can our problems be solved. Only in this way can the world’s 
problems be solved. In this sense, frail and frustrated though it may appear to be this 
Parliament remains the last best hope of mankind.
Source: cvce.eu
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Otto von Habsburg on the reform of the European Parliament 
(Langenlois, 4 July 1974)
Audio Footage
In 1974, at a conference held in Austria on the economic and political situation 
in Europe, Otto von Habsburg, President of the International Paneuropean 
Union, argues in favour of the election of Members of the European Parliament 
by direct universal suffrage.
Click on the picture to start audio
Source: cvce.eu
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The Evolution of the European Parliament
Georges Spénale 
Former President of the European Parliament
Georges Spénale, President of the European Parliament from 1975 to 1977, out-
lines the evolution of this institution from its first meeting in 1952 until 1977.
1. Introduction
For the past 25 years, the European Parliament has given the people a say in the 
process of European integration. The European Parliament’s origins go back to the 
‘Common Assembly’ of the European Coal and Steel Community; today, however, it is 
increasingly assuming the responsibilities vested in it by the other two 1958 Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and by other agreements concluded between 
the Member States.
Since it first met, on 10 September 1952, Parliament has changed in nearly every 
respect, including its powers. Its membership has risen from 78 to 198. In geographic 
terms, it now encompasses not six but nine European Member States. The supervisory 
power originally conferred on it has changed into a genuine power of participation.
These past 25 years have also been marked by the hope, tinged with idealism, 
that a parliamentary system will be established within the Community and by the 
ambition to further or at least maintain the process of integration, to establish a com-
munity of peoples based on solidarity. The European Parliament has never given up 
that ambition or been content with any lesser achievement.
The most marked change for Parliament—direct elections, together with a rise 
in its membership to 410 MEPs—opens this new period. In formal terms, direct 
elections will have less effect on the Treaties establishing the Communities than, for 
example, the replacement in 1958,1 of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and 
Steel Community by a Parliament whose remit extended to all three Communities. 
Politically, however, this signals a new dimension for Parliament, the implications 
of which we cannot, at this point, fully assess. The Council Decision of 20 September 
1976 on the holding of direct elections therefore constitutes, above all, a courageous 
step forward to a new stage that everybody agrees is most important although, as I 
1 Cf. Article 2 of the Convention on certain institutions common to the European Communi-
ties: ‘Upon taking up its duties, the single Assembly referred to in Article 1 shall take the 
place of the Common Assembly provided for in Article 21 of the Treaty
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said, it is impossible fully to assess all its implications. This courage is characteristic 
of an organisation that is alive and dynamic.
A brief look at the European Parliament as it was and as it may become may 
provide an opportunity for a fruitful dialogue between knowledge and aspiration, 
between the past and the future.
[…]
2. About the European Parliament, past and present
(a) However logical it may seem, the establishment of a multinational community 
made up only of parliamentary democracies, and, in particular, the election of a Par-
liament that can work efficiently, is still not something to be taken for granted.
This is a pity, because it makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to 
identify with the
Community of which they form part and which affects their lives. Today, it is 
regarded as inevitable that powers must to some extent be distributed between 
the States and the international organisations. On the whole, however, we still are 
still not sure what forms are most appropriate or how they should relate to existing 
national institutions. This is particularly true of the Parliaments. There we still find 
some reservations, whose origins lie in history: in some Member States—France and 
the United Kingdom in particular—Parliament is regarded as the expression of a 
sovereignty that is felt to be exclusive and indivisible.
The creation of a multinational Parliament also means taking a fresh look at the 
doctrine of sovereignty based on the absolute power of the State, while the devel-
opment of international governmental bodies seems to have far less impact on the 
actual foundations of the State because governments are in a sense derived bodies, 
subject to national supervision and with no aspirations towards sovereignty.
Aside from the direct implementation of Community law, the most striking fea-
ture of the Communities compared with any other international organisation is the 
integration as of now in the European Coal and Steel Community, in the European 
Economic Community and in the European Atomic Energy Community of a European 
Parliament that is likely to continue developing.
The authors of the Treaties realised from the outset that, at a certain point, the 
Community would be unable to move ahead without the active participation of the 
peoples of the Member States. But before it could consolidate its position in the Com-
munities, Parliament had to allay the distrust born of the traditional primacy of the 
Executive in cooperation between States. It also had to determine where it stood in 
relation to the Member State parliaments, which traditionally aspire to exclusive 
sovereignty.
Notwithstanding these obstacles and the fact that its role is doubly limited by 
the Treaties (Parliament has limited powers in the framework of the Communities’ 
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limited powers), the role of the European Parliament must be seen in relation to the 
political objective of the EC Treaties, as set out in the Preamble2 and confirmed by 
subsequent summit conferences.3 But the very weakness of its initial position meant 
that Parliament had to prove that it was dynamic, improve its position and, in so do-
ing, help transform the Community into a political union.
(b) During the period immediately after its first meeting, in 1952, the Common As-
sembly defined the future forms of European cooperation and Parliament’s role in 
a European constitution. The Foreign Ministers of the Member States, anticipating 
the wording of Article 138 of the EEC Treaty, instructed Parliament as an ‘ad hoc As-
sembly’ to draw up a draft constitution.
Today, this text is still the main model for overall political cooperation between 
the Member States. It also reflects the way Parliament envisages its own future.
The Parliament (of the Six) was to consist of two Chambers, a Chamber of Repre-
sentatives elected by direct universal suffrage and a Senate made up of representa-
tives of the national parliaments.
It was to have full legislative powers: the adoption of a law would have required a 
simple majority of both Chambers.
Parliament was also to obtain a right to propose legislation, a right of scrutiny and 
a say on the membership of the Executive.
This draft constitution may not have gone beyond theory, but it is still taken as a 
model for the broad outlines of the institutional debates on the subject: Parliament 
is not relaxing its efforts to achieve, in particular, the implementation of the two key 
proposals: direct elections and legislative power.
To that end, Parliament has hitherto applied two distinct methods:
• it has sought to extend its powers and use them more effectively by consulting 
with the other institutions;
• it has sought amendments to the Treaties.
Parliament’s authority today, as opposed to the early days, is founded mainly on 
its application of these two methods.
Aside from this, the summit conferences have, however informally, assigned 
Parliament new tasks.
2 The Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community provides 
as follows: ‘Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential inter-
ests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper 
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for 
institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared …’
3 Final declarations of the summit conferences of 18 July 1961, paragraph 1, and 2 December 
1969, paragraph 4.
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Following the failure of the great 1953 project for a constitution, the Common As-
sembly concentrated on improving the practical exercise of the powers conferred on 
it by the Treaties. Two particular achievements in this respect were the Commission’s 
declarations of principle to Parliament and the exchanges of view between the Coun-
cil and Parliament held on a regular basis—although neither was formally provided 
for under the Treaties.4
Immediately after its first sitting, the new Parliament of the three Communi-
ties set out to seek a major qualitative amendment to the Treaties on the question 
of direct elections. At first, the preparations made by the working party chaired by 
Fernand Dehoussse proved fruitless. On 17 May 1960, however, Parliament adopted a 
new resolution that can now be said to have marked the starting point of its further 
development.
In it, the Assembly affirmed the urgent need to expand its powers so that it could 
carry out the tasks of a genuine Parliament, including, in particular, a degree of legis-
lative power and powers of political and budgetary control.5
Parliament was being less demanding now than in 1953, when it called for full 
legislative power: in 1960, it had to admit that legislative power in fact resided with 
the Council of Ministers.
Later, Parliament further contained — and defined — its aspirations to exercise 
legislative power: in the Furler report6 (1963), it called only for a power of codecision, 
a call repeated in the report on European Union7 (1975).
In the meantime, certain procedures had actually been adopted in the budgetary 
field (‘conciliation procedure’)8, which paved the way for codecision. At their summit 
conference in December 1974, the Heads of State or Government broke new ground 
by declaring that the Assembly’s powers would be strengthened, in particular by the 
conferring on it of certain powers in the Communities’ legislative process.
Given the obstacles which prevented it from securing legislative power, however 
limited, Parliament directed its efforts at two other aspects: firstly at strengthening 
its quantitative influence — failing any qualitative improvement — and secondly at 
the budgetary procedure.
(c) Parliament managed to take on a wider range of tasks at a fairly early stage. In 
1952–53, it was instructed to draw up the statutes of the European Community as an 
‘ad hoc Assembly’.
4 Cf. Wigny report ‘The Parliamentary Assembly in the Europe of the Six’, adopted on 28 
February 1958, doc. 14/58.
5 Resolution of 17 May 1960, OJ of 1960, p. 840.
6 Doc. 31/1963–64; resolution of 27 June 1963.
7 Resolution of 10 July 1975, OJ C 179, 6.8.1975, p. 28.
8 See pp. 10 and 11.
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The declaration of the Heads of State or Government of 18 July 1961 went even 
further: it invited the European Parliament to extend the scope of its deliberations 
to new areas, with the cooperation of the governments. These new areas had already 
been defined:
• the development of political union;
• education, culture and research.
Along similar lines, the 1972 summit conference instructed the European Parlia-
ment to put forward proposals on a European Union.
Parliament, like the other institutions, did as requested.
This means that Parliament was never refused the right to consider the various is-
sues relating to political union, even though this did not fall expressly within its remit 
under the Treaties. As political cooperation developed between the Member States, 
procedures were defined for involving the European Parliament in that cooperation. 
They include the reports of the President of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, the 
colloquies with the Political Committee, replies to questions about cooperation and 
a possible say on the definition of foreign policy, for it was agreed that the Political 
Committee (a body made up of the Foreign Ministries’ political officials) would draw 
the Ministers’ attention to the foreign policy proposals adopted by the Assembly.9
The increase in the range of Parliament’s tasks included an increase, over and 
above what was provided for in the Treaties, in the number of proposals on which the 
Council consults Parliament. The normal legislative procedure now came very close 
to complying with Parliament’s call in 1968 to be consulted on all proposals involving 
a political decision.
In regard to trade agreements and association agreements, the procedure for 
involving Parliament has not yet been fully clarified.
Yet the principle of participation is not in question: Parliament’s right to scruti-
nise trade agreements, in particular, shows that it is well on the way to acquiring real 
powers in certain specific cases, while national parliaments are still far from having 
the right to scrutinise agreements of this kind.
Aside from acquiring greater powers in general, the European Parliament has 
particularly improved its position in regard to the budget.
The right to decide on the budget is regarded as the key measure of parliamentary 
power.
In accordance with the democratic principles shared by the Member States, the 
creation of own resources provided for under the Treaties (Article 201 of the EEC 
Treaty) meant that Parliament would acquire greater powers of control and decision-
9 Report of the Foreign Ministers on political cooperation , Copenhagen, 23 July 1973, Part 2, 
paragraph 10.
798 | European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges
making at Community level. Most national parliaments soon realised that the rather 
summary formula for transferring powers to the European Communities could not 
in itself explain or justify the loss of parliamentary influence on some of their public 
revenue.
The Community’s revenue would in fact have come under the control of the 
Council, i.e. of the national Executives, had Parliament’s powers not been increased 
at that time. This was soon realised, and it was therefore decided to focus the debates 
concerning the strengthening of Parliament’s powers on budgetary issues; indeed 
parliamentary influence, i.e. democracy at national level, would have been weakened 
if the national parliaments’ loss of power had not been offset by a strengthening of 
the European Parliament’s powers.
We do not propose to trace the development of the European Parliament’s budget-
ary power from the time of the Treaties establishing the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom, 
via the Commission’s 1965 proposals on giving it wider powers, to the Treaties of 22 
April 1970 and 22 July 1975.
We shall merely recall two very important factors. First of all, the Communities’ 
budget can be established only by close cooperation between Parliament, the Com-
mission and the Council. Secondly, now that Parliament has obtained the right to 
reject the budget as a whole, to decide on expenditure that does not increase the total 
amount of budgetary expenditure and to take the final decision on non-compulsory 
expenditure, it has acquired powers equivalent to those of the Member State parlia-
ments.
At the same time, budgetary power cannot be dissociated from general legislative 
power, which still falls within the Council’s remit.
Parliament has never lost sight of that fact. It sees the increase in its budgetary 
powers as a part of its longterm strategy for obtaining legislative powers.10
(d) The new budgetary procedure includes two aspects that can help Parliament 
achieve its objectives. Firstly, in itself the new procedure serves as a model for 
decisions in respect of which responsibility is shared. This shared responsibility is 
defined in a Council resolution of 20 April 1970, which expressly provides for close 
cooperation between the Council and Parliament on budgetary expenditure. In 
practice, this resolution forms the basis for many of the meetings held between the 
Council and parliamentary delegations during the budgetary procedure.
In another resolution dated the same day, the Council undertook to cooperate 
closely with Parliament on the adoption of legal acts with financial implications. 
Aware that the budgetary powers which Parliament exercises under the provisions of 
10 Cf. European Parliament resolution of 13 May 1970, OJ C 65, 5.6.1970, p. 33, paragraphs 7 
and 8.
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the Treaties are meaningless unless Parliament also has some influence on the legal 
acts on which they are based, the Council declared for the first time that it was will-
ing to improve Parliament’s qualitative right to be consulted. This decision, which 
dates back to 1970, has since been consolidated by the joint declaration of the Council, 
Commission and Parliament of 4 March 197511 on the conciliation procedure.
Under the terms of that declaration, if the Council and Parliament have different 
opinions on acts of a general scope with major financial implications, they must en-
deavour to seek agreement through a conciliation procedure.
3. Summary
To summarise this brief look at the way in which the European Parliament’s powers 
of influence have changed, we could say that, since the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, the European Parliament has acquired far more powers and 
responsibilities than were initially provided for under the Treaties.
There were many ways by which it achieved this: wide use of the possibilities 
provided for by the Treaties; agreements concluded between the institutions; 
intergovernmental agreements and amendments to the Treaties. To date, the real 
motive force has been the dynamic way in which Parliament has responded to the 
requirements of democracy and involved the peoples of the European Community in 
the development of democracy.
The Council Decision of 20 September 1976 on the holding of direct elections in 
1978 marks the successful conclusion of this endeavour.
Over the years, Parliament had worked constantly towards that decision. The first 
draft Treaty dating from 1960 may have been forgotten because of a certain amount 
of opposition to it; subsequently, the forces for change concentrated mainly on the 
problems arising from the enlargement of the Community. Not until 1970 could Par-
liament start putting forward new proposals and the Council draft new provisions.
Direct elections will allow the citizens to decide directly and for themselves about 
the political future of the Community.
So the Community will finally be satisfying the basic requirement of any demo-
cratic organisation. Another reason why direct elections are urgently needed is that 
Parliament’s newly acquired powers will need direct legitimation, which can be pro-
vided only by representatives who may devote themselves to the European Parlia-
ment without any constraints whatsoever. A Parliament equipped with substantially 
wider responsibilities and powers and legitimised by the will of the peoples of Europe 
will be in a position to help resolve the most urgent problems facing the citizens of 
Europe.
11 OJ C 89, 22.4.1975, p. 1.
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This is a contribution it can make only within the framework of the Communi-
ties and in liaison with the other European Community bodies. The events we have 
briefly described do, however, give Parliament a political authority that the other 
institutions have to respect.
At the end of a long and determined process, elections by direct universal suffrage 
will bring to Parliament, now equipped with real powers, the vital political force it 
needs.
It will be a big change when the peoples of Europe enter the Community, when the 
People’s Europe consolidates the Europe of the States.
It was a long road.
In the end, however, there will be no turning back: nobody will ever be able to 
undo what the people, who are clearly involved in this process, want to do.
Source: cvce.eu
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European Elections 2014
As the only EU body directly elected by EU voters, the Parliament represents 
the EU’s 500 million inhabitants. It is one of the EU’s main law-making 
institutions, along with the Council of the European Union, which represents 
the governments of the EU member countries.
Source of the graph: europa.eu
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For further information on the European Parliament visit europarl.europa.eu
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The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013
The new agreement on CAP reform reached in 2013 is the fruit of three years of re-
flection, discussion and intensive negotiation. While continuing on the path of reform 
started in the early ‘90’s this deal is historic in many respects; for the first time the 
entire CAP was reviewed all at once and the European Parliament acted as colegisla-
tor with the Council.
The new CAP maintains the two pillars, but increases the links between them, 
thus offering a more holistic and integrated approach to policy support. Specifically 
it introduces a new architecture of direct payments; better targeted, more equitable 
and greener, an enhanced safety net and strengthened rural development. As a result 
it is adapted to meet the challenges ahead by being more efficient and contributing to 
a more competitive and sustainable EU agriculture. This Brief gives an overview of 
the reform and outlines the “why and how” of the new CAP 2014-2020. 
Introduction
The CAP reform started more than 3 years ago in 2010 with a public debate, followed 
by the publication of the Commission’s Communication on its vision of agriculture and 
the challenges and priorities for the future CAP1  and finally by legislative proposals2 
for the first ever overhaul of the entire policy. The decision-making process differed 
from previous reforms, with the European Parliament for the first time acting as co-
legislator with the Council.
It also took place in the framework of the discussions on the overall EU budgetary 
framework for 2014-2020, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which 
provides for the funds at the disposal of the EU including the CAP. After intensive 
negotiations, in 2013 a deal was secured both on the CAP and the MFF. The new CAP 
2014-2020 agreed by the Council and the European Parliament retains most of the 
essential objectives and approaches proposed by the Commission, albeit with a lower 
budget than proposed by the Commission. 
Challenges & Objectives 
The new CAP builds on past reforms to meet new challenges and objectives
For more than twenty years, starting in 1992, the CAP has been through successive 
reforms which have increased market orientation for agriculture while providing in-
come support and safety net mechanisms for producers, improved the integration of 
environmental requirements and reinforced support for rural development across 
the EU. 
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The new policy continues along this reform path, moving from product to producer 
support and now to a more land-based approach. This is in response to the challenges 
facing the sector, many of which are driven by factors that are external to agriculture. 
These have been identified as economic (including food security and globalisa-
tion, a declining rate of productivity growth, price volatility, pressures on production 
costs due to high input prices and the deteriorating position of farmers in the food 
supply chain), environmental (relating to resource efficiency, soil and water quality 
and threats to habitats and biodiversity) and territorial (where rural areas are faced 
with demographic, economic and social developments including depopulation and 
relocation of businesses). 
Since the role of the CAP is to provide a policy framework that supports and en-
courages producers to address these challenges while remaining coherent with other 
EU policies, this translates into three long-term CAP objectives: viable food produc-
tion, sustainable management of natural resources and climate action and balanced 
territorial development.
To achieve these long-term goals, the existing CAP instruments had to be adapted. 
The reform therefore focused on the operational objectives of delivering more effec-
tive policy instruments, designed to improve the competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector and its sustainability over the long term (Chart 1). 
Chart 1. The CAP post-2013: From challenges to reform objectives 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
In short, EU agriculture needs to attain higher levels of production of safe and 
quality food, while preserving the natural resources that agricultural productivity 
depends upon. 
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This can only be achieved by a competitive and viable agricultural sector operat-
ing within a properly functioning supply chain and which contributes to the main-
tenance of a thriving rural economy. In addition, to achieve these long-term goals, 
better targeting of the available CAP budget will be needed.
CAP Budget
What amounts will be available for the new CAP? 
The amounts for the CAP agreed under the new EU multiannual financial framework 
for 2014-2020 are outlined in the table below. The Commission had proposed that, 
in nominal terms, the amounts for both pillars of the CAP for 2014-2020 would be 
frozen at the level of 2013. In real terms CAP funding will decrease compared to the 
current period. Compared to the Commission proposal, the amount for pillar 1 was 
cut by 1.8% and for pillar 2 by 7.6% (in 2011 prices). 
This means a total amount of EUR 362.787 billion for 2014-2020, of which EUR 
277.851 billion is foreseen for Direct Payments and market-related expenditure (Pil-
lar 1) and EUR 84.936 billion for Rural Development (Pillar 2) in 2011 prices. Yet, 
within the current economic and financial climate, these amounts within the MFF 
show continued strong support for an ambitious agricultural policy which represents 
37.8% of the entire ceiling for the period 2014-2020. 
Table 1. MFF Ceiling 2014-2020 (in billion EUR) 
2014-2020 Ceiling 
(Current prices)
2014-2020 Ceiling 
(2011 prices)
Pillar 1 312,74 277.85
Pillar 2 95,58 84,94
Total CAP 408,31 362,79
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development
4. Evolution of Policy and Spending 
The radical change in the orientation of the CAP is demonstrated by the evolution of 
expenditure, echoing the policy shift since 19923, away from product based support 
towards producer support and considerations for the environment (Chart 2). 
In 1992 market management represented over 90% of total CAP expenditure, 
driven by export refunds and intervention purchases. By the end of 2013 it dropped 
to just 5% as market intervention has become a safety net tool for times of crisis and 
direct payments are the major source of support; 94% of which are decoupled from 
production. 
From 2014 onwards, the allocation of direct payments dedicated to coupled 
support, young farmers, small farmers, etc. will depend upon the choices made by 
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Member States. Furthermore the share of expenditure between pillars may change 
in 2014-2020, with the possibility to transfer up to 15% of their national envelopes 
between pillars (as shown in the chart)4, enabling Member States to better target 
spending to their specific priorities.
Chart 2. The path of CAP expenditure by calendar year (in current prices) 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development
New Features of the CAP
Past reforms have led to step changes in the CAP and this one is no exception. It rep-
resents another milestone in the CAP’s history placing the joint provision of public 
and private goods at the core of policy. Farmers should be rewarded for the services 
they deliver to the wider public, such as landscapes, farmland biodiversity, climate 
stability even though they have no market value. Therefore, a new policy instrument 
of the first pillar (greening) is directed to the provision of environmental public 
goods, which constitutes a major change in the policy framework. 
The new CAP design is also more efficient, targeted and coherent. It is based on a 
more holistic approach to policy support through the maintenance of the existing two 
pillar structure but in a more targeted, integrated and complementary way. Both 
pillars of the CAP are aimed at meeting all three CAP objectives more effectively, with 
better targeted instruments of the first pillar complemented by regionally tailor-
made and voluntary measures of the second pillar. 
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There is new flexibility for Member States in the budgeting and implementation of 
first Pillar instruments, acknowledging the wide diversity of agriculture, agronomic 
production potential and climatic, environmental as well as socio-economic condi-
tions and needs across the EU.
This flexibility will however be framed by well-defined regulatory and budget-
ary limits in order to ensure a level-playing field at European level and that common 
objectives are met. In this area Member States share the responsibility to strike the 
right balance between possible benefits and the burdens of red tape for producers as 
well as for administration and controls. 
How the Key Objectives of the Reform are Addressed 
To achieve the long-term goals for the CAP, the reform focuses on the competitiveness 
and sustainability of the agricultural sector by improving the targeting and efficiency 
of policy instruments. How the new policy framework addresses each of these issues 
is explored below. 
Enhanced competitiveness of EU agriculture 
The objective of past reforms to enhance the market orientation of EU agriculture is 
continued by adapting the policy instruments to further encourage farmers to base 
their production decisions on market signals. 
Competitiveness is addressed directly by changes to market mechanisms, par-
ticularly the removal of production constraints. All of the existing restrictions on 
production volumes for sugar, dairy and the wine sector will end, allowing farmers 
to respond to growing world demand.5 Some outdated commodity aid schemes will 
also be abolished, and other schemes modernised. 
Measures to facilitate producer cooperation under both pillars of the CAP should 
also boost the competitiveness of farming by reducing costs, improving access to 
credit and adding value to the primary sector. The reinforced legal framework for 
Producer Organisations6 is backed by financial incentives under the second pillar. 
This includes support for setting up producer groups as well as short supply chains 
and cooperation. Together these instruments are expected to encourage producer 
cooperation and to improve the functioning of the food chain. Product differentia-
tion, quality programs, promotion and on-farm processing should also add value.7 
Other instruments under the second pillar which enhance competiveness at farm 
level include restructuring and modernisation measures as well as start-up aid for 
young farmers. Furthermore, there is a focus on bridging the gap between science 
and practice via the Farm Advisory System, as well as training and innovation8 pro-
grammes. These instruments are aimed at helping the farm sector to adapt to new 
trends and technologies, thus becoming more resource efficient, cost effective and 
capable of adapting to emerging challenges. 
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At the same time the new CAP also offers more responsive safety net measures and 
strengthens the EU’s capacity for crisis management. This will be achieved by more 
efficient market measures to deal with potential threats of market disturbances and 
more flexible exceptional measures. 
A new crisis reserve (of EUR 400 million per year in 2011 prices) is established 
to secure the financial resources needed in case of crisis, through deductions from 
direct payments, with unused amounts reimbursed to farmers in the consecutive 
budget years.
In addition, the second pillar offers a new risk-management toolkit including in-
surance schemes for crops, animals and plants, as well as mutual funds and an income 
stabilisation tool. A more sustainable EU agriculture Given the pressure on natural 
resources, agriculture has to improve its environmental performance through more 
sustainable production methods. Farmers also have to adapt to challenges stemming 
from changes to the climate by pursuing climate change mitigation and adaption ac-
tions (e.g. by developing greater resilience to disasters such as flooding, drought and 
fire). Improved sustainability will be achieved by the combined and complementary 
effects of various instruments (Chart 3). 
Chart 3. The new greening architecture of the CAP 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development
Firstly there is a simplified and more targeted cross-compliance, representing the 
compulsory basic layer of environmental requirements and obligations to be met in 
order to receive full CAP funding.
On top of this, from 2015 onwards, the CAP introduces a new policy instrument in 
Pillar 1, the Green Direct Payment. 
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This accounts for 30% of the national direct payment envelope and rewards farm-
ers for respecting three obligatory agricultural practices, namely maintenance of 
permanent grassland, ecological focus areas and crop diversification. As the green 
direct payment is compulsory it has the advantage of introducing practices that are 
beneficial for the environment and climate on most of the utilised agricultural area. 
Building on these compulsory elements, rural development will continue to play 
a pivotal role in achieving the CAPs environmental objectives and in combating cli-
mate change. The focus of the second pillar on sustainability is clearly visible by the 
fact that at least 30% of the budget of each Rural Development programme must be 
reserved for voluntary measures that are beneficial for the environment and climate 
change. These include agri-environmental-climate measures, organic farming, Areas 
of Natural Constraints (ANC), Natura 2000 areas, forestry measures and investments 
which are beneficial for the environment or climate. All these measures contribute 
significantly to environmental enhancement and climate change because they are 
adapted to local needs.
This whole set of complementary policy instruments is accompanied by related 
training measures and other support from the Farm Advisory System, insights gained 
from the Innovation Partnership and applied research, which should help farmers to 
implement appropriate solutions for their specific situations. 
A more effective and efficient CAP: 
…through more targeted and equitable direct payments 
Within a more restricted budgetary framework, it is crucial that scarce resources 
are distributed in a way that maximises the attainment of the CAP’s objectives. The 
effectiveness and efficiency of the CAP is enhanced by a better targeting of support, 
a more equitable distribution of payments across and within Member States and a 
strategic approach to spending. 
Firstly direct payments are better targeted by limiting support to those who are 
actively engaged in agricultural activities. On top of the Basic Payment (see Chart 4), 
the green direct payment and possible additional support for ANCs will contribute 
to specific environmental and territorial objectives. Faced with an ageing farming 
population (only 14% of EU farmers are under 40 years of age), from 2015, all young 
farmers entering the sector will have the opportunity to get an additional first pillar 
payment, which can still be complemented by a start-up aid under the second pillar. 
Member States also have the option to further target direct payments through 
other optional schemes. A redistributive payment can be attributed to the first 
hectares of the farms, to provide more targeted support to small and medium-sized 
farms. A specific and simplified support scheme for small farmers will substantially 
facilitate their access to direct payments and reduce their administrative burden. 
Member States may also grant limited coupled support to secure the future of poten-
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tially vulnerable sectors. The flexibility offered to Member States to implement the 
new direct payments means that the share of funding allocated to different schemes 
can potentially vary significantly throughout the EU. 
Chart 4. The new design of direct payments (and share of direct payments envelope)
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Chart 5. Changes in the Distribution of Direct Payments 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
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The performance of the CAP will also benefit from a more balanced, transparent 
and more equitable distribution of direct payments among countries and among 
farmers. The reduction in disparities of the level of direct payments between Member 
States, known as external convergence, will reinforce the credibility and legitimacy 
of the support system at EU level. The level of direct payments per hectare, which 
is currently based on historic parameters in many countries, will be progressively 
adjusted with the introduction of a minimum national average direct payment per 
hectare across all Member States by 2020. 
Chart 5 provides an illustration of the changes in the distribution of average 
national payments per hectare by 20209, compared to the status quo (“baseline”). 
This is mirrored by internal convergence within the Member States. Payments will 
no longer be based on uneven historical references of more than a decade ago but rather 
on a fairer and more converging per hectare payment at national or regional level. 
In addition Member States will have further possibilities to rebalance payments 
with the introduction of the redistributive payment, voluntary capping and degres-
sivity (reduction) of payments, beyond the mandatory cuts which will apply to the 
Basic Payment above a certain threshold. 
…and a more strategic approach to RD spending 
The key characteristics of the architecture of the EU Rural development policy remain 
untouched by the reform. As in the past, it will be implemented through national 
and/or regional rural development programs(RDP’s) which, for a seven-year period, 
set out the actions to be undertaken and the corresponding allocation of funding for 
these measures. 
Chart 6. Rural Development Priorities
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development 
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However this reform also aims to improve the policy, firstly by strengthening its 
strategic approach. Member States will have to build their RDP’s based upon at least 
four of the six common EU priorities (Chart 6).
Furthermore, now more than ever, the common objectives and interactions be-
tween the two pillars are being strengthened. 
The key areas of common approach are shown in Chart 7. The two pillars will also 
interact in financial terms, with possible transfers between both and rules to prevent 
double-funding. 
Member State will need to make sure that a possible transfer from the second to 
the first pillar does not inhibit a strong Rural Development policy in its territory. 
Chart 7. Actions targeted under both Pillars
*Only main measures that target the specific issue under Pillar 2 are mentioned. 
 Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
In addition, for the first time a common and coherent overall EU policy framework 
is established for all European Structural and Investment (ESI) funds including EA-
FRD10 to improve co-ordination between them and strengthen the complementarity 
of the different programs. To this end Member States will have to prepare Partnership 
Agreements, followed by the corresponding programmes, based on common priori-
ties and targets set for 2020. 
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Next Steps
The 2013 reform is potentially one of the most significant ever undertaken. In the 
coming months important decisions will be taken at EU level to implement the 
new CAP. For Member States, in addition to drafting their new Rural Development 
programmes, they will also have important choices to make concerning the Direct 
Payment schemes in time for implementation from January 2015. 
The list is long - transfers between pillars, capping and degressivity, regional im-
plementation of the Basic Payment Scheme, internal convergence, greening equiva-
lence, young farmers and the optional schemes (redistributive payment, coupled 
support and for ANCs) as well as the approach towards sectorial cooperation and 
contracts. 
The challenge will be to strike the right balance between effectiveness and ef-
ficiency and keeping the rules as simple as possible. In taking these key decisions 
Member States have a responsibility to make the most of the opportunities offered by 
the reform to set out future strategies for their agricultural sectors that will ensure 
their competiveness and sustainability over the long-term. 
Notes
1 Commission Communication on the CAP towards 2020, COM(2010) 672 final 
2 The Commission tabled four legislative proposals on Direct Payments, Rural 
Development, the single Common Market Organisation and horizontal aspects of 
the CAP, based on an Impact Assessment and extensive consultation with citizens 
and stakeholders
3 Chart 2 shows CAP actual payments from 1990- 2012, commitments for 2013 and 
the new MFF ceiling from 2014-2020. 
4 Member States below 90% average Pillar 1 payments/ha may transfer up to 25% 
from Pillar 2 to Pillar 1.
5 It was already decided in the Health Check that dairy quotas will expire in 2015 
and the 2007 reform of the wine sector laid down the end to the planting rights 
system for 2018 at the latest. Sugar quotas will be abolished in 2017. 
6 The legal framework extends the possibility for collective bargaining (in some 
sectors) and delivery contracts (for all sectors) to Producer Organisations, their 
Associations and Inter Branch Organisations and also introduces temporary 
exemption from certain competition rules (e.g. market withdrawal or storage by 
private operators) in periods of severe market imbalance, subject to safeguards.
7 In parallel to the changes introduced by the new CAP, a High Level Group for a 
Better Functioning Food Supply Chain has been established with the aim of im-
proving the functioning of the food supply chain. 
8 This includes initiatives undertaken by the new European Innovation Partnership 
“Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability”.
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9 This takes account of the budget cut and external convergence and is based on 
potential eligible land in 2009. Actual payments per hectare will depend on the 
number of hectares on which claims are made. The baseline is where MS would 
have been in 2020, had there been no external convergence and no budget cut 
based on the Commission’s MFF proposal.
10 EAFRD: European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
Source: Europa.eu
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The EU for its Citizens
European years
In 2014 various projects linked with the 2013 European Year of Citizens will 
continue. These will include a particular focus on European Parliament elections and 
democratic participation.
2014 is a chance for citizens—especially the young—to take part in events and 
workshops focusing on how to exercise their rights in EU democratic processes. 
A European Year – every year since 1983
The very first European Year, in 1983, was dedicated to small business („SMEs”) and 
craft industry. Every year since, the EU has chosen a specific subject to encourage 
debate and dialogue within and between European countries.
The aim is to raise awareness of certain topics, encourage debate and change at-
titudes. During many European years, extra funding is provided for local, national 
and cross-border projects that address the Year’s special topic.
The European Year can also send a strong commitment and political signal from 
the EU institutions and member governments that the subject will be taken into 
consideration in future policy-making. In some cases, the European Commission may 
propose new legislation on the theme.
The theme of a European Year is proposed by the Commission and adopted by the 
European Parliament and EU member governments.
List of European Years
2013 - European year of citizens
2012 - European year for active ageing
2011 - European year of volunteering
2010 - European year for combating poverty & social exclusion
2009 - European year of creativity & innovation
2008 - European year of intercultural dialogue
2007 - European year of equal opportunities for all
2006 - European year of workers’ mobility
2005 - European year of citizenship through education
2004 - European year of education through sport
2003 - European year of people with disabilities
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2001 - European year of languages
1999 - European year of action to combat violence against women
1998 - European year of local & regional democracy
1997 - European year against racism & xenophobia
1996 - European year of lifelong learning
1995 - European year of road safety & young drivers
1994 - European year of nutrition & health
1993 - European year of the elderly & solidarity between generations
1992 - European year of safety, hygiene & health protection at work  
1990 - European year of tourism
1989 - European year of information on cancer
1988 - European year of cinema & television
1987 - European year of the environment
1986 - European year of road safety
1985 - European year of music
1984 - European year for a people’s Europe
1983 - European year of SMEs & the craft industry
The European Year of Citizens 2013 was dedicated to the rights that come with EU 
citizenship. In 2014, we will continue some of the activities of the European Year of 
Citizens, this time with more of a focus on the European elections (due to take place 
between 22 to 25 May). Over this year, we will encourage dialogue between all levels 
of government, civil society and business at events and conferences around Europe to 
discuss notably the importance of both representative and participatory democracy 
in the European Union and inform on the existing tools to better participate in the 
European democratic process.
Click on the picture to check the forthcoming events
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Your rights country by country
Click on the picture to visit the website where you can find out your rights country by 
country. On the website just click on the flag/country you would like to check!
Click on the picture to check your rights country by country
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Learning in the European Union
16 Billion Euro worth of scholarships available in Europe
Financing your studies becomes especially important when you decide to study 
abroad and unfortunately, financial constraints are the primary reason for students 
not to study abroad. Studying abroad in Europe doesnt necessarily mean though, that 
you need a bulging wallet or pile up loans. Alone in Europe, there are nearly 16 Billion 
Euro worth of scholarships available every year!
There are many different kinds of funding for your studies besides a classical 
scholarship. Government grants, prizes, studentships, competitions, fellowships and 
others might be also a good option for you and sometimes, it is not your GPA that 
counts!
Also if you are not a EU citizen, you will be eligible for hundreds of scholarships 
and other financing opportunities! Some scholarships are even made especially for 
people from outside of the European Union or from a specific country.
Since Europe’s higher education system is a diverse conglomeration of different 
organisations and institutions on European, national, regional and institutional level, 
scholarships are quite scattered. That makes them really difficult to find. However, a 
website called ScholarshipPortal is solving this problem by providing you a central-
ised platform where you can search among over 1000 scholarships if there is the right 
scholarship for you!
Click on the picture below to GET YOUR SCHOLARSHIP!
Click on the picture to get your scholarship
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Strategic framework – Education & Training 2020
What is the EU’s role in education & training?
Each EU country is responsible for its own education and training systems, so EU 
policy is designed to support national action and help address common challenges, 
such as ageing societies, skills deficits in the workforce, and global competition.
The EU offers a forum for exchange of best practices, gathering and dissemination 
of information and statistics, as well as advice and support for policy reforms. Fund-
ing is also available for activities that promote learning and education at all levels 
and for all age groups.
Through the strategic framework for education and training, EU countries have 
identified four common objectives to address these challenges by 2020:
• Making lifelong learning and mobility a reality;
• Improving the quality and efficiency  of education and training;
• Promoting equity, social cohesion, and active citizenship;
• Enhancing creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of 
education and training.
What has been done so far?
The following EU benchmarks for 2020 have been set for education:
• At least 95% of children (from 4 to compulsory school age) should participate in 
early childhood education;
• fewer than 15% of 15-year-olds should be under-skilled in reading, mathematics 
and science;
• fewer than 10% of young people should drop out of education and training;
• at least 40% of people aged 30-34 should have completed some form of higher 
education;
• at least 15% of adults should participate in lifelong learning;
• at least 20% of higher education graduates and 6% of 18-34 year-olds with an 
initial vocational qualification should have spent some time studying or training 
abroad;
• the share of employed graduates (20-34 year-olds having successfully completed 
upper secondary or tertiary education) having left education 1-3 years ago should 
be at least 82%.
Progress on these benchmarks is assessed in each EU country through a yearly 
country analysis, with the EU also providing recommendations.
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Erasmus+
Erasmus+  is the EU’s new programme for boosting skills and employability through 
education, training, youth , and sport. Between 2014-2020 the programme will pro-
vide opportunities for over 4 million Europeans to study, train, gain work experience, 
and volunteer  abroad.
In the field of education and training, the Erasmus initiative is renowned for the 
opportunities it provides students to learn abroad, as well as the opportunities it 
provides for teaching staff in higher education.
Building on these, the Erasmus+ programme now covers five major areas of edu-
cation and training:
• School education opportunities for staff and institutions;
• Vocational education and training opportunities for students, apprentices, train-
ees, staff, institutions, and business;
• Higher Education opportunities for students, staff, institutions, and businesses;
• Adult Education opportunities for staff, institutions, and businesses;
• European Integration opportunities for academic and research staff and institu-
tions.
Source: ec.europa.eu

